Search results for 'cognitive command' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  30
    Bill Wringe (2008). Making the Lightness of Being Bearable: Arithmetical Platonism, Fictional Realism and Cognitive Command. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 453-487.
    In this paper I argue against Divers and Miller's 'Lightness of Being' objection to Hale and Wright's neo-Fregean Platonism. According to the 'Lightness of Being' objection, the neo-Fregean Platonist makes existence too cheap: the same principles which allow her to argue that numbers exist also allow her to claim that fictional objects exist. I claim that this is no objection at all" the neo-Fregean Platonist should think that fictional characters exist. However, the pluralist approach to truth developed by WQright in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  44
    John K. Davis (2015). Faultless Disagreement, Cognitive Command, and Epistemic Peers. Synthese 192 (1):1-24.
    Relativism and contextualism are the most popular accounts of faultless disagreement, but Crispin Wright once argued for an account I call divergentism. According to divergentism, parties who possess all relevant information and use the same standards of assessment in the same context of utterance can disagree about the same proposition without either party being in epistemic fault, yet only one of them is right. This view is an alternative to relativism, indexical contextualism, and nonindexical contextualism, and has advantages over those (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3.  25
    Jakob Hohwy (1997). Quietism and Cognitive Command. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189):495-500.
    Crispin Wright has sought to establish the possibility of ‘significant metaphysics’ in the shape of a common metric with which to measure the realism or robustness of various discourses. One means by which to place discourses in the metric is via the ‘cognitive command constraint’. Importantly, this constraint must be a priori. Richard Rorty has argued against this, that, given content is a function of standards of representationality, the a priori requirement cannot be satisfied. I show that this (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Review author[S.]: Stewart Shapiro & William W. Taschek (1996). Institutionism, Pluralism, and Cognitive Command. Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):74-88.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5.  35
    Stewart Shapiro & William W. Taschek (1996). ``Intuitionism, Pluralism, and Cognitive Command". Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):74-88.
  6.  22
    Terence Cuneo (2003). Moral Explanations, Minimalism, and Cognitive Command. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):351-365.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  7
    Anthony Brueckner (1998). Realism, Best Explanation, and Cognitive Command. Philosophical Papers 27 (1):69-78.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  2
    Tommaso Piazza (2005). Trivializing Cognitive Command. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (2):51-66.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  11
    R. M. Sainsbury (1996). Crispin Wright. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):899-904.
    This belongs to a symposium about Crispin Wright's Truth and Objectivity. Wright entertains the "possibility of pluralist view of truth." I suggest that this should not entail ambiguity in the word "true." For truth to amount to different things for different kinds of subject matter no more entails ambiguity than does the fact that existence amounts to different things for different kinds of entity. Turning to cognitive command, I argue that it is trivially satisfied: if I judge that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10. John K. Davis (2010). An Alternative to Relativism. Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37.
    Some moral disagreements are so persistent that we suspect they are deep : we would disagree even when we have all relevant information and no one makes any mistakes. The possibility of deep disagreement is thought to drive cognitivists toward relativism, but most cognitivists reject relativism. There is an alternative. According to divergentism, cognitivists can reject relativism while allowing for deep disagreement. This view has rarely been defended at length, but many philosophers have implicitly endorsed its elements. I will defend (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  11.  9
    Kenneth R. Westphal (1998). ‘Transcendental Reflections on Pragmatic Realism’. In K. R. Westphal (ed.), Pragmatism, Reason, & Norms: A Realistic Assessment. Fordham UP 17--58.
    By deepening Austin’s reflections on the ‘open texture’ of empirical concepts, Frederick L. Will defends an ‘externalist’ account of mental content: as human beings we could not think, were we not in fact cognizant of a natural world structured by events and objects with identifiable and repeatable similarities and differences. I explicate and defend Will’s insight by developing a parallel critique of Kant’s and Carnap’s rejections of realism, both of whom cannot account properly for the content of experience. This critique (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Dan López de Sa (2000). Non-Objective Truths: Comments on Kölbel's Criterion for Objectivity: Philosophy of Language. Theoria 15 (38):229-234.
    Response to Max Kölbel: "A Criterion for Objectivity", Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 15 > Issue: 2.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  3
    Douglas D. Noble (1989). Cockpit Cognition: Education, the Military and Cognitive Engineering. [REVIEW] AI and Society 3 (4):271-296.
    The goals of public education, as well as conceptions of human intelligence and learning, are undergoing a transformation through the application of military-sponsored information technologies and information processing models of human thought. Recent emphases in education on thinking skills, learning strategies, and computer-based technologies are the latest episodes in the postwar military agenda to engineer intelligent components, human and artificial, for the optimal performance of complex technological systems. Public education serves increasingly as a “human factors” laboratory and production site for (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14.  33
    Grant Gillett & Sam C. Liu (2012). Free Will and Necker's Cube: Reason, Language and Top-Down Control in Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophy 87 (01):29-50.
    The debates about human free will are traditionally the concern of metaphysics but neuroscientists have recently entered the field arguing that acts of the will are determined by brain events themselves causal products of other events. We examine that claim through the example of free or voluntary switch of perception in relation to the Necker cube. When I am asked to see the cube in one way, I decide whether I will follow the command (or do as I am (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   235 citations  
  16.  65
    Michelle Montague (forthcoming). Cognitive Phenomenology and Conscious Thought. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2):1-15.
    How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  18
    S. Orestis Palermos (2014). Loops, Constitution and Cognitive Extension. Cognitive Systems Research 27:25-41.
    The ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy, the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry, and the persisting theoretical confusion about the fundamental difference between the hypotheses of embedded (HEMC) and extended (HEC) cognition are three interrelated worries, whose common point—and the problem they accentuate—is the lack of a principled criterion of constitution. Attempting to address the ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy, mathematically oriented philosophers of mind have previously suggested that the presence of non-linear relations between the inner and the outer contributions is sufficient for cognitive extension. The abstract (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  18. Richard Dean (2010). Does Neuroscience Undermine Deontological Theory? Neuroethics 3 (1):43-60.
    Joshua Greene has argued that several lines of empirical research, including his own fMRI studies of brain activity during moral decision-making, comprise strong evidence against the legitimacy of deontology as a moral theory. This is because, Greene maintains, the empirical studies establish that “characteristically deontological” moral thinking is driven by prepotent emotional reactions which are not a sound basis for morality in the contemporary world, while “characteristically consequentialist” thinking is a more reliable moral guide because it is characterized by greater (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  19. Richard Menary (2007). Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded. Palgrave Macmillan.
    In Cognitive Integration: Attacking The Bounds of Cognition Richard Menary argues that the real pay-off from extended-mind-style arguments is not a new form of externalism in the philosophy of mind, but a view in which the 'internal' and 'external' aspects of cognition are integrated into a whole. Menary argues that the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes cognitive processes and that cognition is hybrid: internal and external processes and vehicles complement one another in the completion of cognitive tasks. (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   59 citations  
  20. Robert Hopkins (2001). Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):166–189.
    Aesthetic judgements are autonomous, as many other judgements are not: for the latter, but not the former, it is sometimes justifiable to change one's mind simply because several others share a different opinion. Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response. However, to cover more than just some of the explananda, this expressivism needs combining with some analogue of cognitive command, i.e. the idea that disagreements over (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  21.  34
    R. M. Sainsbury (1996). Review: Crispin Wright: Truth and Objectivity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):899 - 904.
    This belongs to a symposium about Crispin Wright's Truth\nand Objectivity. Wright entertains the "possibility of a\npluralist view of truth." I suggest that this should not\nentail ambiguity in the word "true." For truth to amount to\ndifferent things for different kinds of subject matter no\nmore entails ambiguity than does the fact that existence\namounts to different things for different kinds of entity.\nTurning to cognitive command, I argue that it is trivially\nsatisfied: if I judge that p and you disagree, then under\nsuitable conditions (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  22.  44
    Max Kölbel (2000). A Criterion for Objectivity. Theoria 15 (2):209-228.
    There are many reasons to assume that the contents expressible by declarative sentences are generally truth-evaluable (reasons stemming from semantics, logic and considerations about truth). This assumption of global truth-evaluability, however, appears to conflict with the view that the contents of some sentences do not admit of truth or falsehood for lack of objectivity of their subject matter. Could there be a notion of truth on which the truth-evaluability of a content does not rule out the non-objectivity of its subject (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  40
    Sieghard Beller, Andrea Bender & Douglas L. Medin (2012). Should Anthropology Be Part of Cognitive Science? Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (3):342-353.
    Anthropology and the other cognitive science (CS) subdisciplines currently maintain a troubled relationship. With a debate in topiCS we aim at exploring the prospects for improving this relationship, and our introduction is intended as a catalyst for this debate. In order to encourage a frank sharing of perspectives, our comments will be deliberately provocative. Several challenges for a successful rapprochement are identified, encompassing the diverging paths that CS and anthropology have taken in the past, the degree of compatibility between (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  24. Dustin Stokes (2013). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
    Perception is typically distinguished from cognition. For example, seeing is importantly different from believing. And while what one sees clearly influences what one thinks, it is debatable whether what one believes and otherwise thinks can influence, in some direct and non-trivial way, what one sees. The latter possible relation is the cognitive penetration of perception. Cognitive penetration, if it occurs, has implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper offers an analysis (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  25.  38
    Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1980). Computation and Cognition: Issues in the Foundation of Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):111-32.
    The computational view of mind rests on certain intuitions regarding the fundamental similarity between computation and cognition. We examine some of these intuitions and suggest that they derive from the fact that computers and human organisms are both physical systems whose behavior is correctly described as being governed by rules acting on symbolic representations. Some of the implications of this view are discussed. It is suggested that a fundamental hypothesis of this approach is that there is a natural domain of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   397 citations  
  26. Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
  27. Stephen P. Stich (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press.
  28.  83
    Richard Heersmink (forthcoming). Extended Mind and Cognitive Enhancement: Moral Aspects of Cognitive Artifacts. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.
    This article connects philosophical debates about cognitive enhancement and situated cognition. It does so by focusing on moral aspects of enhancing our cognitive abilities with the aid of external artifacts. Such artifacts have important moral dimensions that are addressed neither by the cognitive enhancement debate nor situated cognition theory. In order to fill this gap in the literature, three moral aspects of cognitive artifacts are singled out: their consequences for brains, cognition, and culture; their moral status; (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  76
    John R. Searle (1990). Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.
    Cognitive science typically postulates unconscious mental phenomena, computational or otherwise, to explain cognitive capacities. The mental phenomena in question are supposed to be inaccessible in principle to consciousness. I try to show that this is a mistake, because all unconscious intentionality must be accessible in principle to consciousness; we have no notion of intrinsic intentionality except in terms of its accessibility to consciousness. I call this claim the The argument for it proceeds in six steps. The essential point (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   214 citations  
  30. Kim Diaz & Edward Murguia (2015). The Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy: Stoicism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Existentialism. Journal of Evidence-Based Psychotherapies 15 (1):39-52.
    In this study, we examine the philosophical bases of one of the leading clinical psychological methods of therapy for anxiety, anger, and depression, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). We trace this method back to its philosophical roots in the Stoic, Buddhist, Taoist, and Existentialist philosophical traditions. We start by discussing the tenets of CBT, and then we expand on the philosophical traditions that ground this approach. Given that CBT has had a clinically measured positive effect on the psychological well-being of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  32
    Philip J. Walsh (forthcoming). Cognitive Extension, Enhancement, and the Phenomenology of Thinking. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    This paper brings together several strands of thought from both the analytic and phenomenological traditions in order to critically examine accounts of cognitive enhancement that rely on the idea of cognitive extension. First, I explain the idea of cognitive extension, the metaphysics of mind on which it depends, and how it has figured in recent discussions of cognitive enhancement. Then, I develop ideas from Husserl that emphasize the agential character of thought and the distinctive way that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  72
    Raymond W. Gibbs (2006). Embodiment and Cognitive Science. New York ;Cambridge University Press.
    This book explores how people's subjective, felt experiences of their bodies in action provide part of the fundamental grounding for human cognition and language. Cognition is what occurs when the body engages the physical and cultural world and must be studied in terms of the dynamical interactions between people and the environment. Human language and thought emerge from recurring patterns of embodied activity that constrain ongoing intelligent behavior. We must not assume cognition to be purely internal, symbolic, computational, and disembodied, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   49 citations  
  33. Mog Stapleton (2013). Steps to a "Properly Embodied" Cognitive Science. Cognitive Systems Research 22 (June):1-11.
    Cognitive systems research has predominantly been guided by the historical distinction between emotion and cognition, and has focused its efforts on modelling the “cognitive” aspects of behaviour. While this initially meant modelling only the control system of cognitive creatures, with the advent of “embodied” cognitive science this expanded to also modelling the interactions between the control system and the external environment. What did not seem to change with this embodiment revolution, however, was the attitude towards affect (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  34.  62
    Karola Stotz (2010). Human Nature and Cognitive–Developmental Niche Construction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):483-501.
    Recent theories in cognitive science have begun to focus on the active role of organisms in shaping their own environment, and the role of these environmental resources for cognition. Approaches such as situated, embedded, ecological, distributed and particularly extended cognition look beyond ‘what is inside your head’ to the old Gibsonian question of ‘what your head is inside of’ and with which it forms a wider whole—its internal and external cognitive niche. Since these views have been treated as (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  35. Richard Heersmink (2015). Dimensions of Integration in Embedded and Extended Cognitive Systems. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):577-598.
    The complementary properties and functions of cognitive artifacts and other external resources are integrated into the human cognitive system to varying degrees. The goal of this paper is to develop some of the tools to conceptualize this complementary integration between agents and artifacts. It does so by proposing a multidimensional framework, including the dimensions of information flow, reliability, durability, trust, procedural transparency, informational transparency, individualization, and transformation. The proposed dimensions are all matters of degree and jointly they constitute (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  36. Sara J. Unsworth (2012). Anthropology in the Cognitive Sciences: The Value of Diversity. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (3):429-436.
    Beller, Bender, and Medin (this issue) offer a provocative proposal outlining several reasons why anthropology and the rest of cognitive science might consider parting ways. Among those reasons, they suggest that separation might maintain the diversity needed to address larger problems facing humanity, and that the research strategies used across the disciplines are already so diverse as to be incommensurate. The present paper challenges the view that research strategies are incommensurate and offers a multimethod approach to cultural research that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  37.  62
    Ian Apperly (2010). Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind". Psychology Press.
    Introduction -- Evidence from children -- Evidence form infants and non-human animals -- Evidence from neuroimaging and neuropsychology -- Evidence from adults -- The cognitive basis of mindreading -- Elaborating and applying the theory.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  38.  55
    Erhan Demircioglu (forthcoming). Human Cognitive Closure and Mysterianism: Reply to Kriegel. Acta Analytica:1-8.
    In this paper, I respond to Kriegel’s criticism of McGinn’s mysterianism (the thesis that humans are cognitively closed with respect to the solution of the mind-body problem). Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  97
    Anthony I. Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (2002). Introspection and Cognitive Brain Mapping: From Stimulus-Response to Script-Report. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (8):333-339.
    Cognitive science has wholeheartedly embraced functional brain imaging, but introspective data are still eschewed to the extent that it runs against standard practice to engage in the systematic collection of introspective reports. However, in the case of executive processes associated with prefrontal cortex, imaging has made limited progress, whereas introspective methods have considerable unfulfilled potential. We argue for a re-evaluation of the standard ‘cognitive mapping’ paradigm, emphasizing the use of retrospective reports alongside behavioural and brain imaging techniques. Using (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   29 citations  
  40. Mark Reybrouck (2005). A Biosemiotic and Ecological Approach to Music Cognition: Event Perception Between Auditory Listening and Cognitive Economy. [REVIEW] Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems. 15 (2):229-266.
    This paper addresses the question whether we can conceive of music cognition in ecosemiotic terms. It claims that music knowledge must be generated as a tool for adaptation to the sonic world and calls forth a shift from a structural description of music as an artifact to a process-like approach to dealing with music. As listeners, we are observers who construct and organize our knowledge and bring with us our observational tools. What matters is not merely the sonic world in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  41.  91
    Antoni Gomila & Vincent C. Müller (2012). Challenges for Artificial Cognitive Systems. Journal of Cognitive Science 13 (4):452-469.
    The declared goal of this paper is to fill this gap: “... cognitive systems research needs questions or challenges that define progress. The challenges are not (yet more) predictions of the future, but a guideline to what are the aims and what would constitute progress.” – the quotation being from the project description of EUCogII, the project for the European Network for Cognitive Systems within which this formulation of the ‘challenges’ was originally developed (http://www.eucognition.org). So, we stick out (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. William P. Bechtel (1988). Philosophy of Mind: An Overview for Cognitive Science. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    Specifically designed to make the philosophy of mind intelligible to those not trained in philosophy, this book provides a concise overview for students and researchers in the cognitive sciences. Emphasizing the relevance of philosophical work to investigations in other cognitive sciences, this unique text examines such issues as the meaning of language, the mind-body problem, the functionalist theories of cognition, and intentionality. As he explores the philosophical issues, Bechtel draws connections between philosophical views and theoretical and experimental work (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   120 citations  
  43.  35
    Galen Strawson (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology: Real Life. In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford University Press 285--325.
    Cognitive phenomenology starts from something that has been obscured in much recent analytic philosophy: the fact that lived conscious experience isn’t just a matter of sensation or feeling, but is also cognitive in character, through and through. This is obviously true of ordinary human perceptual experience, and cognitive phenomenology is also concerned with something more exclusively cognitive, which we may call propositional meaning-experience: occurrent experience of linguistic representations as meaning something, for example, as this occurs in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  44.  31
    Rita Astuti & Maurice Bloch (2012). Anthropologists as Cognitive Scientists. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (3):453-461.
    Anthropology combines two quite different enterprises: the ethnographic study of particular people in particular places and the theorizing about the human species. As such, anthropology is part of cognitive science in that it contributes to the unitary theoretical aim of understanding and explaining the behavior of the animal species Homo sapiens. This article draws on our own research experience to illustrate that cooperation between anthropology and the other sub-disciplines of cognitive science is possible and fruitful, but it must (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  45.  67
    Vincent C. Müller (2012). Autonomous Cognitive Systems in Real-World Environments: Less Control, More Flexibility and Better Interaction. Cognitive Computation 4 (3):212-215.
    In October 2011, the “2nd European Network for Cognitive Systems, Robotics and Interaction”, EUCogII, held its meeting in Groningen on “Autonomous activity in real-world environments”, organized by Tjeerd Andringa and myself. This is a brief personal report on why we thought autonomy in real-world environments is central for cognitive systems research and what I think I learned about it. --- The theses that crystallized are that a) autonomy is a relative property and a matter of degree, b) increasing (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  40
    Jona Vance & Dustin Stokes (forthcoming). Noise, Uncertainty, and Interest: Predictive Coding and Cognitive Penetration. Consciousness and Cognition.
    This paper concerns how extant theorists of predictive coding conceptualize and explain possible instances of cognitive penetration. §I offers brief clarification of the predictive coding framework and relevant mechanisms, and a brief characterization of cognitive penetration and some challenges that come with defining it. §II develops more precise ways that the predictive coding framework can explain, and of course thereby allow for, genuine top-down causal effects on perceptual experience, of the kind discussed in the context of cognitive (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  8
    David E. Kieras, Gregory H. Wakefield, Eric R. Thompson, Nandini Iyer & Brian D. Simpson (2016). Modeling Two‐Channel Speech Processing With the EPIC Cognitive Architecture. Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (1):291-304.
    An important application of cognitive architectures is to provide human performance models that capture psychological mechanisms in a form that can be “programmed” to predict task performance of human–machine system designs. Although many aspects of human performance have been successfully modeled in this approach, accounting for multitalker speech task performance is a novel problem. This article presents a model for performance in a two-talker task that incorporates concepts from psychoacoustics, in particular, masking effects and stream formation.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48. Dustin Stokes, Attention and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.
    One sceptical rejoinder to those who claim that sensory perception is cognitively penetrable is to appeal to the involvement of attention. So, while a phenomenon might initially look like one where, say, a perceiver’s beliefs are influencing her visual experience, another interpretation is that because the perceiver believes and desires as she does, she consequently shifts her spatial attention so as to change what she senses visually. But, the sceptic will urge, this is an entirely familiar phenomenon, and it hardly (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  98
    Richard P. Cooper (2010). Cognitive Control: Componential or Emergent? Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):598-613.
    The past 25 years have witnessed an increasing awareness of the importance of cognitive control in the regulation of complex behavior. It now sits alongside attention, memory, language, and thinking as a distinct domain within cognitive psychology. At the same time it permeates each of these sibling domains. This introduction reviews recent work on cognitive control in an attempt to provide a context for the fundamental question addressed within this topic: Is cognitive control to be understood (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  50. Dustin Stokes (2015). Towards a Consequentialist Understanding of Cognitive Penetration. In A. Raftopoulos & J. Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability (Oxford University Press).
    Philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists have recently taken renewed interest in cognitive penetration, in particular, in the cognitive penetration of perceptual experience. The question is whether cognitive states like belief influence perceptual experience in some important way. Since the possible phenomenon is an empirical one, the strategy for analysis has, predictably, proceeded as follows: define the phenomenon and then, definition in hand, interpret various psychological data. However, different theorists offer different and apparently inconsistent definitions. And (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000