Search results for 'causal explanations' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. David Pineda (2011). Non-Committal Causal Explanations. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):147-170.score: 240.0
    Some causal explanations are non-committal in that mention of a property in the explanans conveys information about the causal origin of the explanandum even if the property in question plays no causal role for the explanandum . Programme explanations are a variety of non-committal causal (NCC) explanations. Yet their interest is very limited since, as I will argue in this paper, their range of applicability is in fact quite narrow. However there is at (...)
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  2. Michelene T. H. Chi, Rod D. Roscoe, James D. Slotta, Marguerite Roy & Catherine C. Chase (2012). Misconceived Causal Explanations for Emergent Processes. Cognitive Science 36 (1):1-61.score: 234.0
    Studies exploring how students learn and understand science processes such as diffusion and natural selection typically find that students provide misconceived explanations of how the patterns of such processes arise (such as why giraffes’ necks get longer over generations, or how ink dropped into water appears to “flow”). Instead of explaining the patterns of these processes as emerging from the collective interactions of all the agents (e.g., both the water and the ink molecules), students often explain the pattern as (...)
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  3. Elizabeth Valentine (1988). Teleological Explanations and Their Relation to Causal Explanation in Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):61-68.score: 188.0
    The relation of teleological to causal explanations in psychology is examined. Nagel's claim that they are logically equivalent is rejected. Two arguments for their non-equivalence are considered: (i) the impossibility of specifying initial conditions in the case of teleological explanations and (ii) the claim that different kinds of logic are involved. The view that causal explanations provide only necessary conditions whereas teleological explanations provide sufficient conditions is rejected: causal explanations can provide sufficient (...)
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  4. Jim Bogen (2005). Regularities and Causality; Generalizations and Causal Explanations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 36 (2):397-420.score: 180.0
    Machamer, Darden, and Craver argue (Mechanism) that causal explanations explain effects by describing the operations of the mechanisms (systems of entities engaging in productive activities) which produce them. One of this paper’s aims is to take advantage of neglected resources of Mechanism to rethink the traditional idea (Regularism) that actual or counterfactual natural regularities are essential to the distinction between causal and non-causal co-occurrences, and that generalizations describing natural regularities are essential components of causal (...). I think that causal productivity and regularity are by no means the same thing, and that the Regularists are mistaken about the roles generalizations play in causal explanation. Humean, logical empiricist, and other Regularist accounts of causal explanation have had the unfortunate effect of distracting philosophers’ from important non-explanatory scientific uses of laws and lesser generalizations which purport to describe natural regularities. My second aim is to characterize some of these uses, illustrating them with examples from neuroscientific research. (shrink)
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  5. Bradford Skow (2013). Are There Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (3):axs047.score: 180.0
    Philosophers have proposed many alleged examples of non-causal explanations of particular events. I discuss several well-known examples and argue that they fail to be non-causal. 1 Questions2 Preliminaries3 Explanations That Cite Causally Inert Entities4 Explanations That Merely Cite Laws I5 Stellar Collapse6 Explanations That Merely Cite Laws II7 A Final Example8 Conclusion.
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  6. Merrilee H. Salmon (2003). Causal Explanations of Behavior. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):720-738.score: 180.0
    Most discussions of causal explanations of behavior focus on the problem of whether it makes sense to regard reasons as causes of human behavior, whether there can be laws connecting reasons with behavior, and the like. This essay discusses explanations of human behavior that do not appeal to reasons. Such explanations can be found in several areas of the social sciences. Moreover, these explanations are both causal and non-reductionist. Historical linguists, for example, offer (...) explanations of changes in how words are pronouncedand linguistic change in generalwithout appealing to human intentions. I use examples from linguistics, anthropology, and evolutionary psychology to discuss the importance of this sort of explanation and to examine its compatibility with recent philosophical accounts of causation. (shrink)
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  7. Alice McEleney & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2006). Spontaneous Counterfactual Thoughts and Causal Explanations. Thinking and Reasoning 12 (2):235 – 255.score: 180.0
    We report two Experiments to compare counterfactual thoughts about how an outcome could have been different and causal explanations about why the outcome occurred. Experiment 1 showed that people generate counterfactual thoughts more often about controllable than uncontrollable events, whereas they generate causal explanations more often about unexpected than expected events. Counterfactual thoughts focus on specific factors, whereas causal explanations focus on both general and specific factors. Experiment 2 showed that in their spontaneous counterfactual (...)
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  8. Jon Williamson (2013). How Can Causal Explanations Explain? Erkenntnis 78 (2):257-275.score: 180.0
    The mechanistic and causal accounts of explanation are often conflated to yield a ‘causal-mechanical’ account. This paper prizes them apart and asks: if the mechanistic account is correct, how can causal explanations be explanatory? The answer to this question varies according to how causality itself is understood. It is argued that difference-making, mechanistic, dualist and inferentialist accounts of causality all struggle to yield explanatory causal explanations, but that an epistemic account of causality is more (...)
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  9. Anne M. Fagot (1984). About Causation in Medicine: Some Shortcomings of a Probabilistic Account of Causal Explanations. In. In Lennart Nordenfelt & B. I. B. Lindahl (eds.), Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. Reidel. 101--126.score: 180.0
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  10. Robert Wyllie (1980). Causal Explanations in Mental Event Contexts. Philosophical Papers 9 (May):15-31.score: 178.0
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  11. Carl Ginet (2008). In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):229 - 237.score: 172.0
    This paper defends my claim in earlier work that certain non-causal conditions are sufficient for the truth of some reasons explanations of actions, against the critique of this claim given by Randolph Clarke in his book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.
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  12. Angela Potochnik (forthcoming). Causal Patterns and Adequate Explanations. Philosophical Studies:1-20.score: 172.0
    Causal accounts of scientific explanation are currently broadly accepted (though not universally so). My first task in this paper is to show that, even for a causal approach to explanation, significant features of explanatory practice are not determined by settling how causal facts bear on the phenomenon to be explained. I then develop a broadly causal approach to explanation that accounts for the additional features that I argue an explanation should have. This approach to explanation makes (...)
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  13. Jeffrey S. Wicken (1981). Causal Explanations in Classical and Statistical Thermodynamics. Philosophy of Science 48 (1):65-77.score: 164.0
    This paper considers the problem of causal explanation in classical and statistical thermodynamics. It is argued that the irreversibility of macroscopic processes is explained in both formulations of thermodynamics in a teleological way that appeals to entropic or probabilistic consequences rather than to efficient-causal, antecedental conditions. This explanatory structure of thermodynamics is not taken to imply a teleological orientation to macroscopic processes themselves, but to reflect simply the epistemological limitations of this science, wherein consequences of heat-work asymmetries are (...)
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  14. Neil Campbell (2003). Causes and Causal Explanations: Davidson and His Critics. Philosophia 31 (1-2):149-157.score: 154.0
  15. Erik Weber & Jeroen Van Bouwel (2007). Assessing the Explanatory Power of Causal Explanations. In Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.), Rethinking Explanation. Springer.score: 152.0
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  16. Achille Varzi, Omissions and Causal Explanations.score: 150.0
    Little Johnny: “Can we be punished for something we have not done?” Mother: “Of course not!” Johnny: “Good—because I didn’t turn off the gas…” At this point Johnny smiles and thinks he got away with it. Unfortunately, his mother is smarter than he expected. “I said we cannot be punished for something we have not done”, she says, “but certainly we can be punished for not having done something”.
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  17. Jani Raerinne (2011). Causal and Mechanistic Explanations in Ecology. Acta Biotheoretica 59 (3):251-271.score: 150.0
    How are scientific explanations possible in ecology, given that there do not appear to be many—if any—ecological laws? To answer this question, I present and defend an account of scientific causal explanation in which ecological generalizations are explanatory if they are invariant rather than lawlike. An invariant generalization continues to hold or be valid under a special change—called an intervention—that changes the value of its variables. According to this account, causes are difference-makers that can be intervened upon to (...)
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  18. Samuel Gorovitz (1965). Causal Judgments and Causal Explanations. Journal of Philosophy 62 (23):695-711.score: 150.0
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  19. Quentin Smith (1995). Internal and External Causal Explanations of the Universe. Philosophical Studies 79 (3):283 - 310.score: 150.0
    By "an infinite series of contingent beings" is meant a beginningless succession of modally contingent beings, such that the succession of beings occupies an infinite number of equal-lengthened temporal intervals (e.g. an aleph-zero number of past years).
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  20. James Woodward (1986). Are Singular Causal Explanations Implicit Covering-Law Explanations? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):253 - 279.score: 150.0
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  21. R. S. Downie (1985). Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. Journal of Medical Ethics 11 (2):109-109.score: 150.0
  22. Lennart Nordenfelt & B. Ingemar B. Lindahl (eds.) (1984). Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. Reidel.score: 150.0
  23. Douglas Huff & Stephen Turner (1981). Rationalizations and the Application of Causal Explanations of Human Action. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (3):213 - 220.score: 150.0
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  24. R. C. Solomon (1974). Reasons as Causal Explanations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (3):415-428.score: 150.0
  25. James E. White (1971). Avowed Reasons and Causal Explanations. Mind 80 (318):238-245.score: 150.0
  26. T. A. Goudge (1958). Causal Explanations in Natural History. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (35):194-202.score: 150.0
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  27. A. B. Levison & I. Thalberg (1969). Essential and Causal Explanations of Action. Mind 78 (309):91-101.score: 150.0
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  28. Raymond Martin (1972). Singular Causal Explanations. Theory and Decision 2 (3):221-237.score: 150.0
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  29. Schematic Patterns (1988). 7/Causal Explanations In. In M. J. Horowitz (ed.), Psychodynamics and Cognition. University of Chicago Press. 261.score: 150.0
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  30. William H. Austin (1984). Rational Credibility and Causal Explanations of Belief. Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 26 (2-3).score: 150.0
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  31. U. K. Bolton - (2003). Meaning and Causal Explanations in the Behavioural Sciences. In Bill Fulford, Katherine Morris, John Z. Sadler & Giovanni Stanghellini (eds.), Nature and Narrative: An Introduction to the New Philosophy of Psychiatry. Oup Oxford.score: 150.0
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  32. R. Brandt (1963). Personality Traits as Causal Explanations in Historiography. In. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Philosophy and History. [New York]New York University Press.score: 150.0
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  33. Satya P. Gautam (1992). Normative Structure of Human Actions and Causal Explanations. In Jayant Vishnu Narlikar, Indu Banga & Chhanda Gupta (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Perspectives From Natural and Social Sciences. Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. 40--179.score: 150.0
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  34. Ullin T. Place (1987). Causal Laws, Dispositional Properties and Causal Explanations. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (3):149-160.score: 150.0
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  35. Julia Tanney (2009). Reasons as Non-Causal, Context-Placing Explanations. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan. 94--111.score: 148.0
    forthcoming in New Essays on the Explanation of Action Abstract Philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein rejected the idea that the explanatory power of our ordinary interpretive practices is to be found in law-governed, causal relations between items to which our everyday mental terms allegedly refer. Wittgenstein and those he inspired pointed to differences between the explanations provided by the ordinary employment of mental expressions and the style of causal explanation characteristic of the hard sciences. I believe, however, that (...)
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  36. Clark Glymour (1998). Learning Causes: Psychological Explanations of Causal Explanation. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (1):39-60.score: 148.0
    I argue that psychologists interested in human causal judgment should understand and adopt a representation of causal mechanisms by directed graphs that encode conditional independence (screening off) relations. I illustrate the benefits of that representation, now widely used in computer science and increasingly in statistics, by (i) showing that a dispute in psychology between ‘mechanist’ and ‘associationist’ psychological theories of causation rests on a false and confused dichotomy; (ii) showing that a recent, much-cited experiment, purporting to show that (...)
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  37. Sven Walter (2005). Program Explanations and Causal Relevance. Acta Analytica 20 (36):32-47.score: 144.0
    Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have defended a non-reductive account of causal relevance known as the ‘program explanation account’. Allegedly, irreducible mental properties can be causally relevant in virtue of figuring in non-redundant program explanations which convey information not conveyed by explanations in terms of the physical properties that actually do the ‘causal work’. I argue that none of the possible ways to spell out the intuitively plausible idea of a program explanation serves its purpose, viz., (...)
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  38. Jaakko Kuorikoski, Varieties of Modularity for Causal and Constitutive Explanations.score: 134.0
    The invariance under interventions –account of causal explanation imposes a modularity constraint on causal systems: a local intervention on a part of the system should not change other causal relations in that system. This constraint has generated criticism against the account, since many ordinary causal systems seem to break this condition. This paper answers to this criticism by noting that explanatory models are always models of specific causal structures, not causal systems as a whole, (...)
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  39. Paul Schuurman (2013). Determinism and Causal Feedback Loops in Montesquieu's Explanations for the Military Rise and Fall of Rome. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (3):507-528.score: 134.0
    Montesquieu's Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence (1733/1734) is a methodological exercise in causal explanation on the meso-level applied to the subject of the military rise and fall of Rome. Rome is described as a system with contingent initial conditions that have a strong path-determining effect. Contingent and plastic initial configurations become highly determining in their subsequent operation, thanks to self-reinforcing feedback loops. Montesquieu's method seems influenced by the ruthless commitment to efficient (...)
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  40. Peter Gärdenfors (1990). An Epistemic Analysis of Explanations and Causal Beliefs. Topoi 9 (2):109-124.score: 132.0
    The analyses of explanation and causal beliefs are heavily dependent on using probability functions as models of epistemic states. There are, however, several aspects of beliefs that are not captured by such a representation and which affect the outcome of the analyses. One dimension that has been neglected in this article is the temporal aspect of the beliefs. The description of a single event naturally involves the time it occurred. Some analyses of causation postulate that the cause must not (...)
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  41. Erik Weber, Jeroen Van Bouwel & Robrecht Vanderbeeken (2005). Forms of Causal Explanation. Foundations of Science 10 (4):437-454.score: 128.0
    In the literature on scientific explanation two types of pluralism are very common. The first concerns the distinction between explanations of singular facts and explanations of laws: there is a consensus that they have a different structure. The second concerns the distinction between causal explanations and uni.cation explanations: most people agree that both are useful and that their structure is different. In this article we argue for pluralism within the area of causal explanations: (...)
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  42. Alexander Reutlinger (forthcoming). Why Is There Universal Macro-Behavior? Renormalization Group Explanation As Non-Causal Explanation. Philosophy of Science.score: 128.0
    Renormalization group (RG) methods are an established strategy to explain how it is possible that microscopically different systems exhibit virtually the same macro behavior when undergoing phase-transitions. I argue – in agreement with Robert Batterman – that RG explanations are non-causal explanations. However, Batterman misidentifies the reason why RG explanations are non-causal: it is not the case that an explanation is non- causal if it ignores causal details. I propose an alternative argument, according (...)
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  43. Henry M. Wellman & David Liu (2007). Causal Reasoning as Informed by the Early Development of Explanations. In Alison Gopnik & Laura Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation. Oxford University Press. 261--279.score: 126.0
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  44. Eugen Zeleňák (2009). On Explanatory Relata in Singular Causal Explanation. Theoria 75 (3):179-195.score: 124.0
    Explanation is usually taken to be a relation between certain entities. The aim of this paper is to discuss what entities are suitable as explanatory relata of singular causal explanations, i.e., explanations concerning singular causality relating particular events or other appropriate entities. I outline three different positions. The purely causal approach stipulates that the same entities that are related in the singular causal relation are also linked by the explanatory relation. This position, however, has a (...)
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  45. Walter Korpi (1985). Power Resources Approach Vs. Action and Conflict: On Causal and Intentional Explanations in the Study of Power. Sociological Theory 3 (2):31-45.score: 120.0
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  46. Alfred R. Mele (2000). Goal-Directed Action: Teleological Explanations, Causal Theories, and Deviance. Noûs 34 (s14):279 - 300.score: 120.0
  47. Abraham S. Roth (1999). Reasons Explanations of Actions: Causal, Singular, and Situational. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):839-874.score: 120.0
  48. Leen De Vreese (2008). Causal (Mis)Understanding and the Search for Scientific Explanations: A Case Study From the History of Medicine. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 39 (1):14-24.score: 120.0
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  49. Ulla Räisänen, Marie-Jet Bekkers, Paula Boddington, Srikant Sarangi & Angus Clarke (2006). The Causation of Disease – The Practical and Ethical Consequences of Competing Explanations. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 9 (3):293-306.score: 120.0
    The prevention, treatment and management of disease are closely linked to how the causes of a particular disease are explained. For multi-factorial conditions, the causal explanations are inevitably complex and competing models may exist to explain the same condition. Selecting one particular causal explanation over another will carry practical and ethical consequences that are acutely relevant for health policy. In this paper our focus is two-fold; (i) the different models of causal explanation that are put forward (...)
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