Search results for 'belief ascriptions' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Ari Maunu (2002). A Problem with De Re Belief Ascriptions, with a Consequence to Substitutivity. Philosophia 29 (1-4):411-421.score: 240.0
    It is shown that the coherence of de re belief ascriptions is doubtful in view of certain plausible principles. Subsequently, it is argued, the standard argument against substitutivity in de dicto ascriptions loses some of its power. Also, some possible reactions to these results are considered.
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  2. Ronald Loeffler (2014). Belief Ascriptions and Social Externalism. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):211-239.score: 240.0
    I outline Brandom’s theory of de re and de dicto belief ascriptions, which plays a central role in Brandom’s overall theory of linguistic communication, and show that this theory offers a surprising, new response to Burge’s (Midwest Stud 6:73–121, 1979) argument for social externalism. However, while this response is in principle available from the perspective of Brandom’s theory of belief ascription in abstraction from his wider theoretical enterprise, it ceases to be available from this perspective in the (...)
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  3. Ari Maunu (2000). A Simple Solution to the Problem of De Se Belief Ascriptions. Communication and Cognition 33 (3-4):199-226.score: 240.0
    I show how a de se belief ascription such as "Privatus believes that he himself is rich" may be dealt with by means of a scope distinction over and above that one separating de dicto and de re ascriptions. The idea is, roughly, that 'Privatus...himself' forms in this statement a unity, a single "spread" sign that is at the same time in a de re and de dicto position. If so, H-N. Castañeda's contention that the "quasi-indicator" 'he himself' (...)
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  4. Belief Ascriptions (1997). Louis Goble. In Dunja Jutronic (ed.), The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics. Maribor. 285.score: 240.0
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  5. Mark Balaguer (2005). Indexical Propositions and de Re Belief Ascriptions. Synthese 146 (3):325 - 355.score: 180.0
    I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two (...)
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  6. James Beebe (2013). A Knobe Effect for Belief Ascriptions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):235-258.score: 180.0
    Knobe (Analysis 63:190-193, 2003a, Philosophical Psychology 16:309-324, 2003b, Analysis 64:181-187, 2004b) found that people are more likely to attribute intentionality to agents whose actions resulted in negative side-effects that to agents whose actions resulted in positive ones. Subsequent investigation has extended this result to a variety of other folk psychological attributions. The present article reports experimental findings that demonstrate an analogous effect for belief ascriptions. Participants were found to be more likely to ascribe belief, higher degrees of (...)
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  7. Henry Jackman, Belief Ascriptions, Prototypes and Ambiguity.score: 180.0
    A belief ascription such as “Oedipus believes that his mother is the queen of Thebes” can be understood in two ways, one in which it seems true, and another in which it seems false. It can seem true because the woman who was, in fact, Oedipus’ mother was believed by him to be the queen of Thebes. It can seem false because Oedipus himself would have sincerely denied that Jocasta could be correctly characterized as “Oedipus’s mother.” Belief (...) thus seem to admit of two interpretations, and this has suggested to many that belief predicates such as “________ believes that his mother is the queen of Thebes” are ambiguous between a de dicto and a de re reading.1 However, the impression of ambiguity is a function of the narrow ranges of examples that philosophers focus on. When we consider our ascriptional practices as a whole, the suggestion that belief predicates are ambiguous is neither plausible nor needed to explain the de dicto/de re distinction. The following will argue that understanding paradigmatic de dicto and de re ascriptions in terms of disavowals from a more basic sort of ascription is preferable to positing a simple ambiguity in which each of the two sorts of ascription are conceptually primitive. (shrink)
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  8. Henry Jackman, Prototypes, Belief Ascriptions, and Ambiguity.score: 174.0
    Many philosophers have suggested that belief predicates are ambiguous between a de dicto and a de re reading. However, the impression of ambiguity is a function of the narrow ranges of examples that philosophers focus on. When we consider our ascriptional practices as a whole, the suggestion that belief predicates are ambiguous is neither plausible nor needed to explain the de dicto/de re distinction. This paper will argue that understanding paradigmatic de dicto and de re ascriptions in (...)
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  9. Michael McKinsey (1999). The Semantics of Belief Ascriptions. Noûs 33 (4):519-557.score: 162.0
    nated discussion of the semantics of such verbs. I will call this view.
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  10. Sarah Patterson (1990). The Explanatory Role of Belief Ascriptions. Philosophical Studies 59 (3):313-32.score: 162.0
  11. Pierre Jacob, Frege's Puzzle and Belief Ascriptions.score: 150.0
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  12. Thomas McKay (1981). On Proper Names in Belief Ascriptions. Philosophical Studies 39 (3):287-303.score: 150.0
  13. Pierre Jacob (1987). Thoughts and Belief Ascriptions. Mind and Language 2 (4):301-325.score: 150.0
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  14. Charles Travis (1984). Are Belief Ascriptions Opaque? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85:73 - 99.score: 150.0
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  15. D. S. Clarke (2010). Contextual Aspects of Belief Ascriptions: A Response to Buckareff. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):263-267.score: 150.0
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  16. Eric Stiffler (1983). De Re Belief Ascriptions and Action Explanations. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (4):513 - 525.score: 150.0
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  17. A. Consequence To Substitutivity & Ari Maunu (2002). A Problem with de Re Belief Ascriptions. Philosophia 29:411.score: 150.0
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  18. Pascal Engel (2010). Self-Ascriptions of Belief and Transparency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):593-610.score: 126.0
    Among recent theories of the nature of self-knowledge, the rationalistic view, according to which self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement—perceptual or inferential—has been prominent. Upon this kind of view, however, self-knowledge becomes a bit of a mystery. Although the rationalistic conception is defended in this article, it is argued that it has to be supplemented by an account of the transparency of belief: the question whether to believe that P is settled when one asks oneself whether P.
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  19. Mark Richard (1983). Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief. Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (4):425--52.score: 120.0
  20. Hans-Ulrich Hoche & Michael Knoop (2013). Ascriptions of Propositional Attitudes. An Analysis in Terms of Intentional Objects. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):747-768.score: 120.0
    Having briefly sketched the aims of our paper, namely, to logically analyse the ascription of propositional attitudes to somebody else in terms, not of Fregean senses or of intensions-with-s, but of the intentional object of the person spoken about, say, the believer or intender (Section 1), we try to introduce the concept of an intentional object as simply as possible, to wit, as coming into view whenever two (or more) subjective belief-worlds strikingly diverge (Section 2). Then, we assess the (...)
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  21. Bryan Frances (2002). A Test for Theories of Belief Ascription. Analysis 62 (2):116–125.score: 100.0
    These days the two most popular approaches to belief ascription are Millianism and Contextualism. The former approach is inconsistent with the existence of ordinary Frege cases, such as Lois believing that Superman flies while failing to believe that Clark Kent flies. The Millian holds that the only truth-conditionally relevant aspect of a proper name is its referent or extension. Contextualism, as I will define it for the purposes of this essay, includes all theories according to which ascriptions of (...)
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  22. Miri Albahari (2014). Alief or Belief? A Contextual Approach to Belief Ascription. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):701-720.score: 96.0
    There has been a surge of interest over cases where a subject sincerely endorses P while displaying discordant strains of not-P in her behaviour and emotion. Cases like this are telling because they bear directly upon conditions under which belief should be ascribed. Are beliefs to be aligned with what we sincerely endorse or with what we do and feel? If belief doesn’t explain the discordant strains, what does? T.S. Gendler has recently attempted to explain all the discordances (...)
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  23. Karolina Krzyżanowska (2013). Belief Ascription and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 190 (1):21-36.score: 96.0
    In this paper, I analyse a finding by Riggs and colleagues that there is a close connection between people’s ability to reason with counterfactual conditionals and their capacity to attribute false beliefs to others. The result indicates that both processes may be governed by one cognitive mechanism, though false belief attribution seems to be slightly more cognitively demanding. Given that the common denominator for both processes is suggested to be a form of the Ramsey test, I investigate whether Stalnaker’s (...)
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  24. Natasha Alechina & Brian Logan (2010). Belief Ascription Under Bounded Resources. Synthese 173 (2):179 - 197.score: 96.0
    There exists a considerable body of work on epistemic logics for resource-bounded reasoners. In this paper, we concentrate on a less studied aspect of resource-bounded reasoning, namely, on the ascription of beliefs and inference rules by the agents to each other. We present a formal model of a system of bounded reasoners which reason about each other’s beliefs, and investigate the problem of belief ascription in a resource-bounded setting. We show that for agents whose computational resources and memory are (...)
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  25. Kenneth A. Taylor (2003). Singular Beliefs and Their Ascriptions. In Reference and the Rational Mind. Csli Publications.score: 90.0
    This essay defends three interlocking claims about singular beliefs and their ascriptions. The first is a claim about the nature of such beliefs; the second is a claim about the semantic contents of ascriptions of such beliefs; the third is a claim about the pragmatic significance of such ascriptions. With respect to the nature of singular belief, I claim that the contents of our singular beliefs are a joint product of mind and world, with neither mind (...)
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  26. Lynne Rudder Baker (2003). Belief Ascription and the Illusion of Depth. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):183-201.score: 80.0
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  27. Nick Chater & Martin J. Pickering (2003). Two Realms of Mental Life: The Non-Overlap of Belief Ascription and the Scientific Study of Mind and Behavior. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):335-353.score: 80.0
     
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  28. Jonathan Berg (2012). Direct Belief: An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief. De Gruyter Mouton.score: 72.0
    Jonathan Berg argues for the Theory of Direct Belief, which treats having a belief about an individual as an unmediated relation between the believer and the individual the belief is about. After a critical review of alternative positions, Berg uses Grice's theory of conversational implicature to provide a detailed pragmatic account of substitution failure in belief ascriptions and goes on to defend this view against objections, including those based on an unwarranted "Inner Speech" Picture of (...)
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  29. Emar Maier (2004). Acquaintance Resolution and Belief de Re. In Laura Alonso i Alemany & Paul Égré (eds.), Proceedings of the 9th Esslli Student Session.score: 72.0
    This paper proposes a way of semantically representing de re belief ascriptions that involves contextual resolution of the acquaintance relation between the attitude holder and the object about which the attitude is de re. A special case is that where the belief is about the believer herself. Here, we may discern two possibilities: the acquaintance relation is equality, in which case we end up with a de se belief, or, if the first option fails, we search (...)
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  30. Mitchell Ginsberg (1972). Mind And Belief: Psychological Ascription And The Concept Of Belief. Ny: Humanities Press.score: 70.0
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  31. K. Brad Wray (2001). Collective Belief and Acceptance. Synthese 129 (3):319-33.score: 66.0
    Margaret Gilbert explores the phenomenon referred to in everyday ascriptions of beliefs to groups. She refers to this type of phenomenon as "collective belief" and calls the types of groups that are the bearers of such beliefs "plural subjects". I argue that the attitudes that groups adopt that Gilbert refers to as "collective beliefs" are not a species of belief in an important and central sense, but rather a species of acceptance. Unlike proper beliefs, a collective (...) is adopted by a group as a means to realizing the group's goals. Unless we recognize that this phenomenon is a species of acceptance, plural subjects will seem prone to change their "beliefs" for irrelevant reasons, and thus frequently appear to act in an irrational manner. (shrink)
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  32. Lewis Powell (2012). How to Refrain From Answering Kripke's Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):287-308.score: 66.0
    In this paper, I investigate the prospects for using the distinction between rejection and denial to resolve Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. One puzzle Kripke presents in A Puzzle About Belief poses what would have seemed a fairly straightforward question about the beliefs of the bilingual Pierre, who is disposed to sincerely and reflectively assent to the French sentence Londres est jolie , but not to the English sentence London is pretty , both of which he understands perfectly (...)
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  33. Steven E. Boër (2007). Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution. Springer.score: 66.0
    This book provides a formal ontology of senses and the belief-relation that grounds the distinction between de dicto, de re, and de se beliefs as well as the opacity of belief reports. According to this ontology, the relata of the belief-relation are an agent and a special sort of object-dependent sense (a "thought-content"), the latter being an "abstract" property encoding various syntactic and semantic constraints on sentences of a language of thought. One bears the belief-relation to (...)
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  34. Heimir Geirsson (1998). True Belief Reports and the Sharing of Beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (January):331-342.score: 66.0
    In recent years Russell´s view that there are singular propositions, namely propositions that contain the individuals they are about, has gained followers. As a response to a number of puzzles about attitude ascriptions several Russellians (as I will call those who accept the view that proper names and indexicals only contribute their referents to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they occur), including David Kaplan and Nathan Salmon, have drawn a distinction between what proposition is believed and (...)
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  35. Georg Brun & Hans Rott (2013). Interpreting Enthymematic Arguments Using Belief Revision. Synthese 190 (18):4041-4063.score: 66.0
    This paper is about the situation in which an author (writer or speaker) presents a deductively invalid argument, but the addressee aims at a charitable interpretation and has reason to assume that the author intends to present a valid argument. How can he go about interpreting the author’s reasoning as enthymematically valid? We suggest replacing the usual find-the-missing-premise approaches by an approach based on systematic efforts to ascribe a belief state to the author against the background of which the (...)
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  36. Sebastian Knell (2005). A Deflationist Theory of Intentionality? Brandom's Analysis of de Re Specifying Attitude-Ascriptions. Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):73-90.score: 66.0
    The paper presents an interpretation of Brandom¿s analysis of de re specifying attitude-ascriptions. According to this interpretation, his analysis amounts to a deflationist conception of intentionality. In the first section I sketch the specific role deflationist theories of truth play within the philosophical debate on truth. Then I describe some analogies between the contemporary constellation of competing truth theories and the current confrontation of controversial theories of intentionality. The second section gives a short summary of Brandom¿s analysis of attitude-ascription, (...)
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  37. Robert F. Hadley (1991). A Sense-Based, Process Model of Belief. Minds and Machines 1 (3):279-320.score: 66.0
    A process-oriented model of belief is presented which permits the representation of nested propositional attitudes within first-order logic. The model (NIM, for nested intensional model) is axiomatized, sense-based (via intensions), and sanctions inferences involving nested epistemic attitudes, with different agents and different times. Because NIM is grounded upon senses, it provides a framework in which agents may reason about the beliefs of another agent while remaining neutral with respect to the syntactic forms used to express the latter agent's beliefs. (...)
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  38. Emar Maier, Parasitic Attitudes.score: 60.0
    Karttunen observes that a presupposition triggered in an x hopes that complement, can be filtered out by a seemingly inaccessible antecedent under the scope of a preceding x believes that ascription. I show that the problem evaporates once we enrich our semantics of attitude ascriptions with some independently argued assumptions on the structure and interpre- tation of mental states. In particular, I argue that mental states consist of acquaintance-based mental files and variously labeled attitude compartments, laid out in a (...)
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  39. Marco Santambrogio (2006). On the Sameness of Thoughts. Substitutional Quantifiers, Tense, and Belief. Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):111-140.score: 60.0
    In order to know what a belief is, we need to know when it is appropriate to say that two subjects (or the same subject at two different times) believe(s) the same or entertain the same thought. This is not entirely straightforward. Consider for instance1. Tom thinks that he himself is the smartest and Tim believes the same2. In 2001, Bill believed that some action had to be taken to save the rain forest and today he believes the same.What (...)
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  40. Fabrice Pataut (1997). Holism of Content Ascription and Holism of Belief Content. In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.score: 58.0
     
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  41. Richard Holton (1994). Attitude Ascriptions and Intermediate Scope. Mind 103 (410):123-130.score: 56.0
    Quantification into a belief ascription has often been taken to indicate that the believer knows who (or what) their belief is about. Here it is shown, by means of some iterated ascriptions, that this cannot be the correct interpretation of such quantification. In conclusion it is suggested that it should rather be interpreted as indicating that the belief has its source in the object denoted by the quantifier.
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  42. Jennifer Nagel (2008). Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.score: 54.0
    Why do our intuitive knowledge ascriptions shift when a subject's practical interests are mentioned? Many efforts to answer this question have focused on empirical linguistic evidence for context sensitivity in knowledge claims, but the empirical psychology of belief formation and attribution also merits attention. The present paper examines a major psychological factor (called ?need-for-closure?) relevant to ascriptions involving practical interests. Need-for-closure plays an important role in determining whether one has a settled belief; it also influences the (...)
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  43. Sydney Shoemaker (2009). Self-Intimation and Second Order Belief. Erkenntnis 71 (1):35 - 51.score: 54.0
    The paper defends the view that there is a constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it. This view is supported by the incoherence of affirming something while denying that one believes it, and by the role awareness of the contents one’s belief system plays in the rational regulation of that system. Not all standing beliefs are accompanied by higher-order beliefs that self-ascribe them; those that are so accompanied are ones that are “available” in the sense (...)
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  44. Margaret Gilbert (1987). Modelling Collective Belief. Synthese 73 (1):185-204.score: 54.0
    What is it for a group to believe something? A summative account assumes that for a group to believe that p most members of the group must believe that p. Accounts of this type are commonly proposed in interpretation of everyday ascriptions of beliefs to groups. I argue that a nonsummative account corresponds better to our unexamined understanding of such ascriptions. In particular I propose what I refer to as the joint acceptance model of group belief. I (...)
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  45. Markos Valaris (2014). Self-Knowledge and the Phenomenological Transparency of Belief. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (8).score: 54.0
    I develop an account of our capacity to know what we consciously believe, which is based on an account of the phenomenology of conscious belief. While other recent authors have suggested that phenomenally conscious states play a role in the epistemology of self-ascriptions of belief, they have failed to give a satisfying account of how exactly the phenomenology is supposed to help with the epistemology — i.e., an account of the way “what it is like” for the (...)
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  46. Elke Brendel (2014). Contextualism, Relativism, and the Semantics of Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):101-117.score: 54.0
    It is argued that neither contextualism nor relativism can provide a satisfying semantics of knowledge ascriptions. According to contextualism, the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions of the form “S knows that p” vary with the epistemic standards operative in the contexts of utterance. These epistemic standards are determined, in particular, by the speaker’s stakes with regard to p or the consideration of error-possibilities. It is shown that the absolute concept of utterance truth together with a knowledge rule of (...)
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  47. Maura Tumulty (2014). Managing Mismatch Between Belief and Behavior. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):261-292.score: 54.0
    Our behavior doesn't always match the beliefs attributed to us, and sometimes the mismatch raises questions about what our beliefs actually are. I compare two approaches to such cases, and argue in favor of the one which allows some belief-attributions to lack a determinate truth-value. That approach avoids an inappropriate assumption about cognitive activity: namely, that whenever we fail in performing one cognitive activity, there is a distinct cognitive activity at which we succeed. The indeterminacy-allowing approach also meshes well (...)
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  48. Ron Mallon, Differences Between Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Belief Ascription: A Problem with Block's Argument for Holism.score: 52.0
    instead he argues for a conditional: "if there is such a thing as narrow content, it is holistic," where holism is taken to be "the doctrine that any _substantial_ difference in W-beliefs, whether between two people or between one person at two times, requires a difference in the meaning or content of W" (153, 152).
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  49. Stephen Schiffer (1992). Belief Ascription. Journal of Philosophy 89 (10):499-521.score: 50.0
  50. Stephen Schiffer (1993). Belief Ascription and a Paradox of Meaning. Philosophical Issues 3:89-121.score: 50.0
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