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  1. Toby Handfield (2009). The Metaphysics of Dispositions and Causes. In Dispositions and Causes. Clarendon Press 1--30.
    This article gives a general overview of recent metaphysical work on dispositional properties and causal relations. It serves as an introduction to the edited volume, Dispositions and Causes.
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  2. Susanne Bobzien (1999). Chrysippus' Theory of Causes. In Katerina Ierodiakonou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford University Press
    ABSTRACT: A systematic reconstruction of Chrysippus’ theory of causes, grounded on the Stoic tenets that causes are bodies, that they are relative, and that all causation can ultimately be traced back to the one ‘active principle’ which pervades all things. I argue that Chrysippus neither developed a finished taxonomy of causes, nor intended to do so, and that he did not have a set of technical terms for mutually exclusive classes of causes. Rather, the various adjectives (...)
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  3.  56
    Christina H. Dietz (2016). Are All Reasons Causes? Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1179-1190.
    In this paper, I revisit the Davidsonian thesis that all reasons are causes. Drawing on a better taxonomy of reasons than the one Davidson provides, I argue that this thesis is either indefensible or uninteresting.
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  4.  51
    Christopher Byrne (1989). Forms and Causes in Plato's Phaedo. Dionysius 13:3-15.
    Gregory Vlastos has argued that Aristotle and other commentators on the Phaedo have mistakenly interpreted Plato’s Forms to be efficient causes. While Vlastos is correct that the Forms by themselves are not efficient causes, because of his neo-Kantianism he has misunderstood the close connection between the Forms and the explanation of change, including teleological change. This paper explores the connection in Plato’s Phaedo between the Forms, the nature of change, and efficient causality, and argues that Aristotle’s remarks are (...)
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  5.  5
    Yang Wu, Paul Muentener & Laura E. Schulz (2015). The Invisible Hand: Toddlers Connect Probabilistic Events With Agentive Causes. Cognitive Science 40 (1).
    Children posit unobserved causes when events appear to occur spontaneously. What about when events appear to occur probabilistically? Here toddlers saw arbitrary causal relationships in a fixed, alternating order. The relationships were then changed in one of two ways. In the Deterministic condition, the event order changed ; in the Probabilistic condition, the causal relationships changed. As intended, toddlers looked equally long at both changes. We then introduced a previously unseen candidate cause. Toddlers looked longer at the appearance of (...)
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  6.  59
    Sheldon R. Smith (2010). Elementary Classical Mechanics and the Principle of the Composition of Causes. Synthese 173 (3):353-373.
    In this paper, I explore whether elementary classical mechanics adheres to the Principle of Composition of Causes as Mill claimed and as certain contemporary authors still seem to believe. Among other things, I provide a proof that if one reads Mill’s description of the principle literally, it does not hold in any general sense. In addition, I explore a separate notion of Composition of Causes and note that it too does not hold in elementary classical mechanics. Among the (...)
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    Niels Lynöe & Niklas Juth (2013). Does Proficiency Creativity Solve Legal Dilemmas? Experimental Study of Medical Students' Ideas About Death-Causes. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (4):789-793.
    The aim of the present study was to compare and examine how medical students on term one and nine understand and adopt ideas and reasoning when estimating death-causes. Our hypothesis was that compared to students in the beginning of their medical curriculum, term nine students would be more inclined to adopt ideas about causality that allows physicians to alleviate an imminently dying patient, without being suspected for manslaughter—a practice referred to as proficiency creativity. We used a questionnaire containing two (...)
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  8. Arash Abizadeh (2011). Hobbes on the Causes of War: A Disagreement Theory. American Political Science Review 105 (02):298-315.
    Hobbesian war primarily arises not because material resources are scarce; or because humans ruthlessly seek survival before all else; or because we are naturally selfish, competitive, or aggressive brutes. Rather, it arises because we are fragile, fearful, impressionable, and psychologically prickly creatures susceptible to ideological manipulation, whose anger can become irrationally inflamed by even trivial slights to our glory. The primary source of war, according to Hobbes, is disagreement, because we read into it the most inflammatory signs of contempt. Both (...)
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  9.  5
    Jennifer McKitrick (2009). Dispositions, Causes, and Reduction. In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;
    Dispositionality and causation are both modal concepts which have implications not just for how things are, but for how they will be or, in some sense, must be. Some philosophers are suspicious of modal concepts and would like to make do with fewer of them.1 But what are our reductive options, and how viable are they? In this paper, I try to shut down one option: I argue that dispositions are not reducible to causes. In doing so, I try (...)
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  10.  20
    Stephen M. Downes (2005). Integrating the Multiple Biological Causes of Human Behavior. Biology and Philosophy 20 (1):177-190.
    I introduce a range of examples of different causal hypotheses about human mate selection. The hypotheses I focus on come from evolutionary psychology, fluctuating asymmetry research and chemical signaling research. I argue that a major obstacle facing an integrated biology of human behavior is the lack of a causal framework that shows how multiple proximate causal mechanisms can act together to produce components of our behavior.
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  11.  1
    John J. Ayres (1966). Some Artifactual Causes of Perceptual Primacy. Journal of Experimental Psychology 71 (6):896.
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  12. Fred Dretske (1988). Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
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  13. Carl F. Craver & William Bechtel (2007). Top-Down Causation Without Top-Down Causes. Biology and Philosophy 22 (4):547-563.
    We argue that intelligible appeals to interlevel causes (top-down and bottom-up) can be understood, without remainder, as appeals to mechanistically mediated effects. Mechanistically mediated effects are hybrids of causal and constitutive relations, where the causal relations are exclusively intralevel. The idea of causation would have to stretch to the breaking point to accommodate interlevel causes. The notion of a mechanistically mediated effect is preferable because it can do all of the required work without appealing to mysterious interlevel (...). When interlevel causes can be translated into mechanistically mediated effects, the posited relationship is intelligible and should raise no special philosophical objections. When they cannot, they are suspect. (shrink)
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  14.  43
    Nancy Cartwright (2007). Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics. Cambridge University Press.
    Hunting Causes and Using Them argues that causation is not one thing, as commonly assumed, but many. There is a huge variety of causal relations, each with different characterizing features, different methods for discovery and different uses to which it can be put. In this collection of new and previously published essays, Nancy Cartwright provides a critical survey of philosophical and economic literature on causality, with a special focus on the currently fashionable Bayes-nets and invariance methods – and it (...)
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  15.  20
    Kadri Vihvelin (2013). Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter. OUP Usa.
    In Causes, Laws, and Free Will, Kadri Vihvelin argues that we can have free will even if everything we do is predictable given the laws of nature and the past. The belief that determinism robs us of free will springs from mistaken beliefs about the metaphysics of causation, the nature of laws, and the logic of counterfactuals.
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  16. C. Kenneth Waters (2007). Causes That Make a Difference. Journal of Philosophy 104 (11):551-579.
    Biologists studying complex causal systems typically identify some factors as causes and treat other factors as background conditions. For example, when geneticists explain biological phenomena, they often foreground genes and relegate the cellular milieu to the background. But factors in the milieu are as causally necessary as genes for the production of phenotypic traits, even traits at the molecular level such as amino acid sequences. Gene-centered biology has been criticized on the grounds that because there is parity among (...), the “privileging” of genes reflects a reductionist bias, not an ontological difference. The idea that there is an ontological parity among causes is related to a philosophical puzzle identified by John Stuart Mill: what, other than our interests or biases, could possibly justify identifying some causes as the actual or operative ones, and other causes as mere background? The aim of this paper is to solve this conceptual puzzle and to explain why there is not an ontological parity among genes and the other factors. It turns out that solving this puzzle helps answer a seemingly unrelated philosophical question: what kind of causal generality matters in biology? (shrink)
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  17.  93
    Denis M. Walsh (2007). The Pomp of Superfluous Causes: The Interpretation of Evolutionary Theory. Philosophy of Science 74 (3):281-303.
    There are two competing interpretations of the modern synthesis theory of evolution: the dynamical (also know as ‘traditional’) and the statistical. The dynamical interpretation maintains that explanations offered under the auspices of the modern synthesis theory articulate the causes of evolution. It interprets selection and drift as causes of population change. The statistical interpretation holds that modern synthesis explanations merely cite the statistical structure of populations. This paper offers a defense of statisticalism. It argues that a change in (...)
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  18. Luigi Caranti (2010). The Causes of World Poverty: Reflections on Thomas Pogge's Analysis. Theoria 57 (125):36-53.
    While global poverty is the key moral problem of our times, social scientists are far from reaching a consensus on the causes of this disaster and philosophers disagree on the related responsibilities. One important contribution toward an enlarged understanding is offered by Thomas Pogge in World Poverty and Human Rights . The present paper discusses critically Pogge's contribution and attempts to distinguish the valuable intuitions from the unwarranted conclusions that could be derived from them and that Pogge himself suggests (...)
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  19.  97
    Matthew C. Haug (2010). The Exclusion Problem Meets the Problem of Many Causes. Erkenntnis 73 (1):55-65.
    In this paper I develop a novel response to the exclusion problem. I argue that the nature of the events in the causally complete physical domain raises the “problem of many causes”: there will typically be countless simultaneous low-level physical events in that domain that are causally sufficient for any given high-level physical event. This shows that even reductive physicalists must admit that the version of the exclusion principle used to pose the exclusion problem against non-reductive physicalism is too (...)
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  20. Joseph Y. Halpern & Judea Pearl (2005). Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):843-887.
    Department of Computer Science, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA judea{at}cs.ucla.edu' + u + '@' + d + ''//--> We propose a new definition of actual causes, using structural equations to model counterfactuals. We show that the definition yields a plausible and elegant account of causation that handles well examples which have caused problems for other definitions and resolves major difficulties in the traditional account. Introduction Causal models: a review 2.1 Causal models 2.2 Syntax and (...)
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  21.  65
    Collin Rice (2015). Moving Beyond Causes: Optimality Models and Scientific Explanation. Noûs 49 (3):589-615.
    A prominent approach to scientific explanation and modeling claims that for a model to provide an explanation it must accurately represent at least some of the actual causes in the event's causal history. In this paper, I argue that many optimality explanations present a serious challenge to this causal approach. I contend that many optimality models provide highly idealized equilibrium explanations that do not accurately represent the causes of their target system. Furthermore, in many contexts, it is in (...)
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  22.  43
    Kenneth Reisman & Patrick Forber (2005). Manipulation and the Causes of Evolution. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1113-1123.
    Evolutionary processes such as natural selection and random drift are commonly regarded as causes of population-level change. We respond to a recent challenge that drift and selection are best understood as statistical trends, not causes. Our reply appeals to manipulation as a strategy for uncovering causal relationships: if you can systematically manipulate variable A to bring about a change in variable B, then A is a cause of B. We argue that selection and drift can be systematically manipulated (...)
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  23. Jonathan Schaffer (2004). Causes Need Not Be Physically Connected to Their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation. In Christopher Read Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Basil Blackwell 197--216.
    Negative causation occurs when an absence serves as cause, effect, or causal intermediary. Negative causation is genuine causation, or so I shall argue. It involves no physical connection between cause and effect. Thus causes need not be physically connected to their effects.
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  24. Jonathan Schaffer (2003). Overdetermining Causes. Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):23 - 45.
    When two rocks shatter the window at once, what causes the window to shatter? Is the throwing of each individual rock a cause of the window shattering, or are the throwings only causes collectively? This question bears on the analysis of causation, and the metaphysics of macro-causation. I argue that the throwing of each individual rock is a cause of the window shattering, and generally that individual overdeterminers are causes.
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  25. Katalin Farkas & Tomasz Budek (2014). Which Causes of an Experience Are Also Objects of the Experience? In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press 351-370.
    It is part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to be presented to us. The first guide to objects is their perceptual presence. Further reflection shows that we take the objects of our perceptual experiences to be among the causes of our experiences. However, not all causes of the experience are also objects of the experience. This raises the question indicated in the title of this paper. We argue that taking phenomenal presence as the guide (...)
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  26. Alex Broadbent (2012). Causes of Causes. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):457-476.
    When is a cause of a cause of an effect also a cause of that effect? The right answer is either Sometimes or Always . In favour of Always , transitivity is considered by some to be necessary for distinguishing causes from redundant non-causal events. Moreover transitivity may be motivated by an interest in an unselective notion of causation, untroubled by principles of invidious discrimination. And causal relations appear to add up like transitive relations, so that the obtaining of (...)
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  27.  27
    Cheryl K. Stenmark, Alison L. Antes, Xiaoqian Wang, Jared J. Caughron, Chase E. Thiel & Michael D. Mumford (2010). Strategies in Forecasting Outcomes in Ethical Decision-Making: Identifying and Analyzing the Causes of the Problem. Ethics and Behavior 20 (2):110 – 127.
    This study examined the role of key causal analysis strategies in forecasting and ethical decision-making. Undergraduate participants took on the role of the key actor in several ethical problems and were asked to identify and analyze the causes, forecast potential outcomes, and make a decision about each problem. Time pressure and analytic mindset were manipulated while participants worked through these problems. The results indicated that forecast quality was associated with decision ethicality, and the identification of the critical causes (...)
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  28.  61
    Juha Räikkä & Andrei Rodin (2015). Environmental Security and Just Causes for War. Almanac: Discourses of Ethics 10 (1):47-54.
    This article asks whether a country that suffers from serious environmental problems caused by another country could have a just cause for a defensive war? Danish philosopher Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen has argued that under certain conditions extreme poverty may give a just cause for a country to defensive war, if that poverty is caused by other countries. This raises the question whether the victims of environmental damages could also have a similar right to self-defense. Although the article concerns justice of war, (...)
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    Timothy O'Connor (ed.) (1995). Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    Many philosophers are persuaded by familiar arguments that free will is incompatible with causal determinism. Yet, notoriously, past attempts to articulate how the right type of indeterminism might secure the capacity for autonomous action have generally been regarded as either demonstrably inadequate or irremediably obscure. This volume gathers together the most significant recent discussions concerning the prospects for devising a satisfactory indeterministic account of freedom of action. These essays give greater precision to traditional formulations of the problems associated with indeterministic (...)
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  30.  91
    Nuel Belnap (2005). A Theory of Causation: Causae Causantes (Originating Causes) as Inus Conditions in Branching Space-Times. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):221-253.
    permits a sound and rigorously definable notion of ‘originating cause’ or causa causans—a type of transition event—of an outcome event. Mackie has famously suggested that causes form a family of ‘inus’ conditions, where an inus condition is ‘an insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition’. In this essay the needed concepts of BST theory are developed in detail, and it is then proved that the causae causantes of a given outcome event have exactly the structure of (...)
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  31.  21
    Michael D. Mumford, Chase E. Thiel, Jared J. Caughron, Xiaoqian Wang, Alison L. Antes & Cheryl K. Stenmark (2010). Strategies in Forecasting Outcomes in Ethical Decision-Making: Identifying and Analyzing the Causes of the Problem. Ethics and Behavior 20 (2):110-127.
    This study examined the role of key causal analysis strategies in forecasting and ethical decision-making. Undergraduate participants took on the role of the key actor in several ethical problems and were asked to identify and analyze the causes, forecast potential outcomes, and make a decision about each problem. Time pressure and analytic mindset were manipulated while participants worked through these problems. The results indicated that forecast quality was associated with decision ethicality, and the identification of the critical causes (...)
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  32.  4
    Ralf Mayrhofer & Michael R. Waldmann (2015). Agents and Causes: Dispositional Intuitions As a Guide to Causal Structure. Cognitive Science 39 (1):65-95.
    Currently, two frameworks of causal reasoning compete: Whereas dependency theories focus on dependencies between causes and effects, dispositional theories model causation as an interaction between agents and patients endowed with intrinsic dispositions. One important finding providing a bridge between these two frameworks is that failures of causes to generate their effects tend to be differentially attributed to agents and patients regardless of their location on either the cause or the effect side. To model different types of error attribution, (...)
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  33.  34
    Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
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  34.  65
    Krista Lawlor (2008). Knowing Beliefs, Seeking Causes. American Imago 65 (3):335-356.
    Knowing what one believes sometimes takes effort—it sometimes involves seeking to know one’s beliefs as causes. And when one gains self-knowledge of one’s belief this way—that is, through causal self-interpretation—one engages in a characteristically human kind of psychological liberation. By investigating the nature of causal self-interpretation, I discover some surprising features of this liberty. And in doing so, I counter a trend in recent philosophical theories, of discounting the value of self-knowledge in projects of human liberation.
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  35. Luke Glynn (2012). Getting Causes From Powers, by Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum. [REVIEW] Mind 121 (484):1099-1106.
    In this book, Mumford and Anjum advance a theory of causation based on a metaphysics of powers. The book is for the most part lucidly written, and contains some interesting contributions: in particular on the necessary connection between cause and effect and on the perceivability of the causal relation. I do, however, have reservations about some of the book’s central theses: in particular, that cause and effect are simultaneous, and that causes can fruitfully be represented as vectors.
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  36. Gábor Hofer-Szabó, Miklós Rédei & László E. Szabó (2002). Common-Causes Are Not Common Common-Causes. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):623-636.
    A condition is formulated in terms of the probabilities of two pairs of correlated events in a classical probability space which is necessary for the two correlations to have a single (Reichenbachian) common-cause and it is shown that there exists pairs of correlated events probabilities of which violate the necessary condition. It is concluded that different correlations do not in general have a common common-cause. It is also shown that this conclusion remains valid even if one weakens slightly Reichenbach's definition (...)
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  37.  58
    Kevin Lynch (2014). The Vagaries of Psychoanalytic Interpretation: An Investigation Into the Causes of the Consensus Problem in Psychoanalysis. Philosophia 42 (3):779-799.
    Though the psychoanalytic method of interpretation is seen by psychoanalysts as a reliable scientific tool for investigating the unconscious mind, its reputation has long been marred by what’s known as the consensus problem: where different analysts fail to reach agreement when they interpret the same phenomena. This has long been thought, by both practitioners and observers of psychoanalysis, to undermine its claim to scientific status. The causes of this problem, however, are dimly understood. In this paper I attempt to (...)
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  38.  16
    Alan Chalmers (2012). Intermediate Causes and Explanations: The Key to Understanding the Scientific Revolution. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (4):551-562.
    It is instructive to view the scientific revolution from the point of view of Robert Boyle’s distinction between intermediate and ultimate causes. From this point of view, the scientific revolution involved the identification of intermediate causes and their investigation by way of experiment as opposed to the specification of ultimate causes of the kind involved in the corpuscular matter theories of the mechanical philosophers. The merits of this point of view are explored in this paper by focussing (...)
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  39.  14
    Joachim I. Krueger & David C. Funder (2004). Towards a Balanced Social Psychology: Causes, Consequences, and Cures for the Problem-Seeking Approach to Social Behavior and Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):313-327.
    Mainstream social psychology focuses on how people characteristically violate norms of action through social misbehaviors such as conformity with false majority judgments, destructive obedience, and failures to help those in need. Likewise, they are seen to violate norms of reasoning through cognitive errors such as misuse of social information, self-enhancement, and an over-readiness to attribute dispositional characteristics. The causes of this negative research emphasis include the apparent informativeness of norm violation, the status of good behavior and judgment as unconfirmable (...)
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  40. Wayne A. Davis (2005). Reasons and Psychological Causes. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
    The causal theory of reasons holds that acting for a reason entails that the agents action was caused by his or her beliefs and desires. While Donald Davidson (1963) and others effectively silenced the first objections to the theory, a new round has emerged. The most important recent attack is presented by Jonathan Dancy in Practical Reality (2000) and subsequent work. This paper will defend the causal theory against Dancy and others, including Schueler (1995), Stoutland (1999, 2001), and Ginet (2002).Dancy (...)
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  41.  44
    Ming Xu (1997). Causation in Branching Time (I): Transitions, Events and Causes. Synthese 112 (2):137-192.
    We propose a theory of events and causes against the background of branching time. Notions discussed include possibility based on reality, transitions, events, determinacy, contingency, causes and effects. The main idea in defining causal relations is to introduce a certain preconditioning circumstance under which one event follows another. We also briefly compare this theory with some other theories.
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  42. Gregory Vlastos (1969). Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo. Philosophical Review 78 (3):291-325.
    An analysis of phaedo 96c-606c seeks to demonstrate that when forms are cited as either "safe" or "clever" aitiai they are not meant to function as either final or efficient causes, But as logico-Metaphysical essences which have no causal efficacy whatever, But which do have definite (and far-Reaching) implications for the causal order of the physical universe, For it is assumed that a causal statement, Such as "fire causes heat" will be true if, And only if, The asserted (...)
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  43.  30
    David Owens (1992). Causes and Coincidences. Cambridge University Press.
    In an important departure from current theories of causation, David Owens proposes that coincidences have no causes, and that a cause is something that ensures that its effects are no coincidence. He elucidates the idea of a coincidence as an event that can be divided into constituent events, the nomological antecedents of which are independent of each other. He also suggests that causal facts can be analyzed in terms of non-causal facts, including relations of necessity. Thus, causation is defined (...)
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  44.  23
    Ray Hilborn & Stephen C. Stearns (1982). On Inference in Ecology and Evolutionary Biology: The Problem of Multiple Causes. Acta Biotheoretica 31 (3):145-164.
    If one investigates a process that has several causes but assumes that it has only one cause, one risks ruling out important causal factors. Three mechanisms account for this mistake: either the significance of the single cause under test is masked by noise contributed by the unsuspected and uncontrolled factors, or the process appears only when two or more causes interact, or the process appears when there are present any of a number of sufficient causes which are (...)
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  45. Gunnar Björnsson (2007). How Effects Depend on Their Causes, Why Causal Transitivity Fails, and Why We Care About Causation. Philosophical Studies 133 (3):349-390.
    Despite recent efforts to improve on counterfactual theories of causation, failures to explain how effects depend on their causes are still manifest in a variety of cases. In particular, theories that do a decent job explaining cases of causal preemption have problems accounting for cases of causal intransitivity. Moreover, the increasing complexity of the counterfactual accounts makes it difficult to see why the concept of causation would be such a central part of our cognition. In this paper, I propose (...)
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  46.  30
    Clark Glymour (1998). Learning Causes: Psychological Explanations of Causal Explanation. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (1):39-60.
    I argue that psychologists interested in human causal judgment should understand and adopt a representation of causal mechanisms by directed graphs that encode conditional independence (screening off) relations. I illustrate the benefits of that representation, now widely used in computer science and increasingly in statistics, by (i) showing that a dispute in psychology between ‘mechanist’ and ‘associationist’ psychological theories of causation rests on a false and confused dichotomy; (ii) showing that a recent, much-cited experiment, purporting to show that human subjects, (...)
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  47.  21
    David Haig (2013). Proximate and Ultimate Causes: How Come? And What For? [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 28 (5):781-786.
    Proximate and ultimate causes in evolutionary biology have come to conflate two distinctions. The first is a distinction between immediate and historical causes. The second is between explanations of mechanism and adaptive function. Mayr emphasized the first distinction but many evolutionary biologists use proximate and ultimate causes to refer to the second. I recommend that ‘ultimate cause’ be abandoned as ambiguous.
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  48. Boris Hennig (2009). The Four Causes. Journal of Philosophy 106 (3):137-160.
    I will argue that Aristotle’s fourfold division of four causes naturally arises from a combination of two distinctions (a) between things and changes, and (b) between that which potentially is something and what it potentially is. Within this scheme, what is usually called the “efficient cause” is something that potentially is a certain natural change, and the “final cause” is, at least in a basic sense, what the efficient cause potentially is. I will further argue that the essences of (...)
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    David Sedley (1998). Platonic Causes. Phronesis 43 (2):114-132.
    This paper examines Plato's ideas on cause-effect relations in the "Phaedo." It maintains that he sees causes as things (not events, states of affairs or the like), with any information as to how that thing brings about the effect relegated to a strictly secondary status. This is argued to make good sense, so long as we recognise that aition means the "thing responsible" and exploit legal analogies in order to understand what this amounts to. Furthermore, provided that we do (...)
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  50.  62
    Carolina Sartorio (2006). Disjunctive Causes. Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):521-538.
    There is an initial presumption against disjunctive causes. First of all, for some people causation is a relation between events. But, arguably, there are no disjunctive events, since events are particulars and thus they have spatiotemporal locations, while it is unclear what the spatiotemporal location of a disjunctive event could be.1 More importantly, even if one believes that entities like facts can enter in causal relations, and even if there are disjunctive facts, it is still hard to see how (...)
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