Search results for 'bivalence' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Dan López de Sa (2009). Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):273-282.score: 18.0
    Timothy Williamson famously offered an argument from these Tarskian principles in favor of bivalence. I show, dwelling on (Andjelkovic & Williamson, 2000), that the argument depends on a contentious formulation of the Tarskian principles about truth (and falsity), which the supervaluationist can reject without jeopardizing the Tarskian insight. In the mentioned paper, Adjelkovic and Williamson argue that, even if the appropriate formulation seems to make room for failure of bivalence in borderline cases, this appearance is illusory, once one (...)
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  2. Julien Murzi (2010). Knowability and Bivalence: Intuitionistic Solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 149 (2):269 - 281.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I focus on some intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. I first consider the relatively little discussed idea that, on an intuitionistic interpretation of the conditional, there is no paradox to start with. I show that this proposal only works if proofs are thought of as tokens, and suggest that anti-realists themselves have good reasons for thinking of proofs as types. In then turn to more standard intuitionistic treatments, as proposed by Timothy Williamson and, most recently, (...)
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  3. Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi (2014). The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):251-271.score: 18.0
    It is highly now intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed now—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence (...)
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  4. Elizabeth Barnes & Ross Cameron (2009). The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism and Ontology. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):291 - 309.score: 12.0
    In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.
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  5. Manuel García-Carpintero (2007). Bivalence and What is Said. Dialectica 61 (1):167–190.score: 12.0
    On standard versions of supervaluationism, truth is equated with supertruth, and does not satisfy bivalence: some truth-bearers are neither true nor false. In this paper I want to confront a well-known worry about this, recently put by Wright as follows: ‘The downside . . . rightly emphasized by Williamson . . . is the implicit surrender of the T-scheme’. I will argue that such a cost is not high: independently motivated philosophical distinctions support the surrender of the T- scheme, (...)
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  6. Richard Gaskin (1998). Fatalism, Bivalence and the Past. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):83-88.score: 12.0
    In his paper ‘Some Comments on Fatalism’, The Philosophical Quartery, 46 (1996), pp. 1–11, James Cargile offers an argument against the view that the correct response to fatalism is to restrict the principle of bivalence with respect to statements about future contingencies. His argument fails because it is question‐begging. Further, he fails to give due weight to the reason behind this view, which is the desire to give an adequate account of the past/future asymmetry. He supposes that mere appeal (...)
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  7. Charles Sayward (1989). Does the Law of Excluded Middle Require Bivalence? Erkenntnis 31 (1):129 - 137.score: 12.0
    Determining whether the law of excluded middle requires bivalence depends upon whether we are talking about sentences or propositions. If we are talking about sentences, neither side has a decisive case. If we are talking of propositions, there is a strong argument on the side of those who say the excluded middle does require bivalence. I argue that all challenges to this argument can be met.
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  8. Timothy J. Day (1992). Excluded Middle and Bivalence. Erkenntnis 37 (1):93 - 97.score: 12.0
    I consider two related objections to the claim that the law of excluded middle does not imply bivalence. One objection claims that the truth predicate captured by supervaluation semantics is not properly motivated. The second objection says that even if it is, LEM still implies bivalence. I show that LEM does not imply bivalence in a supervaluational language. I also argue that considering supertruth as truth can be reasonably motivated.
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  9. Peter Pagin (1998). Bivalence: Meaning Theory Vs Metaphysics. Theoria 64 (2-3):157-186.score: 12.0
    This paper is an attack on the Dummett-Prawitz view that the principle of bivalence has a crucial double significance, metaphysical and meaning theoretical. On the one hand it is said that holding bivalence valid is what characterizes a realistic view, i.e. a view in metaphysics, and on the other hand it is said that there are meaning theoretical arguments against its acceptability. I argue that these two aspects are incompatible. If the failure of validity of bivalence depends (...)
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  10. F. J. Pelletier & R. J. Stainton (2003). On 'the Denial of Bivalence is Absurd'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):369 – 382.score: 12.0
    Timothy Williamson, in various places, has put forward an argument that is supposed to show that denying bivalence is absurd. This paper is an examination of the logical force of this argument, which is found wanting.
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  11. Timothy Williamson (1988). Bivalence and Subjunctive Conditionals. Synthese 75 (3):405 - 421.score: 12.0
    Writers such as Stalnaker and Dummett have argued that specific features of subjunctive conditional statements undermine the principle of bivalence. This, paper is concerned with rebutting such claims. 1. It is shown how subjective conditionals pose a prima facie threat to bivalence, and how this threat can be dissolved by a distinction between the results of negating a subjective conditional and of negating its consequent. To make this distinction is to side with Lewis against Stalnaker in a dispute (...)
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  12. Cheryl Misak (1990). Pragmatism and Bivalence. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2):171 – 179.score: 12.0
    Abstract The success of the pragmatic account of truth is often thought to founder on the principle of bivalence?the principle which holds that every genuine statement in the indicative mood is either true or false. For pragmatists must, it seems, claim that the principle does not hold for theoretical statements and observation statements about the past. That is, it seems that pragmatists must deny objective truth?values to these perfectly respectable sorts of hypotheses. In this paper, after examining three pragmatist (...)
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  13. Jan Woleński (2013). An Abstract Approach to Bivalence. Logic and Logical Philosophy 23 (1):3-14.score: 12.0
    This paper outlines an approach to the principle of bivalence based on very general, but still elementary, semantic considerations. The principle of bivalence states that (a) “every sentence is either true or false”. Clearly, some logics are bivalent while others are not. A more general formulation of (a) uses the concept of designated and non-designated logical values and is captured by (b) “every sentence is either designated or non-designated”. Yet this formulation seems trivial, because the concept of non-designated (...)
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  14. Greg J. Norman, Catherine J. Norris, Jackie Gollan, Tiffany A. Ito, Louise C. Hawkley, Jeff T. Larsen, John T. Cacioppo & Gary G. Berntson (2011). Current Emotion Research in Psychophysiology: The Neurobiology of Evaluative Bivalence. Emotion Review 3 (3):349-359.score: 12.0
    Evaluative processes have their roots in early evolutionary history, as survival is dependent on an organism’s ability to identify and respond appropriately to positive, rewarding or otherwise salubrious stimuli as well as to negative, noxious, or injurious stimuli. Consequently, evaluative processes are ubiquitous in the animal kingdom and are represented at multiple levels of the nervous system, including the lowest levels of the neuraxis. While evolution has sculpted higher level evaluative systems into complex and sophisticated information-processing networks, they do not (...)
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  15. Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe & María Cerezo (forthcoming). Truth and Bivalence in Aristotle. An Investigation Into the Structure of Saying. In N. Öffenberger & A. Vigo (eds.), Iberoamerikanische Beiträge zur modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik. Olms.score: 12.0
    The aim of this paper is rather modest: we do not intend to reconstruct Aristotle’s theory of truth (although we are convinced that there is such a thing), and we will not try to settle the issue concerning Bivalence in Aristotle. We merely want, on the one hand, to argue for the consistency between the main Aristotelian texts on truth and a possible rejection of Bivalence; and on the other hand, to investigate the conditions of a possible counterexample (...)
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  16. Fred Seymour Michael (2002). Entailment and Bivalence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (4):289-300.score: 10.0
    My purpose in this paper is to argue that the classical notion of entailment is not suitable for non-bivalent logics, to propose an appropriate alternative and to suggest a generalized entailment notion suitable to bivalent and non-bivalent logics alike. In classical two valued logic, one can not infer a false statement from one that is not false, any more than one can infer from a true statement a statement that is not true. In classical logic in fact preserving truth and (...)
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  17. John L. King (1979). Bivalence and the Sorites Paradox. American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1):17 - 25.score: 10.0
    Putative resolutions of the sorites paradox in which the major premise is declared false or illegitimate, Including max black's treatment in terms of the alleged illegitimacy of vague attributions to borderline cases, Are rejected on semantical grounds. The resort to a non-Bivalent logic of representational "accuracy" with a continuum of accuracy values is shown to resolve the paradox, And the identification of accuracy values as truth values is defended as compatible with the central insight of the correspondence theory of truth (...)
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  18. Hilary Putnam (2010). Between Dolev and Dummett: Some Comments on 'Antirealism, Presentism and Bivalence'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (1):91 – 96.score: 9.0
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  19. Yuval Dolev (2010). Antirealism, Presentism and Bivalence. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (1):73 – 89.score: 9.0
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  20. Jeremy Byrd (2010). The Necessity of Tomorrow's Sea Battle. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):160-176.score: 9.0
    In chapter 9 of De Interpretatione, Aristotle offers a defense of free will against the threat of fatalism. According to the traditional interpretation, Aristotle concedes the validity of the fatalist's arguments and then proceeds to reject the Principle of Bivalence in order to avoid the fatalist's conclusion. Assuming that the traditional interpretation is right on this point, it remains to be seen why Aristotle felt compelled to reject such an intuitive semantic principle rather than challenge the fatalist's inference from (...)
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  21. Diana Raffman (2005). Borderline Cases and Bivalence. Philosophical Review 114 (1):1-31.score: 9.0
    It is generally agreed that vague predicates like ‘red’, ‘rich’, ‘tall’, and ‘bald’, have borderline cases of application. For instance, a cloth patch whose color lies midway between a definite red and a definite orange is a borderline case for ‘red’, and an American man five feet eleven inches in height is (arguably) a borderline case for ‘tall’. The proper analysis of borderline cases is a matter of dispute, but most theorists of vagueness agree at least in the thought that (...)
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  22. Michael Dummett (1995). Bivalence and Vagueness. Theoria 61 (3):201-216.score: 9.0
  23. Russell E. Jones (2010). Truth and Contradiction in Aristotle's De Interpretatione 6-9. Phronesis 55 (1):26-67.score: 9.0
    In De Interpretatione 6-9, Aristotle considers three logical principles: the principle of bivalence, the law of excluded middle, and the rule of contradictory pairs (according to which of any contradictory pair of statements, exactly one is true and the other false). Surprisingly, Aristotle accepts none of these without qualification. I offer a coherent interpretation of these chapters as a whole, while focusing special attention on two sorts of statements that are of particular interest to Aristotle: universal statements not made (...)
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  24. W. V. Quine (1981). What Price Bivalence? Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):90-95.score: 9.0
  25. Timothy Williamson (2002). Reply to Machina and Deutsch on Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margins for Error. Acta Analytica 17 (1):47-61.score: 9.0
    In their paper “Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margins for Error” Kenton Machina and Harry Deutsch criticize the epistemic theory of vagueness. This paper answers their objections. The main issues discussed are: the relation between meaning and use; the principle of bivalence; the ontology of vaguely specified classes; the proper form of margin for error principles; iterations of epistemic operators and semantic compositionality; the relation or lack of it between quantum mechanics and theories of vagueness.
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  26. Tor Sandqvist (2009). Classical Logic Without Bivalence. Analysis 69 (2):211-218.score: 9.0
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  27. Adam Rieger (2001). The Liar, the Strengthened Liar, and Bivalence. Erkenntnis 54 (2):195-203.score: 9.0
    A view often expressed is that to classify the liar sentence as neither true nor false is satisfactory for the simple liar but not for the strengthened liar. I argue that in fact it is equally unsatisfactory for both liars. I go on to discuss whether, nevertheless, Kripke''s theory of truth represents an advance on that of Tarski.
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  28. W. Dean & H. Kurokawa (2010). From the Knowability Paradox to the Existence of Proofs. Synthese 176 (2):177 - 225.score: 9.0
    The Knowability Paradox purports to show that the controversial but not patently absurd hypothesis that all truths are knowable entails the implausible conclusion that all truths are known. The notoriety of this argument owes to the negative light it appears to cast on the view that there can be no verification-transcendent truths. We argue that it is overly simplistic to formalize the views of contemporary verificationists like Dummett, Prawitz or Martin-Löf using the sort of propositional modal operators which are employed (...)
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  29. David DeVidi & Graham Solomon (1999). On Confusions About Bivalence and Excluded Middle. Dialogue 38 (04):785-.score: 9.0
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  30. Daniel Kodaj (2013). Open Future and Modal Anti-Realism. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):1-22.score: 9.0
    Open future is incompatible with realism about possible worlds. Since realistically conceived (concrete or abstract) possible worlds are maximal in the sense that they contain/represent the full history of a possible spacetime, past and future included, if such a world is actual now, the future is fully settled now, which rules out openness. The kind of metaphysical indeterminacy required for open future is incompatible with the kind of maximality which is built into the concept of possible worlds. The paper discusses (...)
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  31. Ian Rumfitt (2012). On A Neglected Path to Intuitionism. Topoi 31 (1):101-109.score: 9.0
    According to Quine, in any disagreement over basic logical laws the contesting parties must mean different things by the connectives or quantifiers implicated in those laws; when a deviant logician ‘tries to deny the doctrine he only changes the subject’. The standard (Heyting) semantics for intuitionism offers some confirmation for this thesis, for it represents an intuitionist as attaching quite different senses to the connectives than does a classical logician. All the same, I think Quine was wrong, even about the (...)
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  32. Aladdin M. Yaqub (2008). Two Types of Deflationism. Synthese 165 (1):77 - 106.score: 9.0
    It is a fundamental intuition about truth that the conditions under which a sentence is true are given by what the sentence asserts. My aim in this paper is to show that this intuition captures the concept of truth completely and correctly. This is conceptual deflationism, for it does not go beyond what is asserted by a sentence in order to define the truth status of that sentence. This paper, hence, is a defense of deflationism as a conceptual account of (...)
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  33. Richard Gaskin (1994). Molina on Divine Foreknowledge and the Principle of Bivalence. Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (4):551-571.score: 9.0
  34. Stotrs McCall (1966). Excluded Middle, Bivalence and Fatalism. Inquiry 9 (1-4):384-386.score: 9.0
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  35. Peter Pagin (2008). Intuitionism and the Anti-Justification of Bivalence. .score: 9.0
    forthcoming in S. Lindström, E. Palmgren, K. Segerberg, and V. Stoltenberg-Hansen (eds) Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism — What has Become of Them?, Synthese Library, Springer. Pdf file.
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  36. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1992). Classical Logic and Truth-Value Gaps. Philosophical Papers 21 (2):141-150.score: 9.0
    An account of the logic of bivalent languages with truth-value gaps is given. This account is keyed to the use of tables introduced by S. C. Kleene. The account has two guiding ideas. First, that the bivalence property insures that the language satisfies classical logic. Second, that the general concepts of a valid sentence and an inconsistent sentence are, respectively, as sentences which are not false in any model and sentences which are not true in any model. What recommends (...)
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  37. Dan López de Sa (2009). Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 273-282.score: 9.0
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  38. Andrea Iacona (2007). Future Contingents and Aristotle's Fantasy (Los futuros contingentes y la fantasía de Aristóteles). Crítica 39 (117):45 - 60.score: 9.0
    This paper deals with the problem of future contingents, and focuses on two classical logical principles, excluded middle and bivalence. One may think that different attitudes are to be adopted towards these two principles in order to solve the problem. According to what seems to be a widely held hypothesis, excluded middle must be accepted while bivalence must be rejected. The paper goes against that line of thought. In the first place, it shows how the rejection of (...) leads to implausible consequences if excluded middle is accepted. In the second place, it addresses the question of why one should reject bivalence, and finds no satisfactory answer. /// Este artículo trata el problema de los futuros contingentes, y se enfoca en dos principios lógicos clásicos: el tercero excluido y la bivalencia. Se podría pensar que una solución del problema requiere actitudes diferentes hacia estos dos principios. Según una hipótesis que parece ampliamente compartida, el tercero excluido debe ser aceptado, mientras que la bivalencia debe ser rechazada. Este artículo argumenta en contra de esta línea de pensamiento. En primer lugar, se aborda cómo el rechazo de la bivalencia lleva a consecuencias poco plausibles si el tercero excluido es aceptado. En segundo lugar, se enfrenta la cuestión de por qué se debería rechazar la bivalencia, sin encontrar una respuesta satisfactoria. (shrink)
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  39. Sam Mitchell (2003). Bivalence as an Issue in the Confirmation of Belief. Philosophical Forum 34 (2):189–222.score: 9.0
  40. B. J. Copeland (1995). Vagueness and Bivalence: A Discussion of Williamson and Simons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1):193 - 200.score: 9.0
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  41. Robert Stainton (2010). On 'the Denial of Bivalence is Absurd'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):369-382.score: 9.0
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  42. Jc Beall & Otávio Bueno (2002). The Simple Liar Without Bivalence? Analysis 62 (273):22–26.score: 9.0
  43. Dorothy Edgington (1980). Meaning, Bivalence and Realism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81:153 - 173.score: 9.0
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  44. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1990). Quine's Relativism. Ratio 3 (2):142-149.score: 9.0
    A doctrine that occurs intermittently in Quine’s work is that there is no extra-theoretic truth. This paper explores this doctrine, and argues that on its best interpretation it is inconsistent with three views Quine also accepts: bivalence, mathematical Platonism, and the disquotational account of truth.
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  45. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2001). The Pragmatist's Troubles with Bivalence and Counterfactuals. Dialogue 40 (04):669-.score: 9.0
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  46. Martin P. Golding (2003). The Legal Analog of the Principle of Bivalence. Ratio Juris 16 (4):450-468.score: 9.0
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  47. A. Iacona (2005). Rethinking Bivalence. Synthese 146 (3):283 - 302.score: 9.0
    Classical logic rests on the assumption that there are two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive truth values. This assumption has always been surrounded by philosophical controversy. Doubts have been raised about its legitimacy, and hence about the legitimacy of classical logic. Usually, the assumption is stated in the form of a general principle, namely the principle that every proposition is either true or false. Then, the philosophical controversy is often framed in terms of the question whether every proposition is either (...)
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  48. John F. Post (1979). Presupposition, Bivalence, and the Possible Liar. Philosophia 8 (4):645-650.score: 9.0
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  49. Ricardo Salles (2004). Bivalencia, fatalismo e inacción en Crisipo (Bivalence, Fatalism and Inaction in Chrysippus). Crítica 36 (106):3 - 27.score: 9.0
    Este ensayo ofrece un análisis del argumento de Crisipo a favor de que todo tiene una causa en Cicerón, De Fato 20. Para ello, se discute en qué sentido el argumento es fatalista y si el tipo de fatalismo que implica alienta la inacción. Asimismo, se presenta una nueva interpretación de la réplica de Crisipo al Argumento Perezoso en Eusebio, Praep. ev. 6.8.28. En particular se sostiene que, para Crisipo, la relación entre sucesos codestinados es analítica: a fin de determinar (...)
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