The paper gives a survey of known results related to computational devices (finite and push–down automata) recognizing monadic generalized quantifiers in finite models. Some of these results are simple reinterpretations of descriptive—feasible correspondence theorems from finite–model theory. Additionally a new result characterizing monadic quantifiers recognized by push down automata is proven.
Quantification is a topic which brings together linguistics, logic, and philosophy. Quantifiers are the essential tools with which, in language or logic, we refer to quantity of things or amount of stuff. In English they include such expressions as no, some, all, both, and many. Peters and Westerstahl present the definitive interdisciplinary exploration of how they work - their syntax, semantics, and inferential role. Quantifiers in Language and Logic is intended for everyone with a scholarly interest in the exact treatment (...) of meaning. It presents a broad view of the semantics and logic of quantifier expressions in natural languages and, to a slightly lesser extent, in logical languages. The authors progress carefully from a fairly elementary level to considerable depth over the course of sixteen chapters; their book will be invaluable to a broad spectrum of readers, from those with a basic knowledge of linguistic semantics and of first-order logic to those with advanced knowledge of semantics, logic, philosophy of language, and knowledge representation in artificial intelligence. (shrink)
Branching quantifiers were first introduced by L. Henkin in his 1959 paper ‘Some Remarks on Infmitely Long Formulas’. By ‘branching quantifiers’ Henkin meant a new, non-linearly structured quantiiier-prefix whose discovery was triggered by the problem of interpreting infinitistic formulas of a certain form} The branching (or partially-ordered) quantifier-prefix is, however, not essentially infinitistic, and the issues it raises have largely been discussed in the literature in the context of finitistic logic, as they will be here. Our discussion transcends, however, the (...) resources of standard lst-order languages and we will consider the new form in the context of 1st-order logic with 1- and 2-place ‘Mostowskian` generalized quantifiers.2.. (shrink)
Starting out from the assumption that monotonicity plays a central role in interpretation and inference, we derive a number of predictions about the complexity of processing quantified sentences. A quantifier may be upward entailing (i.e. license inferences from subsets to supersets) or downward entailing (i.e. license inferences from supersets to subsets). Our main predictions are the following: If the monotonicity profiles of two quantifying expressions are the same, they should be equally easy or hard to process, ceteris paribus. Sentences containing (...) both upward and downward entailing quantifiers are more difficult than sentences with upward entailing quantifiers only. Downward-entailing quantifiers built from cardinals, like ‘at most three’, are more difficult than others. Inferences from subsets to supersets are easier than inferences in the opposite direction. We present experimental evidence confirming these predictions. (shrink)
We study second order generalized quantifiers on finite structures. One starting point of this research has been the notion of definability of Lindström quantifiers. We formulate an analogous notion for second order generalized quantifiers and study definability of second order generalized quantifiers in terms of Lindström quantifiers.
Community initiatives to create more localized food systems ofteninclude the strategy of import substitution, i.e., increasing local foodproduction for local consumption. The purpose of this policy iseffectively to supplant some level of imported food into the region. Weargue that such action can carry social and environmental risks as wellas benefits and we have developed research parameters to measure theimpact of such strategies. Harriet Friedmann's seminal work (1991) onthe employment of import substitution by transnational corporationsprovides a framework to identify possible advantages (...) and disadvantagesof the same approach locally. We propose local autonomy and sustainabledevelopment as positive indicators of a more localized food system.Three units of analysis are proposed to measure changes in localautonomy and sustainable development as a result of import substitutionschemes: fair labor trade, equity and democracy, and environmentalstewardship. We propose that this flexible framework of analysisincreases our ability to describe the shifting and integrated balancebetween more local and more global food systems. (shrink)
It is not only overtly probabilistic illatives like ‘makes it certain that’ but also apparently non-probabilistic ones like ‘therefore’ that have probabilistic import. Illatives like ‘therefore’ convey the meaning that the premise confers on the conclusion a probability not only greater than 0 but also greater than 1/2. But because they do not say whether that probability is equal to or less than 1, these illatives are appropriately called ‘neutral’.
The paper explores the existential import of universal affirmative in Descartes, Arnauld and Malebranche. Descartes holds, inconsistently, that eternal truths are true even if the subject term is empty but that a proposition with a false idea as subject is false. Malebranche extends Descartes? truth-conditions for eternal truths, which lack existential import, to all knowledge, allowing only for non-propositional knowledge of contingent existence. Malebranche's rather implausible Neoplatonic semantics is detailed as consisting of three key semantic relations: illumination by which God's (...) ideas cause mental terms, creation by which God's ideas cause material substances by a kind of ?ontic privation?, and sensation in which brain events occasion states of mental awareness. In contrast, Arnauld distinguishes two types of propositions ? necessary and contingent ? with distinct truth-conditions, one with and one without existential import. Arnauld's more modern semantics is laid out as a theory of reference that substitutes earlier causal accounts with one that adapts the medieval notion of objective being. His version anticipates modern notions of intentional content and appeals in its ontology only to substances and their modes. (shrink)
It is shown that a linguistically well-motivated semantical analysis of certain extensions of categorical sentences is compatible with a semantics that fulfils the so-called existential import condition, but is not compatible with a semantics that does not fulfil this condition.
Many people object to genetically engineerehd (GE) food because they believe that it is unnatural or that its creation amounts to playing God. These objections are often referred to as intrinsic objections, and they have been widely criticized in the agricultural bioethics literature as being unsound, incompatible with modern science, religious, inchoate, and based on emotion instead of reason. Many of their critics also argue that even if these objections did have some merit as ethicalobjections, their quasi-religious nature means that (...) they are entirely irrelevant when interpreted aspolitical objections regarding what public policy ought to be. In this paper, we argue that this widespread view is false. Intrinsic objections have much more political import than has previously been recognized, and indeed the requirements of political liberalism and its associated idea of liberal neutrality, once properly understood, protect intrinsic objections from many of the most common objections. That is, policy-makers may not legitimately base public policy on grounds that are inconsistent with intrinsic objections, even when they believe those objections to be flawed in the ways mentioned above. This means that in the context of a political debate about GE food, the discussion should not center on the substantive merits of the intrinsic objections themselves but rather on the appropriate political norms for achieving democratically legitimate policy on issues that touch people’s deepest religious and moral beliefs. (shrink)
It is widely assumed that disposition predicates do not designate entities which could be causal factors in the production of natural phenomena. Yet, the fact that an object has a given dispositional property is often taken to help explain behavior exhibited by objects to which the disposition is ascribed. Instrumentalist, realist, and rationalist analyses of disposition predicates embody three quite distinct views of how both assumptions could be correct. It is argued that the instrumentalist fails to capture basic intuitions concerning (...) the explanatory import of disposition ascriptions, the rationalist tries unsuccessfully to locate necessary connections in nature, and the realist provides an account which is intuitively satisfying without introducing otiose entities into the ontology of empirical science. (shrink)
Syllogistics reduces to only two rules of inference: monotonicity and symmetry, plus a third if one wants to take existential import into account. We give an implementation that uses only the monotonicity and symmetry rules, with an addendum for the treatment of existential import. Soundness follows from the monotonicity properties and symmetry properties of the Aristotelean quantiﬁers, while completeness for syllogistic theory is proved by direct inspection of the valid syllogisms. Next, the valid syllogisms are decomposed in terms of the (...) rules they involve. The implementation uses Haskell , and is given in ‘literate programming’ style . (shrink)
Confucianism has usually been regarded as a secular moral philosophy with no religious import at all. In china, However, Confucianism has been mentioned along with buddhism and taoism as one of the three religions (the so-Called san-Chiao) for centuries. This means that we must revise and broaden our traditional concept of religion. The confucian tradition certainly has its unique way of expressing its ultimate and therefore religious concern. The present essay is an attempt to uncover the religious import in confucian (...) philosophy and to ascertain its meaning in contemporary discussions of theology and philosophy of religion. In this article, First, The development of the confucian religious attitude has been traced; second, This attitude has been compared with the christian attitude; third, Its contemporary significance with reference to the current development of theology and religious philosophy in the west has been discussed; finally, Some general remarks upon the relevance of religious message to today's situation have been made. (shrink)
This paper discusses a common contemporary characterization of skepticism and skeptical arguments-that their real importance is instrumental, that they “drive progress in philosophy.“ I explore two possible contrasts to the idea that skepticism's significance is thus wholly methodological. First, I recall for the reader a range of views that can be understood as `truth in skepticism' views. These concessive views are those most clearly at odds with the idea that skepticism is false, but instrumentally valuable. Considering the contributions of such (...) `truth in skepticism' theorists, I argue, shows that the good of furthering philosophical progress is partly achieved by the work of those who would reject the `merely methodological' view of skepticism's import. While this shows such a view of skepticism's import to be partially self-effacing, it is not therefore incoherent. Rather, the characterization is revealed to be wedded to particular diagnoses of skepticism, and not independently innocuous or neutral. Second, I discuss the idea that the `merely methodological' characterization of skepticism's import draws a contrast with philosophical positions or theses that are supposed to have practical teeth. Here, I think the danger of acquiescing too readily to this view is that the normative import of skeptical arguments is obscured. At a time when discussions of the value of knowledge are in ascendency, this in particular seems a loss-a route from consideration of skeptical arguments to broader normative questions worth keeping open is rather more obscured than opened up. Any radically revisionary outcome of an encounter with skepticism is less likely, led by such an understanding, just when there is opportunity instead to connect up with broad questions of epistemic value. For these reasons I argue the characterization is not one to too readily, unthinkingly, endorse. (shrink)
Although the capacity to infect non-dividing cells is a hallmark of lentiviruses, nuclear import is still barely understood. More than 100 research papers have been dedicated to this topic during the last 15 years, yet, more questions have been raised than answers. The signal-facilitating translocation of the viral preintegration complex (PIC) through the nuclear pore complex (NPC) remains unknown. It is clear, however, that nuclear import is the result of a complex interplay between viral and cellular components. In this review, (...) we discuss the current knowledge on nuclear import. We focus on the controversies and pitfalls and discuss the interplay between virus and host. (shrink)
Relocating Kripke's puzzle about belief, this paper investigates i) in what the puzzle consists, exactly; ii) the method used in its construction; and iii) relations between meaning and rationality. Essential to Kripke's puzzle is a normative notion of contradictory belief. Different positions about the meaning of names yield different views of what constitutes the attribution of contradictory belief; and Kripke's puzzle unwittingly _imports a Millian assumption. Accordingly, the puzzle about belief is not independent of positions about the meaning of names.
My central philosophical concern for many years has been with what it is to be a person. Of course, we persons are agents, indeed agents of a special sort, so understanding personhood has of course led me to think about that special sort of agency. Yet my background in the philosophy of mind leads me to think that any account of this special sort of agency must appeal to psychological capacities that are themselves grounded in an account of the relation (...) between the mind and the body. Here I have in mind not the thought that we must provide a compatibilist account of free will (though I do think that is true) but rather the thought that it is all to easy for philosophers of action to make what turn out to be false presuppositions about the nature of psychological capacities like belief and desire and the role they play in motivation. Conversely, I think, philosophers of mind, focused too narrowly on worries about intentionality and consciousness, have offered accounts of various psychological capacities that are inadequate to understanding the sort of agency characteristic of us persons. Before I begin, I need to acknowledge my general orientation in philosophy of mind. Mental states and capacities are to be understood in terms of their place within an explanatory framework. Psychological explanation, however, I take to be fundamentally normative, a matter of locating particular phenomena within a broader pattern of rationality. This is a broadly Davidsonian or Dennettian orientation to the mind, according to which, as Davidson says, rationality is the constitutive ideal of the mental.1 In.. (shrink)
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In this illuminating study of Kant's theory of imagination and its role in interpretation, Rudolf A. Makkreel argues against the commonly held notion that Kant's transcendental philosophy is incompatible with hermeneutics. The charge that Kant's foundational philosophy is inadequate to the task of interpretation can be rebutted, explains Makkreel, if we fully understand the role of imagination in his work. In identifying this role, Makkreel also reevaluates the relationship among Kant's discussions of the feeling of life, common sense, and the (...) purposiveness of history. (shrink)
: Descartes' conceptual distinction (or distinctio rationis) is commonly understood to be a distinction created by the mind's activity without a foundation in re. This paper challenges this understanding partially based on a letter to an unknown correspondent in which Descartes claims not to admit distinctions without a foundation. He goes on to claim that his conceptual distinction is not a distinctio rationis ratiocinantis (i.e. a distinction of reasoning reason) but is something like a formal distinction or, more precisely, a (...) distinctio ! rationis ratiocinatae (i.e. a distinction of reasoned reason). This remark is then explored through Descartes' other writings and his scholastic intellectual heritage. I conclude that Descartes' conceptual distinction just is a formal distinction understood as a distinctio rationis ratiocinatae as expressed in the works of Scotus, Suarez and Eustachius, and so it has a foundation in re in very much the same way as a formal distinction. (shrink)
In this paper I argue that two domains of uncertainty should inform our strategies for making social policy on new genetic technologies. The first is biological complexity, which includes both unknown consequences on known variables and unknown unknowns. The second is value pluralism, which includes both moral conflict and moral pluralism. This framework is used to investigate policy on genetically modified food and suggests that adaptive management is required to track changes in biological knowledge of these interventions and that less (...) simplistic, polemic representations of scientific knowledge are required to permit democratic decision making. (shrink)
The notion of probability occupies a central role in contemporary epistemology and cognitive science. Nevertheless, the classical notion of probability is hard to reconcile with the central notions postulated by the epistemological tradition.