Search results for 'backaward induction in indefinitely long games' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Magnus Jiborn & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2003). Reconsidering the Foole's Rejoinder: Backward Induction in Indefinitely Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas. Synthese 136 (2):135 - 157.score: 2391.0
    According to the so-called “Folk Theorem” for repeated games, stable cooperative relations can be sustained in a Prisoner’s Dilemma if the game is repeated an indefinite number of times. This result depends on the possibility of applying strategies that are based on reciprocity, i.e., strategies that reward cooperation with subsequent cooperation and punish defectionwith subsequent defection. If future interactions are sufficiently important, i.e., if the discount rate is relatively small, each agent may be motivated to cooperate by fear of (...)
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  2. Gonzalo Olcina (1997). Forward Induction in Games with an Outside Option. Theory and Decision 42 (2):177-192.score: 522.0
    We provide eductive foundations for the concept of forward induction, in the class of games with an outside option. The formulation presented tries to capture in a static notion the rest point of an introspective process, achievable from some restricted preliminary beliefs. The former requisite is met by requiring the rest point to be a Nash equilibrium that yields a higher payoff than the outside option. With respect to the beliefs, we propose the Incentive Dominance Criterion. Players should (...)
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  3. Wlodek Rabinowicz, Backward Induction in Games: An Attempt at Logical Reconstruction.score: 501.0
    Backward induction has been the standard method of solving finite extensive-form games with perfect information, notwithstanding the fact that this procedure leads to counter-intuitive results in various games (iterated prisoner's dilemma, centipede, chain store, etc.). However, beginning in the late eighties, the method of backward induction became an object of criticism. It is claimed (most notably, by Reny 1988, 1989, Binmore 1987, Bicchieri 1989, and Pettit & Sugden 1989) that the assumptions needed for its defence are (...)
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  4. John Broome & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1999). Backwards Induction in the Centipede Game. Analysis 59 (264):237–242.score: 482.0
    The standard backward-induction reasoning in a game like the centipede assumes that the players maintain a common belief in rationality throughout the game. But that is a dubious assumption. Suppose the first player X didn't terminate the game in the first round; what would the second player Y think then? Since the backwards-induction argument says X should terminate the game, and it is supposed to be a sound argument, Y might be entitled to doubt X's rationality. Alternatively, Y (...)
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  5. Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Common Knowledge of Rationality in Extensive Games. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (3):261-280.score: 480.0
    We develop a logical system that captures two different interpretations of what extensive games model, and we apply this to a long-standing debate in game theory between those who defend the claim that common knowledge of rationality leads to backward induction or subgame perfect (Nash) equilibria and those who reject this claim. We show that a defense of the claim à la Aumann (1995) rests on a conception of extensive game playing as a one-shot event in combination (...)
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  6. Nabil Al-Najjar (1995). A Theory of Forward Induction in Finitely Repeated Games. Theory and Decision 38 (2):173-193.score: 463.5
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  7. Taneli Huuskonen (1991). Small Nonisomorphic Models Can Be Equivalent in Long Games. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 20 (3/4):105-106.score: 420.0
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  8. Andrés Eduardo Caicedo (2006). Neeman Itay. The Determinacy of Long Games. De Gruyter Series in Logic and its Applications, Vol. 7. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2004, Xi+ 317 Pp. [REVIEW] Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):299-302.score: 420.0
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  9. Olcina Gonzalo (1997). Forward Induction in Games with an Outside Option. Theory and Decision 42 (2).score: 420.0
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  10. Gonzalo Olcina Vauteren (1997). Forward Induction in Games with an Outside Option. Theory and Decision 42 (2).score: 420.0
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  11. Robert Stalnaker (1998). Belief Revision in Games: Forward and Backward Induction. Mathematical Social Sciences 36 (1):31 - 56.score: 405.0
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  12. M. A. Lynch (1989). Mechanisms Underlying Induction and Maintenance of Long-Term Potentiation in the Hippocampus. Bioessays 10 (2-3):85-90.score: 405.0
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  13. Wlodek Rabinowicz (1998). Grappling With the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction for BI-Terminating Games. Economics and Philosophy 14 (01):95-.score: 352.5
    According to a standard objection to the use of backward induction in extensive-form games with perfect information, backward induction (BI) can only work if the players are confident that each player is resiliently rational - disposed to act rationally at each possible node that the game can reach, even at the nodes that will certainly never be reached in actual play - and also confident that these beliefs in the players’ future resilient rationality are robust, i.e. that (...)
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  14. Charles Figuières (2009). Markov Interactions in a Class of Dynamic Games. Theory and Decision 66 (1):39-68.score: 282.0
    This paper contributes to the understanding of economic strategic behaviors in inter-temporal settings. Comparing the MPE and the OLNE of a widely used class of differential games it is shown: (i) what qualifications on behaviors a markov (dynamic) information structure brings about compared with an open-loop (static) information structure, (ii) what is the reason leading to intensified or reduced competition between the agents in the long run. It depends on whether agents’ interactions are characterized by markov substitutability or (...)
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  15. Stephen J. Willson (1998). Long-Term Behavior in the Theory of Moves. Theory and Decision 45 (3):201-240.score: 279.0
    This paper proposes a revised Theory of Moves (TOM) to analyze matrix games between two players when payoffs are given as ordinals. The games are analyzed when a given player i must make the first move, when there is a finite limit n on the total number of moves, and when the game starts at a given initial state S. Games end when either both players pass in succession or else a total of n moves have been (...)
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  16. Hubert R. Dinse Jan-Christoph Kattenstroth, Tobias Kalisch, Sören Peters, Martin Tegenthoff (2012). Long-Term Sensory Stimulation Therapy Improves Hand Function and Restores Cortical Responsiveness in Patients with Chronic Cerebral Lesions. Three Single Case Studies. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.score: 270.0
    Rehabilitation of sensorimotor impairment resulting from cerebral lesion (CL) utilizes task specific training and massed practice to drive reorganization and sensorimotor improvement due to induction of neuroplasticity mechanisms. Loss of sensory abilities often complicates recovery, and thus the individual’s ability to use the affected body part for functional tasks. Therefore, the development of additional and alternative approaches that supplement, enhance, or even replace conventional training procedures would be advantageous. Repetitive sensory stimulation protocols (rSS) have been shown to evoke sensorimotor (...)
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  17. Jan-Christoph Kattenstroth, Tobias Kalisch, Sören Peters, Martin Tegenthoff & Hubert R. Dinse (2012). Long-Term Sensory Stimulation Therapy Improves Hand Function and Restores Cortical Responsiveness in Patients with Chronic Cerebral Lesions. Three Single Case Studies. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.score: 270.0
    Rehabilitation of sensorimotor impairment resulting from cerebral lesion (CL) utilizes task specific training and massed practice to drive reorganization and sensorimotor improvement due to induction of neuroplasticity mechanisms. Loss of sensory abilities often complicates recovery, and thus the individual’s ability to use the affected body part for functional tasks. Therefore, the development of additional and alternative approaches that supplement, enhance, or even replace conventional training procedures would be advantageous. Repetitive sensory stimulation protocols (rSS) have been shown to evoke sensorimotor (...)
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  18. Horacio Arlo-Costa & Cristina Bicchieri, Knowing and Supposing in Games with Perfect Information.score: 267.0
    The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain (...)
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  19. Ken Binmore (2011). Interpreting Knowledge in the Backward Induction Problem. Episteme 8 (3):248-261.score: 264.0
    Robert Aumann argues that common knowledge of rationality implies backward induction in finite games of perfect information. I have argued that it does not. A literature now exists in which various formal arguments are offered in support of both positions. This paper argues that Aumann's claim can be justified if knowledge is suitably reinterpreted.
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  20. Johan van Benthem, Rational Dynamics and Epistemic Logic in Games.score: 264.0
    Game-theoretic solution concepts describe sets of strategy profiles that are optimal for all players in some plausible sense. Such sets are often found by recursive algorithms like iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies in strategic games, or backward induction in extensive games. Standard logical analyses of solution sets use assumptions about players in fixed epistemic models for a given game, such as mutual knowledge of rationality. In this paper, we propose a different perspective, analyzing solution algorithms as (...)
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  21. Thorsten Clausing (2004). Belief Revision in Games of Perfect Information. Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):89-115.score: 264.0
    A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” (...)
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  22. Johan van Benthem, Rationalizations and Promises in Games.score: 264.0
    Understanding human behaviour involves "why"'s as well as "how"'s. Rational people have good reasons for acting, but it can be hard to find out what these were and how they worked. In this Note, we discuss a few ways in which actions, preferences, and expectations are intermingled. This mixture is especially clear with the well-known solution procedure for extensive games called 'Backward Induction'. In particular, we discuss three scenarios for analyzing behaviour in a game. One can rationalize given (...)
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  23. John D. Norton (2006). How the Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green Defeats What is New in the New Riddle of Induction. Synthese 150 (2):185 - 207.score: 261.0
    That past patterns may continue in many different ways has long been identified as a problem for accounts of induction. The novelty of Goodman’s ”new riddle of induction” lies in a meta-argument that purports to show that no account of induction can discriminate between incompatible continuations. That meta-argument depends on the perfect symmetry of the definitions of grue/bleen and green/blue, so that any evidence that favors the ordinary continuation must equally favor the grue-ified continuation. I argue (...)
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  24. Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (2006). Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman–Pearson Philosophy of Induction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):323-357.score: 261.0
    Despite the widespread use of key concepts of the Neyman–Pearson (N–P) statistical paradigm—type I and II errors, significance levels, power, confidence levels—they have been the subject of philosophical controversy and debate for over 60 years. Both current and long-standing problems of N–P tests stem from unclarity and confusion, even among N–P adherents, as to how a test's (pre-data) error probabilities are to be used for (post-data) inductive inference as opposed to inductive behavior. We argue that the relevance of error (...)
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  25. Benoît Dubreuil (2010). Paleolithic Public Goods Games: Why Human Culture and Cooperation Did Not Evolve in One Step. Biology and Philosophy 25 (1):53-73.score: 261.0
    It is widely agreed that humans have specific abilities for cooperation and culture that evolved since their split with their last common ancestor with chimpanzees. Many uncertainties remain, however, about the exact moment in the human lineage when these abilities evolved. This article argues that cooperation and culture did not evolve in one step in the human lineage and that the capacity to stick to long-term and risky cooperative arrangements evolved before properly modern culture. I present evidence that Homo (...)
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  26. Gerhard Schurz (2009). Meta-Induction and Social Epistemology: Computer Simulations of Prediction Games. Episteme 6 (2):200-220.score: 261.0
    The justification of induction is of central significance for cross-cultural social epistemology. Different ‘epistemological cultures’ do not only differ in their beliefs, but also in their belief-forming methods and evaluation standards. For an objective comparison of different methods and standards, one needs (meta-)induction over past successes. A notorious obstacle to the problem of justifying induction lies in the fact that the success of object-inductive prediction methods (i.e., methods applied at the level of events) can neither be shown (...)
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  27. Horacio Arló-Costa & Cristina Bicchieri (2007). Knowing and Supposing in Games of Perfect Information. Studia Logica 86 (3):353 - 373.score: 261.0
    The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain (...)
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  28. Johan van Benthem, Preference Logic, Conditionals and Solution Concepts in Games.score: 261.0
    Preference is a basic notion in human behaviour, underlying such varied phenomena as individual rationality in the philosophy of action and game theory, obligations in deontic logic (we should aim for the best of all possible worlds), or collective decisions in social choice theory. Also, in a more abstract sense, preference orderings are used in conditional logic or non-monotonic reasoning as a way of arranging worlds into more or less plausible ones. The field of preference logic (cf. Hansson [10]) studies (...)
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  29. L. W. Lee (2011). International Justice in Elder Care: The Long Run. Public Health Ethics 4 (3):292-296.score: 261.0
    The migration of elder-care workers appears to be a zero-sum game. This naturally offends our sense of justice, especially when the host populations are richer. In this article, I argue that we ought to look beyond the short run. Once we look at the long run, we will see possibilities of non-zero-sum games that are mutually beneficial.
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  30. Martin Dufwenberg & Johan Lindén (1996). Inconsistencies in Extensive Games. Erkenntnis 45 (1):103 - 114.score: 261.0
    In certain finite extensive games with perfect information, Cristina Bicchieri (1989) derives a logical contradiction from the assumptions that players are rational and that they have common knowledge of the theory of the game. She argues that this may account for play outside the Nash equilibrium. She also claims that no inconsistency arises if the players have the minimal beliefs necessary to perform backward induction. We here show that another contradiction can be derived even with minimal beliefs, so (...)
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  31. Marc J. Buehner & Jon May (2002). Knowledge Mediates the Timeframe of Covariation Assessment in Human Causal Induction. Thinking and Reasoning 8 (4):269 – 295.score: 261.0
    How do humans discover causal relations when the effect is not immediately observable? Previous experiments have uniformly demonstrated detrimental effects of outcome delays on causal induction. These findings seem to conflict with everyday causal cognition, where humans can apparently identify long-term causal relations with relative ease. Three experiments investigated whether the influence of delay on adult human causal judgements is mediated by experimentally induced assumptions about the timeframe of the causal relation in question, as suggested by Einhorn and (...)
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  32. Darryl A. Seale, William E. Stein & Amnon Rapoport (forthcoming). Hold or Roll: Reaching the Goal in Jeopardy Race Games. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision:1-32.score: 252.0
    We consider a class of dynamic tournaments in which two contestants are faced with a choice between two courses of action. The first is a riskless option (“hold”) of maintaining the resources the contestant already has accumulated in her turn and ceding the initiative to her rival. The second is the bolder option (“roll”) of taking the initiative of accumulating additional resources, and thereby moving ahead of her rival, while at the same time sustaining a risk of temporary setback. We (...)
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  33. Giacomo Bonanno (2001). Branching Time, Perfect Information Games and Backward Induction. Games and Economic Behavior 36 (1):57-73.score: 243.0
    The logical foundations of game-theoretic solution concepts have so far been explored within the con¯nes of epistemic logic. In this paper we turn to a di®erent branch of modal logic, namely temporal logic, and propose to view the solution of a game as a complete prediction about future play. The branching time framework is extended by adding agents and by de¯ning the notion of prediction. A syntactic characterization of backward induction in terms of the property of internal consistency of (...)
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  34. Erik De Schutter (1996). One Cannot Build Theories of Cerebellar Function on Shaky Foundations: Induction Properties of Long-Term Depression Have to Be Taken Into Account. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):440-441.score: 231.0
    The theories of cerebellar function presented in this BBS special issue cannot be reconciled with the established induction properties of cerebellar LTD. At the same time, the authors presenting their research on cerebellar LTD do not appear very interested in function.
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  35. Gerhard Schurz (2010). Local, General and Universal Prediction Methods: A Game-Theoretical Approach to the Problem of Induction. In. In M. Dorato M. Suàrez (ed.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer. 267--278.score: 226.7
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  36. Edward Branigan (2006). Projecting a Camera : Language-Games in Film Theory. Routledge.score: 216.0
    In Projecting a Camera, film theorist Edward Branigan offers a groundbreaking approach to understanding film theory. Why, for example, does a camera move? What does a camera "know"? (And when does it know it?) What is the camera's relation to the subject during long static shots? What happens when the screen is blank? Through a wide-ranging engagement with Wittgenstein and theorists of film, he offers one of the most fully developed understandings of the ways in which the camera operates (...)
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  37. George Ainslie (2013). Intertemporal Bargaining Predicts Moral Behavior, Even in Anonymous, One-Shot Economic Games. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):78 - 79.score: 216.0
    To the extent that acting fairly is in an individual's long-term interest, short-term impulses to cheat present a self-control problem. The only effective solution is to interpret the problem as a variant of repeated prisoner's dilemma, with each choice as a test case predicting future choices. Moral choice appears to be the product of a contract because it comes from self-enforcing intertemporal cooperation.
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  38. Keisuke Yoshii & Kazuyuki Tanaka (2012). Infinite Games and Transfinite Recursion of Multiple Inductive Definitions. In. In S. Barry Cooper (ed.), How the World Computes. 374--383.score: 215.0
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  39. Michael H. Coen & Yue Gao (2009). Learning From Games: Inductive Bias and Bayesian Inference. In. In N. A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn (eds.), Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. 2729--2734.score: 215.0
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  40. Jean-Pierre Ponssard (1990). Self Enforceable Paths in Extensive Form Games. Theory and Decision 29 (1):69-83.score: 213.0
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  41. Andrew M. Colman (2003). Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.score: 210.0
    Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only rationality but also common (...)
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  42. Timothy C. Salmon (2004). Evidence for Learning to Learn Behavior in Normal Form Games. Theory and Decision 56 (4):367-404.score: 202.0
    Evidence presented in Salmon (2001; Econometrica 69(6) 1597) indicates that typical tests to identify learning behavior in experiments involving normal form games possess little power to reject incorrect models. This paper begins by presenting results from an experiment designed to gather alternative data to overcome this problem. The results from these experiments indicate support for a learning-to-learn or rule learning hypothesis in which subjects change their decision rule over time. These results are then used to construct an adaptive learning (...)
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  43. W. E. Schlaretzki (1960). Scientific Reasoning and the Summum Bonum. Philosophy of Science 27 (1):48-57.score: 196.0
    C. S. Peirce argued that inductive reasoning and probability judgments are adequately secure only in the indefinitely long run, and that therefore it is illogical to employ these modes of inference unless one's chief devotion is to the interests of an ideal community of all rational beings, past, present, and future. He thought of this devotion as a "social sentiment", involving self-sacrifice. An examination of his argument shows that the attitude presupposed by his conceptions of induction and (...)
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  44. Tianqun Pan (2010). Conversation Through Actions and the Changing of Epistemic States in a Game. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (4):666-673.score: 187.0
    When a person performs a certain action, it signifies that he is causing a certain event to occur. Therefore the action is conveying a certain true sentence. Playing a game is a mutual activity, namely the listener and the speaker undertake an exchange through a linguistic dialogue or communicate through action. Because of the peculiar nature of the action, the actions in games belong to an activity where the speaker speaks true words and the listener hears true words. A (...)
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  45. Herbert Dawid & Alexander Mehlmann (1996). Genetic Learning in Strategic Form Games. Complexity 1 (5):51-59.score: 178.0
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  46. Brendan Shea (2010). Three Ways of Getting It Wrong: Induction in Wonderland. In Richard Brian Davis (ed.), Alice in Wonderland and Philosophy: Curiouser and Curiouser. Wiley Blackwell. 93-107.score: 174.0
    Alice encounters at least three distinct problems in her struggles to understand and navigate Wonderland. The first arises when she attempts to predict what will happen in Wonderland based on what she has experienced outside of Wonderland. In many cases, this proves difficult -- she fails to predict that babies might turn into pigs, that a grin could survive without a cat or that playing cards could hold criminal trials. Alice's second problem involves her efforts to figure out the basic (...)
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  47. C. James Scheirer & Michael J. Hanley (1974). Scanning for Similar and Different Material in Short- and Long-Term Memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology 102 (2):343.score: 172.0
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  48. M. J. Hill, J. B. Paris & G. M. Wilmers (2002). Some Observations on Induction in Predicate Probabilistic Reasoning. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):43-75.score: 168.0
    We consider the desirability, or otherwise, of various forms of induction in the light of certain principles and inductive methods within predicate uncertain reasoning. Our general conclusion is that there remain conflicts within the area whose resolution will require a deeper understanding of the fundamental relationship between individuals and properties.
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  49. Manolo Martínez (forthcoming). Deception in Sender–Receiver Games. Erkenntnis:1-13.score: 168.0
    Godfrey-Smith advocates for linking deception in sender-receiver games to the existence of undermining signals. I present games in which deceptive signals can be arbitrarily frequent, without this undermining information transfer between sender and receiver.
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  50. Aris Spanos (2013). A Frequentist Interpretation of Probability for Model-Based Inductive Inference. Synthese 190 (9):1555-1585.score: 168.0
    The main objective of the paper is to propose a frequentist interpretation of probability in the context of model-based induction, anchored on the Strong Law of Large Numbers (SLLN) and justifiable on empirical grounds. It is argued that the prevailing views in philosophy of science concerning induction and the frequentist interpretation of probability are unduly influenced by enumerative induction, and the von Mises rendering, both of which are at odds with frequentist model-based induction that dominates current (...)
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