Medical bribery seems to be a global problem from Eastern Europe and the Balkans to China, a diffuse phenomenon, starting with morally acceptable gratitude and ending with institutional bribery. I focus my attention on Romania and analyze similar cases in Eastern European and postcommunist countries. Medical bribery can be regarded as a particular form of human transaction, a kind of primitive contract that occurs when people do not trust institutions or other forms of social contract that are (...) meant to guarantee their rights and protect their interests. Concluding with strategies to fight medical bribery, I will underline better public policies for financing health and social care, and an ethic of trust that may help to restore trustworthiness of institutions and to rebuild interpersonal trust. This should be complemented by an educational program dedicated to understanding the negative consequences and mechanisms of corruption and the importance of ethical behavior. (shrink)

The concept of bribery is important to our thinking about ethics, especially in professional contexts. This is in no small part due to the thought that, as Seamus Miller has put it, bribery is “a paradigm of corruption”. Business persons and corporate entities are often evaluated by how well they remain free from, root out, and punish corruption – especially in democratic societies. It is a common thought, for example, that a democratic institution ought to be free from (...) corruption. Since bribery is often thought a form – perhaps the paradigmatic form – of corruption, bribery, too, serves as a central concept in our evaluations of business persons and corporate entities. This article will lay out three common elements which together are characteristics of bribery (payment, intention, and wrongdoing), and then briefly illustrate how this conjunction of elements allows for distinguishing between bribery and two other questionable acts often examined in the context of business (grease payment and extortion). (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify the concept of bribery, and to do this in a way that reveals its underlying normative features. Bribery, like lying is not a value neutral concept. It has a negative connotation and is regarded by most as generally, although not necessarily universally, wrong. At the very least, those who resort to bribery bear a burden of justification for what they do. This is no small point, as no such burden (...) must be borne for the vast majority of human activities, such as engaging in conversation or taking a walk, which normally do not. As Sissela Bok says of lying, we might say that a negative moral weight attaches to every act of bribery; it may be possible to counter this negative weight in some instances, but not without an argument.1 Why should a negative moral weight be attached to every act of bribery? It might be thought that, even if most instances of bribery are morally objectionable, the concept of bribery itself is morally neutral.2 However, enticing people to violate what they take to be their positional duties does seem to call for some sort of moral justification. This seems to be so even in extreme cases, for example, when bribing a Nazi guard to allow concentration camp prisoners to escape. The ready availability of a moral justification in such circumstances does not eliminate the need for one. (shrink)

This article analyzes the attitudes of United States business professionals toward the issue of international bribery, and in particular, whether or not having a written code of ethics has an effect on these attitudes. A vignette relating to international bribery from a widely used survey instrument was employed in a nationwide survey of business professionals to gather information on ethical attitudes of respondents. Data were also collected on gender of respondents, whether or not respondents were self-employed, whether or (...) not the respondents' firms had a written code of ethics, and to what extent the respondents' firms generated revenues from international operations. Attitudes concerning whether or not international bribery is ever acceptable exhibited wide dispersion. Respondents from firms that have a written code of ethics were significantly less likely to find international bribery acceptable. Firms that generate revenues from international operations were significantly more likely to have a written code of ethics than were firms which did not generate revenues from international operations. Implications of the findings for business policy are discussed. (shrink)

This book responds to the need to help Christians in Asia find a biblical response to pressures in the marketplace. It takes seriously both Scripture and the context Asian Christians function in. It contains a theological framework for grappling with real-time problems, responses from theologians, and actual case studies from the marketplace.

Bribery is an agreement to exchange something of value for an official act. According to the dominant view, bribery is wrong because this agreement violates the professional or positional duties of the official. This chapter argues that this duty-based account is flawed. Instead, the author argues that the key features of bribery, as compared to other sorts of exchanges, reside in the fact that goods or services of different types are exchanged.

Globalization leads to cross-border business transactions between societies with very different norms and regulations regarding bribery. Bribery in international business transactions can be seen as a function of not only the demand for such bribes in different countries, but the supply, or willingness to provide bribes by multinational firms and their representatives. This study addresses the propensity of firms from 30 different countries to engage in international bribery. The study incorporates both domestic (economic development, culture, and domestic (...) corruption in the supplying country) and international factors (those countries’ patterns of trade and involvement in international accords) in explaining the willingness to bribe abroad. The propensity to provide bribes was the lowest when corruption was not tolerated in the multinational firms’ home countries, when the firms’ countries were signatories of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) anti-bribery convention, and when those countries traded heavily with wealthier nations. Further, these findings are maintained when controlling for levels of economic development and cultural values in the supplying country. In terms of culture, firms from high power distance countries showed a somewhat greater propensity for providing bribes in transactions with less-developed nations. (shrink)

Bribery is a complicated, multi-dimensional issue. Upon first glance, most westerners would immediately condemn it as an underhanded, unfair means of gaining an advantage in a competitive or legal situation, and so it is in virtually every case in the westernized world. However, the issue becomes much more complicated in the international context, particularly in developing nations, where giving and accepting bribes is often normal and expected. This paper serves to inform ethical decision-making in situations where the “right choice” (...) is unclear with regards to bribery, primarily for individuals performing aid work in foreign countries with corrupt officials and police officers. In such contexts, a simple offering of food, money, or a small trinket may make the difference between a person being able to accomplish meaningful, life-changing work for the local populace or having that work significantly slowed at best and being thrown out of the country, robbed, or imprisoned in worse cases. The larger scale bribery issues in international business and the laws pertaining to them are also discussed. (shrink)

Bribery has previously been viewed as a two-party transaction between the bribe-offerer and the bribe-taker. But there is a third party: the one who has a prior claim on the bribe-taker's loyalty. Breaking the first contract in response to the offer of a bribe is alienation of agency (a category that strictly includes bribes): alienation of agency is the additional immorality of bribery beyond any immorality of the act solicited by the bribe.

Examples of tipping suggest that the distinction between tipping, bribery and extortion can be questioned. Some well known ideas about bribery will not work if extended to tipping and, indeed, these analyses may founder whether or not tipping, bribery and extortion merge. I suggest that more case study analysis as well as a discussion of the relationship between character and actions are needed.

For several centuries, the Russians have been famous for the number of transactions they conduct through unofficial channels. This book, the first sustained attempt to explain and analyze Russian society's reliance on unofficial "give-and-take," focuses especially on two key practices: bribery (the use of public office for private gain) and blat (the informal exchange of favors). It brings together specialists from a wide range of disciplines.

Managers seeking to respect local norms when operating in cross-cultural settings may encounter ethical dilemmas when faced with values that potentially conflict with their own. The question of whose ethics or values should be applied or whether a set of universal ethical norms should be developed often confronts managers in their international business dealings. This article explores the findings from a qualitative research study that examines critical ethical dilemmas confronting Australian managers in their international business operations and their responses to (...) those dilemmas. For Australians managers in this study, bribery emerged as the major ethical dilemma confronting them in their international operations. (shrink)

This paper examines the impact of Chinese business managers’ moral philosophies on the perception of corrupt payments such as bribery, kickbacks and gift giving. Business managers from Mainland China were selected as target respondents. As hypothesized the survey results generally indicate that moral relativism is a significant predictor of Chinese business managers’ favorable perception of bribery and kickbacks. In examining the attitude toward gift giving, the survey showed that an individual’s attitude toward gift giving was neither affected by (...) their moral relativism nor by their moral idealism, which implies that gift giving is widely accepted as legal practice in business in Chinese cultural society. (shrink)

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores for 47 countries reported by Transparency International were used to ascertain determinants of bribe taking in international business. Two sets of independent variables – economic and cultural – were used in a multiple regression analysis. Results indicate that bribe taking was more likely to be prevalent in countries with low per capita income and lower disparities in income distribution. Cultural factors such as high power distance and high masculinity in a country were also likely to (...) be associated with high level of bribe taking. Both economic and cultural factors were important explanatory factors of bribery. Implications of the findings for combating bribery are discussed. (shrink)

We examine how corporate bribery is impacted by cultural distance between multinational enterprises home and host countries, and organizational distance to core values between MNE entry modes and MNE headquarters. Tension between external and internal legitimacy helps to explain why cultural and organizational distances will affect MNE bribery. The empirical analysis used data from cross-border transactions by MNEs that were sanctioned by US regulatory officials between 1978 and 2011. We find statistical support for all hypotheses capturing main and (...) moderating effects and suggest that MNEs may be seriously risking their legitimacies from transactions in corruption-prone host countries. (shrink)

This article discusses the effects of the OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, which was signed in 1997 and is due to be implemented by the signatory nation‐states this year. The Convention represents the expansion of legal measures to combat the bribery of foreign public officials by individuals or corporations, and it has been accompanied by the Organisation of American States’ Convention Against Corruption. Previously the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act , which applied only to (...) United States individuals or corporations, ‘stood alone in the world as a legal barrier to transnational bribery’ . This article proceeds in stages to evaluate implications of the Convention. Firstly the Convention is placed in the context of the increased focus on transnational business bribery in recent years. Second, the main points of the Convention are outlined. Third, the issues and problems posed by the Convention for business are discussed. Finally some themes regarding enforcement by the relevant authorities are outlined. (shrink)

A review of my undergraduate students' commentaries on two of Bartky's essays serves as the occasion for elaborating on Bartky's analyses of factors that sustain and perpetuate the subjection and disempowerment of women. In my elaboration I draw from John Stuart Mill's statement: "In the case of women, each individual of the subject-class is in a chronic state of bribery and intimidation combined." I conclude by raising the question, How is personal transformation possible?

While it is widely believed that bribery is ubiquitous among Asian firms, few studies have offered systematic evidence of such activities, and the dynamics of bribery in Asian firms have not been well understood. The research reported here used World Business Environment Survey data to examine some distinct characteristics of bribery in Asian firms and to empirically test 10 hypotheses on determinants of bribery. We find that firm characteristics such as firm size, growth rate, and corporate (...) governance are important determinants of bribery activities at the firm level, and that Asian firms are more likely to bribe when faced with fierce market competition, corrupted court systems, convoluted licensing requirements, nontransparent interpretation of laws and regulations, inefficient government service delivery, and high taxes. (shrink)

Managers seeking to respect local norms when operating in cross-cultural settings may encounter ethical dilemmas when faced with values that potentially conflict with their own. The question of whose ethics or values should be applied or whether a set of universal eth- ical norms should be developed often confronts managers in their international business dealings. This article explores the findings from a qualitative research study that examines critical ethical dilemmas confronting Australian managers in their international business operations and their responses (...) to those dilemmas. For Australians managers in this study, bribery emerged as the major ethical dilemma confronting them in their international operations. (shrink)

This study investigates the differences in he way bribery and extortion is perceived by two different cultures — American and Greek. Two hundred and forty American business students and two hundred and four Greek business students were presented with three scenarios describing a businessman offering a bribe to a government official and three scenarios describing a businessman being forced to pay a bribe to an official in order to do business. The Reidenbach-Robin instrument was used to measure the ethical (...) reactions of the two samples to these scenarios. Results indicate that ethical reactions to bribery and extortion vary by (a) the nationality of the person offering the bribe, and (b) the country where the bribe is offered. In addition, Greeks perceived some of the scenarios as being less unethical than did Americans. (shrink)

This study investigates the influence of formal and informal institutions on firm innovation in transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEs) by explicitly differentiating between corruption and bribery as distinct informal institutions. We integrate institutional theory and legitimacy theory to explain that the failure of formal institutions creates an environment of corruption which encourages firms to use bribes to facilitate economic exchange. We test our hypotheses on the innovation performance of a sample (n = 1603) of firms in (...) 11 CEEs. The results show that weak rule of law and ineffective business regulations in CEEs propagate the perception of corruption that inhibits firm innovation. However, the use of bribery enables firms to transform this environment of corruption into innovation outcomes. The policy and managerial implications of our research for differentiating between corruption and bribery and our findings that bribery acts as the glue that binds formal and informal institutions are fully discussed. (shrink)

This article discusses the effects of the OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, which was signed in 1997 and is due to be implemented by the signatory nation‐states this year. The Convention represents the expansion of legal measures to combat the bribery of foreign public officials by individuals or corporations, and it has been accompanied by the Organisation of American States’ Convention Against Corruption. Previously the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which applied only to (...) United States individuals or corporations, ‘stood alone in the world as a legal barrier to transnational bribery’ (Low, Bjorklund and Atkinson 1998:245). This article proceeds in stages to evaluate implications of the Convention. Firstly the Convention is placed in the context of the increased focus on transnational business bribery in recent years. Second, the main points of the Convention are outlined. Third, the issues and problems posed by the Convention for business are discussed. Finally some themes regarding enforcement by the relevant authorities are outlined. (shrink)

The question of what firms do internally in the fight against bribery is probably as important to the successful outcome of that fight as formal anti-bribery law and enforcement. This paper looks at corporate approaches to anti-bribery commitment and compliance management using an inventory of 246 codes of conduct. It suggests that, while bribery is often mentioned in the codes of conduct, there is considerable diversity in the language and concepts adopted in anti-bribery commitments. This (...) diversity is a feature of the language used in describing parties to bribery and in defining which activities are prohibited (e.g. promising bribes versus actually giving them, gifts and entertainment, and solicitation. This diversity of language and concepts suggests that it might be useful to extend and deepen efforts in business associations and international organisations to build consensus on the meaning of bribery and corruption. In contrast, the bribery codes show evidence of an emerging consensus on managerial approaches to combating bribery. This involves the deployment of a distinctive mix of management tools, including financial record keeping, statements by executive officers, internal monitoring, whistle-blowing facilities, creation of compliance offices and threats of disciplinary action. (shrink)

Bribery is a frequently discussed problem in international business. This article looks at the problem from the North American and from the developing country perspective. It describes and analyses specific cases and highlights recurring patterns of behavior.The article is based on the experiences of the authors who have been promoting business in the developing world. In addition to ethical considerations involved with bribery there are some very practical reasons for not engaging in the practice. There are also real (...) barriers to establishing the relationships necessary to avoid the practice yet continue doing business. (shrink)

The article argues that bribery is wrong because it violates fundamental notion of equality and it undermines the vitality of the institutions affected.

Many studies of bribery acknowledge the important role of bribe-givers, but their true motives remain unclear. We propose that the likelihood of bribery depends on the willingness of an organization to affiliate with local parties or to be successful in a host country, or to have power over local parties. We further argue that different opportunities, either pervasive or arbitrary, facilitate different types of motives that affect the likelihood of bribery. In addition, we investigate the effect of (...) perceived fairness on the likelihood of bribery. We employ a 3 (motives: affiliation vs. achievement vs. power) × 2 (opportunities: pervasiveness vs. arbitrariness) × 2 (perceived fairness: high vs. low) factorial design in experimental settings among Executive MBA students in southern Taiwan. Our findings indicate that, when companies perceive a higher level of distributive fairness, high-achieving organizations are more likely to offer a bribe when the condition is pervasive. When they have a powerful motive, arbitrariness engenders a higher likelihood of bribery. When they perceive less distributive fairness, there are no significant differences between motive and opportunity. (shrink)

This study examines attitudes toward bribery in international business and whether such attitudes differ between men and women. Results of surveys of adults studying for careers in international business indicate ambivalent and nuanced attitudes over bribe giving/taking with significant differences by sex with respect to specific hypothetical situations, suggesting a gender gap on matters of bribery. It is recommended that academic curriculum and management development programs stress ethics and legality and focus on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and (...) similar antibribery laws so that aspiring managers are properly trained to recognize and manage the challenges prevalent in conducting business internationally. (shrink)

This essay ranges widely, using selected ideas from microeconomics, ethics, and elementary game theory in an effort to gain some understanding of the controversial issue of bribery in international markets. Its goal is partial charification of the issue and increased awareness of alternative remedy strategies.

This article provides an ISCT analysis of commercial bribery focused on transaction cost economics. In the language of Antitrust, commercial bribery is a form of vertical arrangement subject to the same efficiency analysis that has found other vertical arrangements potentially beneficial to consumers. My analysis shows that actions condemned as commerical bribery in the Honda case may well have benefited Honda's dealer network once promotional free riding and other forms of rent seeking by dealers are considered. I (...) propose that the term "commercial bribery" should be avoided until after an ISCT analysis shows that the community is likely to have been harmed. The term "third-party payments" is a more ethically neutral term with which to begin the analysis. (shrink)

The author has elsewhere defended the view that accepting a bribe involves the violation of an implicit or explicit promise or understanding associated with an office or position that one occupies and that therefore it is prima facie wrong to accept a bribe. Michael Philips has criticized this position in a recent paper. He argues that (a) there are cases in which accepting a bribe violates no promises or agreements, and (b) there are cases in which there is no prima (...) facie duty to refuse an offer of a bribe. The author offers replies to both of these objections. (shrink)

Responding to my paper Bribery Tom Carson argues that bribe takers violate promisory obligations in a wider range of cases than I acknowledge and insists that bribe taking is prima facie wrong in all contexts. I argue that he is wrong on both counts.

Economic openness, both in terms of increased international trade exposure and enhanced inter-firm networking, has been a key element of China’s economic emergence since the implementation of market reforms and the “opening-up policy” over 30 years ago. Unfortunately, these changes have also coincided with the increased incidence of bribery and corruption. Both in general, and in the specific context of China, research on the relationship between a firm’s tendency toward openness and its propensity to engage in bribery is (...) scarce. This study seeks to fill this gap based on empirical evidence provided by a large sample of Chinese firms. The findings of the study reveal that firms’ increased networking and openness tend to occur contemporaneously with greater bribery and corruption. We suggest that this may be due to the misuse of guanxi-based networks that coincide with the presence of firms’ open network strategies, heightened by the potential loss of resource and capability heterogeneity (and hence reduced competitive advantages) in the context of openness. We further find that firms paying bribes do so as an attempt to overcome unnecessary bureaucratic processes and ineffective institutional support that might tend to hinder their development. (shrink)

Anti-bribery and corruption in sport governing bodies is a little explored area in academic literature. This paper addresses the gap in the literature through expert perceptions on the current state of anti-bribery and corruption policies in international and national sport governing bodies as seen through an ethical climate theory lens. Thus, this paper addresses the question of how and why enhancing anti-bribery and corruption in sport internal controls can mitigate financial corruption and improve ethical climates. Semi-structured interviews (...) were undertaken with 17 forensic accountants and anticorruption experts to garner their opinion on strengths and weaknesses of current policies in sport governing bodies and ascertain the link between anticorruption, accounting controls, and ethical climates. The transcripts were analysed using thematic analysis and the results showed a consistency of opinion with regards to the policy improvements required for a robust anti-bribery and corruption programme within sport governing bodies, with multiple implications for ethical organisational climates. (shrink)

Over the past decade, we have witnessed some early signs of progress in the battle against international bribery and corruption, a problem that throughout the history of commerce had previously been ignored. We present a model that we then use to assess progress in reducing bribery. The model components include both hard law and soft law legislation components and enforcement and compliance components. We begin by summarizing the literature that convincingly argues that bribery is an immoral and (...) unethical practice and that the economic harm it causes falls most heavily on those least able to absorb it. The next section summarizes the main provisions of anti-bribery legislation including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the Organization for Eco nomic Development's Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the laws of selected countries. We conclude this section with a discussion of the "moral imperialism" argument for not imposing Western laws and values on other cultures. The next section focuses on the roles played by NGOs including Transparency International (TI), the World Economic Forum (WEF), and the International Chamber of Commerce. We review trends in enforcement and prosecution, including a review of the United States' enforcement processes, mechanisms for cross-border legal assistance, a discussion of the distinctive nature of FCPA cases, and an assessment of what the future holds for enforcement. The final section focuses on compliance processes for corporations aimed at reducing the risk of FCPA and related violations. This section also addresses the ethics of gift giving and "grease" payments. The article concludes with a summary and suggestions for further research. Throughout the article, we reference important bribery cases and include comments from several authorities who are on the front lines of the battle against international bribery. (shrink)