Search results for 'computational theory of mind' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Bartlomiej Swiatczak (2011). Conscious Representations: An Intractable Problem for the Computational Theory of Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 21 (1):19-32.
    Advocates of the computational theory of mind claim that the mind is a computer whose operations can be implemented by various computational systems. According to these philosophers, the mind is multiply realisable because—as they claim—thinking involves the manipulation of syntactically structured mental representations. Since syntactically structured representations can be made of different kinds of material while performing the same calculation, mental processes can also be implemented by different kinds of material. From this perspective, consciousness (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  2. Jon Cogburn & Jason Megill (2010). Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind. Minds and Machines 20 (3):423-439.
    We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3. Gualtiero Piccinini (2004). The First Computational Theory of Mind and Brain: A Close Look at McCulloch and Pitts' Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity. Synthese 141 (2):175-215.
    Despite its significance in neuroscience and computation, McCulloch and Pitts's celebrated 1943 paper has received little historical and philosophical attention. In 1943 there already existed a lively community of biophysicists doing mathematical work on neural networks. What was novel in McCulloch and Pitts's paper was their use of logic and computation to understand neural, and thus mental, activity. McCulloch and Pitts's contributions included (i) a formalism whose refinement and generalization led to the notion of finite automata (an important formalism in (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  4.  19
    Steven Horst (1996). Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind. University of California Press.
    In this carefully argued critique, Steven Horst pronounces the theory deficient.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  5.  73
    Steven Horst (1999). Symbols and Computation: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind. Minds and Machines 9 (3):347-381.
    Over the past several decades, the philosophical community has witnessed the emergence of an important new paradigm for understanding the mind.1 The paradigm is that of machine computation, and its influence has been felt not only in philosophy, but also in all of the empirical disciplines devoted to the study of cognition. Of the several strategies for applying the resources provided by computer and cognitive science to the philosophy of mind, the one that has gained the most attention (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  6.  88
    Jeffrey Hershfield (2005). Is There Life After the Death of the Computational Theory of Mind? Minds and Machines 15 (2):183-194.
    In this paper, I explore the implications of Fodor’s attacks on the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), which get their most recent airing in The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way. I argue that if Fodor is right that the CTM founders on the global nature of abductive inference, then several of the philosophical views about the mind that he has championed over the years founder as well. I focus on Fodor’s accounts of mental causation, psychological (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  90
    Kirk Ludwig & Susan Schneider (2008). Fodor's Challenge to the Classical Computational Theory of Mind. Mind and Language 23 (1):123–143.
    In The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way, Jerry Fodor argues that mental representations have context sensitive features relevant to cognition, and that, therefore, the Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is mistaken. We call this the Globality Argument. This is an in principle argument against CTM. We argue that it is self-defeating. We consider an alternative argument constructed from materials in the discussion, which avoids the pitfalls of the official argument. We argue that it is also (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  8.  24
    Hans D. Muller (1999). Steven W. Horst, Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 9 (3):424-430.
  9.  75
    Steven Horst, The Computational Theory of Mind. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Over the past thirty years, it is been common to hear the mind likened to a digital computer. This essay is concerned with a particular philosophical view that holds that the mind literally is a digital computer (in a specific sense of “computer” to be developed), and that thought literally is a kind of computation. This view—which will be called the “Computational Theory of Mind” (CTM)—is thus to be distinguished from other and broader attempts to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  10.  62
    Marcin Milkowski, Computational Theory of Mind.
    The Computational Theory of Mind The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) claims that the mind is a computer, so the theory is also known as computationalism. It is generally assumed that CTM is the main working hypothesis of cognitive science. CTM is often understood as a specific variant of the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), […].
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2006). Two Concepts of "Form" and the so-Called Computational Theory of Mind. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):795-821.
    According to the computational theory of mind , to think is to compute. But what is meant by the word 'compute'? The generally given answer is this: Every case of computing is a case of manipulating symbols, but not vice versa - a manipulation of symbols must be driven exclusively by the formal properties of those symbols if it is qualify as a computation. In this paper, I will present the following argument. Words like 'form' and 'formal' (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Vinod Goel (1991). Sketches of Thought: A Study of the Role of Sketching in Design Problem-Solving and its Implications for the Computational Theory of Mind. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    Much of cognitive science is based on the Computational Theory of Mind hypothesis. The claim is that the mind is in part a computer and as such requires a representational medium--a language of thought--in which to represent information and to carry out computations. ;But the Computational Theory of Mind is much more than a bland commitment to internal representations. It requires that the system of representation have some very stringent properties. In this dissertation (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13. John-Michael Kuczynski (2007). Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind: A Defense of Content-Internalism and Semantic Externalism. John Benjamins & Co.
    Contemporary philosophy and theoretical psychology are dominated by an acceptance of content-externalism: the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively, as opposed to causally, dependent on facts about the external world. In the present work, it is shown that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between semantics and pre-semantics---between, on the one hand, the literal meanings of expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must exploit in order to ascertain their literal meanings. It is (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  77
    Murat Aydede (2005). Computation and Functionalism: Syntactic Theory of Mind Revisited. In G. Irzik & G. Guezeldere (eds.), Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Springer
    There is a thesis often aired by some philosophers of psychology that syntax is all we need and there is no need to advert to intentional/semantic properties of symbols for purposes of psychological explanation. Indeed, the worry has been present since the first explicit articulation of so-called Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Even Fodor, who has been the most ardent defender of the Language of Thought Hypoth- esis (LOTH) (which requires the CTM), has raised worries about its (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15.  1
    Jane Duran (1989). Epistemics: Epistemic Justification Theory Naturalized and the Computational Model of Mind. Upa.
    This author explores the intersection between cognitive science, as exemplified by the computational model of mind, and epistemologyó specifically, epistemic justification theory. Her analysis leads to the conclusion that some very specific and somewhat technical issues in epistemic justification theory can be at least partially resolved, if not entirely cleared up, by the use of the computational model. The third and fourth chapters of this work are devoted directly to that effort. Chapter one examines in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  16
    Elske van der Vaart & Charlotte K. Hemelrijk (2012). 'Theory of Mind' in Animals: Ways to Make Progress. Synthese 191 (3):1-20.
    Whether any non-human animal can attribute mental states to others remains the subject of extensive debate. This despite the fact that several species have behaved as if they have a ‘theory of mind’ in various behavioral tasks. In this paper, we review the reasons of skeptics for their doubts: That existing experimental setups cannot distinguish between ‘mind readers’ and ‘behavior readers’, that results that seem to indicate ‘theory of mind’ may come from studies that are (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17.  14
    Elske Vaart & Charlotte K. Hemelrijk (2012). 'Theory of Mind' in Animals: Ways to Make Progress. Synthese (3):1-20.
    Whether any non-human animal can attribute mental states to others remains the subject of extensive debate. This despite the fact that several species have behaved as if they have a ‘theory of mind’ in various behavioral tasks. In this paper, we review the reasons of skeptics for their doubts: That existing experimental setups cannot distinguish between ‘mind readers’ and ‘behavior readers’, that results that seem to indicate ‘theory of mind’ may come from studies that are (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  82
    Jason L. Megill (2004). Are We Paraconsistent? On the Lucas-Penrose Argument and the Computational Theory of Mind. Auslegung 27 (1):23-30.
  19. Roger Fellows (1995). Welcome to Wales: Searle on the Computational Theory of Mind: Roger Fellows. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 38:85-97.
    In a recent book devoted to giving an overview of cognitive science, Justin Lieber writes: …dazzingly complex computational processes achieve our visual and linguistic understanding, but apart from a few levels of representation these are as little open to our conscious view as the multitudinous rhythm of blood flow through the countless vessels of our brain. It is the aim of hundreds of workers in the allied fields of Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence to unmask these computation processes and (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  40
    Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.) (1986). Meaning And Cognitive Structure: Issues In The Computational Theory Of Mind. Norwood: Ablex.
  21.  7
    Craig DeLancey (1997). Emotion and the Computational Theory of Mind. In S. O'Nuillain, Paul McKevitt & E. MacAogain (eds.), Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  6
    Roger Fellows (1995). Welcome to Wales: Searle on the Computational Theory of Mind. In Philosophy and Technology. New York: Cambridge University Press 85-97.
  23.  23
    Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer (2008). The Computational Theory of Mind and the Decomposition of Actions. Philosophical Topics 36 (2):63-86.
  24. Paul Thagard (1987). Zenon W. Pylyshyn and William Demopoulos, Eds., Meaning and Cognitive Structure: Issues in the Computational Theory of Mind Reviewed By. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 7 (10):422-423.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Richard McDonough (2001). Why the Computational Theory of Mind Doesn't Compute. [REVIEW] Metascience 10 (3):442-447.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Sheldon Richmond (2004). What We Can Learn From Polanyi About the Computational Theory of Mind? Appraisal 5.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. A. Marras (1998). Intentionality and the Computational Theory of the Mind. Metalogicon 2:81-102.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Akifumi Tokosumi (2001). A Computational Literary Theory: The Ultimate Products of the Brain/Mind Machine. In T. Kitamura (ed.), What Should Be Computed to Understand and Model Brain Function? World Scientific 3--43.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  60
    Louis C. Charland (1995). Feeling and Representing: Computational Theory and the Modularity of Affect. Synthese 105 (3):273-301.
    In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  30. Alan M. Leslie, Ori Friedman & Tim P. German (2004). Core Mechanisms in ‘Theory of Mind’. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (12):528-533.
    Our ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of other people does not initially develop as a <span class='Hi'>theory</span> but as a mechanism. The ‘<span class='Hi'>theory</span> of <span class='Hi'>mind</span>’ mechanism (ToMM) is part of the core architecture of the human brain, and is specialized for learning about mental states. Impaired development of this mechanism can have drastic effects on social learning, seen most strikingly in the autistic spectrum disorders. ToMM kick-starts belief–desire attribution but effective reasoning (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   46 citations  
  31. Jonathan Waskan (2011). A Vehicular Theory of Corporeal Qualia (a Gift to Computationalists). Philosophical Studies 152 (1):103 - 125.
    I have argued elsewhere that non-sentential representations that are the close kin of scale models can be, and often are, realized by computational processes. I will attempt here to weaken any resistance to this claim that happens to issue from those who favor an across-the-board computational theory of cognitive activity. I will argue that embracing the idea that certain computers harbor nonsentential models gives proponents of the computational theory of cognition the means to resolve the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  33
    Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman (2011). Towards a Computational Theory of Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):807-827.
    A standing challenge for the science of mind is to account for the datum that every mind faces in the most immediate – that is, unmediated – fashion: its phenomenal experience. The complementary tasks of explaining what it means for a system to give rise to experience and what constitutes the content of experience (qualia) in computational terms are particularly challenging, given the multiple realizability of computation. In this paper, we identify a set of conditions that a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  33. Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). Computational Explanation and Mechanistic Explanation of Mind. In Francesco Ferretti, Massimo Marraffa & Mario De Caro (eds.), Synthese. Springer 343-353.
    According to the computational theory of mind (CTM), mental capacities are explained by inner computations, which in biological organisms are realized in the brain. Computational explanation is so popular and entrenched that it’s common for scientists and philosophers to assume CTM without argument.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  34.  8
    Massimiliano Lorenzo Cappuccio (forthcoming). Mind-Upload. The Ultimate Challenge to the Embodied Mind Theory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.
    The ‘Mind-Upload’ hypothesis, a radical version of the Brain-in-a-Vat thought experiment, asserts that a whole mind can safely be transferred from a brain to a digital device, after being exactly encoded into substrate independent informational patterns. Prima facie, MU seems the philosophical archenemy of the Embodied Mind theory, which understands embodiment as a necessary and constitutive condition for the existence of a mind and its functions. In truth, whether and why MU and EM are ultimately (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  38
    Vivian Bohl & Nivedita Gangopadhyay (2014). Theory of Mind and the Unobservability of Other Minds. Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):203-222.
    The theory of mind (ToM) framework has been criticised by emerging alternative accounts. Each alternative begins with the accusation that ToM's validity as a research paradigm rests on the assumption of the ‘unobservability’ of other minds. We argue that the critics' discussion of the unobservability assumption (UA) targets a straw man. We discuss metaphysical, phenomenological, epistemological, and psychological readings of UA and demonstrate that it is not the case that ToM assumes the metaphysical, phenomenological, or epistemological (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  36. Edward Cokely & Adam Feltz (2008). Individual Differences, Judgment Biases, and Theory-of-Mind: Deconstructing the Intentional Action Side Effect Asymmetry. Journal of Research in Personality 43:18-24.
    When the side effect of an action involves moral considerations (e.g. when a chairman’s pursuit of profits harms the environment) it tends to influence theory-of-mind judgments. On average, bad side effects are judged intentional whereas good side effects are judged unintentional. In a series of two experiments, we examined the largely uninvestigated roles of individual differences in this judgment asymmetry. Experiment 1 indicated that extraversion accounted for variations in intentionality judgments, controlling for a range of other general (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  37.  15
    P. Cariani (2012). Mind, a Machine? Review of “The Search for a Theory of Cognition: Early Mechanisms and New Ideas” Edited by Stefano Franchi and Francesco Bianchini. Constructivist Foundations 7 (3):222-227.
    Upshot: Written by recognized experts in their fields, the book is a set of essays that deals with the influences of early cybernetics, computational theory, artificial intelligence, and connectionist networks on the historical development of computational-representational theories of cognition. In this review, I question the relevance of computability arguments and Jonasian phenomenology, which has been extensively invoked in recent discussions of autopoiesis and Ashby’s homeostats. Although the book deals only indirectly with constructivist approaches to cognition, it is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Peter Carruthers (2011). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. OUP Oxford.
    Do we have introspective access to our own thoughts? Peter Carruthers challenges the consensus that we do: he argues that access to our own thoughts is always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness and sensory imagery. He proposes a bold new theory of self-knowledge, with radical implications for understanding of consciousness and agency.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   51 citations  
  39.  81
    C. M. Heyes (1998). Theory of Mind in Nonhuman Primates. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):101-114.
    Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?,” it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as “want” and “know.” Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, deception, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   54 citations  
  40. Gualtiero Piccinini & Sonya Bahar (2013). Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition. Cognitive Science 37 (3):453-488.
    We begin by distinguishing computationalism from a number of other theses that are sometimes conflated with it. We also distinguish between several important kinds of computation: computation in a generic sense, digital computation, and analog computation. Then, we defend a weak version of computationalism—neural processes are computations in the generic sense. After that, we reject on empirical grounds the common assimilation of neural computation to either analog or digital computation, concluding that neural computation is sui generis. Analog computation requires continuous (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  41. David J. Chalmers (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
    The book is an extended study of the problem of consciousness. After setting up the problem, I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible , and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework. In the second half of the book, I move toward a positive theory of consciousness with fundamental laws linking the physical and the experiential in a systematic way. Finally, I use the ideas and arguments developed earlier to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   329 citations  
  42. Daniel D. Hutto (2011). Understanding Fictional Minds Without Theory of Mind! Style 45 (2):276-282.
    This paper explores the idea that when dealing with certain kinds of narratives, ‘like it or not’, consumers of fiction will bring the same sorts of skills (or at least a subset of them) to bear that they use when dealing with actual minds. Let us call this the ‘Same Resources Thesis’. I believe the ‘Same Resources Thesis’ is true. But this is because I defend the view that engaging in narrative practices is the normal developmental route through which children (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Josh Weisberg, The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.
    Over the last quarter century or so, no one has done more to shape debate in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science than Jerry Fodor. He is best known for championing the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), the view that thinking consists of computations over syntactically structured mental representations (Fodor, 1975). He has also developed the idea that the mind is partially made up of isolated mechanisms called “modules” that employ innate databases informationally encapsulated (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. David M. Armstrong (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. Routledge.
    This classic work of recent philosophy was first published in 1968, and remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In A Materialist Theory of the Mind , D. M. Armstrong provided insight into the debate surrounding the relationship of the mind and body. He put forth a detailed materialist account of all the main mental phenomena, including perception, sensation, belief, the will, introspection, mental images, and consciousness. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   453 citations  
  45. Shannon Spaulding (2014). Embodied Cognition and Theory of Mind. In Lawrence Shapiro (ed.), Handbook of Embodied Cognition. Routledge 197-206.
    According to embodied cognition, the philosophical and empirical literature on theory of mind is misguided. Embodied cognition rejects the idea that social cognition requires theory of mind. It regards the intramural debate between the Theory Theory and the Simulation Theory as irrelevant, and it dismisses the empirical studies on theory of mind as ill conceived and misleading. Embodied cognition provides a novel deflationary account of social (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  39
    Liesbeth Flobbe, Rineke Verbrugge, Petra Hendriks & Irene Krämer (2008). Children's Application of Theory of Mind in Reasoning and Language. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (4):417-442.
    Many social situations require a mental model of the knowledge, beliefs, goals, and intentions of others: a Theory of Mind (ToM). If a person can reason about other people’s beliefs about his own beliefs or intentions, he is demonstrating second-order ToM reasoning. A standard task to test second-order ToM reasoning is the second-order false belief task. A different approach to investigating ToM reasoning is through its application in a strategic game. Another task that is believed to involve (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  47. Marcus P. Adams (2011). Modularity, Theory of Mind, and Autism Spectrum Disorder. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):763-773.
    The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism spectrum disorder has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. In a series of papers, Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone argue that positing a ToM module does not best explain the deficits exhibited by individuals with autism (Gerrans 2002; Stone & Gerrans 2006a, 2006b; Gerrans & Stone 2008). In this paper, I first criticize Gerrans and Stone’s (2008) account. Second, I discuss various (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  48. Monika Dullstein (2012). The Second Person in the Theory of Mind Debate. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):231-248.
    It has become increasingly common to talk about the second person in the theory of mind debate. While theory theory and simulation theory are described as third person and first person accounts respectively, a second person account suggests itself as a viable, though wrongfully neglected third option. In this paper I argue that this way of framing the debate is misleading. Although defenders of second person accounts make use of the vocabulary of the theory (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49.  97
    Theodore Bach (2014). A Unified Account of General Learning Mechanisms and Theory‐of‐Mind Development. Mind and Language 29 (3):351-381.
    Modularity theorists have challenged that there are, or could be, general learning mechanisms that explain theory-of-mind development. In response, supporters of the ‘scientific theory-theory’ account of theory-of-mind development have appealed to children's use of auxiliary hypotheses and probabilistic causal modeling. This article argues that these general learning mechanisms are not sufficient to meet the modularist's challenge. The article then explores an alternative domain-general learning mechanism by proposing that children grasp the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  13
    Rineke Verbrugge & Lisette Mol (2008). Learning to Apply Theory of Mind. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (4):489-511.
    In everyday life it is often important to have a mental model of the knowledge, beliefs, desires, and intentions of other people. Sometimes it is even useful to to have a correct model of their model of our own mental states: a second-order Theory of Mind. In order to investigate to what extent adults use and acquire complex skills and strategies in the domains of Theory of Mind and the related skill of natural language use, we (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000