Search results for 'basing' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  99
    Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter (forthcoming). The Basing Relation and the Impossibility of the Debasing Demon. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Descartes’ demon is a deceiver: the demon makes things appear to you other than as they really are. However, as Descartes famously pointed out in the Second Meditation, not all knowledge is imperilled by this kind of deception. You still know you are a thinking thing. Perhaps, though, there is a more virulent demon in epistemic hell, one from which none of our knowledge is safe. Jonathan Schaffer (2010) thinks so. The “Debasing Demon” he imagines threatens knowledge not via the (...)
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  2. Ian Evans (2013). The Problem of the Basing Relation. Synthese 190 (14):2943-2957.
    In days past, epistemologists expended a good deal of effort trying to analyze the basing relation—the relation between a belief and its basis. No satisfying account was offered, and the project was largely abandoned. Younger epistemologists, however, have begun to yearn for an adequate theory of basing. I aim to deliver one. After establishing some data and arguing that traditional accounts of basing are unsatisfying, I introduce a novel theory of the basing relation: the dispositional theory. (...)
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  3. Kevin McCain (2012). The Interventionist Account of Causation and the Basing Relation. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):357-382.
    It is commonplace to distinguish between propositional justification (having good reasons for believing p) and doxastic justification (believing p on the basis of those good reasons).One necessary requirement for bridging the gap between S’s merely having propositional justification that p and S’s having doxastic justification that p is that S base her belief that p on her reasons (propositional justification).A plausible suggestion for what it takes for S’s belief to be based on her reasons is that her reasons must contribute (...)
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  4.  48
    Hannah Tierney & Nicholas D. Smith (2012). Keith Lehrer on the Basing Relation. Philosophical Studies 161 (1):27-36.
    In this paper, we review Keith Lehrer’s account of the basing relation, with particular attention to the two cases he offered in support of his theory, Raco (Lehrer, Theory of knowledge, 1990; Theory of knowledge, (2nd ed.), 2000) and the earlier case of the superstitious lawyer (Lehrer, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 311–313, 1971). We show that Lehrer’s examples succeed in making his case that beliefs need not be based on the evidence, in order to be justified. These cases (...)
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  5.  78
    Paul Silva Jr (2014). Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement? Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):1-17.
    The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is the distinction between having justification to believe P (= propositional justification) versus having a justified belief in P (= doxastic justification). The focus of this paper is on doxastic justification and on what conditions are necessary for having it. In particular, I challenge the basing demand on doxastic justification, i.e., the idea that one can have a doxastically justified belief only if one’s belief is based on an epistemically appropriate reason. This (...)
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  6.  54
    Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4).
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  7.  62
    Colin Ruloff (2015). Swinburne on Basing and Deviant Inferential Pathways. Acta Analytica 30 (1):87-95.
    In his Epistemic Justification , Swinburne offers a sophisticated and intuitively plausible causal-doxastic analysis of the basing relation that has escaped the attention of those working on this relation, where the basing relation can be understood as the relation that holds between a reason and one’s belief when the belief is held for that reason. In this paper, I aim to fill this lacuna in the literature by arguing that, despite its initial plausibility, Swinburne’s analysis of the (...) relation is subject to a simple counterexample and so must be rejected. (shrink)
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  8.  4
    Joseph P. Walsh (2016). Agent-Basing, Consequences, and Realized Motives. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):649-661.
    According to agent-based approaches to virtue ethics, the rightness of an action is a function of the motives which prompted that action. If those motives were morally praiseworthy, then the action was right; if they were morally blameworthy, the action was wrong. Many critics find this approach problematically insensitive to an act’s consequences, and claim that agent-basing fails to preserve the intuitive distinction between agent- and act-evaluation. In this article I show how an agent-based account of right action can (...)
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  9.  49
    John K. Davis (2009). Subjectivity, Judgment, and the Basing Relationship. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):21-40.
    Moral and legal judgments sometimes depend on personal traits in this sense: the subject offers good reasons for her judgment, but if she had a different social or ideological background, her judgment would be different. If you would judge the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion differently if you were not a secular liberal, is your judgment really based on the arguments you find convincing, or do you find them so only because you are a secular liberal? I argue that a (...)
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  10. Paul Silva Jr (2015). On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs. Erkenntnis 80 (5):945-955.
    According to an orthodox account of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, basing one’s belief in P on one’s source of propositional justification to believe P suffices for having a doxastically justified belief. But in an increasingly recognized work Turri argues that this thesis fails and proposes a new view according to which having propositional justification depends on having the ability to acquire doxastic justification. Turri’s novel position has surprisingly far-reaching epistemological consequences, ruling out some common epistemological positions (...)
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  11.  26
    Joseph Tolliver (1982). Basing Beliefs on Reasons. Grazer Philosophische Studien 15:149-161.
    I propose to analyze the concept of basing beliefs on reasons. The concept is an important one in understanamg the so-called "inferential" or "indirect" knowledge. After briefly stating the causal analyses of this concept given by D.M. Armstrong and Marshall Swain I will present two cases which show these analyses to be too strong and too weak. Finally, I will propose an analysis which avoids these twin difficulties.
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  12.  2
    Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  13.  79
    Jonathan Kvanvig (1987). On Lemke's Defence of a Causal Basing Requirement. Analysis 47 (3):162 - 167.
    LEMKE has recently taken issue (see ANALYSIS 46.3, June 1986, pp. 138-44) with my claim that no counterfactual causal account of the basing relation is plausible (see ANALYSIS 45.3, June 1985, pp. 153-8). Intuitively, a counterfactual causal account claims that belief is based on evidence if and only if the evidence either causes the belief or would have caused it had the actual cause been absent. This intuitive formulation accounts only for counterfactual causes of level one: events which would (...)
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  14. Adam Leite, What the Basing Relation Can Teach Us About the Theory of Justification.
    According to a common view, the activity of justifying is epistemologically irrelevant: being justified in believing as one does never requires the ability to justify one’s belief. This view runs into trouble regarding the epistemic basing relation, the relation between a person’s belief and the reasons for which the person holds it. The view must appeal to basing relations as part of its account of what it is for a person to be justified in believing as she does, (...)
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  15. Keith Allen Korcz (1996). The Epistemic Basing Relation. Dissertation, The Ohio State University
    The epistemic basing relation is the relation occurring between a belief and a reason when the reason is the reason for which the belief is held. It marks the distinction between a belief's being justifiable for a person, and the person's being justified in holding the belief. As such, it is an essential component of any complete theory of epistemic justification. ;I survey and evaluate all theories of the basing relation that I am aware of published between 1965 (...)
     
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  16.  1
    Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  17.  1
    Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  18.  1
    Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  19.  1
    Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  20.  1
    Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  21.  1
    Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  22.  17
    Hamid Vahid (2009). Triangulation, Content and the Basing Relation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1):231-250.
    It is widely believed that what distinguishes between a justifiable and a justified belief is the obtaining of an epistemic relation, the basing relation, whose nature and character has long been a controversial issue in epistemology. There are currently two major approaches to the problem of the basing relation, namely, the causal and doxastic theories. In this paper, after a brief survey of the field, I examine Alston's recent account of the basing relation, as input to psychologically (...)
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  23.  1
    Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  24. Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  25. Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  26. Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  27. Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  28. Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  29. Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  30. Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  31. Patrick Bondy (2015). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The (...)
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  32.  73
    Kurt Sylvan (2016). Epistemic Reasons II: Basing. Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.
    The paper is an opinionated tour of the literature on the reasons for which we hold beliefs and other doxastic attitudes, which I call ‘operative epistemic reasons’. After drawing some distinctions in §1, I begin in §2 by discussing the ontology of operative epistemic reasons, assessing arguments for and against the view that they are mental states. I recommend a pluralist non-mentalist view that takes seriously the variety of operative epistemic reasons ascriptions and allows these reasons to be both propositions (...)
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  33.  58
    Keith Allen Korcz (2000). The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):525-550.
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  34.  47
    Keith Allen Korez (1997). Recent Work on the Basing Relation. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (2):171 - 191.
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  35.  50
    Daniel M. Mittag (2002). On the Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):543 - 559.
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  36.  84
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1985). Swain on the Basing Relation. Analysis 45 (3):153-158.
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  37.  81
    Jonathan Kvanvig (1985). Swain on the Basing Relation. Analysis 45 (3):153 - 158.
    Suppose we want to know whether a person justifiably believes a certain claim. Further, suppose that our interest in this question is because we take such justification to be necessary for knowledge. To justifiably believe a claim requires more than there being a justification for that claim. Presumably, there is a justification for accepting all sorts of scientific theories of which I have no awareness; because of my lack of awareness, I do not justifiably believe those theories. Further, even if (...)
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  38.  28
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). Justification and Proper Basing. In Erik Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co. 43-62.
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  39.  4
    Keith Stenning & Michiel Lambalgen (2004). A Little Logic Goes a Long Way: Basing Experiment on Semantic Theory in the Cognitive Science of Conditional Reasoning. Cognitive Science 28 (4):481-529.
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  40.  62
    Julia Driver (1995). Monkeying with Motives: Agent-Basing Virtue Ethics. Utilitas 7 (2):281.
    Virtue ethics has generated a great deal of excitement among ethicists largely because it is seen as an alternative to the traditional theories – utilitarianism and Kantian ethics – which have come under considerable scrutiny and criticism in the past 30 years. Rather than give up the enterprise of doing moral theory altogether, as some have suggested, others have opted to develop an alternative that would hopefully avoid the shortcomings of both utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. Several writers, such as Jorge (...)
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  41.  4
    Mehmet Aközer & Emel Aközer (forthcoming). Basing Science Ethics on Respect for Human Dignity. Science and Engineering Ethics:1-21.
    A “no ethics” principle has long been prevalent in science and has demotivated deliberation on scientific ethics. This paper argues the following: An understanding of a scientific “ethos” based on actual “value preferences” and “value repugnances” prevalent in the scientific community permits and demands critical accounts of the “no ethics” principle in science. The roots of this principle may be traced to a repugnance of human dignity, which was instilled at a historical breaking point in the interrelation between science and (...)
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  42.  6
    Keith Stenning & Michiel van Lambalgen (2004). A Little Logic Goes a Long Way: Basing Experiment on Semantic Theory in the Cognitive Science of Conditional Reasoning. Cognitive Science 28 (4):481-529.
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  43.  39
    Lory Lemke (1986). Kvanvig and Swain on the Basing Relation. Analysis 46 (3):138-144.
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  44. George Pappas (1979). ``Basing Relations&Quot. In Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel 51-65.
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  45.  12
    Geogre S. Pappas (1979). Basing Relations. In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel 51--63.
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  46.  7
    Frederic Schick (1999). Status Quo Basing and the Logic of Value. Economics and Philosophy 15 (1):23.
    Some writers have noted that valuation is often focused on foreseen changes. They say that we often don't value situations in terms of what we would have in them only but also in terms of the gains or losses that they offer us — that we then focus on departures from our status quo. They argue that such thinking conflicts with basic economic analysis, and also that it violates logic: they say that it is irrational. I agree that it seems (...)
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  47.  8
    A. Tajduś (1997). Estimation of Rockburst Hazard Basing on 3D Stress Field Analysis. Ratio 1 (2).
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  48.  13
    Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (1996). Relativism and Normative Nonrealism: Basing Morality on Rationality. Metaphilosophy 27 (3):277-295.
    Normative nonrealism denies, first, that some things are good or bad independently of facts about the attitudes of moral agents and, second, that attitude-independent moral facts determine what is rational. This implies that facts about what is rational are logically prior to what is moral. Nonrealism commonly assumes that moral realism is false or unjustifiable, that there is a conceptual connection between morality and rationality and that the particular theory of rationality is the correct account of rationality. Facing the threat (...)
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  49.  4
    Felicia Ackerman (1991). Imaginary Gardens and Real Toads: On the Ethics of Basing Fiction on Actual People. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 16 (1):142-151.
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  50.  9
    M. Weingarten & A. Matalon (2010). The Ethics of Basing Community Prevention in General Practice. Journal of Medical Ethics 36 (3):138-141.
    In this paper we argue that the responsibility for systematic community-based preventive medicine should not be made part of the role of the general practitioner (GP). Preventive medicine cannot be shown to be more effective than curative or supportive medicine. Therefore, the allocation of the large amount of general practice staff time and resources required for systematic preventive medicine should not come at the expense of the care of the sick and the suffering. The traditional healing role of the GP (...)
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