Search results for 'bootstrapping' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Michael G. Titelbaum (2010). Tell Me You Love Me: Bootstrapping, Externalism, and No-Lose Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):119–134.score: 18.0
    Recent discussion of Vogel-style “bootstrapping” scenarios suggests that they provide counterexamples to a wide variety of epistemological theories. Yet it remains unclear why it’s bad for a theory to permit bootstrapping, or even exactly what counts as a bootstrapping case. Going back to Vogel's original bootstrapping example, I note that an agent who could gain justification through the method Vogel describes would have available a “no-lose investigation”: an investigation that can justify a proposition but has no (...)
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  2. Jon Altschul (2012). Entitlement, Justification, and the Bootstrapping Problem. Acta Analytica 27 (4):345-366.score: 18.0
    According to the bootstrapping problem, any view that allows for basic knowledge (knowledge obtained from a reliable source prior to one’s knowing that that source is reliable) is forced to accept that one can utilize a track-record argument to acquire justification for believing that one’s belief source is reliable; yet, we tend to think that acquiring justification in this way is too easy. In this paper I argue, first, that those who respond to the bootstrapping problem by denying (...)
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  3. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2009). Bootstrapping and Knowledge of Reliability. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):407–412.score: 18.0
    This is a critical discussion of a paper on the problem of bootstrapping by Jose Zalabardo.
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  4. Jochen Briesen (2013). Reliabilism, Bootstrapping, and Epistemic Circularity. Synthese 190 (18):4361-4372.score: 18.0
    Pretheoretically we hold that we cannot gain justification or knowledge through an epistemically circular reasoning process. Epistemically circular reasoning occurs when a subject forms the belief that p on the basis of an argument A, where at least one of the premises of A already presupposes the truth of p. It has often been argued that process reliabilism does not rule out that this kind of reasoning leads to justification or knowledge (cf. the so-called bootstrapping-problem or the easy-knowledge-problem). For (...)
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  5. David Lauer (2009). Genuine Normativity, Expressive Bootstrapping, and Normative Phenomenalism. Etica and Politica / Ethics & Politics 11 (1):321-350.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I offer a detailed critical reading of Robert Brandom’s project to give an expressive bootstrapping account of intentionality, cashed out as a normative-phenomenalist account of what I will call genuine normativity. I claim that there is a reading of Making It Explicit that evades the predominant charges of either reductionism or circularity. However, making sense of Brandom’s book in the way proposed here involves correcting Brandom’s own general account of what he is doing in it, and (...)
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  6. Zoltan Jakab, How to Improve on Quinian Bootstrapping – a Response to Nativist Objections. Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.score: 18.0
    Quinian bootstrapping is Susan Carey's solution to Fodor’s paradox of concept learning. Carey claims that contrary to Fodor’s view, not all learning amounts to hypothesis testing, and that there are ways in which even primitive concepts can be learned. Recently Georges Rey has argued that Carey’s attempt to refute radical concept nativism is unsuccessful. First it cannot explain how the expressive power of mental representational systems could increase due to learning. Second, both Fodorian circularity charges and Goodmanian problems of (...)
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  7. Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp (2013). Proper Bootstrapping. Synthese 190 (1):171-185.score: 15.0
    According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type (...)
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  8. Dedre Gentner (2010). Bootstrapping the Mind: Analogical Processes and Symbol Systems. Cognitive Science 34 (5):752-775.score: 15.0
    Human cognition is striking in its brilliance and its adaptability. How do we get that way? How do we move from the nearly helpless state of infants to the cognitive proficiency that characterizes adults? In this paper I argue, first, that analogical ability is the key factor in our prodigious capacity, and, second, that possession of a symbol system is crucial to the full expression of analogical ability.
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  9. Luis Cheng-Guajardo (2014). The Normative Requirement of Means-End Rationality and Modest Bootstrapping. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):487-503.score: 15.0
    “Myth theorists” have recently called the normative requirement of means-end rationality into question. I show that we can accept certain lessons from the Myth Theorists and also salvage our intuition that there is a normative requirement of means-end rationality. I argue that any appeal to a requirement to make our attitudes coherent as such is superfluous and unnecessary in order to vindicate the requirement of means-end rationality and also avoid the problematic conclusion that persons ought to take the means to (...)
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  10. Tiwonge Davis Manda and Terje Aksel Sanner (2012). Bootstrapping Information Technology Innovations Across Organisational and Geographical Boundaries: Lessons From an mHealth Implementation in Malawi. Iris 35.score: 15.0
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  11. Jonathan Weisberg (2010). Bootstrapping in General. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525 - 548.score: 12.0
    Vogel (2000) argues that bootstrapping poses a novel problem for reliabilist theories of knowledge. According to the reliabilist, a true belief is knowledge just in case it was formed by a reliable process, even if one does not know that the process is reliable. Vogel argues that reliabilism allows one to gain knowledge of a source’s reliability in an intuitively illicit way, using the deliverances of the source itself. Cohen (2002; 2005), Van Cleve (2003), and others have argued that (...)
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  12. Tuomas E. Tahko (2011). A Priori and A Posteriori: A Bootstrapping Relationship. Metaphysica 12 (2):151-164.score: 12.0
    The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge has been the subject of an enormous amount of discussion, but the literature is biased against recognizing the intimate relationship between these forms of knowledge. For instance, it seems to be almost impossible to find a sample of pure a priori or a posteriori knowledge. In this paper, it will be suggested that distinguishing between a priori and a posteriori is more problematic than is often suggested, and that a priori and (...)
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  13. Jonathan Weisberg (2012). The Bootstrapping Problem. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.score: 12.0
    Bootstrapping is a suspicious form of reasoning that verifies a source's reliability by checking it against itself. Theories that endorse such reasoning face the bootstrapping problem. This article considers which theories face the problem, and surveys potential solutions. The initial focus is on theories like reliabilism and dogmatism, which allow one to gain knowledge from a source without knowing that it is reliable. But the discussion quickly turns to a more general version of the problem that does not (...)
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  14. Jesper Kallestrup (2012). Bootstrap and Rollback: Generalizing Epistemic Circularity. Synthese 189 (2):395-413.score: 12.0
    Reliabilists accept the possibility of basic knowledge—knowledge that p in virtue of the reliability of some belief-producing process r without antecedent knowledge that r is reliable. Cohen (Philos Phenomenol Res 65:309–329, 2002 , Philos Phenomenol Res 70:417–430, 2005 ) and Vogel (J Philos 97:602–623, 2000 , J Philos 105:518–539, 2008 ) have argued that one can bootstrap knowledge that r is reliable from basic knowledge. This paper provides a diagnosis of epistemic bootstrapping, and then shows that recent attempts at (...)
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  15. Anthony Brueckner (2013). Bootstrapping, Evidentialist Internalism, and Rule Circularity. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):591-597.score: 12.0
    Bootstrapping, evidentialist internalism, and rule circularity Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-7 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9876-9 Authors Anthony Brueckner, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  16. David Christensen (1990). The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping. Philosophy of Science 57 (4):644-662.score: 12.0
    The main appeal of the currently popular "bootstrap" account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had severe problems; and Glymour has revised his original account in an attempt to solve them. I argue that this attempt fails completely, and that any similar modifications must also fail. If the problems can be solved, it will only be by radical revisions which involve jettisoning bootstrapping's basic approach (...)
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  17. Sam Mitchell (1995). Toward a Defensible Bootstrapping. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):241-260.score: 12.0
    An amended bootstrapping can avoid Christensen's counterexamples. Earman and Edidin argue that Christensen's examples to bootstrapping rely on his failure to analyze background knowledge. I add an additional condition to bootstrapping that is motivated by Glymour's remarks on variety of evidence. I argue that it avoids the problems that the examples raise. I defend the modification against the charge that it is holistic, and that it collapses into Bayesianism.
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  18. Jacob Beck, Can Bootstrapping Explain Concept Learning?score: 12.0
    Susan Carey’s account of bootstrapping aims to explain how important new concepts are learned. After arguing that Carey’s own formulations of bootstrapping fail in this aim, I critically evaluate three reformulations of bootstrapping that may have a better chance at success.
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  19. Ken Gemes (2006). Bootstrapping and Content Parts. Erkenntnis 64 (3):345 - 370.score: 12.0
    Christensen [Philosophy of Science, 50: 471–481, 1983] and [Philosophy of Science, 57: 644–662, 1990] provides two sets of counter-examples to the versions of bootstrap confirmation for standard first-order languages presented in Glymour [Theory and Evidence, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980] and [Philosophy of Science, 50: 626–629, 1983]. This paper responds to the counter-examples of Christensen [Philosophy of Science, 50: 471–481, 1983] by utilizing a new notion of content introduced in Gemes [Journal of Philosophical Logic, 26, 449–476, 1997]. It is (...)
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  20. R. Hengeveld & M. A. Fedonkin (2007). Bootstrapping the Energy Flow in the Beginning of Life. Acta Biotheoretica 55 (2).score: 12.0
    This paper suggests that the energy flow on which all living structures depend only started up slowly, the low-energy, initial phase starting up a second, slightly more energetic phase, and so on. In this way, the build up of the energy flow follows a bootstrapping process similar to that found in the development of computers, the first generation making possible the calculations necessary for constructing the second one, etc. In the biogenetic upstart of an energy flow, non-metals in the (...)
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  21. Nicolas Fay, Michael Arbib & Simon Garrod (2013). How to Bootstrap a Human Communication System. Cognitive Science 37 (7):1356-1367.score: 12.0
    How might a human communication system be bootstrapped in the absence of conventional language? We argue that motivated signs play an important role (i.e., signs that are linked to meaning by structural resemblance or by natural association). An experimental study is then reported in which participants try to communicate a range of pre-specified items to a partner using repeated non-linguistic vocalization, repeated gesture, or repeated non-linguistic vocalization plus gesture (but without using their existing language system). Gesture proved more effective (measured (...)
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  22. Jon J. Nordby (1989). Bootstrapping While Barefoot (Crime Models Vs. Theoretical Models in the Hunt for Serial Killers). Synthese 81 (3):373 - 389.score: 12.0
    Investigating random homicides involves constructing models of an odd sort. While the differences between these models and scientific models are radical, calling them models is justified both by functional and structural similarities. Serial homicide investigations illustrate the marked difference between theoretical models in science and the models applied in these criminal investigations. This is further illustrated by considering Glymourian bootstrapping in attempts to solve such homicides. The solutions that result differ radically from explanations in science that are confirmed or (...)
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  23. Joseph Ramsey, Bootstrapping the PC and CPC Algorithms to Improve Search Accuracy.score: 12.0
    By bootstrapping the output of the PC algorithm (Spirtes et al., 2000; Meek 1995), using larger conditioning sets informed by the current graph state, it is possible to define a novel algorithm, JPC, that improves accuracy of search for i.i.d. data drawn from linear, Gaussian, sparse to moderately dense models. The motivation for constructing sepsets using information in the current graph state is to highlight the differences between d-­‐separation information in the graph and conditional independence information extracted from the (...)
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  24. Susan Carey (2011). Concept Innateness, Concept Continuity, and Bootstrapping. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):152.score: 12.0
    The commentators raised issues relevant to all three important theses of The Origin of Concepts (henceforth TOOC). Some questioned the very existence of innate representational primitives, and others questioned my claims about their richness and whether they should be thought of as concepts. Some questioned the existence of conceptual discontinuity in the course of knowledge acquisition and others argued that discontinuity is much more common than was portrayed in TOOC. Some raised issues with my characterization of Quinian bootstrapping, and (...)
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  25. David Grünberg (2001). Bootstrapping and the Problem of Testing Quantitative Theoretical Hypotheses. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2001:143-150.score: 12.0
    Two alternative solutions to the problem of computing the values of theoretical quantities and of testing theoretical hypotheses are Sneed’s structuralist eliminationism and Glymour’s bootstrapping. Sneed attempts to solve the problem by eliminating theoretical quantities by means of the so-called Ramsey-Sneed sentence that represents the global empirical claim of the given theory. Glymour proposes to solve the problem by deducing the values of the theoretical quantities from the hypothesis to be tested. In those cases where the theoretical quantities are (...)
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  26. Julian Kiverstein (2010). No Bootstrapping Without Semantic Inheritance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):279-280.score: 12.0
    Anderson's massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) takes the grounding of meaning in sensorimotor behaviour to be a side effect of neural reuse. I suggest this grounding may play a much more fundamental role in accounting for the bootstrapping of higher-level cognition from sensorimotor behaviour. Thus, the question of when neural reuse delivers semantic inheritance is a pressing one for MRH.
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  27. Alison Wylie (1986). Bootstrapping in Un-Natural Sciences: Archaeological Theory Testing. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:314 - 321.score: 12.0
    Several difficulties have been raised concerning applicability of Glymour's model to developing and "un-natural" sciences, those contexts in which he claims it should be most clearly instantiated. An analysis of testing in such a field, archaeology, indicates that while bootstrapping may be realized in general outline practice necessarily departs from the ideal in at least three important respects 1) testing is not strictly theory contained, 2) the theory-mediated inference from evidence to test hypothesis is not exclusively deductive (...)
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  28. Sean A. Fulop (2005). Semantic Bootstrapping of Type-Logical Grammar. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 14 (1):49-86.score: 12.0
    A two-stage procedure is described which induces type-logical grammar lexicons from sentences annotated with skeletal terms of the simply typed lambda calculus. First, a generalized formulae-as-types correspondence is exploited to obtain all the type-logical proofs of the sample sentences from their lambda terms. The resulting lexicons are then optimally unified. The first stage constitutes the semantic bootstrapping (Pinker, Language Learnability and Language Development, Harvard University Press, 1984), while the unification procedure of Buszkowski and Penn represents a first attempt at (...)
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  29. Maciej Haman & Mikołaj Hernik (2011). Can Multiple Bootstrapping Provide Means of Very Early Conceptual Development? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):130-131.score: 12.0
    Carey focuses her theory on initial knowledge and Quinian bootstrapping. We reflect on developmental mechanisms, which can operate in between. Whereas most of the research aims at delimitating early cognitive mechanisms, we point at the need for studying their integration and mutual bootstrapping. We illustrate this call by referring to a current debate on infants' use of featural representations.
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  30. Emily Mather (2013). Bootstrapping the Early Lexicon: How Do Children Use Old Knowledge to Create New Meanings? Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 12.0
    Bootstrapping the early lexicon: how do children use old knowledge to create new meanings?
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  31. Christian Piller (2013). The Bootstrapping Objection. Organon F 20 (4):612-631.score: 12.0
    If our mental attitudes were reasons, we could bootstrap anything into rationality simply by acquiring these mental attitudes. This, it has been argued, shows that mental attitudes cannot be reasons. In this paper, I focus on John Broome’s development of the bootstrapping objection. I distinguish various versions of this objection and I argue that the bootstrapping objection to mind-based accounts of reasons fails in all its versions.
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  32. Laura Schroeter (2012). Bootstrapping Our Way to Samesaying. Synthese 189 (1):177-197.score: 10.0
    This paper articulates two constraints on an acceptable account of meaning: (i) accessibility: sameness of meaning affords an immediate appearance of de jure co-reference, (ii) flexibility: sameness of meaning tolerates open-ended variation in speakers' substantive understanding of the reference. Traditional accounts of meaning have trouble simultaneously satisfying both constraints. I suggest that relationally individuated meanings provide a promising way of avoiding this tension. On relational accounts, we bootstrap our way to de jure co-reference: the subjective appearance of de jure co-reference (...)
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  33. Madison Culler (1995). Beyond Bootstrapping: A New Account of Evidential Relevance. Philosophy of Science 62 (4):561-579.score: 10.0
    This paper investigates the adequacy of evidential relevance relations proposed by Glymour and others. These accounts incorporate, as a necessary condition, what I call the Positive Instance Condition (PIC): the evidence statement and auxiliary assumptions entail a "positive instance" of the hypothesis. I argue that any account which incorporates PIC as a necessary condition while allowing "bootstrap testing" is doomed to fail. A nonbootstrapping evidential relevance relation of similar form is proposed, and it is argued that, in addition to avoiding (...)
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  34. Geoffrey F. Chew (1983). Bootstrapping the Photon. Foundations of Physics 13 (2):217-246.score: 10.0
    A nontechnical review is given of a topological bootstrap theory, with emphasis on theraison d'être for an electromagnetism whose fine-structure constant is of order10 −2.
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  35. Jonathan Vogel (2008). Epistemic Bootstrapping. Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):518-539.score: 9.0
  36. Stewart Cohen (2010). Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning, and a Priori Justification. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):141-159.score: 9.0
  37. Ralph Wedgwood (forthcoming). A Priori Bootstrapping. In Albert Casullo & Joshua Thurow (eds.), The A Priori In Philosophy. Oxford University Press.score: 9.0
    This paper explores the problems that are raised by a certain traditional sceptical paradox. The conclusion will be that the most challenging problem raised by this paradox does not primarily concern the justification of beliefs; it concerns the justification of belief-forming practices. This conclusion is supported by showing that if we can solve the sceptical problem for belief-forming practices, then it will be a relatively straightforward matter to solve the problem that concerns the justification of beliefs.
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  38. Hilary Kornblith (2009). A Reliabilist Solution to the Problem of Promiscuous Bootstrapping. Analysis 69 (2):263-267.score: 9.0
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  39. David James Barnett (2013). What's the Matter with Epistemic Circularity? Philosophical Studies:1-29.score: 9.0
    If the reliability of a source of testimony is open to question, it seems epistemically illegitimate to verify the source’s reliability by appealing to that source’s own testimony. Is this because it is illegitimate to trust a questionable source’s testimony on any matter whatsoever? Or is there a distinctive problem with appealing to the source’s testimony on the matter of that source’s own reliability? After distinguishing between two kinds of epistemically illegitimate circularity—bootstrapping and self-verification—I argue for a qualified version (...)
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  40. Julian Kiverstein & Andy Clark (2008). Bootstrapping the Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):41-58.score: 9.0
    After offering a brief account of how we understand the shared circuits model (SCM), we divide our response into four sections. First, in section R1, we assess to what extent SCM is committed to an account of the ontogeny and phylogeny of shared circuits. In section R2, we examine doubts raised by several commentators as to whether SCM might be expanded so as to accommodate the mirroring of emotions, sensations, and intransitive actions more generally. Section R3 responds to various criticisms (...)
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  41. Graham White (2011). Bootstrapping Normativity. Philosophy and Technology 24 (1):35-53.score: 9.0
    We compare the role of Cartesian assumptions in the symbol grounding problem and in the Myth of the Given: We argue that the Sellars–McDowell critique of the Myth of the Given and, in particular, its use of the concept of normativity can provide useful resources for responding to the symbol grounding problem. We also describe the concepts of normativity at work in computer science and cognitive science: We argue that normative concepts are pervasive in the sciences and that, in particular, (...)
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  42. Thomas R. Grimes (1987). The Promiscuity of Bootstrapping. Philosophical Studies 51 (1):101 - 107.score: 9.0
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  43. Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2011). Beyond the Building Blocks Model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):139-140.score: 9.0
    This article is a commentary on Carey (2009) The Origin of Concepts. Carey rightly rejects the building blocks model of concept acquisition on the grounds that new primitive concepts can be learned via the process of bootstrapping. But new primitives can be learned by other acquisition processes that do not involve bootstrapping, and bootstrapping itself is not a unitary process. Nonetheless, the processes associated with bootstrapping provide important insights into conceptual change.
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  44. Bruce Edmonds, Bootstrapping Knowledge About Social Phenomena Using Simulation Models.score: 9.0
    Formidable difficulties face anyone trying to model social phenomena using a formal system, such as a computer program. The differences between formal systems and complex, multi-facetted and meaning-laden social systems are so fundamental that many will criticise any attempt to bridge this gap. Despite this, there are those who are so bullish about the project of social simulation that they appear to believe that simple computer models, that are also useful and reliable indicators of how aspects of society works, are (...)
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  45. Louise Connell & Dermot Lynott (2014). Principles of Representation: Why You Can't Represent the Same Concept Twice. Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (3):390-406.score: 9.0
    As embodied theories of cognition are increasingly formalized and tested, care must be taken to make informed assumptions regarding the nature of concepts and representations. In this study, we outline three reasons why one cannot, in effect, represent the same concept twice. First, online perception affects offline representation: Current representational content depends on how ongoing demands direct attention to modality-specific systems. Second, language is a fundamental facilitator of offline representation: Bootstrapping and shortcuts within the computationally cheaper linguistic system continuously (...)
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  46. Leo Townsend (2013). Being and Becoming in the Theory of Group Agency. Abstracta 7 (1).score: 9.0
    Article Title: ‘Being and Becoming in the Theory of Group Agency’This paper explores a bootstrapping puzzle which appears to afflict Philip Pettit’s theory of group agency. Pettit claims that the corporate persons recognised by his theory come about when a set of individuals ‘gets its act together’ by undertaking to reason at the collective level. But this is puzzling, because it is hard to see how the step such a collective must take to become a group agent – the (...)
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  47. Susan Carey (2011). Précis of the Origin of Concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):113-124.score: 9.0
    A theory of conceptual development must specify the innate representational primitives, must characterize the ways in which the initial state differs from the adult state, and must characterize the processes through which one is transformed into the other. The Origin of Concepts (henceforth TOOC) defends three theses. With respect to the initial state, the innate stock of primitives is not limited to sensory, perceptual, or sensorimotor representations; rather, there are also innate conceptual representations. With respect to developmental change, conceptual development (...)
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  48. Adam Drozdek (1998). Bootstrapping Faith. Philosophical Inquiry 20 (3-4):31-40.score: 9.0
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  49. Eleanor Olds Batchelder (2002). Bootstrapping the Lexicon: A Computational Model of Infant Speech Segmentation. Cognition 83 (2):167-206.score: 9.0
    Prelinguistic infants must find a way to isolate meaningful chunks from the continuous streams of speech that they hear. BootLex, a new model which uses distributional cues to build a lexicon, demonstrates how much can be accomplished using this single source of information. This conceptually simple probabilistic algorithm achieves significant segmentation results on various kinds of language corpora - English, Japanese, and Spanish; child- and adult-directed speech, and written texts; and several variations in coding structure - and reveals which statistical (...)
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  50. Sedki Boughattas & J. -P. Ressayre (2010). Bootstrapping, Part I. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 161 (4):511-533.score: 9.0
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