Search results for 'belief revision' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  84
    Rafael R. Testa, Marcelo E. Coniglio & Márcio M. Ribeiro (2015). Paraconsistent Belief Revision Based on a Formal Consistency Operator. CLE E-Prints 15 (8):01-11.
    In this paper two systems of AGM-like Paraconsistent Belief Revision are overviewed, both defined over Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) due to the possibility of defining a formal consistency operator within these logics. The AGM° system is strongly based on this operator and internalize the notion of formal consistency in the explicit constructions and postulates. Alternatively, the AGMp system uses the AGM-compliance of LFIs and thus assumes a wider notion of paraconsistency - not necessarily related to the notion (...)
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  2. Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley (2016). Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint Characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's Rules. Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which (...)
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  3. Hans Rott (2000). Two Dogmas of Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):503-522.
    The paper attacks the almost universally held view that belief revison theories, as they have been studied in the literature of the past two decades, are founded on a Principle of Minimal Change, or Principle of Informational Economy. The principle comes in two versions. According to the first, an agent should, when accepting new information, aim at a posterior belief set that minimizes the items on which it disagrees with the prior belief set. If there are different (...)
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  4. Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (2008). Probabilistic Dynamic Belief Revision. Synthese 165 (2):179 - 202.
    We investigate the discrete (finite) case of the Popper–Renyi theory of conditional probability, introducing discrete conditional probabilistic models for knowledge and conditional belief, and comparing them with the more standard plausibility models. We also consider a related notion, that of safe belief, which is a weak (non-negatively introspective) type of “knowledge”. We develop a probabilistic version of this concept (“degree of safety”) and we analyze its role in games. We completely axiomatize the logic of conditional belief, knowledge (...)
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  5.  33
    Nir Friedman & Joseph Y. Halpern (1999). Belief Revision: A Critique. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (4):401-420.
    We examine carefully the rationale underlying the approaches to belief change taken in the literature, and highlight what we view as methodological problems. We argue that to study belief change carefully, we must be quite explicit about the ontology or scenario underlying the belief change process. This is something that has been missing in previous work, with its focus on postulates. Our analysis shows that we must pay particular attention to two issues that have often been taken (...)
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  6.  90
    Franz Huber (2013). Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):613-621.
    Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I, I have first presented the AGM theory of belief revision. Then I have focused on the problem of iterated belief revisions. In part II, I will first present ranking theory (Spohn 1988). Then I will show how it solves the problem of iterated belief revisions. I will conclude by sketching two areas of future (...)
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  7.  34
    Holger Andreas (2011). A Structuralist Theory of Belief Revision. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (2):205-232.
    The present paper aims at a synthesis of belief revision theory with the Sneed formalism known as the structuralist theory of science. This synthesis is brought about by a dynamisation of classical structuralism, with an abductive inference rule and base generated revisions in the style of Rott (2001). The formalism of prioritised default logic (PDL) serves as the medium of the synthesis. Why seek to integrate the Sneed formalism into belief revision theory? With the hybrid system (...)
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  8. Hans Rott (2008). Belief Revision. In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press 514--534.
    This is a survey paper. Contents: 1 Introduction -- 2 The representation of belief -- 3 Kinds of belief change -- 4 Coherence constraints for belief revision -- 5 Different modes of belief change -- 6 Two strategies for characterizing rational changes of belief - 6.1 The postulates strategy - 6.2 The constructive strategy -- 7 An abstract view of the elements of belief change -- 8 Iterated changes of belief -- 9 (...)
     
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  9.  74
    Sebastian Enqvist (2009). Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):527 - 548.
    The well known AGM framework for belief revision has recently been extended to include a model of the research agenda of the agent, i.e. a set of questions to which the agent wishes to find answers (Olsson & Westlund in Erkenntnis , 65 , 165–183, 2006 ). The resulting model has later come to be called interrogative belief revision . While belief revision has been studied extensively from the point of view of modal logic, (...)
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  10.  43
    Dongmo Zhang & Norman Foo (2001). Infinitary Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):525-570.
    This paper extends the AGM theory of belief revision to accommodate infinitary belief change. We generalize both axiomatization and modeling of the AGM theory. We show that most properties of the AGM belief change operations are preserved by the generalized operations whereas the infinitary belief change operations have their special properties. We prove that the extended axiomatic system for the generalized belief change operators with a Limit Postulate properly specifies infinite belief change. This (...)
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  11.  18
    Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1991). Epistemic Entrenchment with Incomparabilities and Relational Belief Revision. In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer
    In earlier papers (Lindstrrm & Rabinowicz, 1989. 1990), we proposed a generalization of the AGM approach to belief revision. Our proposal was to view belief revision as a relation rather thanas a function on theories (or belief sets). The idea was to allow for there being several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition. In the present paper, we show that the relational approach is the natural result of generalizing in a certain (...)
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  12.  15
    Yongfeng Yuan & Shier Ju (2015). Rational Evaluation in Belief Revision. Synthese 192 (7):2311-2336.
    We introduce a new operator, called rational evaluation, in belief change. The operator evaluates new information according to the agent’s core beliefs, and then exports the plausible part of the new information. It belongs to the decision module in belief change. We characterize rational evaluation by axiomatic postulates and propose two functional constructions for it, based on the well-known constructions of kernel sets and remainder sets, respectively. The main results of the paper are two representation theorems with respect (...)
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  13. Andrés Páez (2006). Explanations in K: An Analysis of Explanation as a Belief Revision Operation. Athena Verlag.
    Explanation and understanding are intimately connected notions, but the nature of that connection has generally not been considered a topic worthy of serious philosophical investigation. Most authors have avoided making reference to the notion of understanding in their accounts of explanation because they fear that any mention of the epistemic states of the individuals involved compromises the objectivity of explanation. Understanding is a pragmatic notion, they argue, and pragmatics should be kept at a safe distance from the universal features of (...)
     
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  14.  17
    Zachary Horne, Derek Powell & John Hummel (2015). A Single Counterexample Leads to Moral Belief Revision. Cognitive Science 39 (8):1950-1964.
    What kind of evidence will lead people to revise their moral beliefs? Moral beliefs are often strongly held convictions, and existing research has shown that morality is rooted in emotion and socialization rather than deliberative reasoning. In addition, more general issues—such as confirmation bias—further impede coherent belief revision. Here, we explored a unique means for inducing belief revision. In two experiments, participants considered a moral dilemma in which an overwhelming majority of people judged that it was (...)
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  15.  22
    Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley, A Unified Characterization of Belief-Revision Rules.
    This paper characterizes several belief-revision rules in a unified framework: Bayesian revision upon learning some event, Jeffrey revision upon learning new probabilities of some events, Adams revision upon learning some new conditional probabilities, and 'dual-Jeffrey' revision upon learning a new conditional probability function. Despite their differences, these revision rules can be characterized in terms of the same two axioms: responsiveness, which requires that revised beliefs incorporate what has been learnt, and conservativeness, which requires (...)
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  16.  29
    Eric Martin & Daniel Osherson (2000). Scientific Discovery on Positive Data Via Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (5):483-506.
    A model of inductive inquiry is defined within a first-order context. Intuitively, the model pictures inquiry as a game between Nature and a scientist. To begin the game, a nonlogical vocabulary is agreed upon by the two players along with a partition of a class of structures for that vocabulary. Next, Nature secretly chooses one structure ("the real world") from some cell of the partition. She then presents the scientist with a sequence of atomic facts about the chosen structure. With (...)
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  17.  14
    Andrés Perea (2009). A Model of Minimal Probabilistic Belief Revision. Theory and Decision 67 (2):163-222.
    In the literature there are at least two models for probabilistic belief revision: Bayesian updating and imaging [Lewis, D. K. (1973), Counterfactuals, Blackwell, Oxford; Gärdenfors, P. (1988), Knowledge in flux: modeling the dynamics of epistemic states, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA]. In this paper we focus on imaging rules that can be described by the following procedure: (1) Identify every state with some real valued vector of characteristics, and accordingly identify every probabilistic belief with an expected vector of (...)
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  18.  65
    Natasha Alechina, Mark Jago & Brian Logan (2008). Preference-Based Belief Revision for Rule-Based Agents. Synthese 165 (2):159-177.
    Agents which perform inferences on the basis of unreliable information need an ability to revise their beliefs if they discover an inconsistency. Such a belief revision algorithm ideally should be rational, should respect any preference ordering over the agent’s beliefs (removing less preferred beliefs where possible) and should be fast. However, while standard approaches to rational belief revision for classical reasoners allow preferences to be taken into account, they typically have quite high complexity. In this paper, (...)
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  19.  18
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Sten Lindström (1994). How to Model Relational Belief Revision. In Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala. Kluwer
    This is a short version of Lindström & Rabinowicz 1991.In earlier papers, we proposed a generalization of the AGM approach to belief revision. The proposal was to view belief revision as a relation rather than as a function on theories (or belief sets). Going relational means that one allows for several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition. In the present paper, we show that the relational approach is the natural result of (...)
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  20.  4
    Hans Rott (2008). A New Psychologism in Logic? Reflections From the Point of View of Belief Revision. Studia Logica 88 (1):113-136.
    This paper addresses the question whether the past couple of decades of formal research in belief revision offers evidence of a new psychologism in logic. In the first part I examine five potential arguments in favour of this thesis and find them all wanting. In the second part of the paper I argue that belief revision research has climbed up a hierarchy of models for the change of doxastic states that appear to be clearly normative at (...)
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  21.  21
    Frederik Van De Putte & Peter Verdée (2012). The Dynamics of Relevance: Adaptive Belief Revision. Synthese 187 (S1):1-42.
    This paper presents eight (previously unpublished) adaptive logics for belief revision, each of which define a belief revision operation in the sense of the AGM framework. All these revision operations are shown to satisfy the six basic AGM postulates for belief revision, and Parikh's axiom of Relevance. Using one of these logics as an example, we show how their proof theory gives a more dynamic flavor to belief revision than existing approaches. (...)
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  22.  20
    Sebastian Enqvist (2012). Interrogative Belief Revision Based on Epistemic Strategies. Studia Logica 100 (3):453-479.
    I develop a dynamic logic for reasoning about "interrogative belief revision", a new branch of belief revision theory that has been developed in a small number of papers, beginning with E. J. Olsson and D. Westlund's paper "On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change" [12]. In interrogative belief revision, epistemic states are taken to include a research agenda, consisting of questions the agent seeks to answer. I present a logic for (...) of such epistemic states based on the notion of an epistemic strategy, a stable plan of action that determines changes in the agent's research agenda. This idea is a further development of an idea put forward in [6], that changes in the research agenda of an agent should be determined by stable, "long term" research interests. I provide complete axioms and a decidability result for the logic. (shrink)
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  23.  33
    Bernard Walliser, Denis Zwirn & Hervé Zwirn (2005). Abductive Logics in a Belief Revision Framework. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 14 (1):87-117.
    Abduction was first introduced in the epistemological context of scientific discovery. It was more recently analyzed in artificial intelligence, especially with respect to diagnosis analysis or ordinary reasoning. These two fields share a common view of abduction as a general process of hypotheses formation. More precisely, abduction is conceived as a kind of reverse explanation where a hypothesis H can be abduced from events E if H is a good explanation of E. The paper surveys four known schemes for abduction (...)
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  24.  6
    Hans van Ditmarsch (2013). Revocable Belief Revision. Studia Logica 101 (6):1185-1214.
    Krister Segerberg proposed irrevocable belief revision, to be contrasted with standard belief revision, in a setting wherein belief of propositional formulas is modelled explicitly. This suggests that in standard belief revision is revocable: one should be able to unmake (‘revoke’) the fresh belief in the revision formula, given yet further information that contradicts it. In a dynamic epistemic logical setting for belief revision, for multiple agents, we investigate what the (...)
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  25. Belief Revision (1994). Michael Goldstein. In Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala. Kluwer 117.
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  26. How to Model Relational Belief Revision (1994). Wlodzmierz Rabinowicz and Sten Lindstrom. In Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala. Kluwer 69.
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  27. Hans Rott (2008). Information Structures in Belief Revision. In Pieter Adriaans Johan van Benthem (ed.), Philosophy of Information, Vol. 8 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science. Elsevier 457-482.
    This is a survey paper. Contents: 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminary remarks on information, truth and mind - 2.1 Remarks on information and truth - 2.2 Some clues from the philosophy of mind - 2.3 Functionalism as applied to belief revision - 2.4 Filling in the parameters -- 3 Belief change = revision + reflection - 3.1 Foundationalism - 3.2 Coherentism -- 4 Inference operations for simple change operations: three examples - 4.1 Example 1: flat data (...)
     
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  28. Paul Weingartner, Elena Klevakina-Uljanov, Gerhard Schurz & International Conference on Scientific and Religious Belief (1994). Scientific and Religious Belief.
     
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  29.  58
    Hans Rott (2001). Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Oxford University Press.
    Change, Choice and Inference develops logical theories that are necessary both for the understanding of adaptable human reasoning and for the design of intelligent systems. The book shows that reasoning processes - the drawing on inferences and changing one's beliefs - can be viewed as belonging to the realm of practical reason by embedding logical theories into the broader context of the theory of rational choice. The book unifies lively and significant strands of research in logic, philosophy, economics and artificial (...)
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  30. Simon D'Alfonso (2011). Supplementing Belief Revision for The Aim of Truthlikeness. The Reasoner 5 (9):143-144.
  31.  45
    Georg Brun & Hans Rott (2013). Interpreting Enthymematic Arguments Using Belief Revision. Synthese 190 (18):4041-4063.
    This paper is about the situation in which an author (writer or speaker) presents a deductively invalid argument, but the addressee aims at a charitable interpretation and has reason to assume that the author intends to present a valid argument. How can he go about interpreting the author’s reasoning as enthymematically valid? We suggest replacing the usual find-the-missing-premise approaches by an approach based on systematic efforts to ascribe a belief state to the author against the background of which the (...)
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  32.  38
    Giacomo Bonanno (2012). Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-Consistency and Iterated Revision. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):201-236.
    We study belief change in the branching-time structures introduced in Bonanno (Artif Intell 171:144–160, 2007 ). First, we identify a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent (when the set of states is finite) to AGM-consistency, which is defined as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent if the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant pair and an arbitrary model based on that frame can be extended to a full belief revision function that satisfies (...)
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  33.  14
    Marcelo Alejandro Falappa, Alejandro Javier García, Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Guillermo Ricardo Simari (2013). Stratified Belief Bases Revision with Argumentative Inference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):161-193.
    We propose a revision operator on a stratified belief base, i.e., a belief base that stores beliefs in different strata corresponding to the value an agent assigns to these beliefs. Furthermore, the operator will be defined as to perform the revision in such a way that information is never lost upon revision but stored in a stratum or layer containing information perceived as having a lower value. In this manner, if the revision of one (...)
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  34.  19
    Hans Rott (2012). Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):173-200.
    This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the (...) does not depend on the reference sentence (although the posterior belief state does depend on it). Bounded revision satisfies the Darwiche–Pearl (DP) axioms for iterated belief change. If the reference sentence is fixed to be a tautology or a contradiction, two well-known one-dimensional revision operations result. Bounded revision thus naturally fills the space between conservative revision (also known as natural revision) and moderate revision (also known as lexicographic revision). I compare this approach to the two-dimensional model of ‘revision by comparison’ investigated by Fermé and Rott (Artif Intell 157:5–47, 2004 ) that satisfies neither the SBC nor the DP axioms. I conclude that two-dimensional revision operations add substantially to the expressive power of qualitative approaches that do not make use of numbers as measures of degrees of belief. (shrink)
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  35.  65
    Johan van Benthem (2007). Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
    We show how belief revision can be treated systematically in the format of dynamicepistemic logic, when operators of conditional belief are added. The core engine consists of definable update rules for changing plausibility relations between worlds, which have been proposed independently in the dynamic-epistemic literature on preference change. Our analysis yields two new types of modal result. First, we obtain complete logics for concrete mechanisms of belief revision, based on compositional reduction axioms. Next, we show (...)
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  36.  49
    Emmanuel J. Genot (2009). The Game of Inquiry: The Interrogative Approach to Inquiry and Belief Revision Theory. Synthese 171 (2):271-289.
    I. Levi has advocated a decision-theoretic account of belief revision. We argue that the game-theoretic framework of Interrogative Inquiry Games, proposed by J. Hintikka, can extend and clarify this account. We show that some strategic use of the game rules generate Expansions, Contractions and Revisions, and we give representation results. We then extend the framework to represent explicitly sources of answers, and apply it to discuss the Recovery Postulate. We conclude with some remarks about the potential extensions of (...)
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  37. Sven Ove Hansson, Ten Philosophical Problems in Belief Revision.
    The paper introduces ten open problems in belief revision theory, related to the representation of the belief state, to different notions of degrees of belief, and to the nature of change operations. It is argued that these problems are all issues in philosopical logic, in the strong sense of requiring inputs from both logic and philosophy for their solution.
     
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  38.  21
    Hans P. Van Ditmarsch (2005). Prolegomena to Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision. Synthese 147 (2):229-275.
    In ‘belief revision’ a theory is revised with a formula φ resulting in a revised theory . Typically, is in , one has to give up belief in by a process of retraction, and φ is in . We propose to model belief revision in a dynamic epistemic logic. In this setting, we typically have an information state (pointed Kripke model) for the theory wherein the agent believes the negation of the revision formula, i.e., (...)
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  39. Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl (1997). On the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision. Artificial Intelligence 89:1-29.
    We show in this paper that the AGM postulates are too weak to ensure the rational preservation of conditional beliefs during belief revision, thus permitting improper responses to sequences of observations. We remedy this weakness by proposing four additional postulates, which are sound relative to a qualitative version of probabilistic conditioning. Contrary to the AGM framework, the proposed postulates characterize belief revision as a process which may depend on elements of an epistemic state that are not (...)
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  40. Robert Stalnaker (2009). Iterated Belief Revision. Erkenntnis 70 (2):189 - 209.
    This is a discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new information, but also for revising one’s revision rules in response to potential new information. The emphasis in the paper is on foundational questions about the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the (...)
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  41.  12
    Krister Segerberg (1998). Irrevocable Belief Revision in Dynamic Doxastic Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 39 (3):287-306.
    In this paper we present a new modeling for belief revision that is what we term irrevocable. This modeling is of philosophical interest since it captures some features of suppositional reasoning, and of formal interest since it is closely connected with AGM, yet provides for iterated belief revision. The analysis is couched in terms of dynamic doxastic logic.
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  42.  12
    Daniel Lehmann, Menachem Magidor & Karl Schlechta (2001). Distance Semantics for Belief Revision. Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (1):295-317.
    A vast and interesting family of natural semantics for belief revision is defined. Suppose one is given a distance d between any two models. One may then define the revision of a theory K by a formula α as the theory defined by the set of all those models of α that are closest, by d, to the set of models of K. This family is characterized by a set of rationality postulates that extends the AGM postulates. (...)
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  43.  53
    Giacomo Bonanno (2007). Axiomatic Characterization of the AGM Theory of Belief Revision in a Temporal Logic. Artificial Intelligence 171 (2-3):144-160.
    Since belief revision deals with the interaction of belief and information over time, branching-time temporal logic seems a natural setting for a theory of belief change. We propose two extensions of a modal logic that, besides the next-time temporal operator, contains a belief operator and an information operator. The first logic is shown to provide an axiomatic characterization of the first six postulates of the AGM theory of belief revision, while the second, stronger, (...)
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  44. Franz Huber (2013). Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):604-612.
    Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I I will first present the AGM theory of belief revision (Alchourrón & Gärdenfors & Makinson 1985). Then I will focus on the problem of iterated belief revisions.
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  45. Moisés Goldszmidt & Judea Pearl (1996). Qualitative Probabilities for Default Reasoning, Belief Revision, and Causal Modeling. Artificial Intelligence 84:57-112.
    This paper presents a formalism that combines useful properties of both logic and probabilities. Like logic, the formalism admits qualitative sentences and provides symbolic machinery for deriving deductively closed beliefs and, like probability, it permits us to express if-then rules with different levels of firmness and to retract beliefs in response to changing observations. Rules are interpreted as order-of-magnitude approximations of conditional probabilities which impose constraints over the rankings of worlds. Inferences are supported by a unique priority ordering on rules (...)
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  46.  23
    Sven Ove Hansson (1999). A Survey of Non-Prioritized Belief Revision. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):413-427.
    This paper summarizes and systematizes recent and ongoing work on non-prioritized belief change, i.e., belief revision in which the new information has no special priority due to its novelty.
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  47.  38
    Giacomo Bonanno (2009). Rational Choice and Agm Belief Revision. Artificial Intelligence 173:1194-1203.
    We establish a correspondence between the rationalizability of choice studied in the revealed preference literature and the notion of minimal belief revision captured by the AGM postulates. A choice frame consists of a set of alternatives , a collection E of subsets of (representing possible choice sets) and a function f : E ! 2 (representing choices made). A choice frame is rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order R on..
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  48.  51
    Jan van Eijck & Yanjing Wang, Propositional Dynamic Logic as a Logic of Belief Revision.
    This paper shows how propositional dynamic logic (PDL) can be interpreted as a logic for multi-agent belief revision. For that we revise and extend the logic of communication and change (LCC) of [9]. Like LCC, our logic uses PDL as a base epistemic language. Unlike LCC, we start out from agent plausibilities, add their converses, and build knowledge and belief operators from these with the PDL constructs. We extend the update mechanism of LCC to an update mechanism (...)
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  49.  18
    Renata Wassermann (1999). Resource Bounded Belief Revision. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):429-446.
    The AGM paradigm for belief revision provides a very elegant and powerful framework for reasoning about idealized agents. The paradigm assumes that the modeled agent is a perfect reasoner with infinite memory. In this paper we propose a framework to reason about non-ideal agents that generalizes the AGM paradigm. We first introduce a structure to represent an agent's belief states that distinguishes different status of beliefs according to whether or not they are explicitly represented, whether they are (...)
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  50. Mark Ryan & Pierre-Yves Schobbens (1995). Belief Revision and Verisimilitude. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (1):15-29.
    The Egli-Milner power-ordering is used to define verisimilitude orderings on theories from preference orderings on models. The effects of the definitions on constraints such as stopperedness and soundness are explored. Orderings on theories are seen to contain more information than orderings on models. Belief revision is defined in terms of both types of orderings, and conditions are given which make the two notions coincide.
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