Search results for 'causal relata' (try it on Scholar)

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Bibliography: Causal Relata in Metaphysics
  1. Eugen Zeleňák (2009). On Explanatory Relata in Singular Causal Explanation. Theoria 75 (3):179-195.score: 204.0
    Explanation is usually taken to be a relation between certain entities. The aim of this paper is to discuss what entities are suitable as explanatory relata of singular causal explanations, i.e., explanations concerning singular causality relating particular events or other appropriate entities. I outline three different positions. The purely causal approach stipulates that the same entities that are related in the singular causal relation are also linked by the explanatory relation. This position, however, has a problem (...)
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  2. David Lynn Holt (1990). Causation, Transitivity, and Causal Relata. Journal of Philosophical Research 15:263-277.score: 180.0
    I consider an alleged example of a non-transitive causal chain, on the basis of which J. Lee has argued that causation is non-transitive. I show that his analysis of the example rests on too coarse-grained an approach to causal relata. I develop a fine-grained analysis of events which owes much to Dretske’s notion of an allomorphic event, and I use this analysis to show that in the example all the genuine causal chains are indeed transitive. It (...)
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  3. Emma Tobin, Natural Kinds, Causal Relata and Causal Relations.score: 174.0
    Realist accounts of natural kinds rely on an account of causation where the relata of causal relations are real and discrete. These views about natural kinds entail very different accounts of causation. In particular, the necessity of the causal relation given the instantiation of the properties of natural kinds is more robust in the fundamental sciences (e.g. physics and chemistry) than it is in the life sciences (e.g. biology and the medical sciences). In this paper, I wish (...)
     
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  4. Daniel Murray Hausman (2005). Causal Relata: Tokens, Types, or Variables? [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 63 (1):33 - 54.score: 156.0
    The literature on causation distinguishes between causal claims relating properties or types and causal claims relating individuals or tokens. Many authors maintain that corresponding to these two kinds of causal claims are two different kinds of causal relations. Whether to regard causal relations among variables as yet another variety of causation is also controversial. This essay maintains that causal relations obtain among tokens and that type causal claims are generalizations concerning causal relations (...)
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  5. Peter Menzies (1989). A Unified Account of Causal Relata. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1):59 – 83.score: 150.0
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  6. Douglas Ehring (1987). Causal Relata. Synthese 73 (2):319 - 328.score: 150.0
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  7. Douglas Ehring (1988). Causal Asymmetry and Causal Relata: Reply to Lee. Synthese 76 (3):371 - 375.score: 150.0
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  8. Douglas Ehring (1987). Compound Emphasis and Causal Relata. Analysis 47 (4):209 - 213.score: 150.0
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  9. Menno Hulswit (2005). How Causal is Downward Causation? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (2):261 - 287.score: 90.0
    The purpose of this paper is to lay bare the major problems underlying the concept of downward causation as discussed within the perspective of the present interest for phenomena that are characterized by self-organization. In our Discussion of the literature, we have focussed on two questions: (1) What sorts of things are said to be, respectively, causing and caused within the context of downward causation? And (2) What is the meaning of 'causing' in downward causation? We have concluded that the (...)
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  10. M. J. Garcia-Encinas (2009). Tropes for Causation. Metaphysica 10 (2):157-174.score: 90.0
    Tropes, as distinguished from other possible kinds of entities such as universals, states of affairs, events and bare particulars, are best-suited to play the role of causal relata.
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  11. Johannes Persson (2002). Cause, Effect, and Fake Causation. Synthese 131 (1):129 - 143.score: 66.0
    The possibility of apparently negative causation has been discussed in a number of recent works on causation, but the discussion has suffered from beingscattered. In this paper, the problem of apparently negative causation and its attemptedsolutions are examined in more detail. I discuss and discard three attempts that have beensuggested in the literature. My conclusion is negative: Negative causation shows that thetraditional cause & effect view is inadequate. A more unified causal perspective is needed.
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  12. Cei Maslen (2008). A Higher-Order Problem of Causal Relevance? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:149-157.score: 60.0
    Robb & Heil describe a higher-order version of the popular Causal Exclusion Problem. In particular, they ask whether the argument that led to a change in focus from event causation to causal relevance of properties can be iterated, leading us to focus on the causal relevance of properties of those properties, or properties of properties of those properties, and so on. In this paper, I investigate this curious higher-order problem and argue that the appeal of both the (...)
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  13. Martin Montminy & Andrew Russo, A Defense of Causal Invariantism.score: 54.0
    [Under Review] Causal contextualism holds that sentences of the form ‘c causes e’ have context-sensitive truth-conditions. Contextualists argue that how one describes the relata of a causal relation affects the truth of one’s claim. We show that this argument appeals to the wrong kind of nominals to denote events; when proper nominals are used, the data actually favor invariantism over contextualism. Second, contextualists invoke the phenomenon of contrastive focus to argue that causal statements implicitly designate salient (...)
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  14. Robert C. Koons (2004). The Logic of Causal Explanation an Axiomatization. Studia Logica 77 (3):325 - 354.score: 54.0
    Three-valued (strong-Kleene) modal logic provides the foundation for a new approach to formalizing causal explanation as a relation between partial situations. The approach makes fine-grained distinctions between aspects of events, even between aspects that are equivalent in classical logic. The framework can accommodate a variety of ontologies concerning the relata of causal explanation. I argue, however, for a tripartite ontology of objects corresponding to sentential nominals: facts, tropes (or facta or states of affairs), and situations (or events). (...)
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  15. Petri Ylikoski (2013). Causal and Constitutive Explanation Compared. Erkenntnis 78 (2):277-297.score: 54.0
    This article compares causal and constitutive explanation. While scientific inquiry usually addresses both causal and constitutive questions, making the distinction is crucial for a detailed understanding of scientific questions and their interrelations. These explanations have different kinds of explananda and they track different sorts of dependencies. Constitutive explanations do not address events or behaviors, but causal capacities. While there are some interesting relations between building and causal manipulation, causation and constitution are not to be confused. Constitution (...)
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  16. Anders Strand (2007). Immense Multiple Realization. Metaphysica 8 (1):61-78.score: 42.0
    In his latest book Physicalism, or Something near Enough, Jaegwon Kim argues that his version of functional reductionism is the most promising way for saving mental causation. I argue, on the other hand, that there is an internal tension in his position: Functional reductionism does not save mental causation if Kim’s own supervenience argument is sound. My line of reasoning has the following steps: (1) I discuss the supervenience argument and I explain how it motivates Kim’s functional reductionism; (2) I (...)
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  17. Jessica M. Wilson (2006). Causality. In Jessica Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge. 90--100.score: 40.0
    Arguably no concept is more fundamental to science than that of causality, for investigations into cases of existence, persistence, and change in the natural world are largely investigations into the causes of these phenomena. Yet the metaphysics and epistemology of causality remain unclear. For example, the ontological categories of the causal relata have been taken to be objects (Hume 1739), events (Davidson 1967), properties (Armstrong 1978), processes (Salmon 1984), variables (Hitchcock 1993), and facts (Mellor 1995). (For convenience, causes (...)
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  18. Danilo Šuster (2002). Embedded Conditionals as the Essence of Causality? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):197-211.score: 40.0
    Counterfactual analysis of causation between particular events, combined with standard semantics for counterfactual conditionals, cannot express the idea that the cause is sufficient for the effect. Several authors have suggested that a more complex pattern of nested counterfactual conditionals is a better candidate for expressing the idea of causal connection. The most systematic account is developed by Kadri Vihvelin. She argues that a complex pattern of causal dependence, expressed by embedded conditionals, covers all the cases of causation and (...)
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  19. John Norton (2009). Is There an Independent Principle of Causality in Physics? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):475-486.score: 34.0
    Mathias Frisch has argued that the requirement that electromagnetic dispersion processes are causal adds empirical content not found in electrodynamic theory. I urge that this attempt to reconstitute a local principle of causality in physics fails. An independent principle is not needed to recover the results of dispersion theory. The use of ‘causality conditions’ proves to be the mere adding of causal labels to an already presumed fact. If instead one seeks a broader, independently formulated grounding for the (...)
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  20. Sophie Gibb (2006). Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.score: 30.0
    Despite the fact that Davidson's theory of the causal relata is crucial to his response to the problem of mental causation - that of anomalous monism - it is commonly overlooked within discussions of his position. Anomalous monism is accused of entailing property epiphenomenalism, but given Davidson's understanding of the causal relata, such accusations are wholly misguided. There are, I suggest, two different forms of property epiphenomenalism. The first understands the term 'property' in an ontological sense, (...)
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  21. Jonathan Schaffer, The Metaphysics of Causation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 30.0
    Questions about the metaphysics of causation may be usefully divided as follows. First, there are questions about the nature of the causal relata, including (1.1) whether they are in spacetime immanence), (1.2) how fine grained they are individuation), and (1.3) how many there are adicity). Second, there are questions about the metaphysics of the causal relation, including (2.1) what is the difference between causally related and causally unrelated sequences connection), (2.2) what is the difference between sequences related (...)
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  22. Douglas E. Ehring (2003). Part-Whole Physicalism and Mental Causation. Synthese 136 (3):359-388.score: 30.0
    A well-known ``overdetermination''argument aims to show that the possibility of mental causes of physical events in a causally closed physical world and the possibility of causally relevant mental properties are both problematic. In the first part of this paper, I extend an identity reply that has been given to the first problem to a property-instance account of causal relata. In the second, I argue that mental types are composed of physical types and, as a consequence, both mental and (...)
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  23. Cei Maslen, Proportionality and the Metaphysics of Causation.score: 30.0
    This paper reexamines the case for a proportionality constraint on causation. The general idea behind the proportionality constraint is that causes need the right amount of detail. The cause needs to be detailed enough to be sufficient for the effect yet general enough to be fully relevant to the effect. The case for the proportionality constraint mainly rests on some examples. Suppose we are searching for the cause of an injury: “being hit by a red bus” is too detailed, “being (...)
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  24. L. A. Paul (2000). Aspect Causation. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):235-256.score: 30.0
    While skiing, Suzy falls and breaks her right wrist. The next day, she writes a philosophy paper. Her right wrist is broken, so she writes her paper using her left hand. (Assume, as seems plausible, that she isn’t dexterous enough to write it any other way, e.g., with her right foot.) She writes the paper, sends it off to a journal, and it is subsequently published. Is Suzy’s accident a cause of the publication of the paper?2 Of course not. Below, (...)
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  25. Stathis Psillos (2004). A Glimpse of the Secret Connexion: Harmonizing Mechanisms with Counterfactuals. Perspectives on Science 12 (3):288-319.score: 30.0
    Among the current philosophical attempts to understand causation two seem to be the most prominent. The first is James Woodward’s counterfactual approach; the second is the mechanistic approach advocated by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, Carl Craver, Jim Bogen and Stuart Glennan. The counterfactual approach takes it that causes make a difference to their effects, where this difference-making is cashed out in terms of actual and counterfactual interventions. The mechanistic approach takes it that two events are causally related if and only (...)
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  26. Thomas M. Ward (2011). Spinoza on the Essences of Modes. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (1):19-46.score: 30.0
    This paper examines some aspects of Spinoza's metaphysics of the essences of modes.2 I situate Spinoza's use of the notion of essence as a response to traditional, Aristotelian, ways of thinking about essence. I argue that, although Spinoza rejects part of the Aristotelian conception of essence, according to which it is in virtue of its essence that a thing is a member of a kind, he nevertheless retains a different part of such a conception, according to which an essence is (...)
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  27. M. J. García-Encinas (2002). Necessity in Singular Causation. Philosophia 29 (1-4):149-172.score: 30.0
    I want to make sense of the view that singular causation involves a metaphysical necessary connection. By this I understand, where A and B are particulars, that ifA causes B then in every possible world in which A (or an A-indiscernible) or B (or a B-indiscernible) occurs, A (or an Aindiscernible) and B (or a B-indiscernible) occur. In the singularist approach that I will favour causal facts do not supervene on laws, causal relata are best understood as (...)
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  28. Michael S. Moore (2012). Four Friendly Critics: A Response. Legal Theory 18 (4):491-542.score: 30.0
    In this reply, I seek to summarize fairly the criticisms advanced by each of my four critics, Jonathan Schaffer, Gideon Yaffe, John Gardner, and Carolina Sartorio. That there is so little overlap either in the aspects of the book on which they focus or in the arguments they advance about those issues has forced me to reply to each of them separately. Schaffer focuses much of his criticisms on my view that absences cannot serve as causal relata and (...)
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  29. Johannes Persson (1999). The Determinables of Explanatory Mechanisms. Synthese 120 (1):77-87.score: 30.0
    Sometimes instances of perceived causation turn out to lack causal relata. The reasons may vary. Causation may display itself as prevention, or as omission, and in some cases causation occurs within such complex environments that few of the things we associate with causes and effects are true of them, etc. But even then, there may be causal explanations to be had. This suggests that the explanatory power of causal reports have other sources than the relation between (...)
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  30. Wade Robison (1995). Hume on Spatial Contiguity. Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (2):49-64.score: 30.0
    Hume is generally thought to hold that spatial contiguity is essential to the causal relation. Indeed, Pears, in his recent "Hume's System", adds to Hume's system the claim that perceptions must exist somewhere--have, that is, spatial coordinates--so that, he claims, we can identify them as well as solve the problem of sorting out one person's perceptions from another. Pears fails to accomplish his aims in this attempt, but, more seriously, he fails to understand Hume's commitment to some perceptions being (...)
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  31. Garrett Pendergraft (2011). In Defense of a Causal Requirement on Explanation. In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. 470.score: 25.0
    Causalists about explanation claim that to explain an event is to provide information about the causal history of that event. Some causalists also endorse a proportionality claim, namely that one explanation is better than another insofar as it provides a greater amount of causal information. In this chapter I consider various challenges to these causalist claims. There is a common and influential formulation of the causalist requirement – the ‘Causal Process Requirement’ – that does appear vulnerable to (...)
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  32. Agustín Vicente (2006). On the Causal Completeness of Physics. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.score: 24.0
    According to an increasing number of authors, the best, if not the only, argument in favour of physicalism is the so-called 'overdetermination argument'. This argument, if sound, establishes that all the entities that enter into causal interactions with the physical world are physical. One key premise in the overdetermination argument is the principle of the causal closure of the physical world, said to be supported by contemporary physics. In this paper, I examine various ways in which physics may (...)
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  33. Caleb Cohoe (2013). There Must Be A First: Why Thomas Aquinas Rejects Infinite, Essentially Ordered, Causal Series. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (5):838 - 856.score: 24.0
    Several of Thomas Aquinas's proofs for the existence of God rely on the claim that causal series cannot proceed in infinitum. I argue that Aquinas has good reason to hold this claim given his conception of causation. Because he holds that effects are ontologically dependent on their causes, he holds that the relevant causal series are wholly derivative: the later members of such series serve as causes only insofar as they have been caused by and are effects of (...)
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  34. Markus E. Schlosser (2014). The Luck Argument Against Event-Causal Libertarianism: It is Here to Stay. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):375-385.score: 24.0
    The luck argument raises a serious challenge for libertarianism about free will. In broad outline, if an action is undetermined, then it appears to be a matter of luck whether or not one performs it. And if it is a matter of luck whether or not one performs an action, then it seems that the action is not performed with free will. This argument is most effective against event-causal accounts of libertarianism. Recently, Franklin (Philosophical Studies 156:199–230, 2011) has defended (...)
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  35. Jesper Kallestrup (2006). The Causal Exclusion Argument. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):459-85.score: 24.0
    Jaegwon Kim’s causal exclusion argument says that if all physical effects have sufficient physical causes, and no physical effects are caused twice over by distinct physical and mental causes, there cannot be any irreducible mental causes. In addition, Kim has argued that the nonreductive physicalist must give up completeness, and embrace the possibility of downward causation. This paper argues first that this extra argument relies on a principle of property individuation, which the nonreductive physicalist need not accept, and second (...)
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  36. Donald Gillies & Aidan Sudbury (2013). Should Causal Models Always Be Markovian? The Case of Multi-Causal Forks in Medicine. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (3):275-308.score: 24.0
    The development of causal modelling since the 1950s has been accompanied by a number of controversies, the most striking of which concerns the Markov condition. Reichenbach's conjunctive forks did satisfy the Markov condition, while Salmon's interactive forks did not. Subsequently some experts in the field have argued that adequate causal models should always satisfy the Markov condition, while others have claimed that non-Markovian causal models are needed in some cases. This paper argues for the second position by (...)
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  37. Toby Handfield (2010). Dispositions, Manifestations, and Causal Structure. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.score: 24.0
    This paper examines the idea that there might be natural kinds of causal processes, with characteristic diachronic structure, in much the same way that various chemical elements form natural kinds, with characteristic synchronic structure. This claim -- if compatible with empirical science -- has the potential to shed light on a metaphysics of essentially dispositional properties, championed by writers such as Bird and Ellis.
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  38. David Yates (2012). Functionalism and the Metaphysics of Causal Exclusion. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (13).score: 24.0
    Given their physical realization, what causal work is left for functional properties to do? Humean solutions to the exclusion problem (e.g. overdetermination and difference-making) typically appeal to counterfactual and/or nomic relations between functional property-instances and behavioural effects, tacitly assuming that such relations suffice for causal work. Clarification of the notion of causal work, I argue, shows not only that such solutions don't work, but also reveals a novel solution to the exclusion problem based on the relations between (...)
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  39. Daniel von Wachter (2006). Why the Argument From Causal Closure Against the Existence of Immaterial Things is Bad. In H. J. Koskinen, R. Vilkko & S. Philström (eds.), Science - A Challenge to Philosophy? Peter Lang.score: 24.0
    Some argue for materialism claiming that a physical event cannot have a non-physical cause, or by claiming the 'Principle of Causal Closure' to be true. This I call a 'Sweeping Naturalistic Argument'. This article argues against this. It describes what it would be for a material event to have an immaterial cause.
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  40. Gabriele Contessa (2012). Do Extrinsic Dispositions Need Extrinsic Causal Bases? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):622-638.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I distinguish two often-conflated theses—the thesis that all dispositions are intrinsic properties and the thesis that the causal bases of all dispositions are intrinsic properties—and argue that the falsity of the former does not entail the falsity of the latter. In particular, I argue that extrinsic dispositions are a counterexample to first thesis but not necessarily to the second thesis, because an extrinsic disposition does not need to include any extrinsic property in its causal basis. (...)
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  41. Todd Buras (2009). An Argument Against Causal Theories of Mental Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129.score: 24.0
    Some mental states are about themselves. Nothing is a cause of itself. So some mental states are not about their causes; they are about things distinct from their causes. If this argument is sound, it spells trouble for causal theories of mental content—the precise sort of trouble depending on the precise sort of causal theory. This paper shows that the argument is sound (§§1-3), and then spells out the trouble (§4).
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  42. Robert K. Garcia (2014). Closing in on Causal Closure. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):96-109.score: 24.0
    I examine the meaning and merits of a premise in the Exclusion Argument, the causal closure principle that all physical effects have physical causes. I do so by addressing two questions. First, if we grant the other premises, exactly what kind of closure principle is required to make the Exclusion Argument valid? Second, what are the merits of the requisite closure principle? Concerning the first, I argue that the Exclusion Argument requires a strong, “stringently pure” version of closure. The (...)
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  43. Luke Glynn (2013). Causal Foundationalism, Physical Causation, and Difference-Making. Synthese 190 (6):1017-1037.score: 24.0
    An influential tradition in the philosophy of causation has it that all token causal facts are, or are reducible to, facts about difference-making. Challenges to this tradition have typically focused on pre-emption cases, in which a cause apparently fails to make a difference to its effect. However, a novel challenge to the difference-making approach has recently been issued by Alyssa Ney. Ney defends causal foundationalism, which she characterizes as the thesis that facts about difference-making depend upon facts about (...)
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  44. Jessica M. Wilson (2010). The Causal Argument Against Component Forces. Dialectica 63 (4):525-554.score: 24.0
    Do component forces exist in conjoined circumstances? Cartwright (1980) says no; Creary (1981) says yes. I'm inclined towards Cartwright's side in this matter, but find several problems with her argumentation. My primary aim here is to present a better, distinctly causal, argument against component forces: very roughly, I argue that the joint posit of component and resultant forces in conjoined circumstances gives rise to a threat of causal overdetermination, avoidance of which best proceeds via eliminativism about component forces. (...)
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  45. Christoph Hoerl (2011). Causal Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):167-179.score: 24.0
    The main focus of this paper is the question as to what it is for an individual to think of her environment in terms of a concept of causation, or causal concepts, in contrast to some more primitive ways in which an individual might pick out or register what are in fact causal phenomena. I show how versions of this question arise in the context of two strands of work on causation, represented by Elizabeth Anscombe and Christopher Hitchcock, (...)
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  46. Richard Corry (2013). Emerging From the Causal Drain. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):29-47.score: 24.0
    For over 20 years, Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument has stood as the major hurdle for non-reductive physicalism. If successful, Kim’s argument would show that the high-level properties posited by non-reductive physicalists must either be identical with lower-level physical properties, or else must be causally inert. The most prominent objection to the Causal Exclusion Argument—the so-called Overdetermination Objection—points out that there are some notions of causation that are left untouched by the argument. If causation is simply counterfactual dependence, (...)
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  47. Marcel Weber, Causal Selection Versus Causal Parity in Biology: Relevant Counterfactuals and Biologically Normal Interventions.score: 24.0
    Causal selection is the task of picking out, from a field of known causally relevant factors, some factors as the actual causes of an event or class of events or the causes that "make the difference". The Causal Parity Thesis in the philosophy of biology is basically the claim that there are no grounds for such a selection. The main target of this thesis is usually gene centrism, the doctrine that genes play some special role in ontogeny, which (...)
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  48. Uwe Meixner (2009). Three Indications for the Existence of God in Causal Metaphysics. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (1):33 - 46.score: 24.0
    With the emergence of modern physics a conflict became apparent between the Principle of Sufficient Cause and the Principle of Physical Causal Closure. Though these principles are not logically incompatible, they could no longer be considered to be both true; one of them had to be false. The present paper makes use of this seldom noticed conflict to argue on the basis of considerations of comparative rationality for the truth of causal statements that have at least some degree (...)
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  49. Jim Stone (2009). Trumping the Causal Influence Account of Causation. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):153 - 160.score: 24.0
    Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis’s causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example.
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  50. Steve Matthews (2010). Personal Identity, the Causal Condition, and the Simple View. Philosophical Papers 39 (2):183-208.score: 24.0
    Among theories of personal identity over time the simple view has not been popular among philosophers, but it nevertheless remains the default view among non philosophers. It may be construed either as the view that nothing grounds a claim of personal identity over time, or that something quite simple (a soul perhaps) is the ground. If the former construal is accepted, a conspicuous difficulty is that the condition of causal dependence between person-stages is absent. But this leaves such a (...)
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