Search results for 'belief revision' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Sebastian Enqvist (2009). Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):527 - 548.score: 90.0
    The well known AGM framework for belief revision has recently been extended to include a model of the research agenda of the agent, i.e. a set of questions to which the agent wishes to find answers (Olsson & Westlund in Erkenntnis , 65 , 165–183, 2006 ). The resulting model has later come to be called interrogative belief revision . While belief revision has been studied extensively from the point of view of modal logic, (...)
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  2. Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (2008). Probabilistic Dynamic Belief Revision. Synthese 165 (2):179 - 202.score: 90.0
    We investigate the discrete (finite) case of the Popper–Renyi theory of conditional probability, introducing discrete conditional probabilistic models for knowledge and conditional belief, and comparing them with the more standard plausibility models. We also consider a related notion, that of safe belief, which is a weak (non-negatively introspective) type of “knowledge”. We develop a probabilistic version of this concept (“degree of safety”) and we analyze its role in games. We completely axiomatize the logic of conditional belief, knowledge (...)
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  3. Natasha Alechina, Mark Jago & Brian Logan (2008). Preference-Based Belief Revision for Rule-Based Agents. Synthese 165 (2):159-177.score: 90.0
    Agents which perform inferences on the basis of unreliable information need an ability to revise their beliefs if they discover an inconsistency. Such a belief revision algorithm ideally should be rational, should respect any preference ordering over the agent’s beliefs (removing less preferred beliefs where possible) and should be fast. However, while standard approaches to rational belief revision for classical reasoners allow preferences to be taken into account, they typically have quite high complexity. In this paper, (...)
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  4. Dongmo Zhang & Norman Foo (2001). Infinitary Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):525-570.score: 90.0
    This paper extends the AGM theory of belief revision to accommodate infinitary belief change. We generalize both axiomatization and modeling of the AGM theory. We show that most properties of the AGM belief change operations are preserved by the generalized operations whereas the infinitary belief change operations have their special properties. We prove that the extended axiomatic system for the generalized belief change operators with a Limit Postulate properly specifies infinite belief change. This (...)
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  5. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Sten Lindström (1994). How to Model Relational Belief Revision. In Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala. Kluwer.score: 90.0
    This is a short version of Lindström & Rabinowicz 1991.In earlier papers, we proposed a generalization of the AGM approach to belief revision. The proposal was to view belief revision as a relation rather than as a function on theories (or belief sets). Going relational means that one allows for several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition. In the present paper, we show that the relational approach is the natural result of (...)
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  6. Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1991). Epistemic Entrenchment with Incomparabilities and Relational Belief Revision. In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer.score: 90.0
    In earlier papers (Lindstrrm & Rabinowicz, 1989. 1990), we proposed a generalization of the AGM approach to belief revision. Our proposal was to view belief revision as a relation rather thanas a function on theories (or belief sets). The idea was to allow for there being several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition. In the present paper, we show that the relational approach is the natural result of generalizing in a certain (...)
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  7. Bernard Walliser, Denis Zwirn & Hervé Zwirn (2005). Abductive Logics in a Belief Revision Framework. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 14 (1):87-117.score: 90.0
    Abduction was first introduced in the epistemological context of scientific discovery. It was more recently analyzed in artificial intelligence, especially with respect to diagnosis analysis or ordinary reasoning. These two fields share a common view of abduction as a general process of hypotheses formation. More precisely, abduction is conceived as a kind of reverse explanation where a hypothesis H can be abduced from events E if H is a good explanation of E. The paper surveys four known schemes for abduction (...)
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  8. Sebastian Enqvist (2012). Interrogative Belief Revision Based on Epistemic Strategies. Studia Logica 100 (3):453-479.score: 90.0
    I develop a dynamic logic for reasoning about "interrogative belief revision", a new branch of belief revision theory that has been developed in a small number of papers, beginning with E. J. Olsson and D. Westlund's paper "On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change" [12]. In interrogative belief revision, epistemic states are taken to include a research agenda, consisting of questions the agent seeks to answer. I present a logic for (...) of such epistemic states based on the notion of an epistemic strategy, a stable plan of action that determines changes in the agent's research agenda. This idea is a further development of an idea put forward in [6], that changes in the research agenda of an agent should be determined by stable, "long term" research interests. I provide complete axioms and a decidability result for the logic. (shrink)
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  9. Frederik Van De Putte & Peter Verdée (2012). The Dynamics of Relevance: Adaptive Belief Revision. Synthese 187 (S1):1-42.score: 90.0
    This paper presents eight (previously unpublished) adaptive logics for belief revision, each of which define a belief revision operation in the sense of the AGM framework. All these revision operations are shown to satisfy the six basic AGM postulates for belief revision, and Parikh's axiom of Relevance. Using one of these logics as an example, we show how their proof theory gives a more dynamic flavor to belief revision than existing approaches. (...)
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  10. Nir Friedman & Joseph Y. Halpern (1999). Belief Revision: A Critique. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (4):401-420.score: 90.0
    We examine carefully the rationale underlying the approaches to belief change taken in the literature, and highlight what we view as methodological problems. We argue that to study belief change carefully, we must be quite explicit about the ontology or scenario underlying the belief change process. This is something that has been missing in previous work, with its focus on postulates. Our analysis shows that we must pay particular attention to two issues that have often been taken (...)
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  11. Eric Martin & Daniel Osherson (2000). Scientific Discovery on Positive Data Via Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (5):483-506.score: 90.0
    A model of inductive inquiry is defined within a first-order context. Intuitively, the model pictures inquiry as a game between Nature and a scientist. To begin the game, a nonlogical vocabulary is agreed upon by the two players along with a partition of a class of structures for that vocabulary. Next, Nature secretly chooses one structure ("the real world") from some cell of the partition. She then presents the scientist with a sequence of atomic facts about the chosen structure. With (...)
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  12. Hans van Ditmarsch (2013). Revocable Belief Revision. Studia Logica 101 (6):1185-1214.score: 90.0
    Krister Segerberg proposed irrevocable belief revision, to be contrasted with standard belief revision, in a setting wherein belief of propositional formulas is modelled explicitly. This suggests that in standard belief revision is revocable: one should be able to unmake (‘revoke’) the fresh belief in the revision formula, given yet further information that contradicts it. In a dynamic epistemic logical setting for belief revision, for multiple agents, we investigate what the (...)
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  13. Holger Andreas (2011). A Structuralist Theory of Belief Revision. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (2):205-232.score: 90.0
    The present paper aims at a synthesis of belief revision theory with the Sneed formalism known as the structuralist theory of science. This synthesis is brought about by a dynamisation of classical structuralism, with an abductive inference rule and base generated revisions in the style of Rott (2001). The formalism of prioritised default logic (PDL) serves as the medium of the synthesis. Why seek to integrate the Sneed formalism into belief revision theory? With the hybrid system (...)
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  14. Andrés Perea (2009). A Model of Minimal Probabilistic Belief Revision. Theory and Decision 67 (2):163-222.score: 90.0
    In the literature there are at least two models for probabilistic belief revision: Bayesian updating and imaging [Lewis, D. K. (1973), Counterfactuals, Blackwell, Oxford; Gärdenfors, P. (1988), Knowledge in flux: modeling the dynamics of epistemic states, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA]. In this paper we focus on imaging rules that can be described by the following procedure: (1) Identify every state with some real valued vector of characteristics, and accordingly identify every probabilistic belief with an expected vector of (...)
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  15. Georg Brun & Hans Rott (2013). Interpreting Enthymematic Arguments Using Belief Revision. Synthese 190 (18):4041-4063.score: 81.0
    This paper is about the situation in which an author (writer or speaker) presents a deductively invalid argument, but the addressee aims at a charitable interpretation and has reason to assume that the author intends to present a valid argument. How can he go about interpreting the author’s reasoning as enthymematically valid? We suggest replacing the usual find-the-missing-premise approaches by an approach based on systematic efforts to ascribe a belief state to the author against the background of which the (...)
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  16. Giacomo Bonanno (2012). Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-Consistency and Iterated Revision. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):201-236.score: 81.0
    We study belief change in the branching-time structures introduced in Bonanno (Artif Intell 171:144–160, 2007 ). First, we identify a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent (when the set of states is finite) to AGM-consistency, which is defined as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent if the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant pair and an arbitrary model based on that frame can be extended to a full belief revision function that satisfies (...)
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  17. Marcelo Alejandro Falappa, Alejandro Javier García, Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Guillermo Ricardo Simari (2013). Stratified Belief Bases Revision with Argumentative Inference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):161-193.score: 78.0
    We propose a revision operator on a stratified belief base, i.e., a belief base that stores beliefs in different strata corresponding to the value an agent assigns to these beliefs. Furthermore, the operator will be defined as to perform the revision in such a way that information is never lost upon revision but stored in a stratum or layer containing information perceived as having a lower value. In this manner, if the revision of one (...)
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  18. Hans Rott (2012). Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):173-200.score: 78.0
    This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the (...) does not depend on the reference sentence (although the posterior belief state does depend on it). Bounded revision satisfies the Darwiche–Pearl (DP) axioms for iterated belief change. If the reference sentence is fixed to be a tautology or a contradiction, two well-known one-dimensional revision operations result. Bounded revision thus naturally fills the space between conservative revision (also known as natural revision) and moderate revision (also known as lexicographic revision). I compare this approach to the two-dimensional model of ‘revision by comparison’ investigated by Fermé and Rott (Artif Intell 157:5–47, 2004 ) that satisfies neither the SBC nor the DP axioms. I conclude that two-dimensional revision operations add substantially to the expressive power of qualitative approaches that do not make use of numbers as measures of degrees of belief. (shrink)
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  19. Simon D'Alfonso (2011). Supplementing Belief Revision for The Aim of Truthlikeness. The Reasoner 5 (9):143-144.score: 75.0
  20. Emmanuel J. Genot (2009). The Game of Inquiry: The Interrogative Approach to Inquiry and Belief Revision Theory. Synthese 171 (2):271 - 289.score: 66.0
    I. Levi has advocated a decision-theoretic account of belief revision. We argue that the game-theoretic framework of Interrogative Inquiry Games , proposed by J. Hintikka, can extend and clarify this account. We show that some strategic use of the game rules (or ‘policies’) generate Expansions , Contractions and Revisions , and we give representation results. We then extend the framework to represent explicitly (multiple) sources of answers , and apply it to discuss the Recovery Postulate. We conclude (...)
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  21. Craig Boutilier (1996). Iterated Revision and Minimal Change of Conditional Beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):263 - 305.score: 63.0
    We describe a model of iterated belief revision that extends the AGM theory of revision to account for the effect of a revision on the conditional beliefs of an agent. In particular, this model ensures that an agent makes as few changes as possible to the conditional component of its belief set. Adopting the Ramsey test, minimal conditional revision provides acceptance conditions for arbitrary right-nested conditionals. We show that problem of determining acceptance of any (...)
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  22. Robert Stalnaker (2009). Iterated Belief Revision. Erkenntnis 70 (2):189 - 209.score: 60.0
    This is a discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new information, but also for revising one’s revision rules in response to potential new information. The emphasis in the paper is on foundational questions about the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the (...)
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  23. Peter Fritz, Belief Revision in Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Ranking Theory.score: 60.0
    I want to look at recent developments of representing AGM-style belief revision in dynamic epistemic logics and the options for doing something similar for ranking theory. Formally, my aim will be modest: I will define a version of basic dynamic doxastic logic using ranking functions as the semantics. I will show why formalizing ranking theory this way is useful for the ranking theorist first by showing how it enables one to compare ranking theory more easily with other approaches (...)
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  24. Mark Ryan & Pierre-Yves Schobbens (1995). Belief Revision and Verisimilitude. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (1):15-29.score: 60.0
    The Egli-Milner power-ordering is used to define verisimilitude orderings on theories from preference orderings on models. The effects of the definitions on constraints such as stopperedness and soundness are explored. Orderings on theories are seen to contain more information than orderings on models. Belief revision is defined in terms of both types of orderings, and conditions are given which make the two notions coincide.
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  25. Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa (2012). &Quot;merely a Logician's Toy?&Quot; Belief Revision Confronting Scientific Theory Change. [REVIEW] Metascience 21 (2):463-466.score: 60.0
    Review of Olsson, Erik J. and Enqvist, Sebastian (Eds.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science .
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  26. Sven Ove Hansson, Ten Philosophical Problems in Belief Revision.score: 60.0
    The paper introduces ten open problems in belief revision theory, related to the representation of the belief state, to different notions of degrees of belief, and to the nature of change operations. It is argued that these problems are all issues in philosopical logic, in the strong sense of requiring inputs from both logic and philosophy for their solution.
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  27. Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl (1997). On the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision. Artificial Intelligence 89:1-29.score: 60.0
    We show in this paper that the AGM postulates are too weak to ensure the rational preservation of conditional beliefs during belief revision, thus permitting improper responses to sequences of observations. We remedy this weakness by proposing four additional postulates, which are sound relative to a qualitative version of probabilistic conditioning. Contrary to the AGM framework, the proposed postulates characterize belief revision as a process which may depend on elements of an epistemic state that are not (...)
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  28. Sven Ove Hansson (2006). Coherence in Epistemology and Belief Revision. Philosophical Studies 128 (1):93 - 108.score: 60.0
    A general theory of coherence is proposed, in which systemic and relational coherence are shown to be interdefinable. When this theory is applied to sets of sentences, it turns out that logical closure obscures the distinctions that are needed for a meaningful analysis of coherence. It is concluded that references to “all beliefs” in coherentist phrases such as “all beliefs support each other” have to be modified so that merely derived beliefs are excluded. Therefore, in order to avoid absurd conclusions, (...)
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  29. John L. Pollock & Anthony S. Gillies (2000). Belief Revision and Epistemology. Synthese 122 (1-2):69-92.score: 60.0
    Postulational approaches attempt to understand the dynamics of belief revision by appealing to no more than the set of beliefs held by an agent and the logical relations between them. It is argued there that such an approach cannot work. A proper account of belief revision must also appeal to the arguments supporting beliefs, and recognize that those arguments can be defeasible. If we begin with a mature epistemological theory that accommodates this, it can be seen (...)
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  30. Giacomo Bonanno (2008). Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework. In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press.score: 60.0
    The theory of belief revision deals with (rational) changes in beliefs in response to new information. In the literature a distinction has been drawn between belief revision and belief update (see [6]). The former deals with situations where the objective facts describing the world do not change (so that only the beliefs of the agent change over time), while the letter allows for situations where both the facts and the doxastic state of the agent change (...)
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  31. Gerard Renardel de Lavalette & Sjoerd Zwart (2011). Belief Revision and Verisimilitude Based on Preference and Truth Orderings. Erkenntnis 75 (2):237-254.score: 60.0
    In this rather technical paper we establish a useful combination of belief revision and verisimilitude according to which better theories provide better predictions, and revising with more verisimilar data results in theories that are closer to the truth. Moreover, this paper presents two alternative definitions of refined verisimilitude, which are more perspicuous than the algebraic version used in previous publications.
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  32. Neil Tennant (2008). Belief-Revision, the Ramsey Test, Monotonicity, and the so-Called Impossibility Results. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):402-423.score: 60.0
    Peter G¨ ardenfors proved a theorem purporting to show that it is impossible to adjoin to the AGM -postulates for belief-revision a principle of monotonicity for revisions. The principle of monotonicity in question is implied by the Ramsey test for conditionals. So G¨.
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  33. Giacomo Bonanno (2007). Axiomatic Characterization of the AGM Theory of Belief Revision in a Temporal Logic. Artificial Intelligence 171 (2-3):144-160.score: 60.0
    Since belief revision deals with the interaction of belief and information over time, branching-time temporal logic seems a natural setting for a theory of belief change. We propose two extensions of a modal logic that, besides the next-time temporal operator, contains a belief operator and an information operator. The first logic is shown to provide an axiomatic characterization of the first six postulates of the AGM theory of belief revision, while the second, stronger, (...)
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  34. Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz (1992). Belief Revision, Epistemic Conditionals and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 91 (3):195 - 237.score: 60.0
    Epistemic conditionals have often been thought to satisfy the Ramsey test (RT): If A, then B is acceptable in a belief state G if and only if B should be accepted upon revising G with A. But as Peter Gärdenfors has shown, RT conflicts with the intuitively plausible condition of Preservation on belief revision. We investigate what happens if (a) RT is retained while Preservation is weakened, or (b) vice versa. We also generalize Gärdenfors' approach by (...)
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  35. Hans Rott (2008). A New Psychologism in Logic? Reflections From the Point of View of Belief Revision. Studia Logica 88 (1):113 - 136.score: 60.0
    This paper addresses the question whether the past couple of decades of formal research in belief revision offers evidence of a new psychologism in logic. In the first part I examine five potential arguments in favour of this thesis and find them all wanting. In the second part of the paper I argue that belief revision research has climbed up a hierarchy of models for the change of doxastic states that appear to be clearly normative at (...)
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  36. Kevin T. Kelly (1999). Iterated Belief Revision, Reliability, and Inductive Amnesia. Erkenntnis 50 (1):11-58.score: 60.0
    Belief revision theory concerns methods for reformulating an agent's epistemic state when the agent's beliefs are refuted by new information. The usual guiding principle in the design of such methods is to preserve as much of the agent's epistemic state as possible when the state is revised. Learning theoretic research focuses, instead, on a learning method's reliability or ability to converge to true, informative beliefs over a wide range of possible environments. This paper bridges the two perspectives by (...)
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  37. Giacomo Bonanno (2009). Rational Choice and Agm Belief Revision. Artificial Intelligence 173:1194-1203.score: 60.0
    We establish a correspondence between the rationalizability of choice studied in the revealed preference literature and the notion of minimal belief revision captured by the AGM postulates. A choice frame consists of a set of alternatives , a collection E of subsets of (representing possible choice sets) and a function f : E ! 2 (representing choices made). A choice frame is rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order R on..
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  38. Johan van Benthem (2007). Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.score: 60.0
    We show how belief revision can be treated systematically in the format of dynamicepistemic logic, when operators of conditional belief are added. The core engine consists of definable update rules for changing plausibility relations between worlds, which have been proposed independently in the dynamic-epistemic literature on preference change. Our analysis yields two new types of modal result. First, we obtain complete logics for concrete mechanisms of belief revision, based on compositional reduction axioms. Next, we show (...)
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  39. Edwin D. Mares (2002). A Paraconsistent Theory of Belief Revision. Erkenntnis 56 (2):229 - 246.score: 60.0
    This paper presents a theory of belief revision that allows people to come tobelieve in contradictions. The AGM theory of belief revision takes revision,in part, to be consistency maintenance. The present theory replacesconsistency with a weaker property called coherence. In addition to herbelief set, we take a set of statements that she rejects. These two sets arecoherent if they do not overlap. On this theory, belief revision maintains coherence.
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  40. Mark Jago (2006). Resource-Bounded Belief Revision and Contraction. In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer. 141--154.score: 60.0
    Agents need to be able to change their beliefs; in particular, they should be able to contract or remove a certain belief in order to restore consistency to their set of beliefs, and revise their beliefs by incorporating a new belief which may be inconsistent with their previous beliefs. An influential theory of belief change proposed by Alchourron, G¨ardenfors and Makinson (AGM) [1] describes postulates which a rational belief revision and contraction operations should satisfy. The (...)
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  41. Jan van Eijck, Yet More Modal Logics of Preference Change and Belief Revision.score: 60.0
    We contrast Bonanno’s ‘Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework’ [15] with preference change and belief revision from the perspective of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL). For that, we extend the logic of communication and change of [11] with relational substitutions [8] for preference change, and show that this does not alter its properties. Next we move to a more constrained context where belief and knowledge can be defined from preferences [29; 14; 5; 7], prove completeness of (...)
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  42. Jan van Eijck, Propositional Dynamic Logic as a Logic of Knowledge Update and Belief Revision.score: 60.0
    This talk shows how propositional dynamic logic (PDL) can be interpreted as a logic for multi-agent knowledge update and belief revision, or as a logic of preference change, if the basic relations are read as preferences instead of plausibilities. Our point of departure is the logic of communication and change (LCC) of [9]. Like LCC, our logic uses PDL as a base epistemic language. Unlike LCC, we start out from agent plausibilities, add their converses, and build knowledge and (...)
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  43. Moisés Goldszmidt & Judea Pearl (1996). Qualitative Probabilities for Default Reasoning, Belief Revision, and Causal Modeling. Artificial Intelligence 84:57-112.score: 60.0
    This paper presents a formalism that combines useful properties of both logic and probabilities. Like logic, the formalism admits qualitative sentences and provides symbolic machinery for deriving deductively closed beliefs and, like probability, it permits us to express if-then rules with different levels of firmness and to retract beliefs in response to changing observations. Rules are interpreted as order-of-magnitude approximations of conditional probabilities which impose constraints over the rankings of worlds. Inferences are supported by a unique priority ordering on rules (...)
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  44. Kevin Kelly, The Learning Power of Belief Revision.score: 60.0
    Belief revision theory aims to describe how one should change one’s beliefs when they are contradicted by newly input information. The guiding principle of belief revision theory is to change one’s prior beliefs as little as possible in order to maintain consistency with the new information. Learning theory focuses, instead, on learning power: the ability to arrive at true beliefs in a wide range of possible environments. The goal of this paper is to bridge the two (...)
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  45. Paul Thagard & Scott Findlay (2011). Changing Minds About Climate Change: Belief Revision, Coherence, and Emotion. In. In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. 329--345.score: 60.0
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  46. Lydia Mechtenberg (2004). The Stability Theory of Knowledge and Belief Revision: Comments on Rott. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):495 - 507.score: 60.0
    In this commentary on Rotts paper Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge, I discuss two problems of the stability theory of knowledge which are pointed out by Rott. I conclude that these problems offer no reason for rejecting the stability theory, but might be grounds for deviating from the standard AGM account of belief revision which Rott presupposes.
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  47. Jan van Eijck & Yanjing Wang, Propositional Dynamic Logic as a Logic of Belief Revision.score: 60.0
    This paper shows how propositional dynamic logic (PDL) can be interpreted as a logic for multi-agent belief revision. For that we revise and extend the logic of communication and change (LCC) of [9]. Like LCC, our logic uses PDL as a base epistemic language. Unlike LCC, we start out from agent plausibilities, add their converses, and build knowledge and belief operators from these with the PDL constructs. We extend the update mechanism of LCC to an update mechanism (...)
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  48. Dov Gabbay, Odinaldo Rodrigues & Alessandra Russo (2008). Belief Revision in Non-Classical Logics. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (3):267-304.score: 60.0
    In this article, we propose a belief revision approach for families of (non-classical) logics whose semantics are first-order axiomatisable. Given any such (non-classical) logic , the approach enables the definition of belief revision operators for , in terms of a belief revision operation satisfying the postulates for revision theory proposed by Alchourrrdenfors and Makinson (AGM revision, Alchourrukasiewicz's many-valued logic. In addition, we present a general methodology to translate algebraic logics into classical logic. (...)
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  49. Laura Giordano, Valentina Gliozzi & Nicola Olivetti (2002). Iterated Belief Revision and Conditional Logic. Studia Logica 70 (1):23-47.score: 60.0
    In this paper we propose a conditional logic called IBC to represent iterated belief revision systems. We propose a set of postulates for iterated revision which are a small variant of Darwiche and Pearl''s ones. The conditional logic IBC has a standard semantics in terms of selection function models and provides a natural representation of epistemic states. We establish a correspondence between iterated belief revision systems and IBC-models. Our representation theorem does not entail Gärdenfors'' Triviality (...)
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  50. Brian Hill (2008). Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part II: Belief Revision. Studia Logica 89 (3):291 - 323.score: 60.0
    In the companion paper (Towards a “sophisticated” model of belief dynamics. Part I), a general framework for realistic modelling of instantaneous states of belief and of the operations involving them was presented and motivated. In this paper, the framework is applied to the case of belief revision. A model of belief revision shall be obtained which, firstly, recovers the Gärdenfors postulates in a well-specified, natural yet simple class of particular circumstances; secondly, can accommodate iterated (...)
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