While collaboration has always played an important role in many cases of discovery and creation, recent developments such as the web facilitate and encourage collaboration at scales never seen before, even in areas such as mathematics, where contributions by single individuals have historically been the norm. This new scenario poses a challenge at the theoretical level, as it brings out the importance of various issues which, as of yet, have not been sufficiently central to the study of problem-solving, (...) discovery, and creativity. We analyze the case of collective and web-based proof events in mathematics, which share their temporal and social nature with every case of collective problem-solving. We propose that some ideas from cognitive architectures, in particular, the notion of codelet—understood as an agent engaged in one of a multitude of available tasks—can illuminate our understanding of collective problem-solving and act as a natural bridge from some of the theoretical aspects of collective, web-based discovery to the practical concern of designing cognitively inspired systems to support collective problem-solving. We use the Pythagorean Theorem and its many proofs as a case study to illustrate our approach. (shrink)

'Never before has there been so many and such dreadful weapons in so many irresponsible hands.' - Karl Popper, from the Preface All Life is Problem Solving is a stimulating and provocative selection of Popper's writings on his main preoccupations during the last twenty-five years of his life. This collection illuminates Popper's process of working out key formulations in his theory of science, and indicates his view of the state of the world at the end of the Cold (...) War and after the collapse of communism. (shrink)

_'Never before has there been so many and such dreadful weapons in so many irresponsible hands.'__ - Karl Popper, from the Preface_ _All Life is Problem Solving_ is a stimulating and provocative selection of Popper's writings on his main preoccupations during the last twenty-five years of his life. This collection illuminates Popper's process of working out key formulations in his theory of science, and indicates his view of the state of the world at the end of the Cold War (...) and after the collapse of communism. (shrink)

_'Never before has there been so many and such dreadful weapons in so many irresponsible hands.'__ - Karl Popper, from the Preface_ _All Life is Problem Solving_ is a stimulating and provocative selection of Popper's writings on his main preoccupations during the last twenty-five years of his life. This collection illuminates Popper's process of working out key formulations in his theory of science, and indicates his view of the state of the world at the end of the Cold War (...) and after the collapse of communism. (shrink)

A paradigm instructs in how to do research successfully. Analytic philosophy of science, currently dominant, models paradigmatic rational science as a system of logical inferences. It is, however, an abundantly inadequate paradigm. This paper presents an alternative paradigm: science as an organized collection of problem solving processes. This position is backed, on the one side, by a cognitive model of problem solving process applicable to all problem solving circumstances and, on the other, by a (...) non-formal conception of rationality that provides a wider enriched notion of rational research process than is available to the analytic paradigm. The result is a very different way of looking at science and of doing history and philosophy of science. The position is developed sufficiently to display its nature and merits. (shrink)

To measure non-cognitive facets of competence, we developed and tested a new method that we refer to as Embedded Experience Sampling (EES). Domain-specific problem-solving competence is a multi-faceted construct that is not limited to cognitive facets such as domain knowledge or problem-solving strategies but also comprises non-cognitive facets in the sense of domain-specific emotional and motivational dispositions such as interest and self-concept. However, in empirical studies non-cognitive facets are usually either neglected or measured by generalized self-report (...) questionnaires that are detached from the performance assessment. To enable an integrated measurement, we developed the EES method to collect data on non-cognitive facets during scenario-based low-stakes assessments. Test-takers are requested to stop at certain times and spontaneously answer short items (EES items) regarding their actual experience of the problem situation. These EES items are embedded in an EES event that resembles typical social interactions with non-player characters. To evaluate the feasibility and validity of the method, we implemented EES in a series of three studies in the context of commercial vocational education and training (VET): A feasibility study with 77 trainees, a pilot study with 20 trainees, and the main study with 780 trainees who worked on three complex problem scenarios in a computer-based office simulation. In the present paper, we investigate how test-takers perceived the EES events, and whether social desirability biased their answers, and investigate the internal structure of the data and the relationship between EES data and data from several other sources. Interview data and survey data indicated no biases due to social desirability and no additional burden for the test-takers due to the EES events. A correlation analysis following the multitrait-multimethod approach as well as the calibration of a multidimensional model based on Item Response Theory (IRT) also supported the construct validity. Furthermore, EES data shows substantial correlations with test motivation but almost zero correlations with data from generalized retrospective self-report questionnaires on non-cognitive facets. Altogether, EES offers an alternative approach to measuring non-cognitive facets of competence under certain conditions. For instance, EES is also based on self-reporting and thus might not be suitable for high-stakes testing. (shrink)

Traditional methods of evaluating and solving world problems are insufficient to deal with today's issues, which are complex and interconnected, and therefore cannot be understood, or solved, in isolation. The author's study aimed to better understand behaviors that impact systemic problems in the capacity-building community. The resultant theory of simulating benevolence conceptualizes a collection of behaviors where change agents undertake activities that are not in the best interest of community members. Instead, activities satisfy the need for activity, involvement, and (...) excitement. This theory has real-world implications in the pursuit of systemic social change. In any social context, a change agent cannot merely go through the motions of change, seemingly behaving active and engaged, at the expense of those that he or she claims to help. (shrink)

During the last decade, scholars have identified a number of factors that pose significant challenges to effective business ethics education. This article offers a "coping-modeling, problem-solving" (CMPS) approach (Cunningham, 2006) as one option for addressing these concerns. A rationale supporting the use of the CMPS framework for courses on ethical decisionmaking in business is provided, following which the implementation processes for this program are described. Evaluative data collected from N = 101 undergraduate business students enrolled in a third (...) year required course on ethical decision-making in business indicated that the CMPS model is a promising alternative for both overcoming teaching challenges and for facilitating skill acquisition in the areas of ethical recognition, judgment, and action. Limitations and directions for future research are discussed. (shrink)

We hypothesize that effective collaboration is facilitated when individuals and environmental components form a synergy where they work together and regulate one another to produce stable patterns of behavior, or regularity, as well as adaptively reorganize to form new behaviors, or irregularity. We tested this hypothesis in a study with 32 triads who collaboratively solved a challenging visual computer programming task for 20 min following an introductory warm‐up phase. Multidimensional recurrence quantification analysis was used to examine fine‐grained (i.e., every 10 (...) s) collective patterns of regularity across team members' speech rate, body movement, and team interaction with the shared user interface. We found that teams exhibited significant patterns of regularity as compared to shuffled baselines, but there were no systematic trends in regularity across time. We also found that periods of regularity were associated with a reduction in overall behavior. Notably, the production of irregular behavior predicted expert‐coded metrics of collaborative activity, such as teams' ability to construct shared knowledge and effectively negotiate and coordinate execution of solutions, net of overall behavioral production and behavioral self‐similarity. Our findings support the theory that groups can interact to form interpersonal synergies and indicate that information about system‐level dynamics is a viable way to understand and predict effective collaborative processes. (shrink)

Contemporary societies require citizens and workers to face unexpected challenges. This calls for a shift of emphasis from individualistic competence to the importance of collective intelligence. This article describes a plan for a project in which students who are eight to twelve years old will not only realize that difference is a crucial resource in problem solving and decision making but also live out their personal value as thinking, active beings. They will participate in an online dialogue (...) that takes place among children who attend schools in under-resourced communities and in middle-class and upper-class communities. The students will work on learning units based on philosophical content designed to stimulate their critical ability. The philosophical scenarios will be related to the everyday lives of the children through concrete examples. These examples will be followed by questions that aim to promote the advancement of the students’ thinking skills. (shrink)

Engineering ethics entails three frames of reference: individual, professional, and social. “Microethics” considers individuals and internal relations of the engineering profession; “macroethics” applies to the collective social responsibility of the profession and to societal decisions about technology. Most research and teaching in engineering ethics, including online resources, has had a “micro” focus. Mechanisms for incorporating macroethical perspectives include: integrating engineering ethics and science, technology and society (STS); closer integration of engineering ethics and computer ethics; and consideration of the influence (...) of professional engineering societies and corporate social responsiblity programs on ethical engineering practice. Integrating macroethical issues and concerns in engineering ethics involves broadening the context of ethical problem solving. This in turn implies: developing courses emphasizing both micro and macro perspectives, providing faculty development that includes training in both STS and practical ethics; and revision of curriculum materials, including online resources. Multidisciplinary collaboration is recommended 1) to create online case studies emphasizing ethical decision making in individual, professional, and societal contexts; 2) to leverage existing online computer ethics resources with relevance to engineering education and practice; and 3) to create transparent linkages between public policy positions advocated by professional societies and codes of ethics. (shrink)

During the last decade, scholars have identified a number of factors that pose significant challenges to effective business ethics education. This article offers a “coping-modeling, problem-solving” approach as one option for addressing these concerns. A rationale supporting the use of the CMPS framework for courses on ethical decision-making in business is provided, following which the implementation processes for this program are described. Evaluative data collected from N = 101 undergraduate business students enrolled in a third year required course (...) on ethical decision-making in business indicated that the CMPS model is a promising alternative for both overcoming teaching challenges and for facilitating skill acquisition in the areas of ethical recognition, judgment, and action. Limitations and directions for future research are discussed. (shrink)

This book describes how one can use The Scientific Method to solve everyday problems including medical ailments, health issues, money management, traveling, shopping, cooking, household chores, etc. It illustrates how to exploit the information collected from our five senses, how to solve problems when no information is available for the present problem situation, how to increase our chances of success by redefining a problem, and how to extrapolate our capabilities by seeing a relationship among heretofore unrelated concepts.One should (...) formulate a hypothesis as early as possible in order to have a sense of direction regarding which path to follow. Occasionally, by making wild conjectures, creative solutions can transpire. However, hypotheses need to be well-tested. Through this way, The Scientific Method can help readers solve problems in both familiar and unfamiliar situations. Containing real-life examples of how various problems are solved — for instance, how some observant patients cure their own illnesses when medical experts have failed — this book will train readers to observe what others may have missed and conceive what others may not have contemplated. With practice, they will be able to solve more problems than they could previously imagine.In this second edition, the authors have added some more theories which they hope can help in solving everyday problems. At the same time, they have updated the book by including quite a few examples which they think are interesting. (shrink)

Peer interaction has been found to be conducive to learning in many settings. Knowledge co-construction has been proposed as one explanatory mechanism. However, KCC is a theoretical construct that is too abstract to guide the development of instructional software that can support peer interaction. In this study, we present an extensive analysis of a corpus of peer dialogs that we collected in the domain of introductory Computer Science. We show that the notion of task initiative shifts correlates with both KCC (...) and learning. Speakers take task initiative when they contribute new content that advances problem solving and that is not invited by their partner; if initiative shifts between the partners, it indicates they both contribute to problem solving. We found that task initiative shifts occur more frequently within KCC episodes than outside. In addition, task initiative shifts within KCC episodes correlate with learning for low pre-testers, and total task initiative shifts correlate with learning for high pre-testers. As recognizing task initiative shifts does not require as much deep knowledge as recognizing KCC, task initiative shifts as an indicator of productive collaboration are potentially easier to model in instructional software that simulates a peer. (shrink)

The academic debate over the propriety of attributing moral responsibility to corporations is decades old and ongoing. The conventional approach to this debate is to identify the sufficient conditions for moral agency and then attempt to determine whether corporations possess them. This article recommends abandoning the conventional approach in favor of an examination of the practical consequences of corporate moral responsibility. The article’s thesis is that such an examination reveals that attributing moral responsibility to corporations is ethically acceptable only if (...) it does not authorize the punishment of corporations as collective entities, and further, that this renders the debate over corporate moral responsibility virtually pointless. (shrink)

In this 6-year, multi-study paper we summarize a new and effective framework of single-session problem-solving developed in an elite sport context at a world leading national institute of sport science and medicine. In Study 1, we used ethnography to observe how single-session problem-solving methods were being considered, explored, introduced and developed within the EIS. In Study 2, we used case-study methods split into two parts. A multiple case-study design was employed in Part one to evaluate how (...) the approach was refined into an effective framework of practice. An individual case-study is then illustrated to detail the framework in-action. Collectively, findings realized a framework of single-session problem-solving for use both inside and outside of elite sport that focused on ways to reframe clients’ problems into more ‘solvable’ descriptions. Guidance for psychologists wishing to integrate these problem-solving techniques into their practice are offered. (shrink)

In this article, we focus on problem solving talk in the business meeting event. We zoom in on the processes of formulating, negotiating and ratifying an issue as a problem, and we argue that individuals negotiate their stances in relation to their perceived/projected professional roles. The processes of problem-solving are, simultaneously, processes of self/other positioning. We take an Interactional Sociolinguistic perspective and draw on audio-recorded meeting talk collected in a multinational corporate workplace. Our analysis shows (...) that interactants draw on issues of accountability, perceived/projected responsibilities and expertise in pursuit of their own interactional agenda in the problem-solving meeting. We close the article with directions for further research. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to use a commognitive responsibility framework to visualize responsibility shift in collaborative problem solving during computer-supported one-to-one tutoring. Commognitive responsibility shift means that individuals’ cognitive responsibility shift can be reflected by the discourse in communication. For our sample, we chose a 15-year-old Chinese boy and his mathematics teacher with 6 years of teaching experience, both of whom have experienced computer-supported learning and teaching mathematics, respectively. We collected four tutoring videos online, and a (...) 45-min interview video from the teacher. We found that the third type of commognitive responsibility shift in both the teacher’s and student’s CPS behavior online is not only teacher–student comparison but also alternating-led, which includes teacher–student-led and student–teacher-led. (shrink)

Scientists often reach provisional agreement solutions to problems central to their disciplines, whereas philosophers do not. Although philosophy has been practiced by outstanding intellects for over two thousand years, philosophers have not reached agreement, provisional or otherwise, on the solution or dissolution of any central philosophical problem by philosophical methods. What about philosophy’s future? Until about 1970, philosophers were generally optimistic. Some pinned their hopes on revolution in methodology, others on reform of practice. The case for gradual reform still (...) finds articulate advocates in philosophers like Michael Dummett and Timothy Williamson, but many philosophers today suspect that perennial disagreement may be inescapable. I consider three explanations for the inescapability of perennial disagreement—Richard Rorty’s relativism, Colin McGinn’s skepticism, and Nicholas Rescher’s pluralism—and find each wanting. I argue that a better explanation is the resistance of philosophers to commit, as scientists do, to formulating testable theories and collecting data to help decide between competing theories. I close by proposing that experimental philosophy, a movement still in its infancy, holds the promise of reuniting philosophy with science and moving philosophers closer to agreement on the solution of its central problems. (shrink)

Antimicrobial resistance is a global collective action problem with dire consequences for human health. This article considers how domestic and international legal mechanisms can be used to address antimicrobial resistance and overcome the governance and political economy challenges that accelerate it.

What are consequential world problems? As “grand societal challenges”, one might define them as problems that affect a large number of people, perhaps even the entire planet, including problems such as climate change, distributive justice, world peace, world nutrition, clean air and clean water, access to education, and many more. The “Sustainable Development Goals”, compiled by the United Nations, represent a collection of such global problems. From my point of view, these problems can be seen as complex. Such complex problems (...) are characterized by the complexity, connectivity, dynamics, intransparency, and polytely of their underlying systems. These attributes require special competencies for dealing with the uncertainties of the given domains, e.g., critical thinking. My position is that it is not IQ, but complex problem-solving competencies for dealing with complex and dynamic situations, that is important for handling consequential global problems. These problems require system competencies, i.e., competencies that go beyond analytical intelligence, and comprise systems understanding as well as systems control. Complex problem-solving is more than analytic intelligence. (shrink)

This is a reply to Chris Tweed's recent attempt to solve the problem of "nearly convergent knowledge" and thus defend a binary account of knowledge against a contrastivist alternative. Ingenuous as his proposal is, it still does not solve the problem.

A recently developed model of general collective intelligence defines a method for organizing humans or artificially intelligent agents that is believed to create the potential to exponentially increase the general problem-solving ability of groups of such entities over that of any individual entity. An analysis based on this model suggests that many and perhaps all “wicked problems” are collective optimization problems that cannot reliably be addressed without a system of collective optimization, but that might be (...) reliably addressed through such a system. This paper briefly introduces the concept of GCI as well as why it is a system of collective optimization, and explores why “wicked problems” from the perspective of GCI are collective optimization problems, and therefore why such problems might require GCI to be reliably solvable. (shrink)

A recently developed model of general collective intelligence defines a method for organizing humans or artificially intelligent agents that is believed to create the potential to exponentially increase the general problem-solving ability of groups of such entities over that of any individual entity. An analysis based on this model suggests that many and perhaps all “wicked problems” are collective optimization problems that cannot reliably be addressed without a system of collective optimization, but that might be (...) reliably addressed through such a system. This paper briefly introduces the concept of GCI as well as why it is a system of collective optimization, and explores why “wicked problems” from the perspective of GCI are collective optimization problems, and therefore why such problems might require GCI to be reliably solvable. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically examine Stephen Turner's critique of practice theory in light of recent neurophysiological discoveries regarding the “mirror neuron system” in the pre-frontal mo-tor cortex of humans and other primates. I argue that two of Turner's strongest objections against the sociological version of the practice-theoretical account, the problem of transmission and the problem of sameness, are substantially undermined when examined from the perspective of re-cently systematized accounts of embodied learning and intersubjective action understanding in-spired by (...) these developments. In addition, I show that the practice-theoretical framework out-lined by Pierre Bourdieu in the Logic of Practice and other works is, in contrast to Turner's por-trayal of a confused hodgepodge of logical errors and empirical impossibilities, largely consistent with the latest neurophysiological evidence and as such fundamentally foreshadowed more recent understandings of the neurocognitive foundations of the perception, understanding and structure of the motor schemes productive of action in the world. Also in line with these newer neurosci-entific developments, the practice-theoretical focus on the body as the central matrix generative of tacit understandings and analogical operations responsible for “higher order” systems of classi-fication emerges as the key to solving some of the thorniest problems in the theory of action: eliminating to need to resort to unwarranted “collective object” explanations for the origins of shared presuppositional frameworks. (shrink)

A popular positivistic line of thinking seems to be cropping up again, declaring that the sciences are on the verge of a paradigmatic shift. One that will merge science and philosophy to finally answer all the great big questions once and for all. Questions such as What is life? What is consciousness? What makes individuals who they are? Why does our universe seem fine-tuned for our existence? How did it all begin? While such questions are undoubtedly important, the truth is, (...) they are essentially philosophical. That is to say, they escape the kind of exactness required of the hard sciences. The upshot is that they are at best only answerable to a limited extent, if they are even answerable at all. (shrink)

In this special issue, we draw on pragmatist political and social theory and philosophy to illustrate the creative potential of this intellectual tradition for thinking about the numerous crises that haunt liberal democratic societies today. The introduction identifies five overlapping problem constellations (demise of public power, lasting consequences of inequality, pluralization of society, return of authoritarian practices and globalization of the world) that have driven the recent rise of undemocratic or authoritarian patterns of social organization and political rule. Against (...) this backdrop, we conclude that the revitalization of certain dimensions of liberal democracy will not suffice to overcome these problems, which means that democratic practices need radical rethinking and reconceptualization. For this intellectual and political endeavour, we argue, pragmatism provides a suitable framework to identify problems that require resolution and define and mobilize collective problem solving capacities from already existing practices. All eight contributions to this special issue draw on pragmatist political and social theory and philosophy to illustrate to what extent, and to what ends, this intellectual tradition can revitalize the political and social discourse on the past, present and future of democracy. The articles are organized in two sections : (1) Pragmatist critique and the critical potential of pragmatism, (2) pragmatist politics and theories of democratic practice. (shrink)

The process of cooperative problem solving can be divided into four stages. First, finding potential team members, then forming a team followed by constructing a plan for that team. Finally, the plan is executed by the team. Traditionally, very simple protocols like the Contract Net protocol are used for performing the first two stages of the process. In an open environment however, there can be discussion among the agents in order to form a team that can achieve the (...) collective intention of solving the problem. For these cases fixed protocols like contract net do not suffice. In this paper we present an alternative solution, using structured dialogues, with an emphasis on persuasion, that can be shown to lead to the required team formation. The dialogues are described formally using modal logics and speech acts. (shrink)

We are all problem-solvers of some sort. We solve problems to earn a living, get promoted, show that we are smart and deserve colleagues’ respect, and contribute to human progress. Yes, problem-solving is important; the better solution-maker we are, the brighter future we expect. But we are not such good problem solvers for simple reasons: it is hard to define a genuine problem.

Current general restrictions on performance-enhancing drugs pose a collective action problem that cannot be solved and bring a variety of adverse consequences for sport. General prohibitions of PEDs are grounded in claims that they violate the integrity of sport. But there are decisive arguments against integrity of sport-based prohibitions of PEDs for elite sport. We defend a harm prevention approach to PED prohibition as an alternative. This position cannot support a general ban on PEDs, since it provides no (...) basis for prohibiting non-harmful PED use. We argue that a harm prevention approach to restricting PEDs is ethically justified, has better prospects of compliance, is consistent with respecting the integrity of sport, and holds at least a modest prospect of resolving the collective action problem around PED restriction. (shrink)

Climate change can be construed as a question of collective responsibility from two different viewpoints: climate change being inherently a collective problem, or collective entities bearing responsibility for climate change. When discussing collective responsibility for climate change, “collective” can thus refer to the problem of climate change itself, or to the entity causing the harm and/or bearing responsibility for it. The first viewpoint focuses on how climate change is a harm that has been (...) caused collectively. Collective action problem refers to an aggregation of individual actions which together produce an outcome that is not intended at the level of an individual action. It cannot be solved by any one agent acting unilaterally. Instead, climate change action must be enacted and supported by numerous agents. The second way to conceptualize climate change as a question of collective responsibility focuses on the collective entities that bear responsibility for climate change. As a global problem, climate change is linked to the realm of international politics, where states, governments, and intergovernmental organizations are the main collective entities. Other important agential collectives in terms of climate responsibility are corporations, including carbon majors who have produced the bulk of emissions. Climate change has also been theorized as a structural injustice, which combines elements from both the viewpoints on what is collective about responsibility for climate change. (shrink)

Collective moral agents can cause their own moral incapacity. If an agent is morally incapacitated, then the agent is exempted from responsibility. Due to self-induced moral incapacity, corporate responsibility gaps resurface. To solve this problem, I first set out and defend a minimalist account of moral competence for group agents. After setting out how a collective agent can cause its own moral incapacity, I argue that self-induced temporary exempting conditions do not free an agent from diachronic responsibility (...) once the agent regains its moral faculties. For collective agents, any exempting condition is potentially temporary due to the ‘malleability’ of their constitution. Therefore, in cases of self-induced moral incapacity and subsequent wrongdoing, unlike individuals, every collective agent can be (made) morally responsible for its actions even though it did not qualify as a moral agent at the time of wrongdoing. Hence, this is no reason for skepticism concerning corporate responsibility. (shrink)

We all believe an unbounded number of things about the way the world is and about the way the world works. For example, I believe that if I move this book into the other room, it will not change color -- unless there is a paint shower on the way, unless I carry an umbrella through that shower, and so on; I believe that large red trucks at high speeds can hurt me, that trucks with polka dots can hurt me, (...) and so on; that if I move this book, the room will stay in place -- unless there is a pressure switch under the book attached to a bomb, unless the switch communicates to the bomb by radio and there is shielding in the way, and so on; that the moon is not made of green cheese, that the moon is not made of caviar, that the moon is not made of gold, and so on. The problems involved in accounting for such infinite proliferations of beliefs -- and the computations and inferences that take them into account -- are collectively called the Frame Problems, and are considered by some to constitute a major discovery of a new philosophical problem. How could we possibly learn them all? How could the brain possibly hold them all? The problems appear insoluble, impossible. Yet we all learn and hold such unbounded numbers of beliefs; in particular, children do. Something must be wrong. I wish to argue that the frame problem arises from a fundamental presupposition about the nature of representation -- a false presupposition. Yet, it is a presupposition that dominates contemporary developmental psychology (and psychology more broadly, and cognitive science, artificial intelligence, philosophy of mind, and so on). In particular, I will offer an alternative model of the nature of representation within which the frame problem does not arise -- within which such unboundedness is natural. (shrink)

Novel varieties of interplay between humans, robots and software agents are on the rise. Computer-based artefacts are no longer mere tools but have become interaction partners. Distributed problem solving and social agency may be modelled by social computing systems based on multi-agent systems. MAS and agent-based modelling approaches focus on the simulation of complex interactions and relationships of human and/or non-human agents. MAS may be deployed both in virtual environments and cyber-physical systems. With regard to their impact on (...) the physical environment, such systems possess a virtual actuality in a testbed. They have a real actuality when they are employed in real time in order to govern processes in the natural world. Constellations of inter-agency and distributed agency materialize. This paper presents a multidimensional, gradual classification framework for individual and joint agency. Activity level, adaptivity, interaction and personification of others are essential dimensions. The framework allows constellations of distributed and collective agency in socio-technical systems to be analysed in detail. Scenarios where solely humans act can be compared to testbed simulations based on this classification scheme. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to identify the ethical problems that nurse managers encounter in their work and the role of codes of ethics in the solutions to these difficulties. The data were collected using a structured questionnaire and analysed statistically. The target sample included all nurse managers in 21 specialized health care or primary health care organizations in two hospital districts in Finland (N = 501; response rate 41%). The most common ethical problems concerned resource allocation as well (...) as providing and developing high quality care. This was the case in different managerial positions as well as in types of organization. Professional codes of ethics were used more often for problems related to patients’ care compared with issues of resource allocation. Nurse managers at middle or strategic management levels used codes of ethics more often than those in charge of a ward. More research is required to investigate ethical decision making in nursing management, especially with regard to problem solving. In addition, new guidelines and continuing education in ethics are important for management personnel. (shrink)

What can one say to the self-deceived? And – perhaps more importantly – who can say it? The attribution of self-deception depends heavily on the criteria for what is thought to be beyond dispute. For Galeotti, misperception of reality is a product of psychological and emotional pressure resulting in ‘emotionally overloaded wishes’, and her solution thus involves the construction of what an ‘impartial’ and ‘dispassionate’ observer would conclude when presented with the same evidence. Drawing on her examples of foreign policy (...) decision-making, I discuss two objections. First, I ask whether being ‘dispassionate’ is enough get one off the hook from the sorts of value judgements that must be made in assessing evidence in complex situations. Second, I address the role of disagreement and dissent, and suggest that what is required are not actors with a lack of emotionally overloaded wishes, but actors with different goals and wishes. Thus, while Galeotti emphasizes solutions drawing on ideals of impartiality, we might more productively look for solutions that engage multiple forms of partiality. (shrink)

Taken collectively, consumer food choices have a major impact on animal lives, human lives, and the environment. But it is far from clear how to move from facts about the power of collective consumer demand to conclusions about what one ought to do as an individual consumer. In particular, even if a large-scale shift in demand away from a certain product (e.g., factory-farmed meat) would prevent grave harms or injustices, it typically does not seem that it will make a (...) difference whether one refrains from purchasing that product oneself. Most present-day food companies operate at too large a scale for a single purchase to make a difference to production decisions. If that is true, then it is not clear what point there is in refraining. This is “the problem of collective impact.” This chapter explores a range of proposals for how to solve this problem. (shrink)

In the article, in which religious attitudes and behaviours in rural life and agricultural activities in Antalya have been studied, the religious mentality of the farmers engaged in agricultural activities has been analysed in the context of agricultural perceptions, agricultural production problems and religious attitudes scales. Human being has cultivated the soil to meet his most basic physiological needs, and the stages in these cultivation processes constitute the development stages of human history. In this way, it could be said that (...) the history of farming is the history of humanity. Farming, which has undergone a structural transformation with mechanization, is experiencing its most difficult period in the production-health equation today. The ever-increasing population in the world has led to the need to diversify products as well as to produce more. This brought the improvement of seeds, analysis of the soil, spraying in the production process all from the traditional form to a modern form, which brought the problem of trust towards the product and the producer to the fore. In our study, which focuses on the question of what is the effect of religious attitudes on the solution of agricultural production problems, the data have been obtained through face-to-face interviews with the farmers of Antalya and three scales have been developed as agricultural perception, agricultural production problems and religious attitudes. While the agricultural perceptions scale is dealt with three stages: farmers’ perceptions of soil, profession and technology, religious attitude scale is dealt with in four stages: fate, beliefs, traditional practices, and fiqh rules. The scale of agricultural production problems is discussed as one-dimensional. Data collected through each of these three scales has been analysed with the help of standard deviation and mean, t-test results and structural equation modelling (SEM) techniques. Within the framework of the structural equation model, four hypotheses have been developed and these hypotheses have been confirmed. According to structural equation modelling data, fate perception elaborates 17% of variance in farming perception and 12% of variance in religious attitude perception. While farming perception verbalises 31 % of variance in agricultural production problems, religious attitude perception explains 6 % of variance in agricultural production problems. (shrink)

I argue in this essay that today’s conservatives have proven themselves radical—i.e., completely out of step with the history of western political thought—in their refusal to acknowledge the existence of collective action problems and the role government must often play to solve them.

In this paper I will discuss a certain philosophical and conceptual program -- that I have called philosophy of social action writ large -- and also show in detail how parts of the program have been, and is currently being carried out. In current philosophical research the philosophy of social action can be understood in a broad sense to encompass such central research topics as action occurring in a social context (this includes multi-agent action); shared we-attitudes (such as we-intention, mutual (...) belief) and other social attitudes expressing collective intentionality and needed for the explication and explanation of social action; social macro-notions, such as actions performed by social groups and properties of social groups such as their goals and beliefs; social practices, and institutions (see e.g. Tuomela, 1995, 2000a, 2001). The theory of social action understood analogously in a broad sense would then involve not only philosophical but all other relevant theorizing about social action. Thus, in this sense, such fields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Distributed AI (DAI) and the theory of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) fall within the scope of the theory of social action. DAI studies the social side of computer systems and includes various well-known areas ranging from human-computer interaction, computer-supported cooperative work, organizational processing, and distributed problem solving to the simulation of social systems. (shrink)

Several initiatives by the Government of Uganda, Research Institutes and CGIAR centers have promoted the use of tissue culture banana technology as an effective means of providing clean planting material to reduce the spread of Banana Xanthomonas wilt but its uptake is still low. We examine factors that constrain uptake of tissue culture banana planting materials in central Uganda by considering the cultural context of banana cultivation. Data were collected using eight focus group discussions involving 64 banana farmers and 10 (...) key informant interviews and subjected to thematic analysis. Results showed that banana cultivars in the study communities were important for food, cultural practices and medicine. Cultivars supplied through TC were based on commercial considerations focusing on market value and household income and insufficient attention was given to their cultural importance. Farmers regard banana from TC planting material to be incompatible with their tastes and preferences for traditional food and drinks, culture and medicine. Furthermore, the plantlets are perceived as complicated to use, and farmers report requiring more knowledge and information on how to plant and maintain the plantlets on-farm. In these aspects, TC planting material does not align with cultural values linked to societal welfare. Future efforts aimed at controlling pests and diseases would benefit from more location-specific and holistic approaches that integrate cultural dimensions alongside planting material hygiene, quality and vigor. (shrink)

The dilemma mentioned in the title have long been a puzzle to logic. To solve it, it was necessary to make some philosophical decisions. The article provides these decisions and discusses the way to solve the problem.

Could groups ever be an understanding subject (an epistemic agent ascribed with understanding) or should we keep our focus exclusively on the individuals that make up the group? The way this paper will shape an answer to this question is by starting from a case we are most willing to accept as group understanding, then mark out the crucial differences with an unconvincing case, and, ultimately, explain why these differences matter. In order to concoct the cases, however, we need to (...) elucidate what it means to be attributed with understanding and what makes up an epistemic agent. I shall argue that it is abilities, above all, that guide our attributions of understanding. While it is true that understanding must go beyond single acts, this is not going beyond as in going behind them (to private occurrences which are impossible to discern and don’t themselves contribute anything of value), but beyond as in considering what people could and would do: their discernable and valuable abilities. To conceptualize whom the abilities belong to, I will specify what it means to be an epistemic agent. I shall argue that it is being a successful target of the epistemic stance. The epistemic stance (heavily inspired by Dennett’s intentional stance) forms an instrumental abstraction by attributing epistemic properties (i.e., beliefs, epistemic aims, problem-solving tactics) to an entity to explain or predict its behavior. Macro-systematicity (a higher-level pattern which a theory can exploit) is what makes the epistemic stance’s abstraction an explanatory powerful one (regardless of how that macro-systematicity is realized) and emergence (the lack of a straightforward mapping-relation between the micro and the macro) is what makes its power unique to a particular level of explanation. To end, I suggest two kinds of mapping-relations and walk through the shift from reducibility to emergence. (shrink)

There has been considerable recent interest in the “collective moral autonomy” thesis (CMA), that is, the notion that we can predicate moral successes, failures, and duties of collectives even if there are no comparable successes, failures, and duties among members. One reason why this position looks appealing is because the opposing individualist position seems to have what we might call an accounting problem. Individualists maintain that only individuals can be subjects of moral success, failure, or duty; however, many (...) reasonable judgments about collective actions include moral information on a scale and of a stringency that it does not seem possible to predicate even of the duties of members who have steering power in the actions of the collective. Here I offer a paradigm for thinking about responsibility judgments in organized collective cases to help individualism solve its accounting problem, and allow us to account within a strict individualist perspective for moral information that ostensibly favors CMA. (shrink)

Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. Not all groups are moral agents. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties. Moreover, if such duties imply ability then moral agents – of both the individual and group varieties – can only bear duties over actions they are able to perform. I tease out the implications of this for duties over group actions, and argue that groups in many instances cannot bear these duties. This is because only groups (...) with the right kind of structure – groups I call ‘collectives’ – have the agency to bear action-demanding duties. Yet neither can individuals bear these duties, assuming that individuals cannot perform group actions and that duty implies ability. This appears to leave us at a loss when assigning duties to perform some group actions. I argue we can solve this problem by assigning collectivization duties to individuals – duties to form a collective that then incurs a duty over the action. I give criteria for when individuals have collectivization duties and discuss the demands these duties place on their bearers. (shrink)