Search results for 'coercion' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Freedom Coercion (2007). Michael J. Gorr, From Coercion, Freedom, and Exploitation (1989). In Ian Carter, Matthew H. Kramer & Hillel Steiner (eds.), Freedom: A Philosophical Anthology. Blackwell Pub. 304.
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  2. Colin Bird (2013). Coercion and Public Justification. Politics, Philosophy and Economics (3):1470594-13496073.
    According to recently influential conceptions of public reasoning, citizens have the right to demand of each other ‘public justifications’ for controversial political action. On this view, only arguments that all reasonable citizens can affirm from within their diverse ethical standpoints can count as legitimate justifications for political action. Both proponents and critics often assume that the case for this expectation derives from the special justificatory burden created by the systematically coercive character of political action. This paper challenges that assumption. While (...)
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  3. J. S. Blumenthal-Barby (2012). Between Reason and Coercion: Ethically Permissible Influence in Health Care and Health Policy Contexts. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (4):345-366.
    In bioethics, the predominant categorization of various types of influence has been a tripartite classification of rational persuasion (meaning influence by reason and argument), coercion (meaning influence by irresistible threats—or on a few accounts, offers), and manipulation (meaning everything in between). The standard ethical analysis in bioethics has been that rational persuasion is always permissible, and coercion is almost always impermissible save a few cases such as imminent threat to self or others. However, many forms of influence fall (...)
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  4.  4
    Marit H. Hem, Bert Molewijk & Reidar Pedersen (2014). Ethical Challenges in Connection with the Use of Coercion: A Focus Group Study of Health Care Personnel in Mental Health Care. BMC Medical Ethics 15 (1):82.
    In recent years, the attention on the use of coercion in mental health care has increased. The use of coercion is common and controversial, and involves many complex ethical challenges. The research question in this study was: What kind of ethical challenges related to the use of coercion do health care practitioners face in their daily clinical work?
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  5.  25
    Thomas Douglas, Pieter Bonte, Farah Focquaert, Katrien Devolder & Sigrid Sterckx (2013). Coercion, Incarceration, and Chemical Castration: An Argument From Autonomy. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 10 (3):393-405.
    In several jurisdictions, sex offenders may be offered chemical castration as an alternative to further incarceration. In some, agreement to chemical castration may be made a formal condition of parole or release. In others, refusal to undergo chemical castration can increase the likelihood of further incarceration though no formal link is made between the two. Offering chemical castration as an alternative to further incarceration is often said to be partially coercive, thus rendering the offender’s consent invalid. The dominant response to (...)
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  6.  60
    Lisa Rivera (2014). Coercion and Captivity. In Lori Gruen (ed.), The Ethics of Captivity. 248-271.
    This paper considers three modes of captivity with an eye to examining the effects of captivity on free agency and whether these modes depend on or constitute coercion. These modes are: physical captivity, psychological captivity, and social/legal captivity. All these modes of captivity may severely impact capacities a person relies on for free agency in different ways. They may also undermine or destroy a person’s identity-constituting cares and values. On a Nozick-style view of coercion, coercion amounts to (...)
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  7.  43
    Benjamin McMyler (2011). Doxastic Coercion. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):537-557.
    I examine ways in which belief can and cannot be coerced. Belief simply cannot be coerced in a way analogous to central cases of coerced action, for it cannot be coerced by threats which serve as genuine reasons for belief. But there are two other ways in which the concept of coercion can apply to belief. Belief can be indirectly coerced by threats which serve as reasons for acting in ways designed to bring about a belief, and it can (...)
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  8. Laura Valentini (2011). Coercion and Justice. American Political Science Review 105 (1):205-220.
    In this article, I develop a new account of the liberal view that principles of justice are meant to justify state coercion, and consider its implications for the question of global socioeconomic justice. Although contemporary proponents of this view deny that principles of socioeconomic justice apply globally, on my newly developed account this conclusion is mistaken. I distinguish between two types of coercion, systemic and interactional, and argue that a plausible theory of global justice should contain principles justifying (...)
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  9.  4
    R. Klitzman (2013). How IRBs View and Make Decisions About Coercion and Undue Influence. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (4):224.
    Introduction Scholars have debated how to define coercion and undue influence, but how institutional review boards (IRBs) view and make decisions about these issues in actual cases has not been explored. Methods I contacted the leadership of 60 US IRBs (every fourth one in the list of the top 240 institutions by National Institutes of Health funding), and interviewed 39 IRB leaders or administrators from 34 of these institutions (response rate=55%), and 7 members. Results IRBs wrestled with defining of (...)
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  10.  9
    Aaron T. Goetz & Todd K. Shackelford (2006). Sexual Coercion and Forced in-Pair Copulation as Sperm Competition Tactics in Humans. Human Nature 17 (3):265-282.
    Rape of women by men might be generated either by a specialized rape adaptation or as a by-product of other psychological adaptations. Although increasing number of sexual partners is a proposed benefit of rape according to the “rape as an adaptation” and the “rape as a by-product” hypotheses, neither hypothesis addresses directly why some men rape their long-term partners, to whom they already have sexual access. In two studies we tested specific hypotheses derived from the general hypothesis that sexual (...) in the context of an intimate relationship may function as a sperm competition tactic. We hypothesized that men’s sexual coercion in the context of an intimate relationship is related positively to his partner’s perceived infidelities and that men’s sexual coercion is related positively to their mate retention behaviors (behaviors designed to prevent a partner’s infidelity). The results from Study 1 (self-reports from 246 men) and Study 2 (partner-reports from 276 women) supported the hypotheses. The Discussion section addresses limitations of this research and highlights future directions for research on sexual coercion in intimate relationships. (shrink)
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  11.  27
    Joseph Millum (2014). Consent Under Pressure: The Puzzle of Third Party Coercion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (1):113-127.
    Coercion by the recipient of consent renders that consent invalid. But what about when the coercive force comes from a third party, not from the person to whom consent would be proffered? In this paper I analyze how threats from a third party affect consent. I argue that, as with other cases of coercion, we should distinguish threats that render consent invalid from threats whose force is too weak to invalidate consent and threats that are legitimate. Illegitimate controlling (...)
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  12.  13
    Sundari Anitha & Aisha Gill (2009). Coercion, Consent and the Forced Marriage Debate in the UK. Feminist Legal Studies 17 (2):165-184.
    An examination of case law on forced marriage reveals that in addition to physical force, the role of emotional pressure is now taken into consideration. However, in both legal and policy discourse, the difference between arranged and forced marriage continues to be framed in binary terms and hinges on the concept of consent: the context in which consent is constructed largely remains unexplored. By examining the socio-cultural construction of personhood, especially womanhood, and the intersecting structural inequalities that constrain particular groups (...)
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  13.  12
    Osamu Sawada & Thomas Grano (2011). Scale Structure, Coercion, and the Interpretation of Measure Phrases in Japanese. Natural Language Semantics 19 (2):191-226.
    This paper investigates the semantics of measure phrases in Japanese. Based on new data, we argue that the interpretation of measure phrases in Japanese is sensitive to scale structure such that (i) measure phrases are introduced by a degree morpheme that selects only for gradable predicates whose scale contains a minimal element (i.e., a lower closed scale) and (ii) violations to this restriction are repaired via coercion, which forces a comparative interpretation with a contextually determined standard and hence a (...)
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  14.  52
    Scott Anderson (2008). Of Theories of Coercion, Two Axes, and the Importance of the Coercer. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (3):394-422.
    Recent accounts of coercion can be mapped onto two different axes: whether they focus on the situation of the coercee or the activities of the coercer; and whether or not they depend upon moral judgments in their analysis of coercion. Using this analysis, I suggest that almost no recent theories have seriously explored a non-moralized, coercer-focused approach to coercion. I offer some reasons to think that a theory in this underexplored quadrant offers some important advantages over theories (...)
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  15.  34
    Saba Bazargan (2014). Moral Coercion. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (11).
    The practices of using hostages to obtain concessions and using human shields to deter aggression share an important characteristic which warrants a univocal reference to both sorts of conduct: they both involve manipulating our commitment to morality, as a means to achieving wrongful ends. I call this type of conduct “moral coercion”. In this paper I (a) present an account of moral coercion by linking it to coercion more generally, (b) determine whether and to what degree the (...)
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  16. Jeffrey A. Gauthier (1999). Consent, Coercion, and Sexual Autonomy. In Keith Burgess-Jackson (ed.), A Most Detestable Crime: New Philosophical Essays on Rape. Oxford University Press 71-91.
    Feminist legal scholarship has questioned the usefulness of non-consent as a criterion for rape. Under conditions of generalized sexual oppression, consent may not be an adequate for absence of coercion. I defend this argument and propose that rape law reform can be usefully informed by state protection of workers in the capitalist labor market, where it is assumed that the parties occupy an unequal bargaining position.
     
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  17.  47
    Gabriel Wollner (2011). Equality and the Significance of Coercion. Journal of Social Philosophy 42 (4):363-381.
    Some political philosophers believe that equality emerges as a moral concern where and because people coerce each other. I shall argue that they are wrong. The idea of coercion as a trigger of equality is neither as plausible nor as powerful as it may initially appear. Those who rely on the idea that coercion is among the conditions that give rise to equality as a moral demand face a threefold challenge. They will have to succeed in jointly (a) (...)
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  18. Grant Lamond (1996). Coercion, Threats, and the Puzzle of Blackmail. In A. P. Simester & A. T. H. Smith (eds.), Harm and Culpability. Oxford University Press 215-38.
    This paper discusses the puzzle of blackmail, i.e. the way in which the threat of an otherwise legally permissible action can in some cases constitute blackmail. It argues that the key to understanding blackmail is in terms of coercion and threats, and the effect such threats have on the validity of a victim’s consent. The nature of coercion and of coercive threats is considered in detail to support the thesis that threats are prima facie impermissible, though often justified (...)
     
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  19.  25
    Robert C. Hughes (2013). Law and Coercion. Philosophy Compass 8 (3):231-240.
    Though political philosophers often presuppose that coercive enforcement is fundamental to law, many legal philosophers have doubted this. This article explores doubts of two types. Some legal philosophers argue that given an adequate account of coercion and coerciveness, the enforcement of law in actual legal systems will generally not count as coercive. Others accept that actual legal systems enforce many laws coercively, but they deny that law has a necessary connection with coercion. There can be individual laws that (...)
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  20.  14
    Ambrose Y. K. Lee (2014). Legal Coercion, Respect & Reason-Responsive Agency. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):847-859.
    Legal coercion seems morally problematic because it is susceptible to the Hegelian objection that it fails to respect individuals in a way that is ‘due to them as men’. But in what sense does legal coercion fail to do so? And what are the grounds for this requirement to respect? This paper is an attempt to answer these questions. It argues that legal coercion fails to respect individuals as reason-responsive agents; and individuals ought to (...)
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  21. Elinor Mason (2012). Coercion and Integrity. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 2. Oxford
    Williams argues that impartial moral theories undermine agents’ integrity by making them responsible for allowings as well as doings. I argue that in some cases of allowings, where there is an intervening agent, the agent has been coerced, and so is not fully responsible. -/- I provide an analysis of coercion. Whether an agent is coerced depends on various things (the coercer must provide strong reasons, and the coercer must have a mens rea), and crucially, the coercee’s action is (...)
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  22.  20
    Emily Largent, Christine Grady, Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer (2013). Misconceptions About Coercion and Undue Influence: Reflections on the Views of Irb Members. Bioethics 27 (9):500-507.
    Payment to recruit research subjects is a common practice but raises ethical concerns relating to the potential for coercion or undue influence. We conducted the first national study of IRB members and human subjects protection professionals to explore attitudes as to whether and why payment of research participants constitutes coercion or undue influence. Upon critical evaluation of the cogency of ethical concerns regarding payment, as reflected in our survey results, we found expansive or inconsistent views about coercion (...)
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  23.  25
    Thomas Søbirk Petersen (2004). A Woman's Choice? On Women, Assisted Reproduction and Social Coercion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):81 - 90.
    This paper critically discusses an argument that is sometimes pressed into service in the ethical debate about the use of assisted reproduction. The argument runs roughly as follows: we should prevent women from using assisted reproduction techniques, because women who want to use the technology have been socially coerced into desiring children - and indeed have thereby been harmed by the patriarchal society in which they live. I call this the argument from coercion. Having clarified this argument, I conclude (...)
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  24.  6
    Peter Baumann (2003). Coercion and the Varieties of Free Action. Ideas Y Valores 122:31-49.
    Are we free? What does "freedom" mean here? In the following, I shall only focus with freedom of action. My main thesis is that there is not just one basic type of free action but more. Philosophers, however, tend to assume that there is just one way to act freely. Hence, a more detailed analysis of free action is being called for. I will distinguish between different kinds of free action and discuss the relations between them. The analysis of different (...)
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  25.  8
    E. A. Largent, C. Grady, F. G. Miller & A. Wertheimer (2011). Money, Coercion, and Undue Inducement: Attitudes About Payments to Research Participants. IRB: Ethics & Human Research 34 (1):1-8.
    Using payment to recruit research subjects is a common practice, but it raises ethical concerns that coercion or undue inducement could potentially compromise participants’ informed consent. This is the first national study to explore the attitudes of IRB members and other human subjects protection professionals concerning whether payment of research participants constitutes coercion or undue influence, and if so, why. The majority of respondents expressed concern that payment of any amount might influence a participant’s decisions or behaviors regarding (...)
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  26.  6
    Dieter Birnbacher (2009). Thresholds of Coercion in Genetic Testing. Medicine Studies 1 (2):95-104.
    One moot point in bioethical debates about genetic testing concerns the conditions that have to be fulfilled to make individual genetic testing or individual participation in genetic screening programs truly voluntary. Though there is a relatively broad consensus about the non-viability of views on the extremes of the spectrum of opinions, there is considerable disagreement in the middle. This mirrors the difficulties in defining satisfactory demarcation lines between autonomous choice, pressured choice and coercion in cases in which the decision (...)
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  27.  9
    Thomas Søbirk Petersen (2004). A Woman's Choice? – On Women, Assisted Reproduction and Social Coercion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):81-90.
    This paper critically discusses an argument that is sometimes pressed into service in the ethical debate about the use of assisted reproduction. The argument runs roughly as follows: we should prevent women from using assisted reproduction techniques, because women who want to use the technology have been socially coerced into desiring children - and indeed have thereby been harmed by the patriarchal society in which they live. I call this the argument from coercion. Having clarified this argument, I conclude (...)
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  28.  4
    Rikke Spjæt Salkvist & Bodil Pedersen (2008). Subject Subjected - Sexualised Coercion, Agency and the Reorganisation and Reformulation of Life Strategies. Outlines. Critical Practice Studies 10 (2):70-89.
    When not acting in ways that are recognised as physical self-defence, women are often – in psychology and in other dominant discourses – generalised as inherently passive during subjection to sexualised coercion (rape and attempted rape). Likewise, in the aftermaths, their (in)actions are frequently pathologised as ‘maladaptive coping strategies’. We present theoretically and empirically based arguments for an agency-oriented approach to women’s perspectives on sexualised coercion. Agency is understood as intentional, situated and strategic. Sexualised coercion is not (...)
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  29. Arash Abizadeh (2010). Democratic Legitimacy and State Coercion: A Reply to David Miller. Political Theory 38 (1):121-130.
  30.  6
    Terry Carney (2014). The Incredible Complexity of Being? Degrees of Influence, Coercion, and Control of the “Autonomy” of Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa Patients. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 11 (1):41-42.
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  31.  6
    William A. Edmundson, Coercion, Stability, and Indoctrination in the Pejorative Sense.
    John Rawls argued in A Theory of Justice that “justice as fairness…is likely to have greater stability than the traditional alternatives since it is more in line with the principles of moral psychology”. In support, he presented a psychology of moral development that was informed by a comprehensive liberalism. In Political Liberalism, Rawls confessed that the argument was “unrealistic and must be recast”. Rawls, however, never provided a psychology of moral development informed by a specifically political liberalism, leaving it at (...)
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  32.  37
    Mark Leon (2011). Reason and Coercion: In Defence of a Rational Control Account of Freedom. Philosophia 39 (4):733-740.
    According to Pettit, an account of freedom in terms of rational control fails to suffice, for he argues that such an account lacks the resources to rule out coerced actions as unfree. The crucial feature of a coerced action is that it leaves the agent with a choice to make, an apparently rational choice to make. To the extent that it does this, it would seem to leave the agent as free as he would be in any other case where (...)
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  33.  12
    Steve Matthews (2014). Addiction, Competence, and Coercion. Journal of Philosophical Research 39:199-234.
    In what sense is a person addicted to drugs or alcohol incompetent, and so a legitimate object of coercive treatment? The standard tests for competence do not pick out the capacity that is lost in addiction: the capacity to properly regulate consumption. This paper is an attempt to sketch a justificatory framework for understanding the conditions under which addicted persons may be treated against their will. These conditions rarely obtain, for they apply only when addiction is extremely severe and great (...)
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  34. Arash Abizadeh (2007). Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope of Distributive Justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (4):318–358.
    Many anticosmopolitan Rawlsians argue that since the primary subject of justice is society's basic structure, and since there is no global basic structure, the scope of justice is domestic. This paper challenges the anticosmopolitan basic structure argument by distinguishing three interpretations of what Rawls meant by the basic structure and its relation to justice, corresponding to the cooperation, pervasive impact, and coercion theories of distributive justice. On the cooperation theory, it is true that there is no global basic structure, (...)
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  35.  51
    Cynthia Forlini & Eric Racine (2009). Autonomy and Coercion in Academic “Cognitive Enhancement” Using Methylphenidate: Perspectives of Key Stakeholders. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 2 (3):163-177.
    There is mounting evidence that methylphenidate (MPH; Ritalin) is being used by healthy college students to improve concentration, alertness, and academic performance. One of the key concerns associated with such use of pharmaceuticals is the degree of freedom individuals have to engage in or abstain from cognitive enhancement (CE). From a pragmatic perspective, careful examination of the ethics of acts and contexts in which they arise includes considering coercion and social pressures to enhance cognition. We were interested in understanding (...)
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  36.  68
    Gerald Gaus (2010). Coercion, Ownership, and the Redistributive State: Justificatory Liberalism's Classical Tilt. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (1):233.
    Justificatory liberalism1 rests on a conception of members of the public as free and equal. To say that each is free implies that each has a fundamental claim to act as she sees fit on the basis of her own reasoning. To say that each is equal is to insist that members of the public are symmetrically placed insofar as no one has a natural right to command others, nor does anyone have a natural duty to defer to the reasoning (...)
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  37.  97
    Benjamin Sachs (2013). Why Coercion is Wrong When It's Wrong. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):63 - 82.
    It is usually thought that wrongful acts of threat-involving coercion are wrong because they involve a violation of the freedom or autonomy of the targets of those acts. I argue here that this cannot possibly be right, and that in fact the wrongness of wrongful coercion has nothing at all to do with the effect such actions have on their targets. This negative thesis is supported by pointing out that what we say about the ethics of threatening (and (...)
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  38.  88
    Japa Pallikkathayil (2011). The Possibility of Choice: Three Accounts of the Problem with Coercion. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (16).
    There is a strong moral presumption against the use of coercion, and those who are coerced seem to be less responsible for the actions they were coerced to perform. Both these considerations seem to reflect the effect of coercion on the victim’s choice. This paper examines three ways of understanding this effect. First, I argue against understanding victims as unable to engage in genuine action. Next, I consider the suggestion that victims are unable to consent to participate in (...)
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  39.  42
    Chad Van Schoelandt (2015). Justification, Coercion, and the Place of Public Reason. Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1031-1050.
    Public reason accounts commonly claim that exercises of coercive political power must be justified by appeal to reasons accessible to all citizens. Such accounts are vulnerable to the objection that they cannot legitimate coercion to protect basic liberal rights against infringement by deeply illiberal people. This paper first elaborates the distinctive interpersonal conception of justification in public reason accounts in contrast to impersonal forms of justification. I then detail a core dissenter-based objection to public reason based on a worrisome (...)
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  40.  4
    Michael Blake (forthcoming). Agency, Coercion, and Global Justice: A Reply to My Critics. Law and Philosophy:1-23.
    Mathias Risse, Andrea Sangiovanni, and Kok-Chor Tan have offered some subtle and powerful criticisms of the ideas given in my Justice and Foreign Policy. Three themes in particular recur in their critiques. The first is that the arguments I make in that book rest upon unjustified, arbitrary, or contradictory premises. The second is that the use of coercion in the analysis of distributive justice is a mistake. The third is that the global institutional set represents, contrary to my arguments, (...)
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  41.  57
    Jennifer Susan Hawkins & Ezekiel J. Emanuel (2005). Clarifying Confusions About Coercion. Hastings Center Report 35 (5):16-19.
    Commentators often claim that medical research subjects are coerced into participating in clinical studies. In recent years, such claims have appeared especially frequently in ethical discussions of research in developing countries. Medical research ethics is more important than ever as we move into the 21st century because worldwide the pharmaceutical industry has grown so much and shows no sign of slowing its growth. This means that more people are involved in medical research today than ever before, and in the future (...)
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  42. S. Olsaretti (2013). Coercion and Libertarianism: A Reply to Gordon Barnes. Analysis 73 (2):295-299.
    Libertarians oppose coercion and champion a free-market society. Are these two commitments, as libertarians claim, wholly consistent with one another, or is there, by contrast, a tension between them? This paper defends the latter view. Replying to an article by Gordon Barnes, the paper casts doubts on the success of an argument aimed at establishing that, while coercion is justice-disrupting, all non-coercive but forced transactions that occur in a free market are justice-preserving.
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  43.  54
    Gideon Yaffe (2003). Indoctrination, Coercion and Freedom of Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):335–356.
    Manipulation by another person often undermines freedom. To explain this, a distinction is drawn between two forms of manipulation: indoctrination is defined as causing another person to respond to reasons in a pattern that serves the manipulator’s ends; coercion as supplying another person with reasons that, given the pattern in which he responds to reasons, lead him to act in ways that serve the manipulator’s ends. It is argued that both forms of manipulation undermine freedom because manipulators track the (...)
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  44.  41
    Grant Lamond (2001). Coercion and the Nature of Law. Legal Theory 7 (1):35-57.
    It is a commonplace that coercion forms part of the nature of law: Law is inherently coercive. But how well founded is this claim, and what would it mean for coercion to be part of the of law? This article suggests that the claim is grounded in our current conception of law. The main focus of the article, however, is upon two major lines of argument that attempt to establish a link between law and coercion: one based (...)
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  45.  7
    Andrea Sangiovanni (forthcoming). Is Coercion a Ground of Distributive Justice? Law and Philosophy:1-20.
    In his rich and stimulating book, Blake argues that comprehensive coercion triggers egalitarian obligations of distributive justice. I argue that coercion is not a necessary condition for egalitarian justice to apply; Blake’s use of a moralised conception of coercion is a mistake; coercion is a redundant member of any set of sufficient conditions that might explain why distributive justice applies; Blake’s emphasis on providing conditions for the exercise of autonomy might support a much more cosmopolitan theory (...)
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  46.  71
    Nicos Stavropoulos (2009). The Relevance of Coercion: Some Preliminaries. Ratio Juris 22 (3):339-358.
    Many philosophers take the view that, while coercion is a prominent and enduring feature of legal practice, its existence does not reflect a deep, constitutive property of law and therefore coercion plays at best a very limited role in the explanation of law's nature. This view has become more or less the orthodoxy in modern jurisprudence. I argue that an interesting and plausible possible role for coercion in the explanation of law is untouched by the arguments in (...)
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  47.  8
    Alyssa R. Bernstein (2014). The Rights of States, the Rule of Law, and Coercion: Reflections on Pauline Kleingeld's Kant and Cosmopolitanism. Kantian Review 19 (2):233-249.
    Pauline Kleingeld argues that according to Kant it would be wrong to coerce a state into an international federation, due to the wrongness of paternalism. Although I agree that Kant opposes the waging of war as a means to peace, I disagree with Kleingeld's account of the reasons why he would oppose coercing a state into a federation. Since she does not address the broader question of the permissibility of interstate coercion, she does not properly address the narrower question (...)
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  48. Bernd Ludwig (2015). Sympathy for the Devil? Personality and Legal Coercion in Kant's Doctrine of Law. Jurisprudence 6 (1):25-44.
    The central concept in Kant's _Doctrine of Law_ is the concept of a _person_. This very concept is intimately connected with Kant's theory of transcendental freedom and thus with his Transcendental Idealism. Hence the conceptual framework of the _Doctrine of Law_ and with it the 'Universal Principle of Right' are inseparably connected to Kant's _critical_ moral philosophy and require especially the moral law as their foundation. But nevertheless this does not entail that legal coercion requires the personality of those (...)
     
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    Jesper Ryberg & Thomas Petersen (2014). Surgical Castration, Coercion and Ethics. Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (9):593-594.
    John McMillan's detailed ethical analysis concerning the use of surgical castration of sex offenders in the Czech Republic and Germany is mainly devoted to considerations of coercion.1 This is not surprising. When castration is offered as an option to offenders and, at the same time, constitutes the only means by which these offenders are likely to be released from prison, it is reasonable—and close to the heart of modern medical ethics—to consider whether the offer involves some kind of (...). However, despite McMillan's seemingly careful consideration of this question, it appears to us that the matter is more complicated than his approach to it suggests.The first thing that adds to the complexity of the discussion concerns the alternative for sex offenders who do not accept the offer of castration. As mentioned, it is likely that these offenders will be kept in prison. McMillan even underlines that they may be detained ‘indefinitely’. And the response report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to the Czech Government also emphasises—as part of the Czech Criminal Code—the possibility of ‘security detention’ that will last for as long as required for ‘the protection of society’.2 Suppose, …. (shrink)
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    Scott Anderson (2010). The Enforcement Approach to Coercion. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (1):1-31.
    This essay differentiates two approaches to understanding the concept of coercion, and argues for the relative merits of the one currently out of fashion. The approach currently dominant in the philosophical literature treats threats as essential to coercion, and understands coercion in terms of the way threats alter the costs and benefits of an agent’s actions; I call this the “pressure” approach. It has largely superseded the “enforcement approach,” which focuses on the powers and actions of the (...)
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