Search results for 'cognitive penetration' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Dustin Stokes (2014). Cognitive Penetration and the Perception of Art (Winner of 2012 Dialectica Essay Prize). Dialectica 68 (1):1-34.score: 240.0
    There are good, even if inconclusive, reasons to think that cognitive penetration of perception occurs: that cognitive states like belief causally affect, in a relatively direct way, the contents of perceptual experience. The supposed importance of – indeed as it is suggested here, what is definitive of – this possible phenomenon is that it would result in important epistemic and scientific consequences. One interesting and intuitive consequence entirely unremarked in the extant literature concerns the perception of art. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Chris Tucker (2014). If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too. Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.score: 240.0
    Perceptual dogmatism holds that if it perceptually seems to S that P, then S thereby has prima facie perceptual justification for P. But suppose Wishful Willy's desire for gold cognitively penetrates his perceptual experience and makes it seem to him that the yellow object is a gold nugget. Intuitively, his desire-penetrated seeming can't provide him with prima facie justification for thinking that the object is gold. If this intuitive response is correct, dogmatists have a problem. But if dogmatists have a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Kevin Connolly, John Donaldson, David M. Gray, Emily McWilliams, Sofia Ortiz-Hinojosa & David Suarez, Cognitive Penetration? (Network for Sensory Research Toronto Workshop on Perceptual Learning: Question Four).score: 240.0
    This is an excerpt from a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from the workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of Toronto, Mississauga on May 10th and 11th, 2012. This excerpt explores the question: What counts as cognitive penetration?
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Ariel S. Cecchi (2014). Cognitive Penetration, Perceptual Learning and Neural Plasticity. Dialectica 68 (1):63-95.score: 240.0
    Cognitive penetration of perception, broadly understood, is the influence that the cognitive system has on a perceptual system (e.g., visual, auditory, haptic). The paper shows a form of cognitive penetration in the visual system (defined as early vision) which I call ‘architectural’. Architectural cognitive penetration is the process whereby the behaviour or the structure of the perceptual system is influenced by the cognitive system, which consequently may have an impact on the content (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Robert Briscoe (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetration and the Reach of Phenomenal Content. In Athanassios Raftopoulos & John Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press.score: 224.0
    This chapter critically assesses recent arguments that acquiring the ability to categorize an object as belonging to a certain high-level kind can cause the relevant kind property to be represented in visual phenomenal content. The first two arguments, developed respectively by Susanna Siegel (2010) and Tim Bayne (2009), employ an essentially phenomenological methodology. The third argument, developed by William Fish (2013), by contrast, is supported by an array of psychophysical and neuroscientific findings. I argue that while none of these arguments (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Dustin Stokes (forthcoming). Towards a Consequentialist Understanding of Cognitive Penetration. In A. Raftopoulos & J. Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability (Oxford University Press).score: 222.0
    Philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists have recently taken renewed interest in cognitive penetration, in particular, in the cognitive penetration of perceptual experience. The question is whether cognitive states like belief influence perceptual experience in some important way. Since the possible phenomenon is an empirical one, the strategy for analysis has, predictably, proceeded as follows: define the phenomenon and then, definition in hand, interpret various psychological data. However, different theorists offer different and apparently inconsistent (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Fiona Macpherson (2012). Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62.score: 180.0
    Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen (at least in certain ways that are identified in the paper) then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Alexander Grunewald (1999). Neurophysiology Indicates Cognitive Penetration of the Visual System. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):379-380.score: 180.0
    Short-term memory, nonattentional task effects and nonspatial extraretinal representations in the visual system are signs of cognitive penetration. All of these have been found physiologically, arguing against the cognitive impenetrability of vision as a whole. Instead, parallel subcircuits in the brain, each subserving a different competency including sensory and cognitive (and in some cases motor) aspects, may have cognitively impenetrable components.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. John Zeimbekis (forthcoming). Seeing, Visualizing, and Believing: Pictures and Cognitive Penetration. In John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press.score: 164.0
  10. Jona Vance (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetration and the Tribunal of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.score: 164.0
    Perception purports to help you gain knowledge of the world even if the world is not the way you expected it to be. Perception also purports to be an independent tribunal against which you can test your beliefs. It is natural to think that in order to serve these and other central functions, perceptual representations must not causally depend on your prior beliefs and expectations. In this paper, I clarify and then argue against the natural thought above. All perceptual systems (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. John D. Greenwood (1999). Simulation, Theory-Theory and Cognitive Penetration: No 'Instance of the Fingerpost'. Mind and Language 14 (1):32-56.score: 162.0
  12. Jack Lyons (2011). Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.score: 160.0
    Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Dustin Stokes (2013). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.score: 160.0
    Perception is typically distinguished from cognition. For example, seeing is importantly different from believing. And while what one sees clearly influences what one thinks, it is debatable whether what one believes and otherwise thinks can influence, in some direct and non-trivial way, what one sees. The latter possible relation is the cognitive penetration of perception. Cognitive penetration, if it occurs, has implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper offers (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Petra Vetter & Albert Newen (2014). Varieties of Cognitive Penetration in Visual Perception. Consciousness and Cognition 27:62-75.score: 152.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Perceptual Learning and Cognitive Penetration (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Two).score: 150.0
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: Can perceptual experience be modified by reason?
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Matthew McGrath (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification.score: 150.0
  17. Gillian Rhodes & Michael L. Kalish (1999). Cognitive Penetration: Would We Know It If We Saw It? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):390-391.score: 150.0
    How can the impenetrability hypothesis be empirically tested? We comment on the role of signal detection measures, suggesting that context effects on discriminations for which post-perceptual cues are irrelevant, or on neural activity associated with early vision, would challenge impenetrability. We also note the great computational power of the proposed pre-perceptual attention processes and consider the implications for testability of the theory.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Jeffrey Conditionalization (2013). Cognitive Penetration 12—16 (See Also 'Objections to Dogmatism and/or Phenomenal Conservatism'). In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. 2--355.score: 150.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Jona Vance (2014). Emotion and the New Epistemic Challenge From Cognitive Penetrability. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):257-283.score: 140.0
    Experiences—visual, emotional, or otherwise—play a role in providing us with justification to believe claims about the world. Some accounts of how experiences provide justification emphasize the role of the experiences’ distinctive phenomenology, i.e. ‘what it is like’ to have the experience. Other accounts emphasize the justificatory role to the experiences’ etiology. A number of authors have used cases of cognitively penetrated visual experience to raise an epistemic challenge for theories of perceptual justification that emphasize the justificatory role of phenomenology rather (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Dustin Stokes (2012). Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):479-92.score: 124.0
    This paper considers an orectic penetration hypothesis which says that desires and desire-like states may influence perceptual experience in a non-externally mediated way. This hypothesis is clarified with a definition, which serves further to distinguish the interesting target phenomenon from trivial and non-genuine instances of desire-influenced perception. Orectic penetration is an interesting possible case of the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. The orectic penetration hypothesis is thus incompatible with the more common thesis that perception is cognitively (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1999). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.score: 120.0
    Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, Psychophysics, perceptual learning and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just (...)
    Direct download (21 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (2000). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.score: 100.0
    Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to cognition. This target article sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, psychophysics, perceptual learning, and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, corresponding to what some people have called early (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Robert Cowan (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.score: 100.0
    In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, i.e., roughly, the view that the contents and/or character of a subject’s perceptual experience can be modified by what a subject believes and desires. As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has implications for perception’s epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically ‘downgrades’ their (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Costas Pagondiotis (forthcoming). COGNITIVE (IM)PENETRABILITY OF VISION: RESTRICTING VISION Vs. RESTRICTING COGNITION. In J. Zeimbekis & A. Raftopoulos (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. OUP.score: 98.0
    Pylyshyn restricts cognitively penetrable vision to late vision, whereas he does not make any distinction between different kinds of penetrating cognition. I argue that this approach disconnects early vision content from late vision content and blurs the distinction between the latter and the content of thought. To overcome this problem I suggest that we should not distinguish between different kinds of visual content but instead introduce a restriction on the kind of cognition that can directly penetrate visual experience. In particular, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. John Zeimbekis (2013). Color and Cognitive Penetrability. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):167-175.score: 96.0
    Several psychological experiments have suggested that concepts can influence perceived color (e.g., Delk and Fillenbaum in Am J Psychol 78(2):290–293, 1965, Hansen et al. in Nat Neurosci 9(11):1367–1368, 2006, Olkkonen et al. in J Vis 8(5):1–16, 2008). Observers tend to assign typical colors to objects even when the objects do not have those colors. Recently, these findings were used to argue that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable (Macpherson 2012). This interpretation of the experiments has far-reaching consequences: it implies that the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Alon Chasid (2014). Visual Experience: Cognitive Penetrability and Indeterminacy. Acta Analytica 29 (1):119-130.score: 96.0
    This paper discusses a counterexample to the thesis that visual experience is cognitively impenetrable. My central claim is that sometimes visual experience is influenced by the perceiver’s beliefs, rendering her experience’s representational content indeterminate. After discussing other examples of cognitive penetrability, I focus on a certain kind of visual experience— that is, an experience that occurs under radically nonstandard conditions—and show that it may have indeterminate content, particularly with respect to low-level properties such as colors and shapes. I then (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Robert Clowes (forthcoming). Thinking in the Cloud: The Cognitive Incorporation of Cloud-Based Technology. Philosophy and Technology:1-36.score: 96.0
    Technologies and artefacts have long played a role in the structure of human memory and our cognitive lives more generally. Recent years have seen an explosion in the production and use of a new regime of information technologies that might have powerful implications for our minds. Electronic-Memory (E-Memory), powerful, portable and wearable digital gadgetry and “the cloud” of ever-present data services allow us to record, store and access an ever-expanding range of information both about and of relevance to our (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Jack C. Lyons (forthcoming). Unencapsulated Modules and Perceptual Judgment. In A. Raftopoulos J. Zeimbekis (ed.), Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press.score: 88.0
    To what extent are cognitive capacities, especially perceptual capacities, informationally encapsulated and to what extent are they cognitively penetrable? And why does this matter? Two reasons we care about encapsulation/penetrability are: (a) encapsulation is sometimes held to be definitional of modularity, and (b) penetrability has epistemological implications independent of modularity. I argue that modularity does not require encapsulation; that modularity may have epistemological implications independently of encapsulation; and that the epistemological implications of the cognitive penetrability of perception are (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Susanna Siegel (2013). Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role? In Tamar Gendler (ed.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology volume 4. Oxford. 240.score: 66.0
    I distinguish between two kinds of selection effects on experience: selection of objects or features for experience, and anti-selection of experiences for cognitive uptake. I discuss the idea that both kinds of selection effects can lead to a form of confirmation bias at the level of perception, and argue that when this happens, selection effects can influence the rational role of experience.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Eric Mandelbaum, Ballistic, Automatic, Mandatory: On An Ambiguity in Mandatory Perceptual Processing.score: 60.0
  31. Michael Huemer (2013). Epistemological Asymmetries Between Belief and Experience. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):741-748.score: 60.0
  32. Kevin Connolly (forthcoming). Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception. Erkenntnis:1-12.score: 60.0
    Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like the property of "being a wren." Wrens might look different to you now. According to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument, such cases of perceptual learning show that the contents of perception can include high-level kind properties such as the property of "being a wren." I detail an alternative explanation for the different look of the wren: a shift in one’s attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. Philosophers have (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Oisín Deery (2014). Is Agentive Experience Compatible with Determinism? :1-18.score: 60.0
    Is agentive experience compatible with determinism?. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2013.874495.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Philippe G. Schyns (1999). The Case for Cognitive Penetrability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):394-395.score: 60.0
    Pylyshyn acknowledges that cognition intervenes in determining the nature of perception when attention is allocated to locations or properties prior to the operation of early vision. I present evidence that scale perception (one function of early vision) is cognitively penetrable and argue that Pylyshyn's criterion covers not a few, but many situations of recognition. Cognitive penetrability could be their modus operandi.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Robert S. Lockhart (2000). Modularity, Cognitive Penetrability and the Turing Test. Psycoloquy.score: 60.0
    The Turing Test blurs the distinction between a model and irrelevant) instantiation details. Modeling only functional modules is problematic if these are interconnected and cognitively penetrable.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Jane Heal (1996). Simulation and Cognitive Penetrability. Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67.score: 54.0
  37. Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols (1997). Cognitive Penetrability, Rationality, and Restricted Simulation. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):297-326.score: 54.0
    In a series of recent papers, Jane Heal (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b) has developed her own quite distinctive version of simulation theory and offered a detailed critique of the arguments against simulation theory that we and our collaborators presented in earlier papers. Heal's theory is clearly set out and carefully defended, and her critique of our arguments is constructive and well informed. Unlike a fair amount of what has been written in this area in recent years, her work is (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. John Bolender (2001). A Two-Tiered Cognitive Architecture for Moral Reasoning. Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):339-356.score: 54.0
    The view that moral cognition is subserved by a two-tieredarchitecture is defended: Moral reasoning is the result both ofspecialized, informationally encapsulated modules which automaticallyand effortlessly generate intuitions; and of general-purpose,cognitively penetrable mechanisms which enable moral judgment in thelight of the agent's general fund of knowledge. This view is contrastedwith rival architectures of social/moral cognition, such as Cosmidesand Tooby's view that the mind is wholly modular, and it is argued thata two-tiered architecture is more plausible.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Thomas V. Papathomas (1999). Is Perception of 3-D Surface Configurations Cognitively Penetrable? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):388-389.score: 52.0
    Among Pylyshyn's most important questions is determining the boundaries of early vision. A simple stimulus illustrates that, in addition to the dominant percept, most observers can perceive alternative interpretations of 3-D surface layout only after provided with suggestions. These observations may indicate that cognitive influences reach the stages of visual processing where 3-D surface configurations are resolved.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. S. Bentin & Y. Golland (2002). Cognitive Penetrability of the Face Structural Encoding: Electrophysiological Evidence. Cognition 86:1-14.score: 52.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Ophelia Deroy (2013). Object-Sensitivity Versus Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):87-107.score: 50.0
  42. John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.) (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press.score: 50.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. P. Gerrans & J. Kennett, Is Cognitive Penetrability the Mark of the Moral?score: 50.0
    The article discusses various reports published within the issue, including one by Garrett Cullity on moral psychology and another by Richard Joyce on moral judgements.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. James R. Miller (1980). Cognitive Penetrability: Let Us Not Forget About Memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):146.score: 50.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Peter N. Kugler, M. T. Turvey & Robert Shaw (1982). Is the “Cognitive Penetrability” Criterion Invalidated by Contemporary Physics? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (2):303.score: 50.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. O. Deroy (2013). Phenomenal Contrast Without the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Studies 162:87 - 107.score: 50.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.) (2005). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Nova Science.score: 50.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Rob Withagen & Claire F. Michaels (1999). An Ecological Approach to Cognitive (Im)Penetrability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):399-400.score: 48.0
    We offer an ecological (Gibsonian) alternative to cognitive (im)penetrability. Whereas Pylyshyn explains cognitive (im)penetrability by focusing solely on computations carried out by the nervous system, according to the ecological approach the perceiver as a knowing agent influences the entire animal-environmental system: in the determination of what constitutes the environment (affordances), what constitutes information, what information is detected and, thus, what is perceived.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Anna Farennikova (forthcoming). Perception of Absence and Penetration From Expectation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.score: 44.0
    I argue that perception of absence presents a top-down effect from expectations on perception, but then show that this cognitive effect is atypical and indirect. This calls into question usefulness of some of the existing notions of cognitive penetrability of perception and generates new questions about indirect cognitive influences on perception.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Kevin Connolly, John Donaldson, David M. Gray, Emily McWilliams, Sofia Ortiz-Hinojosa & David Suarez, Report on the Network for Sensory Research Toronto Workshop on Perceptual Learning.score: 42.0
    This report highlights and explores five questions which arose from the workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of Toronto, Mississauga on May 10th and 11th, 2012: 1. How should we demarcate perceptual learning from perceptual development? 2. What are the origins of multimodal associations? 3. Does our representation of time provide an amodal framework for multi-sensory integration? 4. What counts as cognitive penetration? 5. How can philosophers and psychologists most fruitfully collaborate?
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000