Search results for 'colour perception' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Mark Eli Kalderon, Form Without Matter, Empedocles and Aristotle on Color Perception.score: 174.0
    Aristotle’s definition in De Anima of perception as the assimilation of sensible form without the matter of the perceived object is notoriously difficult to interpret. The present essay provides a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s definition by reading it in light of a puzzle about sensory presentation to be found in the work of Empedocles. Empedocles held a general conception of sensory awareness for which ingestion provides the model. In order for something to be perceived it must be taken within (...)
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  2. Steven Davis (ed.) (2000). Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic, and Computational Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.score: 168.0
    Color has been studied for centuries, but has never been completely understood. Digital technology has recently sparked a burgeoning interdisciplinary interest in color. The fact that color is a quality of perception rather than a physical quality brings up a host of interesting questions of interest to both artists and scholars. This volume--the ninth in the Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science series--brings together chapters by psychologists, philosophers, computer scientists, and artists to explore the nature of human color perception (...)
     
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  3. Angus Gellatly (2002). Color Perception: Processing of Wavelength Information and Conscious Experience of Color. In Barbara Saunders & Jaap Van Brakel (eds.), Theories, Technologies, Instrumentalities of Color: Anthropological and Historiographic Perspectives. University Press of America. 77-89.score: 156.0
     
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  4. R. Beau Lotto & Dale Purves (2002). The Empirical Basis of Color Perception. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):609-629.score: 150.0
  5. Elof A. Carlson (2002). Color Perception: An Ongoing Convergence of Reductionism and Phenomenology. In Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research Vol Lxxvii. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.score: 150.0
     
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  6. Evan Thompson (1995). Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Perception. New York: Routledge.score: 144.0
    This book is a major contribution to the interdisciplinary project of investigating the true nature of color vision. In recent times, research into color vision has been one of the main success stories of cognitive science. Each discipline in the field--neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, computer science and philosophy--has contributed significantly to our understanding of color. Evan Thompson provides an accessible review of current scientific and philosophical discussions of color vision. He steers a course between the subjective and objective positions on color, (...)
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  7. Gary Hatfield (1992). Color Perception and Neural Encoding: Does Metameric Matching Entail a Loss of Information? Philosophy of Science Association 1992:492-504.score: 144.0
    It seems intuitively obvious that metameric matching of color samples entails a loss of information, for spectrophotometrically diverse materials appear the same. This intuition implicitly relies on a conception of the function of color vision and on a related conception of how color samples should be individuated. It assumes that the function of color vision is to distinguish among spectral energy distributions, and that color samples should be individuated by their physical properties. I challenge these assumptions by articulating a different (...)
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  8. Yasmina Jraissati (2012). Categorical Perception of Color: Assessing the Role of Language. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):439-462.score: 144.0
    Why do we draw the boundaries between “blue” and “green”, where we do? One proposed answer to this question is that we categorize color the way we do because we perceive color categorically. Starting in the 1950’s, the phenomenon of “categorical perception” (CP) encouraged such a response. CP refers to the fact that adjacent color patches are more easily discriminated when they straddle a category boundary than when they belong to the same category. In this paper, I make three (...)
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  9. Mazyar Fallah Carolyn J. Perry (2012). Color Improves Speed of Processing But Not Perception in a Motion Illusion. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 144.0
    When two superimposed surfaces of dots move in different directions, the perceived directions are shifted away from each other. This perceptual illusion has been termed direction repulsion and is thought to be due to mutual inhibition between the representations of the two directions. It has further been shown that a speed difference between the two surfaces attenuates direction repulsion. As speed and direction are both necessary components of representing motion, the reduction in direction repulsion can be attributed to the additional (...)
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  10. David R. Hilbert (1987). Color and Color Perception: A Study in Anthropocentric Realism. Csli Press.score: 138.0
  11. Keith Allen (2009). Inter-Species Variation in Colour Perception. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):197 - 220.score: 132.0
    Inter-species variation in colour perception poses a serious problem for the view that colours are mind-independent properties. Given that colour perception varies so drastically across species, which species perceives colours as they really are? In this paper, I argue that all do. Specifically, I argue that members of different species perceive properties that are determinates of different, mutually compatible, determinables. This is an instance of a general selectionist strategy for dealing with cases of perceptual variation. According (...)
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  12. Edward Averill (2012). The Phenomenological Character of Color Perception. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):27-45.score: 132.0
    When an object looks red to an observer, the visual experience of the observer has two important features. The experience visually represents the object as having a property—being red. And the experience has a phenomenological character; that is, there is something that it is like to have an experience of seeing an object as red. Let qualia be the properties that give our sensory and perceptual experiences their phenomenological character. This essay takes up two related problem for a nonreductive account (...)
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  13. Jonathan Cohen (2007). A Relationalist's Guide to Error About Color Perception. Noûs 41 (2):335–353.score: 132.0
    Color relationalism is the view that colors are constituted in terms of relations to perceiving subjects. Among its explanatory virtues, relation- alism provides a satisfying treatment of cases of perceptual variation. But it can seem that relationalists lack resources for saying that a representa- tion of x’s color is erroneous. Surely, though, a theory of color that makes errors of color perception impossible cannot be correct. In this paper I’ll argue that, initial appearances notwithstanding, relationalism contains the resources to (...)
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  14. Thomas Schmidt (2000). Visual Perception Without Awareness: Priming Responses by Color. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. 157--179.score: 132.0
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  15. C. R. Brian & F. L. Goodenough (1929). The Relative Potency of Color and Form Perception at Various Ages. Journal of Experimental Psychology 12 (3):197.score: 132.0
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  16. Berit Brogaard, Perspectival Truth and Color Perception.score: 120.0
    Perspectivalism is a semantic theory according to which the contents of utterances and mental states (perhaps of a particular kind) have a truth-value only relative to a particular perspective (or standard) determined by the context of the speaker or bearer of the mental state. I have defended this view for epistemic terms, moral terms and predicates of personal taste elsewhere (Brogaard 2008a, 2008b, forthcoming). The main aim of this paper is to defend perspectivalism about color perception and color discourse. (...)
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  17. Austen Clark (1998). Color Perception (in 3000 Words). In George Graham & William Bechtel (eds.), A Companion to Cognitive Science. Blackwell.score: 120.0
    A neighbor who strikes it rich evokes both admiration and envy, and a similar mix of emotions must be aroused in many neighborhoods of cognitive science when the residents look at the results of research in color perception. It provides what is probably the most widely acknowledged success story of any domain of scientific psychology: the success, against all expectation, of the opponent process theory of color perception. Initially proposed by a Ewald Hering, a nineteenth century physiologist, it (...)
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  18. Rainer Mausfeld & Reinhard Niederée (2003). Can a Physicalist Notion of Color Provide Any Insight Into the Nature of Color Perception? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):41-42.score: 120.0
    Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) conceive of color perception as the representation of a physical property “out there.” In our view, their approach does not only have various internal problems, but is also apt to becloud both the intricate and still poorly understood role that “color” plays within perceptual architecture, and the complex coupling to the “external world” of the perceptual system as an entirety. We propose an alternative perspective, which avoids B&H's misleading dichotomy between a purely subjective (...)
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  19. Laurence T. Maloney (2003). Surface Color Perception and Environmental Constraints. In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press. 279--300.score: 120.0
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  20. Nicola Bruno & Stephen Westland (2001). Colour Perception May Optimize Biologically Relevant Surface Discriminations – Rather Than Type-I Constancy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4):658-659.score: 120.0
    Trichromacy may result from an adaptation to the regularities in terrestrial illumination. However, we suggest that a complete characterization of the challenges faced by colour perception must include changes in surface surround and illuminant changes due to inter-reflections between surfaces in cluttered scenes. Furthermore, our trichromatic system may have evolved to allow the detection of brownish-reddish edibles against greenish backgrounds. [Shepard].
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  21. Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.) (2003). Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press.score: 120.0
    Colour has long been a source of fascination to both scientists and philosophers. In one sense, colours are in the mind of the beholder, in another sense they belong to the external world. Colours appear to lie on the boundary where we have divided the world into 'objective' and 'subjective' events. They represent, more than any other attribute of our visual experience, a place where both physical and mental properties are interwoven in an intimate and enigmatic way. -/- The (...)
     
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  22. Maloney & Yang (2003). The Illuminant Estimation Hypothesis and Surface Colour Perception. In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oup Oxford.score: 120.0
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  23. John Campbell (2005). Transparency Vs. Revelation in Color Perception. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):105-115.score: 114.0
    What knowledge of the colors does perception of the colors provide? My first aim in this essay is to characterize the way in which color experience seems to provide knowledge of colors. This in turn tells us something about what it takes for there to be colors. Color experience provides knowledge of the aspect of the world that is being acted on when we, or some external force, act on the color of an object and thus make a difference (...)
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  24. Peter W. Ross (2012). Perceived Colors and Perceived Locations: A Problem for Color Subjectivism. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):125-138.score: 108.0
    Color subjectivists claim that, despite appearances to the contrary, the world external to the mind is colorless. However, in giving an account of color perception, subjectivists about the nature of perceived color must address the nature of perceived spatial location as well. The argument here will be that subjectivists’ problems with coordinating the metaphysics of perceived color and perceived location render color perception implausibly mysterious. Consequently, some version of color realism, the view that colors are (physical, dispositional, functional, (...)
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  25. Peter W. Ross (2001). The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):42-58.score: 108.0
    According to color subjectivism, colors are mental properties, processes, or events of visual experiences of color. I first lay out an argument for subjectivism founded on claims from visual science and show that it also relies on a philosophical assumption. I then argue that subjectivism is untenable because this view cannot provide a plausible account of color perception. I describe three versions of subjectivism, each of which combines subjectivism with a theory of perception, namely sense datum theory, adverbialism, (...)
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  26. Nigel J. T. Thomas (2001). Color Realism: Toward a Solution to the "Hard Problem". Consciousness And Cognition 10 (1):140-145.score: 102.0
    This article was written as a commentary on a target article by Peter W. Ross entitled "The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism" [Consciousness and Cognition 10(1), 42-58 (2001)], and is published together with it, and with other commentaries and Ross's reply. If you or your library have the necessary subscription you can get PDF versions of the target article, all the commentaries, and Ross's reply to the commentaries here. However, I do not think that it is by any means essential (...)
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  27. Austen Clark (1985). Qualia and the Psychophysical Explanation of Color Perception. Synthese 65 (December):377-405.score: 102.0
    Can psychology explain the qualitative content of experience? A persistent philosophical objection to that discipline is that it cannot. Qualitative states or "qualia" are argued to have characteristics which cannot be explained in terms of their relationships to other psychological states, stimuli, and behavior. Since psychology is confined to descriptions of such relationships, it seems that psychology cannot explain qualia.
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  28. Antti Revonsuo (2001). Putting Color Back Where It Belongs. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):78-84.score: 102.0
    I disagree with Ross about the location of colors: They are in the brain, not in the external world. It is difficult to deny that there are colors in our conscious visual experience, and if we take the causal theory of perception seriously, we cannot identify these colors with the beginning of the causal chain in perception (external objects in the distal stimulus field), but we must search for them at the end of the causal chain (in the (...)
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  29. Jonathan Cohen (2001). Subjectivism, Physicalism or None of the Above? Comments on Ross's The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):94-104.score: 102.0
    In “The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism,” Peter Ross argues against what he calls subjectivism — the view that “colors are not describable in physical terms, ... [but are] mental processes or events of visual states” (2),1 and in favor of physicalism — a view according to which colors are “physical properties of physical objects, such as reflectance properties” (10). He rejects an argument that has been offered in support of subjectivism, and argues that, since no form of subjectivism is (...)
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  30. Zoltán Jakab (2005). Opponent Processing, Linear Models, and the Veridicality of Color Perception. In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 336--378.score: 102.0
  31. Nicolas Claidière, Yasmina Jraissati & Coralie Chevallier (2008). A Colour Sorting Task Reveals the Limits of the Universalist/Relativist Dichotomy. Journal of Culture and Cognition 8:211-233.score: 102.0
    We designed a new protocol requiring French adult participants to group a large number of Munsell colour chips into three or four groups. On one, relativist, view, participants would be expected to rely on their colour lexicon in such a task. In this [ramework, the resulting groups should be more similar to French colour categories than to other languages categories. On another, universalist, view, participants would be expected to rely on universal features of perception. In this (...)
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  32. Todd Ganson (2013). Are Color Experiences Representational? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.score: 96.0
    The dominant view among philosophers of perception is that color experiences, like color judgments, are essentially representational: as part of their very nature color experiences possess representational contents which are either accurate or inaccurate. My starting point in assessing this view is Sydney Shoemaker’s familiar account of color perception. After providing a sympathetic reconstruction of his account, I show how plausible assumptions at the heart of Shoemaker’s theory make trouble for his claim that color experiences represent the colors (...)
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  33. Rainer Mausfeld (1998). Color Perception: From Grassmann Codes to a Dual Code for Object and Illumination Colors. In W. Backhaus, R. Kliegl & J. Werner (eds.), Color Vision. Perspectives from Different Disciplines. De Gruyter.score: 96.0
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  34. Dave Ward (2012). Why Don't Synaesthetic Colours Adapt Away? Philosophical Studies 159 (1):123-138.score: 96.0
    Synaesthetes persistently perceive certain stimuli as systematically accompanied by illusory colours, even though they know those colours to be illusory. This appears to contrast with cases where a subject’s colour vision adapts to systematic distortions caused by wearing coloured goggles. Given that each case involves longstanding systematic distortion of colour perception that the subjects recognize as such, how can a theory of colour perception explain the fact that perceptual adaptation occurs in one case but not (...)
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  35. Erik Myin (2001). Color and the Duplication Assumption. Synthese 129 (1):61-77.score: 96.0
    Susan Hurley has attacked the ''Duplication Assumption'', the assumption thatcreatures with exactly the same internal states could function exactly alike inenvironments that are systematically distorted. She argues that the dynamicalinterdependence of action and perception is highly problematic for the DuplicationAssumption when it involves spatial states and capacities, whereas no such problemsarise when it involves color states and capacities. I will try to establish that theDuplication Assumption makes even less sense for lightness than for some ofthe spatial cases. This is (...)
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  36. Mohan Matthen (2005). Is Color Perception Really Categorical? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):504-505.score: 96.0
    Are color categories the evolutionary product of their usefulness in communication, or is this an accidental benefit they give us? It is argued here that embodiment constraints on color categorization suggest that communication is an add-on at best. Thus, the Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) model may be important in explaining coordination, but only at the margin. Furthermore, the concentration on discrimination is questionable: coclassification is at least as important.
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  37. Bruno G. Breitmeyer, Tony Ro & Neel S. Singhal (2004). Unconscious Color Priming Occurs at Stimulus- Not Percept-Dependent Levels of Processing. Psychological Science 15 (3):198-202.score: 96.0
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  38. Noud W. H. van Kruysbergen, Anna M. T. Bosman & Charles de Weert (1997). Universal Colour Perception Versus Contingent Colour Naming: A Paradox? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):209-210.score: 96.0
    Confusion concerning the issue of universality of colour categorization would greatly diminish if context regains its fundamental status in psychological research and we give up on the reductionist notion that biological universality implies behavioral universality.
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  39. Stephen Grossberg (2005). Realistic Constraints on Brain Color Perception and Category Learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):495-496.score: 96.0
    Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) ask how autonomous agents can derive perceptually grounded categories for successful communication, using color categorization as an example. Their comparison of nativism, empiricism, and culturalism, although interesting, does not include key biological and technological constraints for seeing color or learning color categories in realistic environments. Other neural models have successfully included these constraints.
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  40. Laurence T. Maloney (2003). Surface Color Perception in Constrained Environments. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):38-39.score: 96.0
    Byrne & Hilbert propose that color can be identified with explicit properties of physical surfaces. I argue that this claim must be qualified to take into account constraints needed to make recovery of surface color information possible. When these constraints are satisfied, then a biological visual system can establish a correspondence between perceived surface color and specific surface properties.
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  41. A. Bompas & J. K. O'Regan (2004). Induced Dependence of Colour Perception on Eye-Movements. In Robert Schwartz (ed.), Perception. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing. 17-18.score: 96.0
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  42. Yasmina Jraissati (2012). Categorical Perception of Color. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):439-462.score: 96.0
    Why do we draw the boundaries between “blue” and “green”, where we do? One proposed answer to this question is that we categorize color the way we do because we perceive color categorically. Starting in the 1950’s, the phenomenon of “categorical perception” (CP) encouraged such a response. CP refers to the fact that adjacent color patches are more easily discriminated when they straddle a category boundary than when they belong to the same category. In this paper, I make three (...)
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  43. Kathleen Akins & Martin Hahn (2000). The Peculiarity of Color. In Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic, and Computational Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.score: 96.0
     
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  44. Mazviita Chirimuuta (2008). Reflectance Realism and Colour Constancy: What Would Count as Scientific Evidence for Hilbert's Ontology of Colour? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):563 – 582.score: 90.0
    Reflectance realism is an important position in the philosophy of colour. This paper is an examination of David R. Hilbert’s case for there being scientific support for the theory. The specific point in question is whether colour science has shown that reflectance is recovered by the human visual system. Following a discussion of possible counter-evidence in the recent scientific literature, I make the argument that conflicting interpretations of the data on reflectance recovery are informed by different theoretical assumptions (...)
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  45. P. W. Jusczyk, S. P. Johnson, E. S. Spelke & L. J. Kennedy (1999). Synchronous Change and Perception of Object Unity: Evidence From Adults and Infants. Cognition 71 (3):257-88.score: 90.0
    Adults and infants display a robust ability to perceive the unity of a center-occluded object when the visible ends of the object undergo common motion (e.g. Kellman, P.J., Spelke, E.S., 1983. Perception of partly occluded objects in infancy. Cognitive Psychology 15, 483±524). Ecologically oriented accounts of this ability focus on the primacy of motion in the perception of segregated objects, but Gestalt theory suggests a broader possibility: observers may perceive object unity by detecting patterns of synchronous change, of (...)
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  46. Semir Zeki, S. Aglioti, D. McKeefry & G. Berlucchi (1999). The Neurological Basis of Conscious Color Perception in a Blind Patient. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 96 (24):14124-14129.score: 90.0
  47. Allan Silverman (1989). Color and Color-Perception in Aristotle's de Anima. Ancient Philosophy 9 (2):271-292.score: 90.0
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  48. Joerg Fingerhut (2011). Sensorimotor Signature, Skill, and Synaesthesia. Two Challenges for Enactive Theories of Perception. In Synaesthesia and Kinaesthetics. Habitus in Habitat III. Peter Lang.score: 90.0
    The condition of ‘genuine perceptual synaesthesia’ has been a focus of attention in research in psychology and neuroscience over the last decades. For subjects in this condition stimulation in one modality automatically and consistently over the subject’s lifespan triggers a percept in another modality. In hearing→colour synaesthesia, for example, a specific sound experience evokes a perception of a specific colour. In this paper, I discuss questions and challenges that the phenomenon of synaesthetic experience raises for theories of (...)
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  49. Maurice Platnauer (1921). Greek Colour-Perception. Classical Quarterly 15 (3-4):153-.score: 90.0
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  50. Wayne Wright (2013). Color Constancy Reconsidered. Acta Analytica 28 (4):435-455.score: 90.0
    This article proposes an account of color constancy based on an examination of the relevant scientific literature. Differences in experimental settings and task instructions that lead to variation in subject performance are given particular attention. Based on the evidence discussed, the core of the proposal made is that there are two different forms of color constancy, one phenomenal and the other projective. This follows the hypothesis of Reeves et al. (Perception & Psychophysics 70:219–228, 2008). Unlike Reeves et al. ( (...) & Psychophysics 70:219–228, 2008), it is argued that projective color constancy is crucially dependent upon phenomenal color constancy and certain aspects of scene perception. Additionally, it is hypothesized that capacities that support projective color constancy have an important role to play in facilitating our ability to quickly recognize scenes with diagnostic chromatic properties independently of assignments of colors to object surfaces. (shrink)
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