Search results for 'cognitive modularity' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Claudia Lorena García (2007). Cognitive Modularity, Biological Modularity and Evolvability. Biological Theory: Integrating Development, Evolution and Cognition (KLI) 2 (1):62-73.
    There is an argument that has recently been deployed in favor of thinking that the mind is mostly (or even exclusively) composed of cognitive modules; an argument that draws from some ideas and concepts of evolutionary and of developmental biology. In a nutshell, the argument concludes that a mind that is massively composed of cognitive mechanisms that are cognitively modular (henceforth, c-modular) is more evolvable than a mind that is not c-modular (or that is scarcely c-modular), since a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Johan De Smedt (2009). Cognitive Modularity in the Light of the Language Faculty. Logique Et Analyse 208:373-387.
    Ever since Chomsky, language has become the paradigmatic example of an innate capacity. Infants of only a few months old are aware of the phonetic structure of their mother tongue, such as stress-patterns and phonemes. They can already discriminate words from non-words and acquire a feel for the grammatical structure months before they voice their first word. Language reliably develops not only in the face of poor linguistic input, but even without it. In recent years, several scholars have extended this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  46
    H. Clark Barrett (2005). Enzymatic Computation and Cognitive Modularity. Mind and Language 20 (3):259-87.
    Currently, there is widespread skepticism that higher cognitive processes, given their apparent flexibility and globality, could be carried out by specialized computational devices, or modules. This skepticism is largely due to Fodor’s influential definition of modularity. From the rather flexible catalogue of possible modular features that Fodor originally proposed has emerged a widely held notion of modules as rigid, informationally encapsulated devices that accept highly local inputs and whose opera- tions are insensitive to context. It is a mistake, (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  4. Zoe Jenkin & Susanna Siegel (2015). Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and Ethics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):531-545.
    Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  33
    Daniel C. Burnston & Jonathan Cohen (2015). Perceptual Integration, Modularity, and Cognitive Penetration. In A. Raftopoulos & J. Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Influences on Perception: Implications for Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press
  6.  10
    Brian J. Scholl (1997). Neural Constraints on Cognitive Modularity? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):575-576.
    Is innate cognitive modularity consistent with a lack of innate neural modularity? Quartz & Sejnowski's implicit negative answer to his question fuels their antinativist and antimodular cognitive conclusions. I attempt here to suggest a positive answer and to solicit discussion of this crucial issue.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7. Claudia García (2007). Cognitive Modularity, Biological Modularity, and Evolvability. Biological Theory 2 (1):62-73.
    I examine an argument that has recently appeared in the cognitive science literature in favor of thinking that the mind is mostly composed of Fodorian-type cognitive modules; an argument that concludes that a mind that is massively composed of classical cognitive mechanisms that are cognitively modular is more evolvable than a mind that is not cognitively modular, since a cognitive mechanism that is cognitively modular is likely to be biologically modular, and biologically modular characters are more (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  33
    Clark H. Barrett (2005). Enzymatic Computation and Cognitive Modularity. Mind and Language 20 (3):259-287.
    Currently, there is widespread skepticism that higher cognitive processes, given their apparent flexibility and globality, could be carried out by specialized computational devices, or modules. This skepticism is largely due to Fodor’s influential definition of modularity. From the rather flexible catalogue of possible modular features that Fodor originally proposed has emerged a widely held notion of modules as rigid, informationally encapsulated devices that accept highly local inputs and whose opera- tions are insensitive to context. It is a mistake, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  9.  8
    Annette Karmiloff-Smith (1994). Précis of Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):693.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  10.  18
    Louis C. Charland (2008). Cognitive Modularity of Emotion. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press 213-228.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Johan Smedt (2009). Cognitive Modularity in the Light of the Language Faculty. Logique Et Analyse 52.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  71
    Vincent Bergeron (2007). Anatomical and Functional Modularity in Cognitive Science: Shifting the Focus. Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):175 – 195.
    Much of cognitive science is committed to the modular approach to the study of cognition. The core of this approach consists of a pair of assumptions - the anatomical and the functional modularity assumptions - which motivate two kinds of inference: the anatomical and the functional modularity inferences. The legitimacy of both of these inferences has been strongly challenged, a situation that has had surprisingly little impact on most theorizing in the field. Following the introduction of an (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  13.  8
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1997). ERPs and the Modularity of Cognitive Processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):520-521.
    Farah argues that nonlocal models explain clinical data better. However, the locality assumption does not seem so implausible if different sorts of data are taken into account. In particular, priming experiments using evoked response potentials support modularity. I describe some ERP studies relevant to this issue.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Robyn Langdon Max Coltheart (1998). Autism, Modularity and Levels of Explanation in Cognitive Science. Mind and Language 13 (1):138-152.
    Over the past century or more, cognitive neuropsychologists have discussed many of the issues raised in this volume. On the basis of this literature, we argue that autism is not a single homogeneous condition, and so can have no single cause. Instead, each of its symptoms has a cause, and the proper study of autism is the separate study of each of these symptoms and its cause. We also offer evidence to support the radical view advanced by Stoljar and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  56
    Max Coltheart & Robyn Langdon (1998). Autism, Modularity and Levels of Explanation in Cognitive Science. Mind and Language 13 (1):138-152.
  16.  2
    Stephen Grossberg (1985). Cognitive Self-Organization and Neural Modularity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):18-19.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  20
    Robert S. Lockhart (2000). Modularity, Cognitive Penetrability and the Turing Test. Psycoloquy.
    The Turing Test blurs the distinction between a model and irrelevant) instantiation details. Modeling only functional modules is problematic if these are interconnected and cognitively penetrable.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  1
    Daniel N. Osherson (1981). Modularity as an Issue for Cognitive Science. Cognition 10 (1-3):241-242.
  19. David M. Rosenthal (1980). The Modularity and Maturation of Cognitive Capacities. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):32.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  8
    Bongrae Seok (2006). Diversity and Unity of Modularity. Cognitive Science 30 (2):347-380.
    Since the publication of Fodor's (1983) The Modularity of Mind, there have been quite a few discussions of cognitive modularity among cognitive scientists. Generally, in those discussions, modularity means a property of specialized cognitive processes or a domain-specific body of information. In actuality, scholars understand modularity in many different ways. Different characterizations of modularity and modules were proposed and discussed, but they created misunderstanding and confusion. In this article, I classified and analyzed (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21. Dustin Stokes, Attention and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.
    One sceptical rejoinder to those who claim that sensory perception is cognitively penetrable is to appeal to the involvement of attention. So, while a phenomenon might initially look like one where, say, a perceiver’s beliefs are influencing her visual experience, another interpretation is that because the perceiver believes and desires as she does, she consequently shifts her spatial attention so as to change what she senses visually. But, the sceptic will urge, this is an entirely familiar phenomenon, and it (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  21
    S. Echeverri (2014). Indexing the World? Visual Tracking, Modularity, and the Perception-Cognition Interface. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axu033.
    Research in vision science, developmental psychology, and the foundations of cognitive science has led some theorists to posit referential mechanisms similar to indices. This hypothesis has been framed within a Fodorian conception of the early vision module. The article shows that this conception is mistaken, for it cannot handle the ‘interface problem’—roughly, how indexing mechanisms relate to higher cognition and conceptual thought. As a result, I reject the inaccessibility of early vision to higher cognition and make some constructive remarks (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23.  73
    John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.) (2015). The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    According to the cognitive penetrability hypothesis, our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. This book elucidates the nature of the cognitive penetrability and impenetrability hypotheses, assesses their plausibility, and explores their philosophical consequences. It connects the topic's multiple strands (the psychological findings, computationalist background, epistemological consequences of cognitive architecture, and recent philosophical developments) at a time when the outcome of many philosophical debates depends on knowing whether and how cognitive (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24.  86
    Victoria McGeer (2007). Why Neuroscience Matters to Cognitive Neuropsychology. Synthese 159 (3):347 - 371.
    The broad issue in this paper is the relationship between cognitive psychology and neuroscience. That issue arises particularly sharply for cognitive neurospsychology, some of whose practitioners claim a methodological autonomy for their discipline. They hold that behavioural data from neuropsychological impairments are sufficient to justify assumptions about the underlying modular structure of human cognitive architecture, as well as to make inferences about its various components. But this claim to methodological autonomy can be challenged on both philosophical and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  25.  90
    Jack Lyons (forthcoming). Inferentialism and Cognitive Penetration of Perception. Episteme.
    Cognitive penetration of perception is the idea that what we see is influenced by such “ cognitive ” states as beliefs, expectations, and so on. A perceptual belief that results from cognitive penetration may be less justified than a nonpenetrated one. Inferentialism is a kind of internalist view that tries to account for this by claiming that experiences are epistemically evaluable, on the basis of why the perceiver has that experience, and the familiar canons of good (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Jack Lyons (2011). Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
    Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   24 citations  
  27. Dustin Stokes (2015). Towards a Consequentialist Understanding of Cognitive Penetration. In A. Raftopoulos & J. Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability (Oxford University Press).
    Philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists have recently taken renewed interest in cognitive penetration, in particular, in the cognitive penetration of perceptual experience. The question is whether cognitive states like belief influence perceptual experience in some important way. Since the possible phenomenon is an empirical one, the strategy for analysis has, predictably, proceeded as follows: define the phenomenon and then, definition in hand, interpret various psychological data. However, different theorists offer different and apparently inconsistent definitions. And (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  28. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1999). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.
    Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge and utilities - in other words (...)
    Direct download (21 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   57 citations  
  29. Robert Briscoe (2015). Cognitive Penetration and the Reach of Phenomenal Content. In Athanassios Raftopoulos & John Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press
    This chapter critically assesses recent arguments that acquiring the ability to categorize an object as belonging to a certain high-level kind can cause the relevant kind property to be represented in visual phenomenal content. The first two arguments, developed respectively by Susanna Siegel (2010) and Tim Bayne (2009), employ an essentially phenomenological methodology. The third argument, developed by William Fish (2013), by contrast, is supported by an array of psychophysical and neuroscientific findings. I argue that while none of these arguments (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  30. Scott Atran (1998). Folk Biology and the Anthropology of Science: Cognitive Universals and Cultural Particulars. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):547-569.
    This essay in the is about how cognition constrains culture in producing science. The example is folk biology, whose cultural recurrence issues from the very same domain-specific cognitive universals that provide the historical backbone of systematic biology. Humans everywhere think about plants and animals in highly structured ways. People have similar folk-biological taxonomies composed of essence-based, species-like groups and the ranking of species into lower- and higher-order groups. Such taxonomies are not as arbitrary in structure and content, nor as (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   47 citations  
  31.  72
    Steven Gross, Thitaporn Chaisilprungraung, Elizabeth Kaplan, Jorge Aurelio Menendez & Jonathan Flombaum, Problems for the Purported Cognitive Penetration of Perceptual Color Experience and Macpherson’s Proposed Mechanism. Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication.
    Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed mechanism. We base our arguments in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  8
    Karalyn Patterson & David C. Plaut (2009). “Shallow Draughts Intoxicate the Brain”: Lessons From Cognitive Science for Cognitive Neuropsychology. Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (1):39-58.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  33. Philip Robbins (2013). Modularity and Mental Architecture. WIREs Cognitive Science 4 (6):641-648.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34. William Marslen-Wilson & Lorraine Komisarjevsky Tyler (1987). Against Modularity. In Modularity In Knowledge Representation And Natural- Language Understanding. Cambridge: MIT Press
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  35. William F. Brewer (ed.) (2012). The Theory Ladenness of the Mental Processes Used in the Scientific Enterprise: Evidence From Cognitive Psychology and the History of Science. In R. W. Proctor & E. J. Capaldi (Eds.). Psychology of Science: Implicit and Explicit Processes (289-334). New York: Oxford University Press. Oxford.
    This chapter takes a naturalized approach to the philosophy of science using evidence from cognitive psychology and from the history of science. It first describes the problem of the theory ladenness of perception. Then it provides a general top-down/bottom-up framework from cognitive psychology that is used to organize and evaluate the evidence for theory ladenness throughout the process of carrying out science (perception, attention, thinking, experimenting, memory, and communication). The chapter highlights both the facilitatory and inhibitory role of (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Jay L. Garfield (ed.) (1987). Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding. MIT Press.
  37.  63
    Jack C. Lyons (2015). Unencapsulated Modules and Perceptual Judgment. In J. Zeimbekis & A. Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 103-122.
    To what extent are cognitive capacities, especially perceptual capacities, informationally encapsulated and to what extent are they cognitively penetrable? And why does this matter? Two reasons we care about encapsulation/penetrability are: (a) encapsulation is sometimes held to be definitional of modularity, and (b) penetrability has epistemological implications independent of modularity. I argue that modularity does not require encapsulation; that modularity may have epistemological implications independently of encapsulation; and that the epistemological implications of the cognitive (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Jerry A. Fodor (1985). Precis of the Modularity of Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):1-42.
    The Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the or view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   174 citations  
  39. Dustin Stokes & Vincent Bergeron (2015). Modular Architectures and Informational Encapsulation: A Dilemma. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (3):315-38.
    Amongst philosophers and cognitive scientists, modularity remains a popular choice for an architecture of the human mind, primarily because of the supposed explanatory value of this approach. Modular architectures can vary both with respect to the strength of the notion of modularity and the scope of the modularity of mind. We propose a dilemma for modular architectures, no matter how these architectures vary along these two dimensions. First, if a modular architecture commits to the informational encapsulation (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40.  47
    Owen Flanagan & Robert Anthony Williams (2010). What Does the Modularity of Morals Have to Do With Ethics? Four Moral Sprouts Plus or Minus a Few. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):430-453.
    Flanagan (1991) was the first contemporary philosopher to suggest that a modularity of morals hypothesis (MMH) was worth consideration by cognitive science. There is now a serious empirically informed proposal that moral competence is best explained in terms of moral modules-evolutionarily ancient, fast-acting, automatic reactions to particular sociomoral experiences (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). MMH fleshes out an idea nascent in Aristotle, Mencius, and Darwin. We discuss the evidence for MMH, specifically an ancient version, “Mencian Moral Modularity,” (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  41.  52
    Daniel A. Weiskopf (2002). On Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551-562.
    The "New Synthesis" in cognitive science is committed to the computational theory of mind (CTM), massive modularity, nativism, and adaptationism. In The mind doesn't work that way , Jerry Fodor argues that CTM has problems explaining abductive or global inference, but that the New Synthesis offers no solution, since massive modularity is in fact incompatible with global cognitive processes. I argue that it is not clear how global human mentation is, so whether CTM is imperiled is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Brian J. Scholl & Alan M. Leslie (1999). Modularity, Development and "Theory of Mind". Mind and Language 14 (1):131-153.
    Psychologists and philosophers have recently been exploring whether the mechanisms which underlie the acquisition of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) are best charac- terized as cognitive modules or as developing theories. In this paper, we attempt to clarify what a modular account of ToM entails, and why it is an attractive type of explanation. Intuitions and arguments in this debate often turn on the role of _develop-_ _ment_: traditional research on ToM focuses on various developmental sequences, whereas cognitive modules (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   27 citations  
  43. Richard Gray (2001). Cognitive Modules, Synaesthesia and the Constitution of Psychological Natural Kinds. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):65-82.
    Fodor claims that cognitive modules can be thought of as constituting a psychological natural kind in virtue of their possession of most or all of nine specified properties. The challenge to this considered here comes from synaesthesia. Synaesthesia is a type of cross-modal association: input to one sensory modality reliably generates an additional sensory output that is usually generated by the input to a distinct sensory modality. The most common form of synaesthesia manifests Fodor's nine specified properties of (...), and hence, according to Segal (1997), it should be understood as involving an extra module. Many psychologists believe that synaesthesia involves a breakdown in modularity. After outlining how both theories can explain the manifestation of the nine alleged properties of modularity in synaesthesia, I discuss the two concepts of function which initially motivate the respective theories. I argue that only a teleological concept of function is properly able to adjudicate between the two theories. The upshot is a further application of so-called externalist considerations to mental phenomena. (shrink)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  44. Martin Davies (1989). Connectionism, Modularity and Tacit Knowledge. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (December):541-55.
    In this paper, I define tacit knowledge as a kind of causal-explanatory structure, mirroring the derivational structure in the theory that is tacitly known. On this definition, tacit knowledge does not have to be explicitly represented. I then take the notion of a modular theory, and project the idea of modularity to several different levels of description: in particular, to the processing level and the neurophysiological level. The fundamental description of a connectionist network lies at a level between the (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  45. Benny Shanon (1988). Remarks on the Modularity of Mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (September):331-52.
    the concept of modularity of cognitive processes is introduced and a picture of mind is proposed according to which the peripheral input systems are modular whereas the central processes are not. The present paper examines this view from both a methodological and a substaintive perspective. Methodologically, a contrast between considerations of principle and of fact is made and implications for the nature of cognitive theory are discussed. Substantively, constraints on information flow are examined as they appear in (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  46.  50
    Emmanuel Chemla, Vincent Homer & Daniel Rothschild (2011). Modularity and Intuitions in Formal Semantics: The Case of Polarity Items. Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (6):537-570.
    Linguists often sharply distinguish the different modules that support linguistics competence, e.g., syntax, semantics, pragmatics. However, recent work has identified phenomena in syntax (polarity sensitivity) and pragmatics (implicatures), which seem to rely on semantic properties (monotonicity). We propose to investigate these phenomena and their connections as a window into the modularity of our linguistic knowledge. We conducted a series of experiments to gather the relevant syntactic, semantic and pragmatic judgments within a single paradigm. The comparison between these quantitative data (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47.  37
    Fred D'Agostino (2009). From the Organization to the Division of Cognitive Labor. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (1):101-129.
    Discussion of the cognitive division of labor has usually made very little contact with relevant materials from other disciplines, including theoretical biology, management science, and design theory. This article draws on these materials to consider some unavoidable conundrums faced by any attempt to present a particular way of dividing tasks among a labor team as the uniquely rational way of doing this, given the interdependence of the underlying evaluative standards by which the products of a system of division of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  48.  8
    Ellen Fridland (2015). Skill, Nonpropositional Thought, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):105-120.
    In the current literature, discussions of cognitive penetrability focus largely either on interpreting empirical evidence in ways that is relevant to the question of modularity :343–391, 1999; Wu Philos Stud 165:647–669, 2012; Macpherson Philos Phenomenol Res, 84:24–62, 2012) or in offering epistemological considerations regarding which properties are represented in perception :519–540, 2009, Noûs 46:201–222, 2011; Prinz Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 434–460, 2006). In contrast to these debates, in this paper, I explore conceptual issues regarding how (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  47
    Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.) (2008). The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.
    Can emotions be rational or are they necessarily irrational? Are emotions universally shared states? Or are they socio-cultural constructions? Are emotions perceptions of some kind? Since the publication of Jerry Fodor’s The Modularity of Mind (1983), a new question about the philosophy of emotions has emerged: are emotions modular? A positive answer to this question would mean, minimally, that emotions are cognitive capacities that can be explained in terms of mental components that are functionally dissociable from other parts (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50.  57
    Robert A. Wilson (2008). What Computers (Still, Still) Can't Do: Jerry Fodor on Computation and Modularity. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind.
    Fodor's thinking on modularity has been influential throughout a range of the areas studying cognition, chiefly as a prod for positive work on modularity and domain-specificity. In The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, Fodor has developed the dark message of The Modularity of Mind regarding the limits to modularity and computational analyses. This paper offers a critical assessment of Fodor's scepticism with an eye to highlighting some broader issues in play, including the nature of computation and (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000