Search results for 'causal explanations' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  42
    David Pineda (2011). Non-Committal Causal Explanations. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):147-170.
    Some causal explanations are non-committal in that mention of a property in the explanans conveys information about the causal origin of the explanandum even if the property in question plays no causal role for the explanandum . Programme explanations are a variety of non-committal causal (NCC) explanations. Yet their interest is very limited since, as I will argue in this paper, their range of applicability is in fact quite narrow. However there is at (...)
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  2.  43
    Michelene T. H. Chi, Rod D. Roscoe, James D. Slotta, Marguerite Roy & Catherine C. Chase (2012). Misconceived Causal Explanations for Emergent Processes. Cognitive Science 36 (1):1-61.
    Studies exploring how students learn and understand science processes such as diffusion and natural selection typically find that students provide misconceived explanations of how the patterns of such processes arise (such as why giraffes’ necks get longer over generations, or how ink dropped into water appears to “flow”). Instead of explaining the patterns of these processes as emerging from the collective interactions of all the agents (e.g., both the water and the ink molecules), students often explain the pattern as (...)
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  3.  25
    Alexander Reutlinger (forthcoming). Does the Counterfactual Theory of Explanation Apply to Non-Causal Explanations in Metaphysics? European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-18.
    In the recent philosophy of explanation, a growing attention to and discussion of non-causal explanations has emerged, as there seem to be compelling examples of non-causal explanations in the sciences, in pure mathematics, and in metaphysics. I defend the claim that the counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE) captures the explanatory character of both non-causal scientific and metaphysical explanations. According to the CTE, scientific and metaphysical explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies (...)
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  4.  32
    Finnur Dellsén (2016). There May Yet Be Non-Causal Explanations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (2):377-384.
    There are many putative counterexamples to the view that all scientific explanations are causal explanations. Using a new theory of what it is to be a causal explanation, Bradford Skow has recently argued that several of the putative counterexamples fail to be non-causal. This paper defends some of the counterexamples by showing how Skow’s argument relies on an overly permissive theory of causal explanations.
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  5.  60
    Alexander Reutlinger (forthcoming). Is There A Monist Theory of Causal and Non-Causal Explanations? The Counterfactual Theory of Scientific Explanation. Philosophy of Science.
    The goal of this paper is to develop a counterfactual theory of explanation. The CTE provides a monist framework for causal and non-causal explanations, according to which both causal and non-causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans. I argue that the CTE is applicable to two paradigmatic examples of non-causal explanations: Euler’s explanation and renormalization group explanations of universality.
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  6.  16
    Mark Pexton (2016). There Are Non‐Causal Explanations of Particular Events. Metaphilosophy 47 (2):264-282.
    A defence of non-causal explanations of events is presented in cases where explanation is understood as modal explanation. In such cases the source of modal information is crucial. All explanations implicitly use contrast classes, and relative to a particular contrast we can privilege some difference makers over others. Thinking about changes in these privileged “actual” difference makers is then the source of modal information for any given explanandum. If an actual difference maker is non-causal, then we (...)
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  7. Achille C. Varzi (2007). Omissions and Causal Explanations. In Francesca Castellani & Josef Quitterer (eds.), Agency and Causation in the Human Sciences. Mentis Verlag 155–167.
    In previous work I have argued that talk about negative events should not be taken at face value: typically, what we are inclined to think of as a negative event (John’s failure to go jogging) is just an ordinary, positive event (his going to the movie instead); it is a positive event under a negative description. Here I consider more closely the difficulties that arise in those cases where no positive event seems available to do the job, as with putative (...)
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  8. Bradford Skow (2013). Are There Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (3):axs047.
    Philosophers have proposed many alleged examples of non-causal explanations of particular events. I discuss several well-known examples and argue that they fail to be non-causal. 1 Questions2 Preliminaries3 Explanations That Cite Causally Inert Entities4 Explanations That Merely Cite Laws I5 Stellar Collapse6 Explanations That Merely Cite Laws II7 A Final Example8 Conclusion.
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  9.  75
    Jim Bogen (2005). Regularities and Causality; Generalizations and Causal Explanations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 36 (2):397-420.
    Machamer, Darden, and Craver argue (Mechanism) that causal explanations explain effects by describing the operations of the mechanisms (systems of entities engaging in productive activities) which produce them. One of this paper’s aims is to take advantage of neglected resources of Mechanism to rethink the traditional idea (Regularism) that actual or counterfactual natural regularities are essential to the distinction between causal and non-causal co-occurrences, and that generalizations describing natural regularities are essential components of causal (...). I think that causal productivity and regularity are by no means the same thing, and that the Regularists are mistaken about the roles generalizations play in causal explanation. Humean, logical empiricist, and other Regularist accounts of causal explanation have had the unfortunate effect of distracting philosophers’ from important non-explanatory scientific uses of laws and lesser generalizations which purport to describe natural regularities. My second aim is to characterize some of these uses, illustrating them with examples from neuroscientific research. (shrink)
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  10.  15
    Alexander Reutlinger, Does the Counterfactual Theory of Explanation Apply to Non-Causal Explanations in Metaphysics?
    In the recent philosophy of explanation, a growing attention to and discussion of non-causal explanations has emerged, as there seem to be compelling examples of non-causal explanations in the sciences, in pure mathematics, and in metaphysics. I defend the claim that the counterfactual theory of explanation captures the explanatory character of both non-causal scientific and metaphysical explanations. According to the CTE, scientific and metaphysical explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between (...)
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  11.  4
    Reutlinger Alexander & Andersen Holly (forthcoming). Abstract Versus Causal Explanations? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
    In the recent literature on causal and non-causal scientific explanations, there is an intuitive assumption (which we call the ‘abstractness assumption’) according to which an explanation is non-causal by virtue of being abstract. In this context, to be “abstract” means that the explanans in question leaves out many or almost all causal microphysical details of the target system. After motivating this assumption, we argue that the abstractness assumption, in placing the abstract and the causal (...)
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  12.  3
    Finnur Dellsén (2016). There May Yet Be Non-Causal Explanations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (2):377-384.
    There are many putative counterexamples to the view that all scientific explanations are causal explanations. Using a new theory of what it is to be a causal explanation, Bradford Skow has recently argued that several of the putative counterexamples fail to be non-causal. This paper defends some of the counterexamples by showing how Skow’s argument relies on an overly permissive theory of causal explanations.
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  13.  39
    Jon Williamson (2013). How Can Causal Explanations Explain? Erkenntnis 78 (2):257-275.
    The mechanistic and causal accounts of explanation are often conflated to yield a ‘causal-mechanical’ account. This paper prizes them apart and asks: if the mechanistic account is correct, how can causal explanations be explanatory? The answer to this question varies according to how causality itself is understood. It is argued that difference-making, mechanistic, dualist and inferentialist accounts of causality all struggle to yield explanatory causal explanations, but that an epistemic account of causality is more (...)
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  14.  72
    Merrilee H. Salmon (2003). Causal Explanations of Behavior. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):720-738.
    Most discussions of causal explanations of behavior focus on the problem of whether it makes sense to regard reasons as causes of human behavior, whether there can be laws connecting reasons with behavior, and the like. This essay discusses explanations of human behavior that do not appeal to reasons. Such explanations can be found in several areas of the social sciences. Moreover, these explanations are both causal and non-reductionist. Historical linguists, for example, offer (...) explanations of changes in how words are pronouncedand linguistic change in generalwithout appealing to human intentions. I use examples from linguistics, anthropology, and evolutionary psychology to discuss the importance of this sort of explanation and to examine its compatibility with recent philosophical accounts of causation. (shrink)
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  15.  26
    Alice McEleney & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2006). Spontaneous Counterfactual Thoughts and Causal Explanations. Thinking and Reasoning 12 (2):235 – 255.
    We report two Experiments to compare counterfactual thoughts about how an outcome could have been different and causal explanations about why the outcome occurred. Experiment 1 showed that people generate counterfactual thoughts more often about controllable than uncontrollable events, whereas they generate causal explanations more often about unexpected than expected events. Counterfactual thoughts focus on specific factors, whereas causal explanations focus on both general and specific factors. Experiment 2 showed that in their spontaneous counterfactual (...)
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  16.  8
    Anne M. Fagot (1984). About Causation in Medicine: Some Shortcomings of a Probabilistic Account of Causal Explanations. In Lennart Nordenfelt & B. I. B. Lindahl (eds.), Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. Reidel 101--126.
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  17.  5
    Alexander Reutlinger & Holly Andersen, Abstract Versus Causal Explanations?
    In the recent literature on causal and non-causal scientific explanations, there is an intuitive assumption according to which an explanation is non-causal by virtue of being abstract. In this context, to be “abstract” means that the explanans in question leaves out many or almost all causal microphysical details of the target system. After motivating this assumption, we argue that the abstractness assumption, in placing the abstract and the causal character of an explanation in tension, (...)
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  18. Holly Andersen (forthcoming). Complements, Not Competitors: Causal and Mathematical Explanations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw023.
    A finer-grained delineation of a given explanandum reveals a nexus of closely related causal and non- causal explanations, complementing one another in ways that yield further explanatory traction on the phenomenon in question. By taking a narrower construal of what counts as a causal explanation, a new class of distinctively mathematical explanations pops into focus; Lange’s characterization of distinctively mathematical explanations can be extended to cover these. This new class of distinctively mathematical explanations (...)
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  19.  4
    B. Skow (2014). Are There Non-Causal Explanations ? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):445-467.
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  20.  9
    Corrado Matta (2015). Interpretivism and Causal Explanations A Case From Educational Research. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):543-567.
    This article criticizes a view about the interpretation of human action, labeled in the text as interpretivism. This view posits a sharp separation between the natural and social sciences, to the effect that the methods of the latter cannot be applied to the former. I criticize this standpoint by reconstructing a case of educational research. As I argue, the case I analyze indicates that the arguments in support of interpretivism are contradicted by what social researchers can actually achieve. I conclude (...)
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  21.  48
    Elizabeth Valentine (1988). Teleological Explanations and Their Relation to Causal Explanation in Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):61-68.
    The relation of teleological to causal explanations in psychology is examined. Nagel's claim that they are logically equivalent is rejected. Two arguments for their non-equivalence are considered: (i) the impossibility of specifying initial conditions in the case of teleological explanations and (ii) the claim that different kinds of logic are involved. The view that causal explanations provide only necessary conditions whereas teleological explanations provide sufficient conditions is rejected: causal explanations can provide sufficient (...)
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  22.  10
    Robert Wyllie (1980). Causal Explanations in Mental Event Contexts. Philosophical Papers 9 (May):15-31.
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  23.  83
    Angela Potochnik (2015). Causal Patterns and Adequate Explanations. Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1163-1182.
    Causal accounts of scientific explanation are currently broadly accepted (though not universally so). My first task in this paper is to show that, even for a causal approach to explanation, significant features of explanatory practice are not determined by settling how causal facts bear on the phenomenon to be explained. I then develop a broadly causal approach to explanation that accounts for the additional features that I argue an explanation should have. This approach to explanation makes (...)
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  24. Carl Ginet (2008). In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):229 - 237.
    This paper defends my claim in earlier work that certain non-causal conditions are sufficient for the truth of some reasons explanations of actions, against the critique of this claim given by Randolph Clarke in his book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.
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  25. Jeffrey S. Wicken (1981). Causal Explanations in Classical and Statistical Thermodynamics. Philosophy of Science 48 (1):65-77.
    This paper considers the problem of causal explanation in classical and statistical thermodynamics. It is argued that the irreversibility of macroscopic processes is explained in both formulations of thermodynamics in a teleological way that appeals to entropic or probabilistic consequences rather than to efficient-causal, antecedental conditions. This explanatory structure of thermodynamics is not taken to imply a teleological orientation to macroscopic processes themselves, but to reflect simply the epistemological limitations of this science, wherein consequences of heat-work asymmetries are (...)
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  26.  70
    Jani Raerinne (2011). Causal and Mechanistic Explanations in Ecology. Acta Biotheoretica 59 (3):251-271.
    How are scientific explanations possible in ecology, given that there do not appear to be many—if any—ecological laws? To answer this question, I present and defend an account of scientific causal explanation in which ecological generalizations are explanatory if they are invariant rather than lawlike. An invariant generalization continues to hold or be valid under a special change—called an intervention—that changes the value of its variables. According to this account, causes are difference-makers that can be intervened upon to (...)
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  27. T. A. Goudge (1958). Causal Explanations in Natural History. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (35):194-202.
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  28.  7
    Jim Bogen (2005). Regularities and Causality; Generalizations and Causal Explanations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):397-420.
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  29.  4
    Jani Raerinne & Jan Baedke, Exclusions, Explanations, and Exceptions: On the Causal and Lawlike Status of the Competitive Exclusion Principle.
    The lawlike and explanatory status of ecologists’ Competitive Exclusion Principle is a debated topic. It has been argued that the CEP is a ceteris paribus law, a non-lawlike regularity riddled with exceptions, a tautology, a causal regularity, and so on. We argue that the CEP is an empirically respectful and testable strict law that is not riddled with genuine exceptions. Moreover, we argue that the CEP is not a causal explanans in explanations, because it is a coexistence (...)
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  30.  22
    Erik Weber & Jeroen Van Bouwel (2007). Assessing the Explanatory Power of Causal Explanations. In Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.), Rethinking Explanation. Springer
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  31. Neil Campbell (2003). Causes and Causal Explanations: Davidson and His Critics. Philosophia 31 (1-2):149-157.
  32.  30
    Samuel Gorovitz (1965). Causal Judgments and Causal Explanations. Journal of Philosophy 62 (23):695-711.
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  33.  57
    R. S. Downie (1985). Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. Journal of Medical Ethics 11 (2):109-109.
  34.  20
    James Woodward (1986). Are Singular Causal Explanations Implicit Covering-Law Explanations? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):253 - 279.
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  35.  1
    Paul H. Thibodeau, Mira J. Fein, Elizabeth S. Goodbody & Stephen J. Flusberg (2015). The Depression Schema: How Labels, Features, and Causal Explanations Affect Lay Conceptions of Depression. Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  36.  11
    A. B. Levison & I. Thalberg (1969). Essential and Causal Explanations of Action. Mind 78 (309):91-101.
  37.  16
    Lennart Nordenfelt & B. Ingemar B. Lindahl (eds.) (1984). Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. Reidel.
  38.  6
    William H. Austin (1984). Rational Credibility and Causal Explanations of Belief. Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 26 (2-3):116-133.
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  39.  8
    Raymond Martin (1972). Singular Causal Explanations. Theory and Decision 2 (3):221-237.
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  40.  8
    Douglas Huff & Stephen Turner (1981). Rationalizations and the Application of Causal Explanations of Human Action. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (3):213 - 220.
  41.  21
    Quentin Smith (1995). Internal and External Causal Explanations of the Universe. Philosophical Studies 79 (3):283 - 310.
    By "an infinite series of contingent beings" is meant a beginningless succession of modally contingent beings, such that the succession of beings occupies an infinite number of equal-lengthened temporal intervals (e.g. an aleph-zero number of past years).
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  42.  10
    R. C. Solomon (1974). Reasons as Causal Explanations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (3):415-428.
  43.  2
    Schematic Patterns (1988). 7/Causal Explanations In. In M. J. Horowitz (ed.), Psychodynamics and Cognition. University of Chicago Press 261.
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  44.  6
    James E. White (1971). Avowed Reasons and Causal Explanations. Mind 80 (318):238-245.
  45. Nikolai Axmacher (2015). Causal Explanations Within Weak and Incomplete Theories. Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  46. U. K. Bolton - (2003). Meaning and Causal Explanations in the Behavioural Sciences. In Bill Fulford, Katherine Morris, John Z. Sadler & Giovanni Stanghellini (eds.), Nature and Narrative: An Introduction to the New Philosophy of Psychiatry. OUP Oxford
     
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  47. R. Brandt (1963). Personality Traits as Causal Explanations in Historiography. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Philosophy and History. [New York]New York University Press
     
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  48. Quin M. Chrobak & Maria S. Zaragoza (2013). When Forced Fabrications Become Truth: Causal Explanations and False Memory Development. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (3):827-844.
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  49. Satya P. Gautam (1992). Normative Structure of Human Actions and Causal Explanations. In Jayant Vishnu Narlikar, Indu Banga & Chhanda Gupta (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Perspectives From Natural and Social Sciences. Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers 40--179.
     
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  50. Marc Lange (2016). Because Without Cause: Non-Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics. Oxford University Press Usa.
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