Search results for 'cognitive gap' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Tobias Matzner (forthcoming). The Model Gap: Cognitive Systems in Security Applications and Their Ethical Implications. [REVIEW] AI and Society:1-8.score: 72.0
    The use of cognitive systems like pattern recognition or video tracking technology in security applications is becoming ever more common. The paper considers cases in which the cognitive systems are meant to assist human tasks by providing information, but the final decision is left to the human. All these systems and their various applications have a common feature: an intrinsic difference in how a situation or an event is assessed by a human being and a cognitive system. (...)
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  2. Peter Fazekas (2011). Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism Without Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophia 39 (1):21-29.score: 54.0
    The novel approach presented in this paper accounts for the occurrence of the epistemic gap and defends physicalism against anti-physicalist arguments without relying on so-called phenomenal concepts. Instead of concentrating on conceptual features, the focus is shifted to the special characteristics of experiences themselves. To this extent, the account provided is an alternative to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. It is argued that certain sensory representations, as accessed by higher cognition, lack constituent structure. Unstructured representations could freely exchange their causal roles (...)
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  3. Leon De Bruin & Sanneke De Haan (2012). Enactivism and Social Cognition: In Search for the Whole Story. Journal of Cognitive Semiotics (1):225-250.score: 51.0
    Although the enactive approach has been very successful in explaining many basic social interactions in terms of embodied practices, there is still much work to be done when it comes to higher forms of social cognition. In this article, we discuss and evaluate two recent proposals by Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Hutto that try to bridge this ‘cognitive gap’ by appealing to the notion of narrative practice. Although we are enthusiastic about these proposals, we argue that (i) it is (...)
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  4. Leon de Bruin & Lena Kästner (2012). Dynamic Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.score: 51.0
    Abstract In this article, we investigate the merits of an enactive view of cognition for the contemporary debate about social cognition. If enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the “cognitive gap”, i.e. provide us with a convincing account of those higher forms of cognition that have traditionally been the focus of its cognitivist opponents. We show that, when it comes to social cognition, current articulations of enactivism are—despite their celebrated (...)
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  5. Michael Tye (1999). Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion. Mind 108 (432):705-25.score: 50.0
    The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts.
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  6. Alistair Isaac & Jakub Szymanik (2010). Logic in Cognitive Science: Bridging the Gap Between Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms. Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research (2):279-309.score: 45.0
    This paper surveys applications of logical methods in the cognitive sciences. Special attention is paid to non-monotonic logics and complexity theory. We argue that these particular tools have been useful in clarifying the debate between symbolic and connectionist models of cognition.
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  7. Tom Schonberg, Craig R. Fox & Russell A. Poldrack (2011). Mind the Gap: Bridging Economic and Naturalistic Risk-Taking with Cognitive Neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):11.score: 41.0
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  8. Denis Mareschal & Thomas R. Shultz (1997). From Neural Constructivism to Children's Cognitive Development: Bridging the Gap. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):571-572.score: 39.0
    Missing from Quartz & Sejnowski's (Q&S's) unique and valuable effort to relate cognitive development to neural constructivism is an examination of the global emergent properties of adding new neural circuits. Such emergent properties can be studied with computational models. Modeling with generative connectionist networks shows that synaptogenic mechanisms can account for progressive increases in children's representational power.
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  9. Andrea Bender, Sieghard Beller, Giovanni Bennardo, James S. Boster, Asifa Majid & Douglas L. Medin (2010). Bridging the Gap: From Cognitive Anthropology to Cognitive Science. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society.score: 39.0
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  10. Carl Senior & Nick Lee (2013). The State of the Art in Organizational Cognitive Neuroscience: The Therapeutic Gap and Possible Implications for Clinical Practice. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7:808.score: 39.0
    In the last decade, researchers in the social sciences have increasingly adopted neuroscientific techniques, with the consequent rise of research inspired by neuroscience in disciplines such as economics, marketing, decision sciences, and leadership. In 2007, we introduced the term organizational cognitive neuroscience (OCN), in an attempt to clearly demarcate research carried out in these many areas, and provide an overarching paradigm for research utilising cognitive neuroscientific methods, theories, and concepts, within the organizational and business research fields. Here we (...)
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  11. Claire Petitmengin, Anne Remillieux, Béatrice Cahour & Shirley Carter-Thomas (2013). A Gap in Nisbett and Wilson's Findings? A First-Person Access to Our Cognitive Processes. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):654-669.score: 37.0
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  12. Marc Bekoff (1997). Deep Ethology, Animal Rights, and the Great Ape/Animal Project: Resisting Speciesism and Expanding the Community of Equals. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 10 (3):269-296.score: 36.0
    In this essay I argue that the evolutionary and comparative study of nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) cognition in a wide range of taxa by cognitive ethologists can readily inform discussions about animal protection and animal rights. However, while it is clear that there is a link between animal cognitive abilities and animal pain and suffering, I agree with Jeremy Bentham who claimed long ago the real question does not deal with whether individuals can think or reason but rather (...)
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  13. L. R. Albert (2002). Bridging the Achievement Gap in Mathematics: Socio-Cultural Historic Theory and Dynamic Cognitive Assessment. Journal of Thought 37 (4):65-82.score: 36.0
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  14. Hanne De Jaegher & Tom Froese (2009). On the Role of Social Interaction in Individual Agency. Adaptive Behavior 17 (5):444-460.score: 33.0
    Is an individual agent constitutive of or constituted by its social interactions? This question is typically not asked in the cognitive sciences, so strong is the consensus that only individual agents have constitutive efficacy. In this article we challenge this methodological solipsism and argue that interindividual relations and social context do not simply arise from the behavior of individual agents, but themselves enable and shape the individual agents on which they depend. For this, we define the notion of autonomy (...)
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  15. Brian Fiala, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols (2011). On the Psychological Origins of Dualism: Dual-Process Cognition and the Explanatory Gap. In Edward Slingerland & Mark Collard (eds.), Creating Consilience: Issues and Case Studies in teh Integration of the Sciences and Humanities. OUP.score: 30.0
    Consciousness often presents itself as a problem for materialists because no matter which physical explanation we consider, there seems to remain something about conscious experience that hasn't been fully explained. This gives rise to an apparent explanatory gap. The explanatory gulf between the physical and the conscious is reflected in the broader population, in which dualistic intuitions abound. Drawing on recent empirical evidence, this essay presents a dual-process cognitive model of consciousness attribution. This dual-process model, we suggest, provides an (...)
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  16. Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab, Sensory Representation and Cognitive Architecture: An Alternative to Phenomenal Concepts.score: 27.0
    We present a cognitive-physicalist account of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that phenomenal concepts do not differ from other types of concepts. When explaining the peculiarities of conscious experience, the right place to look at is sensory/ perceptual representations and their interaction with general conceptual structures. We utilize Jerry Fodor’s psycho- semantic theory to formulate our view. We compare and contrast our view with that of Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere, who, using Dretskean psychosemantic theory, arrived at a solution different (...)
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  17. Jay F. Rosenberg (1994). Comments on Bechtel, Levels of Description and Explanation in Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 4 (1):27-37.score: 27.0
    I begin by tracing some of the confusions regarding levels and reduction to a failure to distinguish two different principles according to which theories can be viewed as hierarchically arranged — epistemic authority and ontological constitution. I then argue that the notion of levels relevant to the debate between symbolic and connectionist paradigms of mental activity answers to neither of these models, but is rather correlative to the hierarchy of functional decompositions of cognitive tasks characteristic of homuncular functionalism. Finally, (...)
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  18. Nicholas S. Fitz, Roland Nadler, Praveena Manogaran, Eugene W. J. Chong & Peter B. Reiner (2013). Public Attitudes Toward Cognitive Enhancement. Neuroethics:1-16.score: 27.0
    Vigorous debate over the moral propriety of cognitive enhancement exists, but the views of the public have been largely absent from the discussion. To address this gap in our knowledge, four experiments were carried out with contrastive vignettes in order to obtain quantitative data on public attitudes towards cognitive enhancement. The data collected suggest that the public is sensitive to and capable of understanding the four cardinal concerns identified by neuroethicists, and tend to cautiously accept cognitive enhancement (...)
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  19. William E. Morris & Robert C. Richardson (1995). How Not to Demarcate Cognitive Science and Folk Psychology: A Response to Pickering and Chater. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 5 (3):339-355.score: 27.0
    Pickering and Chater (P&C) maintain that folk psychology and cognitive science should neither compete nor cooperate. Each is an independent enterprise, with a distinct subject matter and characteristic modes of explanation. P&C''s case depends upon their characterizations of cognitive science and folk psychology. We question the basis for their characterizations, challenge both the coherence and the individual adequacy of their contrasts between the two, and show that they waver in their views about the scope of each. We conclude (...)
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  20. Sujata Ghosh, Ben Meijering & Rineke Verbrugge (forthcoming). Strategic Reasoning: Building Cognitive Models From Logical Formulas. Journal of Logic, Language and Information:1-29.score: 27.0
    This paper presents an attempt to bridge the gap between logical and cognitive treatments of strategic reasoning in games. There have been extensive formal debates about the merits of the principle of backward induction among game theorists and logicians. Experimental economists and psychologists have shown that human subjects, perhaps due to their bounded resources, do not always follow the backward induction strategy, leading to unexpected outcomes. Recently, based on an eye-tracking study, it has turned out that even human subjects (...)
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  21. Tiago V. Maia Guillermo Horga (2012). Conscious and Unconscious Processes in Cognitive Control: A Theoretical Perspective and a Novel Empirical Approach. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.score: 27.0
    Controlled processing is often referred to as “voluntary” or “willful” and therefore assumed to depend entirely on conscious processes. Recent studies using subliminal-priming paradigms, however, have started to question this assumption. Specifically, these studies have shown that subliminally presented stimuli can induce adjustments in control. Such findings are not immediately reconcilable with the view that conscious and unconscious processes are separate, with each having its own neural substrates and modus operandi. We propose a different theoretical perspective that suggests that conscious (...)
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  22. Axel Cleeremans (1998). The Other Hard Problem: How to Bridge the Gap Between Subsymbolic and Symbolic Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):22-23.score: 24.0
    The constructivist notion that features are purely functional is incompatible with the classical computational metaphor of mind. I suggest that the discontent expressed by Schyns, Goldstone and Thibaut about fixed-features theories of categorization reflects the growing impact of connectionism, and show how their perspective is similar to recent research on implicit learning, consciousness, and development. A hard problem remains, however: How to bridge the gap between subsymbolic and symbolic cognition.
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  23. Liam Dempsey (2013). The Side Left Untouched: Panpsychism, Embodiment, and the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):3-4.score: 24.0
    This paper considers Galen Strawson's recent defence of panpsychism. Strawson's account has a number of attractive features: it proffers an unflappable commitment to the reality of conscious experience, adduces a relatively novel and constructive appeal to the explanatory gap, and presents a picture which is in certain respects consistent with Herbert Feigl's version of mind-brain identity theory, what I call twofold-access theory. Strawson is right that the experiential and physical are not irreconcilable, for at least some physical phenomena have an (...)
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  24. Winfried D'Avis (1998). Theoretische Lücken der Cognitive Science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 29 (1):37-57.score: 23.0
    Theoretical gaps of the cognitive science. First of all the gap-thesis is based on a criticism 1. of the computer-orientated cognitive science (it confuses information with the information carrier), 2. of connectivism (its linguistic borrowing from the neurobiology is not appropriate), 3. of Varelas production model (the elimination of the function of representation results in the loss of the cognitive ability). From the context of meaning and time, then the author sketches a cognitive theoretical approach, in (...)
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  25. Andreas Gregersen (forthcoming). Generic Structures, Generic Experiences: A Cognitive Experientialist Approach to Video Game Analysis. Philosophy and Technology:1-17.score: 23.0
    The article discusses the issue of how to categorize video games—not the medium of video games, but individual video games. As a lead in to this discussion, the article discusses video game specificity and genericity and moves on to genre theory. On the basis of this discussion, a cognitive experientialist genre framework is sketched, which incorporates both general points from genre theory and theories more specific to the video game domain. The framework is illustrated through a brief example. One (...)
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  26. Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.score: 21.0
    The explanatory gap . Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states. (Nagel, 1974, Levine, 1983) Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested (...)
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  27. Mog Stapleton (2013). Steps to a "Properly Embodied" Cognitive Science. Cognitive Systems Research 22 (June):1-11.score: 21.0
    Cognitive systems research has predominantly been guided by the historical distinction between emotion and cognition, and has focused its efforts on modelling the “cognitive” aspects of behaviour. While this initially meant modelling only the control system of cognitive creatures, with the advent of “embodied” cognitive science this expanded to also modelling the interactions between the control system and the external environment. What did not seem to change with this embodiment revolution, however, was the attitude towards affect (...)
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  28. Uriah Kriegel (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 79--102.score: 21.0
    Since the seventies, it has been customary to assume that intentionality is independent of consciousness. Recently, a number of philosophers have rejected this assumption, claiming intentionality is closely tied to consciousness, inasmuch as non- conscious intentionality in some sense depends upon conscious intentionality. Within this alternative framework, the question arises of how to account for unconscious intentionality, and different authors have offered different accounts. In this paper, I compare and contrast four possible accounts of unconscious intentionality, which I call potentialism, (...)
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  29. Carrie Figdor (2011). Semantics and Metaphysics in Informatics: Toward an Ontology of Tasks (a Reply to Lenartowicz Et Al. 2010, Towards an Ontology of Cognitive Control). Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):222-226.score: 21.0
    This article clarifies three principles that should guide the development of any cognitive ontology. First, that an adequate cognitive ontology depends essentially on an adequate task ontology; second, that the goal of developing a cognitive ontology is independent of the goal of finding neural implementations of the processes referred to in the ontology; and third, that cognitive ontologies are neutral regarding the metaphysical relationship between cognitive and neural processes.
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  30. P. Sven Arvidson (2003). A Lexicon of Attention: From Cognitive Science to Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2):99-132.score: 21.0
    This article tries to create a bridge of understanding between cognitive scientists and phenomenologists who work on attention. In light of a phenomenology of attention and current psychological and neuropsychological literature on attention, I translate and interpret into phenomenological terms 20 key cognitive science concepts as examined in the laboratory and used in leading journals. As a preface to the lexicon, I outline a phenomenology of attention, especially as a dynamic three-part structure, which I have freely amended from (...)
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  31. Peter Carruthers (2002). Human Creativity: Its Cognitive Basis, its Evolution, and its Connections with Childhood Pretence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):225-249.score: 21.0
    This paper defends two initial claims. First, it argues that essentially the same cognitive resources are shared by adult creative thinking and problem-solving, on the one hand, and by childhood pretend play, on the other—namely, capacities to generate and to reason with suppositions (or imagined possibilities). Second, it argues that the evolutionary function of childhood pretence is to practice and enhance adult forms of creativity. The paper goes on to show how these proposals can provide a smooth and evolutionarily-plausible (...)
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  32. Mark Collier (2005). Hume and Cognitive Science: The Current Status of the Controversy Over Abstract Ideas. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):197-207.score: 21.0
    In Book I, Part I, Section VII of the Treatise, Hume sets out to settle, once and for all, the early modern controversy over abstract ideas. In order to do so, he tries to accomplish two tasks: (1) he attempts to defend an exemplar-based theory of general language and thought, and (2) he sets out to refute the rival abstraction-based account. This paper examines the successes and failures of these two projects. I argue that Hume manages to articulate a plausible (...)
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  33. Dustin Stokes (forthcoming). Towards a Consequentialist Understanding of Cognitive Penetration. In A. Raftopoulos & J. Ziembekis (eds.), Cognitive Effects on Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives.score: 21.0
    Philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists have recently taken renewed interest in cognitive penetration, in particular, in the cognitive penetration of perceptual experience. The question is whether cognitive states like belief influence perceptual experience in some important way. Since the possible phenomenon is an empirical one, the strategy for analysis has, predictably, proceeded as follows: define the phenomenon and then, definition in hand, interpret various psychological data. However, different theorists offer different and apparently inconsistent definitions. And (...)
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  34. Richard P. Cooper (2010). Cognitive Control: Componential or Emergent? Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):598-613.score: 21.0
    The past 25 years have witnessed an increasing awareness of the importance of cognitive control in the regulation of complex behavior. It now sits alongside attention, memory, language, and thinking as a distinct domain within cognitive psychology. At the same time it permeates each of these sibling domains. This introduction reviews recent work on cognitive control in an attempt to provide a context for the fundamental question addressed within this topic: Is cognitive control to be understood (...)
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  35. Richard P. Cooper & Tim Shallice (2010). Cognitive Neuroscience: The Troubled Marriage of Cognitive Science and Neuroscience. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):398-406.score: 21.0
    We discuss the development of cognitive neuroscience in terms of the tension between the greater sophistication in cognitive concepts and methods of the cognitive sciences and the increasing power of more standard biological approaches to understanding brain structure and function. There have been major technological developments in brain imaging and advances in simulation, but there have also been shifts in emphasis, with topics such as thinking, consciousness, and social cognition becoming fashionable within the brain sciences. The discipline (...)
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  36. Karola Stotz (2010). Human Nature and Cognitive–Developmental Niche Construction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):483-501.score: 21.0
    Recent theories in cognitive science have begun to focus on the active role of organisms in shaping their own environment, and the role of these environmental resources for cognition. Approaches such as situated, embedded, ecological, distributed and particularly extended cognition look beyond ‘what is inside your head’ to the old Gibsonian question of ‘what your head is inside of’ and with which it forms a wider whole—its internal and external cognitive niche. Since these views have been treated as (...)
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  37. Mark Reybrouck (2005). A Biosemiotic and Ecological Approach to Music Cognition: Event Perception Between Auditory Listening and Cognitive Economy. [REVIEW] Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems. 15 (2):229-266.score: 21.0
    This paper addresses the question whether we can conceive of music cognition in ecosemiotic terms. It claims that music knowledge must be generated as a tool for adaptation to the sonic world and calls forth a shift from a structural description of music as an artifact to a process-like approach to dealing with music. As listeners, we are observers who construct and organize our knowledge and bring with us our observational tools. What matters is not merely the sonic world in (...)
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  38. Daniel C. Dennett (2009). The Part of Cognitive Science That Is Philosophy. Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):231--236.score: 21.0
    There is much good work for philosophers to do in cognitive science if they adopt the constructive attitude that prevails in science, work toward testable hypotheses, and take on the task of clarifying the relationship between the scientific concepts and the everyday concepts with which we conduct our moral lives.
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  39. Richard Heersmink (2014). Dimensions of Integration in Embedded and Extended Cognitive Systems. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13:1-22.score: 21.0
    The complementary properties and functions of cognitive artifacts and other external resources are integrated into the human cognitive system to varying degrees. The goal of this paper is to develop some of the tools to conceptualize this complementary integration between agents and artifacts. It does so by proposing a multidimensional framework, including the dimensions of information flow, reliability, durability, trust, procedural transparency, informational transparency, individualization, and transformation. The proposed dimensions are all matters of degree and jointly they constitute (...)
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  40. Dario D. Salvucci & Niels A. Taatgen (2011). Toward a Unified View of Cognitive Control. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):227-230.score: 21.0
    Allen Newell (1973) once observed that psychology researchers were playing “twenty questions with nature,” carving up human cognition into hundreds of individual phenomena but shying away from the difficult task of integrating these phenomena with unifying theories. We argue that research on cognitive control has followed a similar path, and that the best approach toward unifying theories of cognitive control is that proposed by Newell, namely developing theories in computational cognitive architectures. Threaded cognition, a recent theory developed (...)
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  41. Jonathan A. Waskan (2003). Intrinsic Cognitive Models. Cognitive Science 27 (2):259-283.score: 21.0
    Theories concerning the structure, or format, of mental representation should (1) be formulated in mechanistic, rather than metaphorical terms; (2) do justice to several philosophical intuitions about mental representation; and (3) explain the human capacity to predict the consequences of worldly alterations (i.e., to think before we act). The hypothesis that thinking involves the application of syntax-sensitive inference rules to syntactically structured mental representations has been said to satisfy all three conditions. An alternative hypothesis is that thinking requires the construction (...)
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  42. Dedre Gentner (2010). Psychology in Cognitive Science: 1978–2038. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):328-344.score: 21.0
    This paper considers the past and future of Psychology within Cognitive Science. In the history section, I focus on three questions: (a) how has the position of Psychology evolved within Cognitive Science, relative to the other disciplines that make up Cognitive Science; (b) how have particular Cognitive Science areas within Psychology waxed or waned; and (c) what have we gained and lost. After discussing what’s happened since the late 1970s, when the Society and the journal began, (...)
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  43. Sashank Varma (2011). Criteria for the Design and Evaluation of Cognitive Architectures. Cognitive Science 35 (7):1329-1351.score: 21.0
    Cognitive architectures are unified theories of cognition that take the form of computational formalisms. They support computational models that collectively account for large numbers of empirical regularities using small numbers of computational mechanisms. Empirical coverage and parsimony are the most prominent criteria by which architectures are designed and evaluated, but they are not the only ones. This paper considers three additional criteria that have been comparatively undertheorized. (a) Successful architectures possess subjective and intersubjective meaning, making cognition comprehensible to individual (...)
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  44. Marco Mirolli (2012). Representations in Dynamical Embodied Agents: Re-Analyzing a Minimally Cognitive Model Agent. Cognitive Science 36 (5):870-895.score: 21.0
    Understanding the role of ‘‘representations’’ in cognitive science is a fundamental problem facing the emerging framework of embodied, situated, dynamical cognition. To make progress, I follow the approach proposed by an influential representational skeptic, Randall Beer: building artificial agents capable of minimally cognitive behaviors and assessing whether their internal states can be considered to involve representations. Hence, I operationalize the concept of representing as ‘‘standing in,’’ and I look for representations in embodied agents involved in simple categorization tasks. (...)
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  45. Peer F. Bundgaard (2004). The Ideal Scaffolding of Language: Husser's Fourth Logical Investigation in the Light of Cognitive Linguistics. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):49-80.score: 21.0
    One of the central issues in linguistics is whether or not language should be considered a self-contained, autonomous formal system, essentially reducible to the syntactic algorithms of meaning construction (as Chomskyan grammar would have it), or a holistic-functional system serving the means of expressing pre-organized intentional contents and thus accessible with respect to features and structures pertaining to other cognitive subsystems or to human experience as such (as Cognitive Linguistics would have it). The latter claim depends critically on (...)
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  46. Jeanette K. Gundel, Nancy Hedberg & Ron Zacharski (2012). Underspecification of Cognitive Status in Reference Production: Some Empirical Predictions. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (2):249-268.score: 21.0
    Within the Givenness Hierarchy framework of Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski (1993), lexical items included in referring forms are assumed to conventionally encode two kinds of information: conceptual information about the speaker’s intended referent and procedural information about the assumed cognitive status of that referent in the mind of the addressee, the latter encoded by various determiners and pronouns. This article focuses on effects of underspecification of cognitive status, establishing that, although salience and accessibility play an important role in (...)
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  47. Linda B. Smith & Adam Sheya (2010). Is Cognition Enough to Explain Cognitive Development? Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):725-735.score: 21.0
    Traditional views separate cognitive processes from sensory–motor processes, seeing cognition as amodal, propositional, and compositional, and thus fundamentally different from the processes that underlie perceiving and acting. These were the ideas on which cognitive science was founded 30 years ago. However, advancing discoveries in neuroscience, cognitive neuroscience, and psychology suggests that cognition may be inseparable from processes of perceiving and acting. From this perspective, this study considers the future of cognitive science with respect to the study (...)
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  48. Evangelia G. Chrysikou, Jared M. Novick, John C. Trueswell & Sharon L. Thompson-Schill (2011). The Other Side of Cognitive Control: Can a Lack of Cognitive Control Benefit Language and Cognition? Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):253-256.score: 21.0
    Cognitive control refers to the regulation of mental activity to support flexible cognition across different domains. Cragg and Nation (2010) propose that the development of cognitive control in children parallels the development of language abilities, particularly inner speech. We suggest that children’s late development of cognitive control also mirrors their limited ability to revise misinterpretations of sentence meaning. Moreover, we argue that for certain tasks, a tradeoff between bottom-up (data-driven) and top-down (rule-based) thinking may actually benefit performance (...)
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  49. Paul Thagard (2009). Why Cognitive Science Needs Philosophy and Vice Versa. Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):237-254.score: 21.0
    Contrary to common views that philosophy is extraneous to cognitive science, this paper argues that philosophy has a crucial role to play in cognitive science with respect to generality and normativity. General questions include the nature of theories and explanations, the role of computer simulation in cognitive theorizing, and the relations among the different fields of cognitive science. Normative questions include whether human thinking should be Bayesian, whether decision making should maximize expected utility, and how norms (...)
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  50. David Badre (2011). Defining an Ontology of Cognitive Control Requires Attention to Component Interactions. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):217-221.score: 21.0
    Cognitive control is not only componential, but those components may interact in complicated ways in the service of cognitive control tasks. This complexity poses a challenge for developing an ontological description, because the mapping may not be direct between our task descriptions and true component differences reflected in indicators. To illustrate this point, I discuss two examples: (a) the relationship between adaptive gating and working memory and (b) the recent evidence for a control hierarchy. From these examples, I (...)
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