Search results for 'collective intentionality' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
See also:
  1. Guglielmo Feis (2012). The “Ought” Implies “Can” Principle: A Challenge to Collective Intentionality. Phenomenology and Mind 2:114-121.score: 240.0
    I investigate collective intentionality (CI) through the “Ought” implies “Can” (OIC) principle. My leading question is does OIC impose any further requirement on CI? In answering the challenge inside a Searlean framework, I realize that we need to clarify what CI's structure is and what kind of role the agents joining a CI-act have. In the last part of the paper, I put forward an (inverted) Hartian framework to allow the Searlean CI theory to be agent sensitive and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jack J. Vromen (2003). Collective Intentionality, Evolutionary Biology and Social Reality. Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):251-265.score: 228.0
    The paper aims to clarify and scrutinize Searle"s somewhat puzzling statement that collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon. It is argued that the statement is not only meant to bring out that "collective intentionality" is not further analyzable in terms of individual intentionality. It also is meant to convey that we have a biologically evolved innate capacity for collective intentionality.The paper points out that Searle"s dedication to a strong notion of collective (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Antti Saaristo (2006). There is No Escape From Philosophy: Collective Intentionality and Empirical Social Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):40-66.score: 228.0
    This article examines two empirical research traditions—experimental economics and the social identity approach in social psychology—that may be seen as attempts to falsify and verify the theory of collective intentionality, respectively. The article argues that both approaches fail to settle the issue. However, this is not necessarily due to the alleged immaturity of the social sciences but, possibly, to the philosophical nature of intentionality and intentional action. The article shows how broadly Davidsonian action theory, including Hacking’s notion (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Michael Tomasello & Hannes Rakoczy (2003). What Makes Human Cognition Unique? From Individual to Shared to Collective Intentionality. Mind and Language 18 (2):121-147.score: 210.0
  5. Deborah Tollefsen, Collective Intentionality. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 210.0
  6. Thomas Szanto (2014). Social Phenomenology: Husserl, Intersubjectivity, and Collective Intentionality. [REVIEW] International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2):296-301.score: 210.0
  7. Robert Keith Shaw (2011). Understanding Public Organisations: Collective Intentionality as Cooperation. In Proceedings of the 2011 Conference of the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia. Auckland, New Zealand. Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia.score: 180.0
    This paper introduces the concept of collective intentionality and shows its relevance when we seek to understand public management. Social ontology – particularly its leading concept, collective intentionality – provides critical insights into public organisations. The paper sets out the some of the epistemological limitations of cultural theories and takes as its example of these the group-grid theory of Douglas and Hood. It then draws upon Brentano, Husserl and Searle to show the ontological character of public (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Raimo Tuomela, Collective Intentionality and Social Agents.score: 180.0
    In this paper I will discuss a certain philosophical and conceptual program -- that I have called philosophy of social action writ large -- and also show in detail how parts of the program have been, and is currently being carried out. In current philosophical research the philosophy of social action can be understood in a broad sense to encompass such central research topics as action occurring in a social context (this includes multi-agent action); shared we-attitudes (such as we-intention, mutual (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Mattia Gallotti (2012). A Naturalistic Argument for the Irreducibility of Collective Intentionality. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):3-30.score: 180.0
    According to many philosophers and scientists, human sociality is explained by our unique capacity to “share” attitudes with others. The conditions under which mental states are shared have been widely debated in the past two decades, focusing especially on the issue of their reducibility to individual intentionality and the place of collective intentions in the natural realm. It is not clear, however, to what extent these two issues are related and what methodologies of investigation are appropriate in each (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. J. Krause (2012). Collective Intentionality and the (Re)Production of Social Norms: The Scope for a Critical Social Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3):323-355.score: 180.0
    This article aims to contribute to a critical ontology of social objects. Recent works on collective intentionality and norm-following neglect the question how free agents can be brought to collectively intend to x , although x is not in their own interest. By arguing for a natural disposition to empathic understanding and drawing on recent research in the neurosciences, this article outlines an ontological framework that extends collective intentionality to questions of oppression and status asymmetries. In (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Bryce Huebner (2014). Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality. OUP USA.score: 180.0
    This book develops a novel approach to distributed cognition and collective intentionality. It is argued that collective mentality should be only be posited where specialized subroutines are integrated in a way that yields skillful, goal-directed behavior that is sensitive to concerns that are relevant to a group as such.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Raimo Tuomela (2013). Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents. Oup Usa.score: 180.0
    This volume presents a systematic philosophical theory related to the collectivism-versus-individualism debate in the social sciences. A weak version of collectivism (the "we-mode" approach) that depends on group-based collective intentionality is developed in the book. The we-mode approach is used to account for collective intention and action, cooperation, group attitudes, social practices and institutions as well as group solidarity.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.) (2014). From Individual to Collective Intentionality. Oup Usa.score: 180.0
    Acting together requires collective intentions. The contributions to this volume seek to critically assess or to enrich theories of collective intentionality by exploring topics such as collective belief, mutual coordination, and the explanation of group behavior.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Anthonie Wm Meijers (2002). Dialogue, Understanding and Collective Intentionality. In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts & Collective Intentionality. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen Ag.score: 180.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Hannes Rakoczy (2008). Pretence as Individual and Collective Intentionality. Mind and Language 23 (5):499-517.score: 174.0
    Abstract: Focusing on early child pretend play from the perspective of developmental psychology, this article puts forward and presents evidence for two claims. First, such play constitutes an area of remarkable individual intentionality of second-order intentionality (or 'theory of mind'): in pretence with others, young children grasp the basic intentional structure of pretending as a non-serious fictional form of action. Second, early social pretend play embodies shared or collective we-intentionality. Pretending with others is one of the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Cristina Becchio & Cesare Bertone (2004). Wittgenstein Running: Neural Mechanisms of Collective Intentionality and We-Mode. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):123-133.score: 162.0
  17. Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2002). Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.score: 156.0
    In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group.Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view that certain groups are literally intentional agents. In section 4, the author argues that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. David P. Schweikard & Hans Bernhard Schmid, Collective Intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 150.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Peter Tramel (2008). Review of Hans Bernhard Schmid, Katinka Schulte-Ostermann, Nikos Psarros (Eds.), Concepts of Sharedness: Essays on Collective Intentionality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (11).score: 150.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Ingvar Johansson (2003). Review of Georg Meggle, (Ed.), Social Facts & Collective Intentionality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (3).score: 150.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. John B. Davis (2004). 19 Collective Intentionality, Complex Economic Behavior, and Valuation. In John Bryan Davis & Alain Marciano (eds.), The Elgar Companion to Economics and Philosophy. Edward Elgar Pub.. 386.score: 150.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. M. Parker (2004). Response to Orr and Siegler--Collective Intentionality and Procreative Desires: The Permissible View on Consent to Posthumous Conception. Journal of Medical Ethics 30 (4):389-392.score: 150.0
  23. Luca Tummolini & Cristiano Castelfranchi, Cognition, Joint Action and Collective Intentionality.score: 150.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Review by: Maura Priest (2014). Review: Raimo Tuomela, Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents. [REVIEW] Ethics 125 (1):293-298,.score: 150.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Bruno Celano (1999). Collective Intentionality, Self-Referentiality, and False Beliefs: Some Issues Concerning Institutional Facts. Analyse and Kritik 21:237-250.score: 150.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Georg Meggle (ed.) (2002). Social Facts & Collective Intentionality. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen Ag.score: 150.0
  27. Yasuo Nakayama (2001). Collective Intentionality and Social Organization. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):53-64.score: 150.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Stefano Vaselli (2012). Two Ontologies on Historical Reality Documentality and Collective Intentionality in the Proof of Historicization. Rivista di Estetica 52 (2).score: 150.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Jack J. Vromen (2003). Collective Intentionality, Social Reality, and Evolutionary Biology. Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):251-64.score: 150.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Shen-yi Liao (2014). Collective De Se Thoughts and Centered Worlds. Ratio 27 (1):17-31.score: 120.0
    Two lines of investigation into the nature of mental content have proceeded in parallel until now. The first looks at thoughts that are attributable to collectives, such as bands' beliefs and teams' desires. So far, philosophers who have written on collective belief, collective intentionality, etc. have primarily focused on third-personal attributions of thoughts to collectives. The second looks at de se, or self-locating, thoughts, such as beliefs and desires that are essentially about oneself. So far, philosophers who (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Dale Jacquette (2014). Collective Referential Intentionality in the Semantics of Dialogue. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 36 (1):143-159.score: 120.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Titus Stahl (2014). The Conditions of Collectivity: Joint Commitment and the Shared Norms of Membership. In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Springer. 229-244.score: 100.0
    Collective intentionality is one of the most fundamental notions in social ontology. However, it is often thought to refer to a capacity which does not presuppose the existence of any other social facts. This chapter critically examines this view from the perspective of one specific theory of collective intentionality, the theory of Margaret Gilbert. On the basis of Gilbert’s arguments, the chapter claims that collective intentionality is a highly contingent achievement of complex social practices (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Cathal O'Madagain (2014). Can Groups Have Concepts? Semantics for Collective Intentions. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):347-363.score: 96.0
    A substantial literature supports the attribution of intentional states such as beliefs and desires to groups. But within this literature, there is no substantial account of group concepts. Since on many views, one cannot have an intentional state without having concepts, such a gap undermines the cogency of accounts of group intentionality. In this paper I aim to provide an account of group concepts. First I argue that to fix the semantics of the sentences groups use to make their (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Christian List (2014). Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes. Erkenntnis 79 (9):1601-1622.score: 96.0
    This paper offers a comparison of three different kinds of collective attitudes: aggregate, common, and corporate attitudes. They differ not only in their relationship to individual attitudes—e.g., whether they are “reducible” to individual attitudes—but also in the roles they play in relation to the collectives to which they are ascribed. The failure to distinguish them can lead to confusion, in informal talk as well as in the social sciences. So, the paper’s message is an appeal for disambiguation.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Georg Theiner (2013). Onwards and Upwards with the Extended Mind: From Individual to Collective Epistemic Action. In Linnda Caporael, James Griesemer & William Wimsatt (eds.), Developing Scaffolds. MIT Press. 191-208.score: 96.0
    In recent years, philosophical developments of the notion of distributed and/or scaffolded cognition have given rise to the “extended mind” thesis. Against the popular belief that the mind resides solely in the brain, advocates of the extended mind thesis defend the claim that a significant portion of human cognition literally extends beyond the brain into the body and a heterogeneous array of physical props, tools, and cultural techniques that are reliably present in the environment in which people grow, think, and (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Boudewijn de Bruin (2005). Game Theory in Philosophy. Topoi 24 (2):197-208.score: 90.0
    Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals with games in which all players have preference orderings over the possible outcomes of the game. This paper gives an informal introduction to the theory and a survey of applications in diverse branches of philosophy. No criticism (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. William Rehg (2013). The Social Authority of Paradigms as Group Commitments: Rehabilitating Kuhn with Recent Social Philosophy. Topoi 32 (1):21-31.score: 90.0
    By linking the conceptual and social dynamics of change in science, Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions proved tremendously fruitful for research in science studies. But Kuhn’s idea of incommensurability provoked strong criticism from philosophers of science. In this essay I show how Raimo Tuomela’s Philosophy of Sociality illuminates and strengthens Kuhn’s model of scientific change. After recalling the central features and problems of Kuhn’s model, I introduce Tuomela’s approach. I then show (a) how Tuomela’s conception of group ethos aligns with (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Hans Bernhard Schmid (2014). Plural Self-Awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-24.score: 90.0
    It has been claimed in the literature that collective intentionality and group attitudes presuppose some “sense of ‘us’” among the participants (other labels sometimes used are “sense of community,” “communal awareness,” “shared point of view,” or “we-perspective”). While this seems plausible enough on an intuitive level, little attention has been paid so far to the question of what the nature and role of this mysterious “sense of ‘us’” might be. This paper states (and argues for) the following five (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Kirk Ludwig (2007). Foundations of Social Reality in Collective Intentional Behavior. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology.score: 90.0
    This paper clarifies Searle's account of we-intentions and then argues that it is subject to counterexamples, some of which are derived from examples Searle uses against other accounts. It then offers an alternative reductive account that is not subject to the counterexamples.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Frank Hindriks, Sara Rachel Chant & Gerhard Preyer (2014). Beyond the Big Four and the Big Five. In Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality. 1-9.score: 90.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Brian Gordon & Georg Theiner (forthcoming). Scaffolded Joint Action as a Micro–Foundation of Organizational Learning. In Charles B. Stone & Lucas Bietti (eds.), Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past. Psychology Press.score: 90.0
    Organizational learning, at the broadest levels, as it has come to be understood within the organization theory and management literatures, concerns the experientially driven changes in knowledge processes, structures, and resources that enable organizations to perform skillfully in their task environments (Argote and Miron–Spektor, 2011). In this chapter, we examine routines and capabilities as an important micro–foundation for organizational learning. Adopting a micro–foundational approach in line with Barney and Felin (2013), we propose a new model for explaining how routines and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Georg Theiner & Wilson Robert (2013). Group Mind. In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Sage. 401-04.score: 84.0
    Talk of group minds has arisen in a number of distinct traditions, such as in sociological thinking about the “madness of crowds” in the 19th-century, and more recently in making sense of the collective intelligence of social insects, such as bees and ants. Here we provide an analytic framework for understanding a range of contemporary appeals to group minds and cognate notions, such as collective agency, shared intentionality, socially distributed cognition, transactive memory systems, and group-level cognitive adaptations.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Gilbert T. Null (2007). The Ontology of Intentionality II: Dependence Ontology as Prolegomenon to Noetic Modal Semantics. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 23 (2):119-159.score: 84.0
    This is the second in a sequence of three essays which axiomatize and apply Edmund Husserl's dependence ontology of parts and wholes as a non-Diodorean, non-Kantian temporal semantics for first-order predicate modal languages. The Ontology of Intentionality I introduced enough of Husserl's dependence-ontology of parts and wholes to formulate his account of order as effected by relating moments of unity, and The Ontology of Intentionality II extends that axiomatic dependence-ontology far enough to enable its semantic application. Formalizing the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Kirk Ludwig (2014). The Ontology of Collective Action. In Sara Chant Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.score: 78.0
    What is the ontology of collective action? I have in mind three connected questions. 1. Do the truth conditions of action sentences about groups require there to be group agents over and above individual agents? 2. Is there a difference, in this connection, between action sentences about informal groups that use plural noun phrases, such as ‘We pushed the car’ and ‘The women left the party early’, and action sentences about formal or institutional groups that use singular noun phrases, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Hans B. Schmid (2003). Can Brains in Vats Think as a Team? Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):201-218.score: 78.0
    Abstract The specter of the ?group mind? or ?collective subject? plays a crucial and fateful role in the current debate on collective intentionality. Fear of the group mind is one important reason why philosophers of collective intentionality resort to individualism. It is argued here that this measure taken against the group mind is as unnecessary as it is detrimental to our understanding of what it means to share an intention. A non-individualistic concept of shared (...) does not necessarily have to get stuck with some collectivist super-agent. Rather, the specter of the group mind arises from a deep-seated ?Cartesian? preconception concerning intentionality, which we should try to overcome. *I am greatly indebted to Raimo Tuomela for his comments. Also, I wish to thank Michael Bratman, Fabienne Peter, Richard Raatzsch and Katrin Meyer. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Kendy M. Hess (2014). The Free Will of Corporations (and Other Collectives). Philosophical Studies 168 (1):241-260.score: 76.0
    Moderate holists like French (Collective and corporate responsibility, 1984), Copp (J Soc Philos, 38(3):369–388, 2007), Hess (The Background of Social Reality – A Survey, 2013), Isaacs (Moral responsibility in collective contexts, 2011) and List and Pettit (Group agency: The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents, 2011) argue that certain collectives qualify as moral agents in their own right, often pointing to the corporation as an example of a collective likely to qualify. A common objection is that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Marion Smiley (2010). &Quot;from Moral Agency to Collective Wrongs: Re-Thinking Collective Moral Responsibility&Quot;. Journal of Law and Policy (1):171-202.score: 66.0
    This essay argues that while the notion of collective responsibiility is incoherent if it is taken to be an application of the Kantian model of moral responsibility to groups, it is coherent -- and important -- if formulated in terms of the moral reactions that we can have to groups that cause harm in the world. I formulate collective responsibility as such and in doing so refocus attention from intentionality to the production of harm.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Joseph Kisolo-Ssonko (2012). Love, Plural Subjects & Normative Constraint. Phenomenology and Mind (3).score: 66.0
    Andrea Westlund's account of love involves lovers becoming a Plural Subject mirroring Margaret Gilbert's Plural Subject Theory. However, while for Gilbert the creation of a plural will involves individuals jointly committing to pool their wills and the plural will directly normatively constraining those individuals, Westlund, in contrast, sees the creation of a plural will as a continual process thus rejecting the possibility of such direct normative constraint. This rejection appears to be required to explain the flexibility that allows for a (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Mark Phelan, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols (2013). Thinking Things and Feeling Things: On an Alleged Discontinuity in Folk Metaphysics of Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):703-725.score: 66.0
    According to the discontinuity view, people recognize a deep discontinuity between phenomenal and intentional states, such that they refrain from attributing feelings and experiences to entities that do not have the right kind of body, though they may attribute thoughts to entities that lack a biological body, like corporations, robots, and disembodied souls. We examine some of the research that has been used to motivate the discontinuity view. Specifically, we focus on experiments that examine people's aptness judgments for various mental (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Thomas Szanto (2014). How to Share a Mind: Reconsidering the Group Mind Thesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):99-120.score: 66.0
    Standard accounts in social ontology and the group cognition debate have typically focused on how collective modes, types, and contents of intentions or representational states must be construed so as to constitute the jointness of the respective agents, cognizers, and their engagements. However, if we take intentions, beliefs, or mental representations all to instantiate some mental properties, then the more basic issue regarding such collective engagements is what it is for groups of individual minds to share a mind. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000