We investigate the extension of monadic second-order logic of order with cardinality quantifiers "there exists uncountably many sets such that... " and "there exists continuum many sets such that... ". We prove that over the class of countable linear orders the two quantifiers are equivalent and can be effectively and uniformly eliminated. Weaker or partial elimination results are obtained for certain wider classes of chains. In particular, we show that over the class of ordinals the uncountability quantifier (...) can be effectively and uniformly eliminated. Our argument makes use of Shelah's composition method and Ramsey-like theorem for dense linear orders. (shrink)

We generalize Shelah's analysis of cardinality quantifiers for a superstable theory from Chapter V of Classification Theory and the Number of Nonisomorphic Models. We start with a set of bounds for the cardinality of each formula in some general invariant family of formulas in a superstable theory (in Classification Theory, a uniform family of formulas is considered) and find a set of derived bounds for all formulas. The set of derived bounds is sharp: up to a technical (...) restriction, every model that satisfies the original bounds has a sufficiently saturated elementary extension that satisfies the original bounds and such that for each formula the set of its realizations in the extension has arbitrarily large cardinality below the corresponding derived bound of the formula. (shrink)

We show that the predicate “x is the power set of y” is ‐definable, if V = L[E] is an extender model constructed from a coherent sequences of extenders, provided that there is no inner model with a Woodin cardinal. Here is a predicate true of just the infinite cardinals. From this we conclude: the validities of second order logic are reducible to, the set of validities of the Härtig quantifier logic. Further we show that if no L[E] model has (...) a cardinal strong up to one of its ℵ‐fixed points, and, the Löwenheim number of this logic, is less than the least weakly inaccessible δ, then (i) is a limit of measurable cardinals of K, and (ii) the Weak Covering Lemma holds at δ. (shrink)

Inquisitive first-order logic, InqBQ, is a system which extends classical first-order logic with formulas expressing questions. From a mathematical point of view, formulas in this logic express properties of sets of relational structures. This paper makes two contributions to the study of this logic. First, we describe an Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé game for InqBQ and show that it characterizes the distinguishing power of the logic. Second, we use the game to study cardinality quantifiers in the inquisitive setting. That is, we (...) study what statements and questions can be expressed in InqBQ about the number of individuals satisfying a given predicate. As special cases, we show that several variants of the question how many individuals satisfy α(x) are not expressible in InqBQ, both in the general case and in restriction to finite models. (shrink)

We succeed to say something on the identities of when μ > θ > cf with μ strong limit θ-compact or even μ is limit of compact cardinals.

This paper presents a formalization of first-order arithmetic characterizing the natural numbers as abstracta of the equinumerosity relation. The formalization turns on the interaction of a nonstandard cardinality quantifier with an abstraction operator assigning objects to predicates. The project draws its philosophical motivation from a nonreductionist conception of logicism, a deflationary view of abstraction, and an approach to formal arithmetic that emphasizes the cardinal properties of the natural numbers over the structural ones.

In the semantics of natural language, quantification may have received more attention than any other subject, and one of the main topics in psychological studies on deductive reasoning is syllogistic inference, which is just a restricted form of reasoning with quantifiers. But thus far the semantical and psychological enterprises have remained disconnected. This paper aims to show how our understanding of syllogistic reasoning may benefit from semantical research on quantification. I present a very simple logic that pivots on the (...) monotonicity properties of quantified statements - properties that are known to be crucial not only to quantification but to a much wider range of semantical phenomena. This logic is shown to account for the experimental evidence available in the literature as well as for the data from a new experiment with cardinal quantifiers ("at least n" and "at most n"), which cannot be explained by any other theory of syllogistic reasoning. (shrink)

Vectorization of a class of structures is a natural notion in finite model theory. Roughly speaking, vectorizations allow tuples to be treated similarly to elements of structures. The importance of vectorizations is highlighted by the fact that if the complexity class PTIME corresponds to a logic with reasonable syntax, then it corresponds to a logic generated via vectorizations by a single generalized quantifier (Dawar in J Log Comput 5(2):213–226, 1995). It is somewhat surprising, then, that there have been few systematic (...) studies of the expressive power of vectorizations of various quantifiers. In the present paper, we consider the simplest case: the cardinality quantifiers C S. We show that, in general, the expressive power of the vectorized quantifier logic $${{\rm FO}(\{{\mathsf C}_S^{(n)}\, | \, n \in \mathbb{Z}_+\})}$$ is much greater than the expressive power of the non-vectorized logic FO(C S ). (shrink)

Following Henkin's discovery of partially-ordered (branching) quantification (POQ) with standard quantifiers in 1959, philosophers of language have attempted to extend his definition to POQ with generalized quantifiers. In this paper I propose a general definition of POQ with 1-place generalized quantifiers of the simplest kind: namely, predicative, or "cardinality" quantifiers, e.g., "most", "few", "finitely many", "exactly α", where α is any cardinal, etc. The definition is obtained in a series of generalizations, extending the original, Henkin (...) definition first to a general definition of monotone-increasing (M↑) POQ and then to a general definition of generalized POQ, regardless of monotonicity. The extension is based on (i) Barwise's 1979 analysis of the basic case of M↑ POQ and (ii) my 1990 analysis of the basic case of generalized POQ. POQ is a non-compositional Ist-order structure, hence the problem of extending the definition of the basic case to a general definition is not trivial. The paper concludes with a sample of applications to natural and mathematical languages. (shrink)

Following Henkin’s discovery of partially-ordered (branching) quantification (POQ) with standard quantifiers in 1959, philosophers of language have attempted to extend his definition to POQ with generalized quantifiers. In this paper I propose a general definition of POQ with 1-place generalized quantifiers of the simplest kind: namely, predicative, or “cardinality” quantifiers, e.g., “most”, “few”, “finitely many”, “exactly α ”, where α is any cardinal, etc. The definition is obtained in a series of generalizations, extending the original, (...) Henkin definition first to a general definition of monotone-increasing (M↑) POQ and then to a general definition of generalized POQ, regardless of monotonicity. The extension is based on (i) Barwise’s 1979 analysis of the basic case of M↑ POQ and (ii) my 1990 analysis of the basic case of generalized POQ. POQ is a non-compositional 1st-order structure, hence the problem of extending the definition of the basic case to a general definition is not trivial. The paper concludes with a sample of applications to natural and mathematical languages. (shrink)

In the topological semantics, quantified intuitionistic logic, QH, is known to be strongly complete not only for the class of all topological spaces but also for some particular topological spaces — for example, for the irrational line, ${\Bbb P}$, and for the rational line, ${\Bbb Q}$, in each case with a constant countable domain for the quantifiers. Each of ${\Bbb P}$ and ${\Bbb Q}$ is a separable zero-dimensional dense-in-itself metrizable space. The main result of the current article generalizes these (...) known results: QH is strongly complete for any zero-dimensional dense-in-itself metrizable space with a constant domain of cardinality ≤ the space’s weight; consequently, QH is strongly complete for any separable zero-dimensional dense-in-itself metrizable space with a constant countable domain. We also prove a result that follows from earlier work of Moerdijk: if we allow varying domains for the quantifiers, then QH is strongly complete for any dense-in-itself metrizable space with countable domains. (shrink)

THERE IS GREAT MOTIVATION WITHIN FREGE'S THEORY TO\nCONSTRUE THE CARDINAL NUMBERS AS QUANTIFIERS, WHICH ARE\nHIGHER LEVEL CONCEPTS. BUT FREGE ARGUED THAT THE CARDINAL\nNUMBERS ARE OBJECTS, NOT CONCEPTS, AND DEFINED THEM\nACCORDINGLY. MOREOVER, FREGE'S HIERARCHY OF CONCEPTS\nPREVENTED HIM FROM CONSTRUING THE NUMBERS AS CONCEPTS. MY\nPURPOSE IS TO BRING OUT THE QUANTIFICATIONAL NATURE OF THE\nNUMBERS IN THE FACE OF THESE OBSTACLES. THE PAPER PRESSES\nTHE QUANTIFICATIONAL VIEW ONTO FREGE'S CONCEPT OF NUMBER AS\nIT TRACES ITS DEVELOPMENT FROM THE "BEGRIFFSSCHRIFT",\nTHROUGH THE 1880S, INTO ITS FORMALIZATION (...) IN THE\n"GRUNDGESETZE". THE THEORY YIELDS SURPRISINGLY EASILY UNDER\nPRESSURE FROM THE QUANTIFICATIONAL VIEW, AND ONE\nSYMPATHETIC WITH THAT VIEW MAY TAKE ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE\nFACT THAT IT WAS FREGE'S HIERARCHY OF CONCEPTS, NOT HIS\nACTUAL ARGUMENTS, THAT PREVENTED HIS CONSTRUING NUMBERS AS\nQUANTIFIERS. (shrink)

This paper proposes a formalization of the class of sentences quantified by most, which is also interpreted as proportion of or majority of depending on the domain of discourse. We consider sentences of the form “Most A are B”, where A and B are plural nouns and the interpretations of A and B are infinite subsets of \. There are two widely used semantics for Most A are B: \ > C \) and \ > \dfrac{C}{2} \), where C denotes (...) the cardinality of a given finite set X. Although is more descriptive than, it also produces a considerable amount of insensitivity for certain sets. Since the quantifier most has a solid cardinal behaviour under the interpretation majority and has a slightly more statistical behaviour under the interpretation proportional of, we consider an alternative approach in deciding quantity-related statements regarding infinite sets. For this we introduce a new semantics using natural density for sentences in which interpretations of their nouns are infinite subsets of \, along with a list of the axiomatization of the concept of natural density. In other words, we take the standard definition of the semantics of most but define it as applying to finite approximations of infinite sets computed to the limit. (shrink)

We show that assuming modest large cardinals, there is a definable class of ordinals, closed and unbounded beneath every uncountable cardinal, so that for any closed and unbounded subclasses $P, Q, {\langle L[P],\in,P \rangle }$ and ${\langle L[Q],\in,Q \rangle }$ possess the same reals, satisfy the Generalised Continuum Hypothesis, and moreover are elementarily equivalent. Examples of such P are Card, the class of uncountable cardinals, I the uniform indiscernibles, or for any n the class $C^{n}{=_{{\operatorname {df}}}}\{ \lambda \, | \, (...) V_{\lambda } \prec _{{\Sigma }_{n}}V\}$ ; moreover the theory of such models is invariant under ZFC-preserving extensions. They also all have a rich structure satisfying many of the usual combinatorial principles and a definable wellorder of the reals. The inner model constructed using definability in the language augmented by the Härtig quantifier is thus also characterized. (shrink)

Fix a cardinal κ. We can ask the question: what kind of a logic L is needed to characterize all models of cardinality κ up to isomorphism by their L-theories? In other words: for which logics L it is true that if any models A and B of cardinality κ satisfy the same L-theory then they are isomorphic?It is always possible to characterize models of cardinality κ by their Lκ+,κ+-theories, but we are interested in finding a “small” (...) logic L, i.e., the sentences of L are hereditarily of smaller cardinality than κ. For any cardinal κ it is independent of ZFC whether any such small definable logic L exists. If it exists it can be second order logic for κ=ω and fourth order logic or certain infinitary second order logic Lκ,ω source for uncountable κ. All models of cardinality κ can always be characterized by their theories in a small logic with generalized quantifiers, but the logic may be not definable in the language of set theory. Our work continues and extends the work of Ajtai [Miklos Ajtai, Isomorphism and higher order equivalence, Ann. Math. Logic 16 181–203]. (shrink)

The following problem is studied: How large and how small can the Löwenheim and Hanf numbers of unbounded logics be in relation to the most common large cardinals? The main result is that the Löwenheim number of the logic with the Härtig-quantifier can be consistently put in between any two of the first weakly inaccessible, the first weakly Mahlo, the first weakly compact, the first Ramsey, the first measurable and the first supercompact cardinals.

§1. Introduction. After the pioneering work of Mostowski [29] and Lindström [23] it was Jon Barwise's papers [2] and [3] that brought abstract model theory and generalized quantifiers to the attention of logicians in the early seventies. These papers were greeted with enthusiasm at the prospect that model theory could be developed by introducing a multitude of extensions of first order logic, and by proving abstract results about relationships holding between properties of these logics. Examples of such properties areκ-compactness.Any (...) set of sentences of cardinality ≤ κ, every finite subset of which has a model, has itself a model.Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down toκ.If a sentence of the logic has a model, it has a model of cardinality at most κ.Interpolation Property.If ϕ and ψ are sentences such that ⊨ ϕ → Ψ, then there is θ such that ⊨ ϕ → θ, ⊨ θ → Ψ and the vocabulary of θ is the intersection of the vocabularies of ϕ and Ψ.Lindstrom's famous theorem characterized first order logic as the maximal ℵ0-compact logic with Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down to ℵ0. With his new concept of absolute logics Barwise was able to get similar characterizations of infinitary languagesLκω. But hopes were quickly frustrated by difficulties arising left and right, and other areas of model theory came into focus, mainly stability theory. No new characterizations of logics comparable to the early characterization of first order logic given by Lindström and of infinitary logic by Barwise emerged. What was first called soft model theory turned out to be as hard as hard model theory. (shrink)

La dotta ignoranza -- Le congetture -- Il Dio nascosto -- La ricerca di Dio -- La filiazione di Dio -- Il dono del Padre dei lumi -- Congettura sugli ultimi giorni -- Dialogo sulla Genesi -- Difesa della dotta ignoranza -- La sapienza -- La mente -- Gli esperimenti con la bilancia -- La visione di Dio -- Il berillo -- L'ugaglianza -- Il principio -- Il potere che è -- il non-altro -- La caccia della sapienza -- Il (...) gioco della palla -- Compendio -- Il vertice della contemplazione -- La quadratura del cerchio -- I complementi matematici -- La perfezione matematica. (shrink)

§1. Introduction. After the pioneering work of Mostowski [29] and Lindström [23] it was Jon Barwise's papers [2] and [3] that brought abstract model theory and generalized quantifiers to the attention of logicians in the early seventies. These papers were greeted with enthusiasm at the prospect that model theory could be developed by introducing a multitude of extensions of first order logic, and by proving abstract results about relationships holding between properties of these logics. Examples of such properties areκ-compactness.Any (...) set of sentences of cardinality ≤ κ, every finite subset of which has a model, has itself a model.Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down toκ.If a sentence of the logic has a model, it has a model of cardinality at most κ.Interpolation Property.If ϕ and ψ are sentences such that ⊨ ϕ → Ψ, then there is θ such that ⊨ ϕ → θ, ⊨ θ → Ψ and the vocabulary of θ is the intersection of the vocabularies of ϕ and Ψ.Lindstrom's famous theorem characterized first order logic as the maximal ℵ0-compact logic with Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down to ℵ0. With his new concept of absolute logics Barwise was able to get similar characterizations of infinitary languagesLκω. But hopes were quickly frustrated by difficulties arising left and right, and other areas of model theory came into focus, mainly stability theory. No new characterizations of logics comparable to the early characterization of first order logic given by Lindström and of infinitary logic by Barwise emerged. What was first called soft model theory turned out to be as hard as hard model theory. (shrink)

We consider a class of Lindström extensions of first-order logic which are susceptible to a natural Skolemization procedure. In these logics Ehrenfeucht Mostowski (EM) functors for theories with arbitrarily large models can be obtained under suitable restrictions. Characteristic dependencies between algebraic properties of the quantifiers and the maximal domains of EM functors are investigated.Results are applied to Magidor Malitz logic,L(Q <ω), showing e.g. its Hanf number to be equal to ℶω(ℵ1) in the countably compact case. Using results of Baumgartner, (...) the maximal number of isomorphism types of linearly ordered models of regular cardinality is shown to be achieved for theories that admit an EM functor on a typically restricted domain. (shrink)

Les trois dialogues composés par le cardinal Nicolas de Cues pendant l'été 1450 ne résument pas toute la pensée de cet auteur, mais ils éclairent d'un jour relativement nouveau sa réflexion sur le lien entre sagesse et savoir. Proche en cela des Anciens, Nicolas de Cues pense leur unité dans la lumière de l'Un - de la Déité, écrit-il parfois - réfléchie par la puissance de l'esprit humain. Cet esprit est compris comme imago dei, non pas image de Dieu, car (...) tout ce qui est image de Dieu, mais plutôt copie de Dieu, reprise de la toute-puissance divine dans les limites que lui impose, toutefois, le fait d'être finie. La vérité étant en elle-même inaccessible ici-bas - inattingible, écrit Nicolas de Cues - reste le développement de cette vérité ou de l'Un, c'est à dire ce monde que l'esprit a pour tâche de mesurer, de reprendre, de recréer. Savoir pour inventer un monde à venir, avec humilité et ouverture à l'Etranger : cela s'accorde précisément avec ce que certains historiens nomment l'Humanisme. (shrink)

Cardinal Mercier’s Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy is a standard work, prepared at the Higher Institute of Philosophy, Louvain, mainly for the use of clerical students in Catholic Seminaries. Though undoubtedly elementary, it contains a clear, simple, and methodological exposition of the principles and problems of every department of philosophy, and its appeal is not to any particular class, but broadly human and universal. Volume I includes a general introduction to philosophy and sections on cosmology, psychology, criteriology, and metaphysics or (...) ontology. (shrink)

Thus emerges the paradox of All Israel's destiny. Some of the children of Israel gathered in a state like all others—no more and no less and this is legitimate and necessary. This state was founded by the children of the People whom God called not to be like the others, but, rather for the others, because of His design for universal salvation. What is true for the people who have settled in this state which was recreated for the Jews, is (...) true for the members, of the Jewish people who are dispersed throughout the Diaspora as citizens of various countries. But this vocation to testify is in the hands of God, and not in the power of man. The destiny of Israel is that its destiny overtakes it over and over. (shrink)

This paper concerns late 1920 s attempts to construct unitary theories of gravity and electromagnetism. A first attempt using a non-standard connection—with torsion and zero-curvature—was carried out by Albert Einstein in a number of publications that appeared between 1928 and 1931. In 1929, Tullio Levi-Civita discussed Einstein’s geometric structure and deduced a new system of differential equations in a Riemannian manifold endowed with what is nowadays known as Levi-Civita connection. He attained an important result: Maxwell’s electromagnetic equations and the gravitational (...) equations were obtained exactly, while Einstein had deduced them only as a first order approximation. A main feature of Levi-Civita’s theory is the essential use of the Ricci’s rotation coefficients, introduced by Gregorio Ricci Curbastro many years before. We trace the history of Ricci’s coefficients that are still used today, and highlight their geometric and mechanical meaning. (shrink)