Search results for 'collective intentionality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  20
    Caroline Arruda (forthcoming). Review Essay: Chant, Sara Rachel, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer, Editors. From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 240. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences:0048393116632685.
    I summarize and evaluate the aims of the collection From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer in the context of the on-going debate about collective intentionality and group agency. I then consider the individual essays contained therein, both from the perspective of how they advance the collection’s goals and the coherence of their individual arguments.
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  2.  24
    Caroline T. Arruda (2016). What We Can Intend: Recognition and Collective Intentionality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):5-26.
    The concept of recognition has played a role in two debates. In political philosophy, it is part of a communitarian response to liberal theories of distributive justice. It describes what it means to respect others’ right to self-determination. In ethics, Stephen Darwall argues that it comprises our judgment that we owe others moral consideration. I present a competing account of recognition on the grounds that most accounts answer the question of why others deserve recognition without answering the question of what (...)
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  3. Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.) (2014). From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Includes essays that challenge the need for a theory of collective intentionality as well as essays that extend and enrich existing theories of collective intentionality The essays concerning collective rationality (part II) break new ground in that they challenge the idea that there is a straightforward dichotomy between individual and collective level rationality Many of the things we do, we do together with other people. Think of carpooling and playing tennis. In the past two (...)
     
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  4.  27
    Guglielmo Feis (2012). The “Ought” Implies “Can” Principle: A Challenge to Collective Intentionality. Phenomenology and Mind 2:114-121.
    I investigate collective intentionality (CI) through the “Ought” implies “Can” (OIC) principle. My leading question is does OIC impose any further requirement on CI? In answering the challenge inside a Searlean framework, I realize that we need to clarify what CI's structure is and what kind of role the agents joining a CI-act have. In the last part of the paper, I put forward an (inverted) Hartian framework to allow the Searlean CI theory to be agent sensitive and (...)
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  5. Jack J. Vromen (2003). Collective Intentionality, Evolutionary Biology and Social Reality. Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):251-265.
    The paper aims to clarify and scrutinize Searle"s somewhat puzzling statement that collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon. It is argued that the statement is not only meant to bring out that "collective intentionality" is not further analyzable in terms of individual intentionality. It also is meant to convey that we have a biologically evolved innate capacity for collective intentionality.The paper points out that Searle"s dedication to a strong notion of collective (...)
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  6.  78
    Antti Saaristo (2006). There is No Escape From Philosophy: Collective Intentionality and Empirical Social Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):40-66.
    This article examines two empirical research traditions—experimental economics and the social identity approach in social psychology—that may be seen as attempts to falsify and verify the theory of collective intentionality, respectively. The article argues that both approaches fail to settle the issue. However, this is not necessarily due to the alleged immaturity of the social sciences but, possibly, to the philosophical nature of intentionality and intentional action. The article shows how broadly Davidsonian action theory, including Hacking’s notion (...)
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  7. Michael Tomasello & Hannes Rakoczy (2003). What Makes Human Cognition Unique? From Individual to Shared to Collective Intentionality. Mind and Language 18 (2):121-147.
  8.  11
    Henk Bij de Weg, Collective Intentionality and Individual Action. My Website.
    People often do things together and form groups in order to get things done that they cannot do alone. In short they form a collectivity of some kind or a group, for short. But if we consider a group on the one hand and the persons that constitute the group on the other hand, how does it happen that these persons work together and finish a common task with a common goal? In the philosophy of action this problem is often (...)
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  9. Deborah Tollefsen, Collective Intentionality. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  10.  12
    Johannes Himmelreich (2015). From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays, Edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer. Oxford University Press, 2014, 225 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 31 (3):479-486.
  11.  22
    Thomas Szanto (2014). Social Phenomenology: Husserl, Intersubjectivity, and Collective Intentionality. [REVIEW] International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2):296-301.
  12.  26
    Raimo Tuomela (2013). Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents. OUP Usa.
    This volume presents a systematic philosophical theory related to the collectivism-versus-individualism debate in the social sciences. A weak version of collectivism (the "we-mode" approach) that depends on group-based collective intentionality is developed in the book. The we-mode approach is used to account for collective intention and action, cooperation, group attitudes, social practices and institutions as well as group solidarity.
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  13.  3
    Arto Laitinen (2014). Collective Intentionality and Recognition From Others. In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Contributions to Social Ontology. Springer 213-228.
    This paper approaches questions of collective intentionality by drawing inspiration from theories of recognition (e.g. Honneth 1995, Ricoeur 2005, Brandom 2007). After some remarks about recognition and groups, the paper examines whether the kind of dependence on recognition that holds of individual agents is equally true of group agents. In the debates on collective intentionality it is often stressed that the identity, existence, ethos, and membership-issues of the group are up to the group to decide (e.g. (...)
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  14.  71
    Mattia Gallotti (2012). A Naturalistic Argument for the Irreducibility of Collective Intentionality. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):3-30.
    According to many philosophers and scientists, human sociality is explained by our unique capacity to “share” attitudes with others. The conditions under which mental states are shared have been widely debated in the past two decades, focusing especially on the issue of their reducibility to individual intentionality and the place of collective intentions in the natural realm. It is not clear, however, to what extent these two issues are related and what methodologies of investigation are appropriate in each (...)
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  15.  28
    Bryce Huebner (2014). Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality. OUP USA.
    This book develops a novel approach to distributed cognition and collective intentionality. It is argued that collective mentality should be only be posited where specialized subroutines are integrated in a way that yields skillful, goal-directed behavior that is sensitive to concerns that are relevant to a group as such.
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  16. Robert Keith Shaw (2011). Understanding Public Organisations: Collective Intentionality as Cooperation. In Proceedings of the 2011 Conference of the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia. Auckland, New Zealand. Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
    This paper introduces the concept of collective intentionality and shows its relevance when we seek to understand public management. Social ontology – particularly its leading concept, collective intentionality – provides critical insights into public organisations. The paper sets out the some of the epistemological limitations of cultural theories and takes as its example of these the group-grid theory of Douglas and Hood. It then draws upon Brentano, Husserl and Searle to show the ontological character of public (...)
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  17. Raimo Tuomela, Collective Intentionality and Social Agents.
    In this paper I will discuss a certain philosophical and conceptual program -- that I have called philosophy of social action writ large -- and also show in detail how parts of the program have been, and is currently being carried out. In current philosophical research the philosophy of social action can be understood in a broad sense to encompass such central research topics as action occurring in a social context (this includes multi-agent action); shared we-attitudes (such as we-intention, mutual (...)
     
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  18.  2
    Elisabeth Pacherie, Is Collective Intentionality Really Primitive?
    This paper offers a critical discussion of Searle's account of collective intentionality. It argues Bratman's alternative account avoids some of the shortcomings of Searle's account, over-intellectualizes collective intentionality and imposes an excessive cognitive burden on participating agents.Tthe capacities needed to sustain collective intentionality are examined in an attempt to show that we can preserve the gist of Bratman's account in a cognitively more parsimonious way.
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  19.  34
    J. Krause (2012). Collective Intentionality and the (Re)Production of Social Norms: The Scope for a Critical Social Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3):323-355.
    This article aims to contribute to a critical ontology of social objects. Recent works on collective intentionality and norm-following neglect the question how free agents can be brought to collectively intend to x , although x is not in their own interest. By arguing for a natural disposition to empathic understanding and drawing on recent research in the neurosciences, this article outlines an ontological framework that extends collective intentionality to questions of oppression and status asymmetries. In (...)
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  20.  20
    Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.) (2014). From Individual to Collective Intentionality. OUP Usa.
    Acting together requires collective intentions. The contributions to this volume seek to critically assess or to enrich theories of collective intentionality by exploring topics such as collective belief, mutual coordination, and the explanation of group behavior.
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  21. Kirk Ludwig (ed.) (2017). The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. Routledge.
    The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality is the first of its kind, synthesizing research from several disciplines for all students and professionals interested in better understanding the nature and structure of social reality. The contents of the volume are divided into eight sections, each of which begins with a short introduction: Collective Action and Intention Shared and Joint Attitudes Epistemology and Rationality in the Social Context Social Ontology Collectives and Responsibility Collective Intentionality and Social Institutions (...)
     
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  22. Anthonie Wm Meijers (2002). Dialogue, Understanding and Collective Intentionality. In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts & Collective Intentionality. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen Ag
     
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  23. Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.) (2014). From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press Usa.
    Many of the things we do, we do together with other people. Think of carpooling and playing tennis. In the past two or three decades it has become increasingly popular to analyze such collective actions in terms of collective intentions. This volume brings together ten new philosophical essays that address issues such as how individuals succeed in maintaining coordination throughout the performance of a collective action, whether groups can actually believe propositions or whether they merely accept them, (...)
     
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  24. Raimo Tuomela (2013). Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents. Oxford University Press Usa.
    Social ontology, in its broadest sense, is the study of the nature of social reality, including collective intentions and agency. The starting point of Tuomela's account of collective intentionality is the distinction between thinking and acting as a private person versus as a "we-thinking" group member. The we-mode approach is based on social groups consisting of persons, which may range from simple task groups consisting of a few persons to corporations and even to political states. Tuomela extends (...)
     
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  25.  46
    Hannes Rakoczy (2008). Pretence as Individual and Collective Intentionality. Mind and Language 23 (5):499-517.
    Abstract: Focusing on early child pretend play from the perspective of developmental psychology, this article puts forward and presents evidence for two claims. First, such play constitutes an area of remarkable individual intentionality of second-order intentionality (or 'theory of mind'): in pretence with others, young children grasp the basic intentional structure of pretending as a non-serious fictional form of action. Second, early social pretend play embodies shared or collective we-intentionality. Pretending with others is one of the (...)
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  26.  22
    Björn Petersson (forthcoming). Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    Different versions of the idea that individualism about agency is the root of standard game theoretical puzzles have been defended by Regan 1980, Bacharach, Hurley, Sugden :165–181, 2003), and Tuomela 2013, among others. While collectivistic game theorists like Michael Bacharach provide formal frameworks designed to avert some of the standard dilemmas, philosophers of collective action like Raimo Tuomela aim at substantive accounts of collective action that may explain how agents overcoming such social dilemmas would be motivated. This paper (...)
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  27.  89
    Cristina Becchio & Cesare Bertone (2004). Wittgenstein Running: Neural Mechanisms of Collective Intentionality and We-Mode. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):123-133.
    In this paper we discuss the problem of the neural conditions of shared attitudes and intentions: which neural mechanisms underlie “we-mode” processes or serve as precursors to such processes? Neurophysiological and neuropsychological evidence suggests that in different areas of the brain neural representations are shared by several individuals. This situation, on the one hand, creates a potential problem for correct attribution. On the other hand, it may provide the conditions for shared attitudes and intentions.
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  28.  71
    Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2002). Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.
    In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group.Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view that certain groups are literally intentional agents. In section 4, the author argues that (...)
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  29.  11
    Peter Olen & Stephen Turner (2015). Durkheim, Sellars, and the Origins of Collective Intentionality. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (5):954-975.
    Wilfrid Sellars read and annotated Celestine Bouglé’s Evolution of Values, translated by his mother with an introduction by his father. The book expounded Émile Durkheim's account of morality and elaborated his account of origins of value in collective social life. Sellars replaced elements of this account in constructing his own conception of the relationship between the normative and community, but preserved a central one: the idea that conflicting collective and individual intentions could be found in the same person. (...)
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  30.  15
    Matteo Colombo (2015). Bryce Huebner: Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality. Minds and Machines 25 (1):103-109.
    Bryce Huebner’s Macrocognition is a book with a double mission. The first and main mission is “to show that there are cases of collective mentality in our world” . Cases of collective mentality are cases where groups, teams, mobs, firms, colonies or some other collectivities possess cognitive capacities or mental states in the same sense that we individually do. To accomplish this mission, Huebner develops an account of macrocognition, where “the term ‘macrocognition’ is intended as shorthand for the (...)
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  31.  47
    David P. Schweikard & Hans Bernhard Schmid, Collective Intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  32.  19
    Thomas Szanto & Dermot Moran (2015). Introduction: Empathy and Collective Intentionality—The Social Philosophy of Edith Stein. Human Studies 38 (4):445-461.
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  33.  11
    Leo Townsend (2015). Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents. [REVIEW] Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):183–187.
  34.  14
    J. Angelo Corlett & Julia Lyons Strobel (2016). Raimo Tuomela: Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents. Human Studies 39 (2):313-318.
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  35.  12
    Yasuo Nakayama (2001). Collective Intentionality and Social Organization. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):53-64.
  36. John B. Davis (2004). Collective Intentionality, Complex Economic Behavior, and Valuation. In John Bryan Davis & Alain Marciano (eds.), The Elgar Companion to Economics and Philosophy. Edward Elgar Publishers 386-402.
     
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  37.  21
    Bruno Celano (1999). Collective Intentionality, Self-Referentiality, and False Beliefs: Some Issues Concerning Institutional Facts. Analyse & Kritik 21 (2):237-250.
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  38.  14
    Bryan Chambliss (2015). Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality. Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):315-319.
  39.  9
    Luca Tummolini & Cristiano Castelfranchi, Cognition, Joint Action and Collective Intentionality.
  40.  9
    Frank Hindriks (2015). Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents, Raimo Tuomela. Oxford University Press, 2013, Xiv + 310 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):341-348.
  41. John Davis (2003). Collective Intentionality Analysis, Complex Economic Behavior, and Valuation. ProtoSociology 18.
     
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  42.  1
    Ivan Mladenovic (2014). Collective Intentionality, Rationality, and Institutions. Rivista di Estetica 57:67-86.
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  43.  13
    M. Parker (2004). Response to Orr and Siegler--Collective Intentionality and Procreative Desires: The Permissible View on Consent to Posthumous Conception. Journal of Medical Ethics 30 (4):389-392.
    Orr and Siegler have recently defended a restrictive view concerning posthumous sperm retrieval and conception, which would limit insemination to those cases where the deceased man has provided explicit consent for such a procedure. The restrictive view dominates current law and practice. A permissible view, in contrast, would allow insemination and conception in all but those cases where the posthumous procedure has been explicitly refused, or where there is no reasonable evidence that the deceased person desired children. I describe a (...)
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  44.  5
    Carlos Bernal (2014). Collective Intentionality and the Ontological Structure of Law. Rechtstheorie 45 (3):335-353.
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  45. Georg Meggle (ed.) (2002). Social Facts & Collective Intentionality. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen Ag.
  46.  3
    Maurizio Ferraris (2015). Collective Intentionality or Documentality? Philosophy and Social Criticism 41 (4-5):423-433.
    In this article I defend two theses. The first is that the centrality of recording in the social world is manifested through the production of documents, a phenomenon which has been present since the earliest phases of society and which has undergone an exponential growth through the technological developments of the last decades. The second is that the centrality of documents leads to a view of normativity according to which human beings are primarily passive receptors of rules manifested through documents. (...)
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  47.  7
    Review by: Maura Priest (2014). Review: Raimo Tuomela, Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents. [REVIEW] Ethics 125 (1):293-298,.
  48.  9
    Ingvar Johansson (2003). Review of Georg Meggle, (Ed.), Social Facts & Collective Intentionality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (3).
  49.  8
    Peter Tramel (2008). Review of Hans Bernhard Schmid, Katinka Schulte-Ostermann, Nikos Psarros (Eds.), Concepts of Sharedness: Essays on Collective Intentionality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (11).
  50. Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic (2017). An Introduction to Collective Intentionality: In Action, Thought, and Society. Routledge.
     
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