Search results for 'cognitive penetrability' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Dustin Stokes (2012). Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):479-92.
    This paper considers an orectic penetration hypothesis which says that desires and desire-like states may influence perceptual experience in a non-externally mediated way. This hypothesis is clarified with a definition, which serves further to distinguish the interesting target phenomenon from trivial and non-genuine instances of desire-influenced perception. Orectic penetration is an interesting possible case of the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. The orectic penetration hypothesis is thus incompatible with the more common thesis that perception is cognitively impenetrable. It (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  2. Zoe Jenkin & Susanna Siegel (2015). Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and Ethics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):531-545.
    Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. John Zeimbekis (2013). Color and Cognitive Penetrability. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):167-175.
    Several psychological experiments have suggested that concepts can influence perceived color (e.g., Delk and Fillenbaum in Am J Psychol 78(2):290–293, 1965, Hansen et al. in Nat Neurosci 9(11):1367–1368, 2006, Olkkonen et al. in J Vis 8(5):1–16, 2008). Observers tend to assign typical colors to objects even when the objects do not have those colors. Recently, these findings were used to argue that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable (Macpherson 2012). This interpretation of the experiments has far-reaching consequences: it implies that the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  4.  22
    Alon Chasid (2014). Visual Experience: Cognitive Penetrability and Indeterminacy. Acta Analytica 29 (1):119-130.
    This paper discusses a counterexample to the thesis that visual experience is cognitively impenetrable. My central claim is that sometimes visual experience is influenced by the perceiver’s beliefs, rendering her experience’s representational content indeterminate. After discussing other examples of cognitive penetrability, I focus on a certain kind of visual experience— that is, an experience that occurs under radically nonstandard conditions—and show that it may have indeterminate content, particularly with respect to low-level properties such as colors and shapes. I (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  5.  86
    John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.) (2015). The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    According to the cognitive penetrability hypothesis, our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. This book elucidates the nature of the cognitive penetrability and impenetrability hypotheses, assesses their plausibility, and explores their philosophical consequences. It connects the topic's multiple strands (the psychological findings, computationalist background, epistemological consequences of cognitive architecture, and recent philosophical developments) at a time when the outcome of many philosophical debates depends on knowing whether and how (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  19
    Ellen Fridland (2015). Skill, Nonpropositional Thought, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):105-120.
    In the current literature, discussions of cognitive penetrability focus largely either on interpreting empirical evidence in ways that is relevant to the question of modularity :343–391, 1999; Wu Philos Stud 165:647–669, 2012; Macpherson Philos Phenomenol Res, 84:24–62, 2012) or in offering epistemological considerations regarding which properties are represented in perception :519–540, 2009, Noûs 46:201–222, 2011; Prinz Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 434–460, 2006). In contrast to these debates, in this paper, I explore conceptual issues regarding how (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  21
    Costas Pagondiotis (forthcoming). COGNITIVE (IM)PENETRABILITY OF VISION: RESTRICTING VISION Vs. RESTRICTING COGNITION. In J. Zeimbekis & A. Raftopoulos (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. OUP
    Pylyshyn restricts cognitively penetrable vision to late vision, whereas he does not make any distinction between different kinds of penetrating cognition. I argue that this approach disconnects early vision content from late vision content and blurs the distinction between the latter and the content of thought. To overcome this problem I suggest that we should not distinguish between different kinds of visual content but instead introduce a restriction on the kind of cognition that can directly penetrate visual experience. In particular, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Dustin Stokes (2013). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
    Perception is typically distinguished from cognition. For example, seeing is importantly different from believing. And while what one sees clearly influences what one thinks, it is debatable whether what one believes and otherwise thinks can influence, in some direct and non-trivial way, what one sees. The latter possible relation is the cognitive penetration of perception. Cognitive penetration, if it occurs, has implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper offers an analysis (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  9.  86
    Jona Vance (2014). Emotion and the New Epistemic Challenge From Cognitive Penetrability. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):257-283.
    Experiences—visual, emotional, or otherwise—play a role in providing us with justification to believe claims about the world. Some accounts of how experiences provide justification emphasize the role of the experiences’ distinctive phenomenology, i.e. ‘what it is like’ to have the experience. Other accounts emphasize the justificatory role to the experiences’ etiology. A number of authors have used cases of cognitively penetrated visual experience to raise an epistemic challenge for theories of perceptual justification that emphasize the justificatory role of phenomenology rather (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  10. Jack Lyons (2011). Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
    Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   25 citations  
  11. William F. Brewer & Lester Loschky (eds.) (2004). Top-Down and Bottom-Up Influences on Observation: Evidence From Cognitive Psychology and the History of Science. In A. Raftopoulos (Ed.), Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Attention, Action, Strategies, and Bottom-Up Constraints.(Pp. 31-47). Nova Science Publishers.
  12. Susanna Siegel (2012). Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification. Noûs 46 (2):201-222.
    In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   48 citations  
  13.  12
    Robert Cowan (2015). Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.
    In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, i.e., roughly, the view that the contents and/or character of a subject’s perceptual experience can be modified by what a subject believes and desires. As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has implications for perception’s epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically ‘downgrades’ their experience. On (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14. Dustin Stokes, Attention and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.
    One sceptical rejoinder to those who claim that sensory perception is cognitively penetrable is to appeal to the involvement of attention. So, while a phenomenon might initially look like one where, say, a perceiver’s beliefs are influencing her visual experience, another interpretation is that because the perceiver believes and desires as she does, she consequently shifts her spatial attention so as to change what she senses visually. But, the sceptic will urge, this is an entirely familiar phenomenon, and it hardly (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Robert Cowan (2015). Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.
    In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, i.e., roughly, the view that the contents and/or character of a subject’s perceptual experience can be modified by what a subject believes and desires. As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has implications for perception’s epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically ‘downgrades’ their experience. On (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  18
    Gary Lupyan (2015). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception in the Age of Prediction: Predictive Systems Are Penetrable Systems. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):547-569.
    The goal of perceptual systems is to allow organisms to adaptively respond to ecologically relevant stimuli. Because all perceptual inputs are ambiguous, perception needs to rely on prior knowledge accumulated over evolutionary and developmental time to turn sensory energy into information useful for guiding behavior. It remains controversial whether the guidance of perception extends to cognitive states or is locked up in a “cognitively impenetrable” part of perception. I argue that expectations, knowledge, and task demands can shape perception at (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  17.  13
    Athanassios Raftopoulos & John Zeimbekis (2015). Cognitive Penetrability: An Overview. In John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 1-56.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  36
    Philippe G. Schyns (1999). The Case for Cognitive Penetrability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):394-395.
    Pylyshyn acknowledges that cognition intervenes in determining the nature of perception when attention is allocated to locations or properties prior to the operation of early vision. I present evidence that scale perception (one function of early vision) is cognitively penetrable and argue that Pylyshyn's criterion covers not a few, but many situations of recognition. Cognitive penetrability could be their modus operandi.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  8
    Gary Lupyan (2015). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception in the Age of Prediction: Predictive Systems Are Penetrable Systems. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):547-569.
    The goal of perceptual systems is to allow organisms to adaptively respond to ecologically relevant stimuli. Because all perceptual inputs are ambiguous, perception needs to rely on prior knowledge accumulated over evolutionary and developmental time to turn sensory energy into information useful for guiding behavior. It remains controversial whether the guidance of perception extends to cognitive states or is locked up in a “cognitively impenetrable” part of perception. I argue that expectations, knowledge, and task demands can shape perception at (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  79
    Vincent C. Müller (2010). Εικάζει η φιλοσοφία για εμπειρικά δεδομένα; Η γνωσιακή διαπερατότητα της αντίληψης [Does philosophy speculate about empirical facts? The cognitive penetrability of perception]. Noesis 6 (1):161-164.
    Should we do speculative cognitive science? - In present day philosophy, I see a fashion that uses empirical facts (data) to support positions that are not philosophical but empirical in nature. The argumentative structure is classical philosophy, saying that ‘this has to be that way because …’ where the ‘this’ refers to some empirical state of affairs. This kind of philosophy speculates about empirical facts in areas where we do not yet know the facts – the arguments are a (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  31
    Steven Gross (2016). Review of The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception (Zeimbekis and Raftopoulos, Eds.). [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2016:1-7.
  22.  9
    Gary Lupyan (2015). Reply to Macpherson: Further Illustrations of the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):585-589.
    My reply to Macpherson begins by addressing whether it is effects of cognition on early vision or perceptual performance that I am interested in. I proceed to address Macpherson’s comments on evidence from cross-modal effects, interpretations of linguistic effects on image detection, evidence from illusions, and the usefulness of predictive coding for understanding cognitive penetration. By stressing the interactive and distributed nature of neural processing, I am committing to a collapse between perception and cognition. Following such a collapse, the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  94
    Ophelia Deroy (2013). Object-Sensitivity Versus Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):87-107.
  24.  14
    Gary Lupyan (2015). Reply to Macpherson: Further Illustrations of the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):585-589.
    My reply to Macpherson begins by addressing whether it is effects of cognition on early vision or perceptual performance that I am interested in. I proceed to address Macpherson’s comments on evidence from cross-modal effects, interpretations of linguistic effects on image detection, evidence from illusions, and the usefulness of predictive coding for understanding cognitive penetration. By stressing the interactive and distributed nature of neural processing, I am committing to a collapse between perception and cognition. Following such a collapse, the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25.  87
    Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols (1997). Cognitive Penetrability, Rationality and Restricted Simulation. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):297-326.
    In a series of recent papers, Jane Heal (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b) has developed her own quite distinctive version of simulation theory and offered a detailed critique of the arguments against simulation theory that we and our collaborators presented in earlier papers. Heal's theory is clearly set out and carefully defended, and her critique of our arguments is constructive and well informed. Unlike a fair amount of what has been written in this area in recent years, her work is (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  4
    Francesco Marchi (2015). Cognitive Penetrability of Social Perception: A Case for Emotion Recognition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):617-620.
    Adams & Kveraga argue that social visual perception is cognitively penetrable by extending a top-down model for visual object recognition to visual perception of social cues. Here I suggest that, in their view, a clear link between the top-down contextual influences that modulate social visual perception and the perceptual experience of a subject is missing. Without such a link their proposal is consistent with explanations that need not involve cognitive penetration of perceptual experience but only modifications of perceptual judgments (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  55
    Berit Brogaard & Bartek Chomanski (2015). Cognitive Penetrability and High‐Level Properties in Perception: Unrelated Phenomena? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):469-486.
    There has been a recent surge in interest in two questions concerning the nature of perceptual experience; viz. the question of whether perceptual experience is sometimes cognitively penetrated and that of whether high-level properties are presented in perceptual experience. Only rarely have thinkers been concerned with the question of whether the two phenomena are interestingly related. Here we argue that the two phenomena are not related in any interesting way. We argue further that this lack of an interesting connection between (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  10
    Francesco Marchi (2015). Cognitive Penetrability of Social Perception: A Case for Emotion Recognition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):617-620.
    Adams & Kveraga argue that social visual perception is cognitively penetrable by extending a top-down model for visual object recognition to visual perception of social cues. Here I suggest that, in their view, a clear link between the top-down contextual influences that modulate social visual perception and the perceptual experience of a subject is missing. Without such a link their proposal is consistent with explanations that need not involve cognitive penetration of perceptual experience but only modifications of perceptual judgments (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2015). Reframing the Problem of Cognitive Penetrability. In Woosuk Park, Ping Li & Lorenzo Magnani (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science Ii. Springer International Publishing
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. O. Deroy (2013). Phenomenal Contrast Without the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Studies 162:87 - 107.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  31.  87
    Jane Heal (1996). Simulation and Cognitive Penetrability. Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67.
    : Stich, Nichols et al. assert that the process of deriving predictions by simulation must be cognitively impenetrable. Hence, they claim, the occurrence of certain errors in prediction provides empirical evidence against simulation theory. But it is false that simulation‐derived prediction must be cognitively impenetrable. Moreover the errors they cite, which are instances of irrationality, are not evidence against the version of simulation theory that takes the central domain of simulation to be intelligible transitions between states with content.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  32.  29
    Michael Devitt (2014). Linguistic Intuitions and Cognitive Penetrability. Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9 (1).
  33.  1
    Ronald A. Finke & Jennifer J. Freyd (1989). Mental Extrapolation and Cognitive Penetrability: Reply to Ranney and Proposals for Evaluative Criteria. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 118 (4):403-408.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  25
    P. Gerrans & J. Kennett, Is Cognitive Penetrability the Mark of the Moral?
    The article discusses various reports published within the issue, including one by Garrett Cullity on moral psychology and another by Richard Joyce on moral judgements.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  21
    Robert S. Lockhart (2000). Modularity, Cognitive Penetrability and the Turing Test. Psycoloquy.
    The Turing Test blurs the distinction between a model and irrelevant) instantiation details. Modeling only functional modules is problematic if these are interconnected and cognitively penetrable.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  6
    Peter N. Kugler, M. T. Turvey & Robert Shaw (1982). Is the “Cognitive Penetrability” Criterion Invalidated by Contemporary Physics? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (2):303.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  6
    James R. Miller (1980). Cognitive Penetrability: Let Us Not Forget About Memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):146.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. S. Bentin & Y. Golland (2002). Cognitive Penetrability of the Face Structural Encoding: Electrophysiological Evidence. Cognition 86:1-14.
  39. Francesco Marchi & Albert Newen (2015). Cognitive Penetrability and Emotion Recognition in Human Facial Expressions. Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.) (2005). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Nova Science.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  17
    Rob Withagen & Claire F. Michaels (1999). An Ecological Approach to Cognitive (Im)Penetrability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):399-400.
    We offer an ecological (Gibsonian) alternative to cognitive (im)penetrability. Whereas Pylyshyn explains cognitive (im)penetrability by focusing solely on computations carried out by the nervous system, according to the ecological approach the perceiver as a knowing agent influences the entire animal-environmental system: in the determination of what constitutes the environment (affordances), what constitutes information, what information is detected and, thus, what is perceived.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Dustin Stokes (2015). Towards a Consequentialist Understanding of Cognitive Penetration. In A. Raftopoulos & J. Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability (Oxford University Press).
    Philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists have recently taken renewed interest in cognitive penetration, in particular, in the cognitive penetration of perceptual experience. The question is whether cognitive states like belief influence perceptual experience in some important way. Since the possible phenomenon is an empirical one, the strategy for analysis has, predictably, proceeded as follows: define the phenomenon and then, definition in hand, interpret various psychological data. However, different theorists offer different and apparently inconsistent definitions. And (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  43. Dustin Stokes & Vincent Bergeron (2015). Modular Architectures and Informational Encapsulation: A Dilemma. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (3):315-38.
    Amongst philosophers and cognitive scientists, modularity remains a popular choice for an architecture of the human mind, primarily because of the supposed explanatory value of this approach. Modular architectures can vary both with respect to the strength of the notion of modularity and the scope of the modularity of mind. We propose a dilemma for modular architectures, no matter how these architectures vary along these two dimensions. First, if a modular architecture commits to the informational encapsulation of modules, as (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  44. John Zeimbekis (2015). Seeing, Visualizing, and Believing: Pictures and Cognitive Penetration. In John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 298-327.
    Visualizing and mental imagery are thought to be cognitive states by all sides of the imagery debate. Yet the phenomenology of those states has distinctly visual ingredients. This has potential consequences for the hypothesis that vision is cognitively impenetrable, the ability of visual processes to ground perceptual warrant and justification, and the distinction between cognitive and perceptual phenomenology. I explore those consequences by describing two forms of visual ambiguity that involve visualizing: the ability to visually experience a picture (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Robert Briscoe (2015). Cognitive Penetration and the Reach of Phenomenal Content. In Athanassios Raftopoulos & John Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press
    This chapter critically assesses recent arguments that acquiring the ability to categorize an object as belonging to a certain high-level kind can cause the relevant kind property to be represented in visual phenomenal content. The first two arguments, developed respectively by Susanna Siegel (2010) and Tim Bayne (2009), employ an essentially phenomenological methodology. The third argument, developed by William Fish (2013), by contrast, is supported by an array of psychophysical and neuroscientific findings. I argue that while none of these arguments (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  46. Fiona Macpherson (2012). Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62.
    Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typically use to explain away alleged (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   56 citations  
  47. Jack C. Lyons (2015). Unencapsulated Modules and Perceptual Judgment. In J. Zeimbekis & A. Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 103-122.
    To what extent are cognitive capacities, especially perceptual capacities, informationally encapsulated and to what extent are they cognitively penetrable? And why does this matter? Two reasons we care about encapsulation/penetrability are: (a) encapsulation is sometimes held to be definitional of modularity, and (b) penetrability has epistemological implications independent of modularity. I argue that modularity does not require encapsulation; that modularity may have epistemological implications independently of encapsulation; and that the epistemological implications of the cognitive penetrability (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Steven Gross, Thitaporn Chaisilprungraung, Elizabeth Kaplan, Jorge Aurelio Menendez & Jonathan Flombaum, Problems for the Purported Cognitive Penetration of Perceptual Color Experience and Macpherson’s Proposed Mechanism. Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication.
    Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed mechanism. We base our (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  21
    Christopher Mole (2015). Attention and Cognitive Penetration. In John Zeimbekis Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. 218-238.
  50.  23
    Athanassios Raftopoulos (2015). The Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception and Theory-Ladenness. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):87-103.
    In this paper, I claim that since there is a cognitively impenetrable stage of visual perception, namely early vision, and cognitive penetrability and theory-ladenness are coextensive, the CI of early vision entails that early vision content is theory neutral. This theory-neutral part undermines relativism. In this paper, I consider two objections against the thesis. The one adduces evidence from cases of rapid perceptual learning to undermine my thesis that early vision is CI. The other emphasizes that the early (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000