Search results for 'bivalence' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Dan López de Sa (2009). Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):273-282.score: 24.0
    Timothy Williamson famously offered an argument from these Tarskian principles in favor of bivalence. I show, dwelling on (Andjelkovic & Williamson, 2000), that the argument depends on a contentious formulation of the Tarskian principles about truth (and falsity), which the supervaluationist can reject without jeopardizing the Tarskian insight. In the mentioned paper, Adjelkovic and Williamson argue that, even if the appropriate formulation seems to make room for failure of bivalence in borderline cases, this appearance is illusory, once one (...)
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  2. Julien Murzi (2010). Knowability and Bivalence: Intuitionistic Solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 149 (2):269 - 281.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I focus on some intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. I first consider the relatively little discussed idea that, on an intuitionistic interpretation of the conditional, there is no paradox to start with. I show that this proposal only works if proofs are thought of as tokens, and suggest that anti-realists themselves have good reasons for thinking of proofs as types. In then turn to more standard intuitionistic treatments, as proposed by Timothy Williamson and, most recently, (...)
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  3. Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi (2014). The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):251-271.score: 24.0
    It is highly now intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed now—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence (...)
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  4. Elizabeth Barnes & Ross Cameron (2009). The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism and Ontology. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):291 - 309.score: 18.0
    In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.
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  5. Manuel García-Carpintero (2007). Bivalence and What is Said. Dialectica 61 (1):167–190.score: 18.0
    On standard versions of supervaluationism, truth is equated with supertruth, and does not satisfy bivalence: some truth-bearers are neither true nor false. In this paper I want to confront a well-known worry about this, recently put by Wright as follows: ‘The downside . . . rightly emphasized by Williamson . . . is the implicit surrender of the T-scheme’. I will argue that such a cost is not high: independently motivated philosophical distinctions support the surrender of the T- scheme, (...)
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  6. Richard Gaskin (1998). Fatalism, Bivalence and the Past. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):83-88.score: 18.0
    In his paper ‘Some Comments on Fatalism’, The Philosophical Quartery, 46 (1996), pp. 1–11, James Cargile offers an argument against the view that the correct response to fatalism is to restrict the principle of bivalence with respect to statements about future contingencies. His argument fails because it is question‐begging. Further, he fails to give due weight to the reason behind this view, which is the desire to give an adequate account of the past/future asymmetry. He supposes that mere appeal (...)
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  7. Charles Sayward (1989). Does the Law of Excluded Middle Require Bivalence? Erkenntnis 31 (1):129 - 137.score: 18.0
    Determining whether the law of excluded middle requires bivalence depends upon whether we are talking about sentences or propositions. If we are talking about sentences, neither side has a decisive case. If we are talking of propositions, there is a strong argument on the side of those who say the excluded middle does require bivalence. I argue that all challenges to this argument can be met.
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  8. Timothy J. Day (1992). Excluded Middle and Bivalence. Erkenntnis 37 (1):93 - 97.score: 18.0
    I consider two related objections to the claim that the law of excluded middle does not imply bivalence. One objection claims that the truth predicate captured by supervaluation semantics is not properly motivated. The second objection says that even if it is, LEM still implies bivalence. I show that LEM does not imply bivalence in a supervaluational language. I also argue that considering supertruth as truth can be reasonably motivated.
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  9. Peter Pagin (1998). Bivalence: Meaning Theory Vs Metaphysics. Theoria 64 (2-3):157-186.score: 18.0
    This paper is an attack on the Dummett-Prawitz view that the principle of bivalence has a crucial double significance, metaphysical and meaning theoretical. On the one hand it is said that holding bivalence valid is what characterizes a realistic view, i.e. a view in metaphysics, and on the other hand it is said that there are meaning theoretical arguments against its acceptability. I argue that these two aspects are incompatible. If the failure of validity of bivalence depends (...)
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  10. F. J. Pelletier & R. J. Stainton (2003). On 'the Denial of Bivalence is Absurd'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):369 – 382.score: 18.0
    Timothy Williamson, in various places, has put forward an argument that is supposed to show that denying bivalence is absurd. This paper is an examination of the logical force of this argument, which is found wanting.
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  11. Timothy Williamson (1988). Bivalence and Subjunctive Conditionals. Synthese 75 (3):405 - 421.score: 18.0
    Writers such as Stalnaker and Dummett have argued that specific features of subjunctive conditional statements undermine the principle of bivalence. This, paper is concerned with rebutting such claims. 1. It is shown how subjective conditionals pose a prima facie threat to bivalence, and how this threat can be dissolved by a distinction between the results of negating a subjective conditional and of negating its consequent. To make this distinction is to side with Lewis against Stalnaker in a dispute (...)
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  12. Cheryl Misak (1990). Pragmatism and Bivalence. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2):171 – 179.score: 18.0
    Abstract The success of the pragmatic account of truth is often thought to founder on the principle of bivalence?the principle which holds that every genuine statement in the indicative mood is either true or false. For pragmatists must, it seems, claim that the principle does not hold for theoretical statements and observation statements about the past. That is, it seems that pragmatists must deny objective truth?values to these perfectly respectable sorts of hypotheses. In this paper, after examining three pragmatist (...)
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  13. Jan Woleński (2013). An Abstract Approach to Bivalence. Logic and Logical Philosophy 23 (1):3-14.score: 18.0
    This paper outlines an approach to the principle of bivalence based on very general, but still elementary, semantic considerations. The principle of bivalence states that (a) “every sentence is either true or false”. Clearly, some logics are bivalent while others are not. A more general formulation of (a) uses the concept of designated and non-designated logical values and is captured by (b) “every sentence is either designated or non-designated”. Yet this formulation seems trivial, because the concept of non-designated (...)
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  14. Greg J. Norman, Catherine J. Norris, Jackie Gollan, Tiffany A. Ito, Louise C. Hawkley, Jeff T. Larsen, John T. Cacioppo & Gary G. Berntson (2011). Current Emotion Research in Psychophysiology: The Neurobiology of Evaluative Bivalence. Emotion Review 3 (3):349-359.score: 18.0
    Evaluative processes have their roots in early evolutionary history, as survival is dependent on an organism’s ability to identify and respond appropriately to positive, rewarding or otherwise salubrious stimuli as well as to negative, noxious, or injurious stimuli. Consequently, evaluative processes are ubiquitous in the animal kingdom and are represented at multiple levels of the nervous system, including the lowest levels of the neuraxis. While evolution has sculpted higher level evaluative systems into complex and sophisticated information-processing networks, they do not (...)
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  15. Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe & María Cerezo (forthcoming). Truth and Bivalence in Aristotle. An Investigation Into the Structure of Saying. In N. Öffenberger & A. Vigo (eds.), Iberoamerikanische Beiträge zur modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik. Olms.score: 18.0
    The aim of this paper is rather modest: we do not intend to reconstruct Aristotle’s theory of truth (although we are convinced that there is such a thing), and we will not try to settle the issue concerning Bivalence in Aristotle. We merely want, on the one hand, to argue for the consistency between the main Aristotelian texts on truth and a possible rejection of Bivalence; and on the other hand, to investigate the conditions of a possible counterexample (...)
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  16. Fred Seymour Michael (2002). Entailment and Bivalence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (4):289-300.score: 16.0
    My purpose in this paper is to argue that the classical notion of entailment is not suitable for non-bivalent logics, to propose an appropriate alternative and to suggest a generalized entailment notion suitable to bivalent and non-bivalent logics alike. In classical two valued logic, one can not infer a false statement from one that is not false, any more than one can infer from a true statement a statement that is not true. In classical logic in fact preserving truth and (...)
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  17. John L. King (1979). Bivalence and the Sorites Paradox. American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1):17 - 25.score: 16.0
    Putative resolutions of the sorites paradox in which the major premise is declared false or illegitimate, Including max black's treatment in terms of the alleged illegitimacy of vague attributions to borderline cases, Are rejected on semantical grounds. The resort to a non-Bivalent logic of representational "accuracy" with a continuum of accuracy values is shown to resolve the paradox, And the identification of accuracy values as truth values is defended as compatible with the central insight of the correspondence theory of truth (...)
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  18. Hilary Putnam (2010). Between Dolev and Dummett: Some Comments on 'Antirealism, Presentism and Bivalence'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (1):91 – 96.score: 15.0
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  19. Yuval Dolev (2010). Antirealism, Presentism and Bivalence. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (1):73 – 89.score: 15.0
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  20. Diana Raffman (2005). Borderline Cases and Bivalence. Philosophical Review 114 (1):1-31.score: 15.0
    It is generally agreed that vague predicates like ‘red’, ‘rich’, ‘tall’, and ‘bald’, have borderline cases of application. For instance, a cloth patch whose color lies midway between a definite red and a definite orange is a borderline case for ‘red’, and an American man five feet eleven inches in height is (arguably) a borderline case for ‘tall’. The proper analysis of borderline cases is a matter of dispute, but most theorists of vagueness agree at least in the thought that (...)
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  21. Michael Dummett (1995). Bivalence and Vagueness. Theoria 61 (3):201-216.score: 15.0
  22. W. V. Quine (1981). What Price Bivalence? Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):90-95.score: 15.0
  23. Tor Sandqvist (2009). Classical Logic Without Bivalence. Analysis 69 (2):211-218.score: 15.0
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  24. Adam Rieger (2001). The Liar, the Strengthened Liar, and Bivalence. Erkenntnis 54 (2):195-203.score: 15.0
    A view often expressed is that to classify the liar sentence as neither true nor false is satisfactory for the simple liar but not for the strengthened liar. I argue that in fact it is equally unsatisfactory for both liars. I go on to discuss whether, nevertheless, Kripke''s theory of truth represents an advance on that of Tarski.
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  25. David DeVidi & Graham Solomon (1999). On Confusions About Bivalence and Excluded Middle. Dialogue 38 (04):785-.score: 15.0
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  26. Richard Gaskin (1994). Molina on Divine Foreknowledge and the Principle of Bivalence. Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (4):551-571.score: 15.0
  27. Stotrs McCall (1966). Excluded Middle, Bivalence and Fatalism. Inquiry 9 (1-4):384-386.score: 15.0
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  28. Peter Pagin (2008). Intuitionism and the Anti-Justification of Bivalence. .score: 15.0
    forthcoming in S. Lindström, E. Palmgren, K. Segerberg, and V. Stoltenberg-Hansen (eds) Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism — What has Become of Them?, Synthese Library, Springer. Pdf file.
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  29. Dan López de Sa (2009). Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 273-282.score: 15.0
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  30. Sam Mitchell (2003). Bivalence as an Issue in the Confirmation of Belief. Philosophical Forum 34 (2):189–222.score: 15.0
  31. B. J. Copeland (1995). Vagueness and Bivalence: A Discussion of Williamson and Simons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1):193 - 200.score: 15.0
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  32. Robert Stainton (2010). On 'the Denial of Bivalence is Absurd'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):369-382.score: 15.0
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  33. Jc Beall & Otávio Bueno (2002). The Simple Liar Without Bivalence? Analysis 62 (273):22–26.score: 15.0
  34. Dorothy Edgington (1980). Meaning, Bivalence and Realism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81:153 - 173.score: 15.0
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  35. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2001). The Pragmatist's Troubles with Bivalence and Counterfactuals. Dialogue 40 (04):669-.score: 15.0
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  36. A. Iacona (2005). Rethinking Bivalence. Synthese 146 (3):283 - 302.score: 15.0
    Classical logic rests on the assumption that there are two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive truth values. This assumption has always been surrounded by philosophical controversy. Doubts have been raised about its legitimacy, and hence about the legitimacy of classical logic. Usually, the assumption is stated in the form of a general principle, namely the principle that every proposition is either true or false. Then, the philosophical controversy is often framed in terms of the question whether every proposition is either (...)
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  37. Martin P. Golding (2003). The Legal Analog of the Principle of Bivalence. Ratio Juris 16 (4):450-468.score: 15.0
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  38. John F. Post (1979). Presupposition, Bivalence, and the Possible Liar. Philosophia 8 (4):645-650.score: 15.0
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  39. Ricardo Salles (2004). Bivalencia, fatalismo e inacción en Crisipo (Bivalence, Fatalism and Inaction in Chrysippus). Crítica 36 (106):3 - 27.score: 15.0
    Este ensayo ofrece un análisis del argumento de Crisipo a favor de que todo tiene una causa en Cicerón, De Fato 20. Para ello, se discute en qué sentido el argumento es fatalista y si el tipo de fatalismo que implica alienta la inacción. Asimismo, se presenta una nueva interpretación de la réplica de Crisipo al Argumento Perezoso en Eusebio, Praep. ev. 6.8.28. En particular se sostiene que, para Crisipo, la relación entre sucesos codestinados es analítica: a fin de determinar (...)
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  40. Thomas Sheehan (1985). Metaphysics and Bivalence. The Modern Schoolman 63 (1):21-43.score: 15.0
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  41. Gary G. Berntson, Greg J. Norman & John T. Cacioppo (2011). Comment: Laterality and Evaluative Bivalence: A Neuroevolutionary Perspective. Emotion Review 3 (3):344-346.score: 15.0
    Rutherford and Lindell (2011) review an extensive literature on lateralization of emotion. As they note, an important issue surrounding this question is the nature of emotion, which bears on what, precisely, is lateralized. The present comments are intended to broaden the context of the review, by considering lateralization from the standpoint of a bivariate model of evaluative processes and a neuroevolutionary perspective.
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  42. Allen Hazen (1983). An Example Of A Language With Classical Logic For Which Bivalence Cannot Be Assumed. Analysis 43 (January):1-5.score: 15.0
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  43. Jan Wolenski (2009). The Principle of Bivalence and Suszko Thesis. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 38 (3/4):99-110.score: 15.0
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  44. Francesco Ademollo (2010). The Principle of Bivalence in De Interpretatione 4. In Brad Inwood (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 38. Oup Oxford.score: 15.0
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  45. M. D. Agostino (1992). Are Tableaux an Improvement of Truth-Tables? Cut-Free Proofs and Bivalence. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 1 (3):127-139.score: 15.0
     
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  46. Miroslava Andjelkovic (1999). Williamson on Bivalence. Acta Analytica 14 (1).score: 15.0
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  47. Constantin Antonopoulos (1988). Bivalence, Contradiction and the Logic of Change. Logique Et Analyse 31 (123-124):403-432.score: 15.0
     
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  48. Ferdinando Cavaliere (2012). Fuzzy Syllogisms, Numerical Square, Triangle of Contraries, Inter-Bivalence. In. In J.-Y. Beziau & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition. Birkhäuser. 241--260.score: 15.0
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  49. B. J. Copeland (1994). Vagueness and Bivalence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:193-200.score: 15.0
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