Search results for 'concepts' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis (1999). Concepts and Cognitive Science. In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT. 3--81.score: 27.0
    Given the fundamental role that concepts play in theories of cognition, philosophers and cognitive scientists have a common interest in concepts. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of controversy regarding what kinds of things concepts are, how they are structured, and how they are acquired. This chapter offers a detailed high-level overview and critical evaluation of the main theories of concepts and their motivations. Taking into account the various challenges that each theory faces, the chapter also (...)
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  2. Pekka Väyrynen (2013). Thick Concepts and Underdetermination. In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts. Oxford University Press.score: 27.0
    Thick terms and concepts in ethics (e.g. selfish, cruel and courageous) somehow combine evaluation and non-evaluative description. The non-evaluative aspects of thick terms and concepts underdetermine their extensions. Many writers argue that this underdetermination point is best explained by supposing that thick terms and concepts are semantically evaluative in some way such that evaluation plays a role in determining their extensions. This paper argues that the extensions of thick terms and concepts are underdetermined by their meanings (...)
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  3. David Bourget (forthcoming). Representationalism, Perceptual Distortion, and the Limits of Phenomenal Concepts. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.score: 24.0
    This paper replies to objections from perceptual distortion (blur, perspective, double vision, etc.) against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that some pairs of distorted and undistorted experiences share contents without sharing phenomenal characters, which is incompatible with the supervenience thesis. In reply, I suggest that such cases are not counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished in some way compared to (...)
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  4. Katalin Balog (2009). Phenomenal Concepts. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 292--312.score: 24.0
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something (...)
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  5. Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2005). Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An Information-Theoretical Approach. Noûs 39 (2):197-255.score: 24.0
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and (...)
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  6. Jussi Jylkkä (2008). Concepts and Reference: Defending a Dual Theory of Natural Kind Concepts. Dissertation, University of Turkuscore: 24.0
    In this thesis I argue that the psychological study of concepts and categorisation, and the philosophical study of reference are deeply intertwined. I propose that semantic intuitions are a variety of categorisation judgements, determined by concepts, and that because of this, concepts determine reference. I defend a dual theory of natural kind concepts, according to which natural kind concepts have distinct semantic cores and non-semantic identification procedures. Drawing on psychological essentialism, I suggest that the cores (...)
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  7. Hans-Johann Glock (2009). Concepts, Conceptual Schemes and Grammar. Philosophia 37 (4):653-668.score: 24.0
    This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in Wittgenstein’s last writings. It lists eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings. It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is an important difference between conceptual and factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims, all of them revolving around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar’. I explain why Wittgenstein’s account does (...)
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  8. Erhan Demircioglu (2013). Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.score: 24.0
    Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual (...)
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  9. Peter Nichols (2010). Substance Concepts and Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):255-270.score: 24.0
    According to one argument for Animalism about personal identity, animal , but not person , is a Wigginsian substance concept—a concept that tells us what we are essentially. Person supposedly fails to be a substance concept because it is a functional concept that answers the question “what do we do?” without telling us what we are. Since person is not a substance concept, it cannot provide the criteria for our coming into or going out of existence; animal , on the (...)
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  10. Daniel A. Weiskopf (2009). The Plurality of Concepts. Synthese 169 (1):145 - 173.score: 24.0
    Traditionally, theories of concepts in psychology assume that concepts are a single, uniform kind of mental representation. But no single kind of representation can explain all of the empirical data for which concepts are responsible. I argue that the assumption that concepts are uniformly the same kind of mental structure is responsible for these theories’ shortcomings, and outline a pluralist theory of concepts that rejects this assumption. On pluralism, concepts should be thought of as (...)
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  11. Ken Daley (2010). The Structure of Lexical Concepts. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):349 - 372.score: 24.0
    Jerry Fodor (Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) famously argued that lexical concepts are unstructured. After examining the advantages and disadvantages of both the classical approach to concepts and Fodor's conceptual atomism, I argue that some lexical concepts are, in fact, structured. Roughly stated, I argue that structured lexical concepts bear a necessary biconditional entailment relation to their structural constituents. I develop this account of the structure of lexical (...) within the framework of Pavel Tichy's (The foundations of Frege's logic. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 1988) theory of constructions. I argue that concepts are constructions which can be combined by way of Tichy's construction-forming operations of composition and closure and an additional operation, simplification, which I propose in section 6. The last of these construction-forming operations plays a central role in my account of lexical concept structure. Stated generally, structured lexical concepts are a result of simplifying their structural constituents. (shrink)
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  12. Adam M. Croom (2010). Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein's Rule Following Considerations. South African Journal of Philosophy 29:286-309.score: 24.0
    Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist position in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and the Wittgensteinian (...)
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  13. Katalin Balog (2008). Review of Torin Alter, Sven Walter (Eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5).score: 24.0
    The book under review is a collection of thirteen essays on the nature phenomenal concepts and the ways in which phenomenal concepts figure in debates over physicalism. Phenomenal concepts are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences (aka “qualia”) whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. There are recent arguments, originating in Descartes’ famous conceivability argument, that purport to show that phenomenal experience is irreducibly (...)
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  14. David Merli (2009). Possessing Moral Concepts. Philosophia 37 (3):535-556.score: 24.0
    Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers’ eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence against conceptual-role and informational atomist approaches to understanding (...)
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  15. Susan Carey (2009). The Origin of Concepts. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Only human beings have a rich conceptual repertoire with concepts like tort, entropy, Abelian group, mannerism, icon and deconstruction. How have humans constructed these concepts? And once they have been constructed by adults, how do children acquire them? While primarily focusing on the second question, in The Origin of Concepts , Susan Carey shows that the answers to both overlap substantially. Carey begins by characterizing the innate starting point for conceptual development, namely systems of core cognition. Representations (...)
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  16. Pekka Väyrynen (2009). Objectionable Thick Concepts in Denials. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):439-469.score: 24.0
    So-called "thick" moral concepts are distinctive in that they somehow "hold together" evaluation and description. But how? This paper argues against the standard view that the evaluations which thick concepts may be used to convey belong to sense or semantic content. That view cannot explain linguistic data concerning how thick concepts behave in a distinctive type of disagreements and denials which arise when one speaker regards another's thick concept as "objectionable" in a certain sense. The paper also (...)
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  17. Daniel A. Weiskopf (2008). The Origins of Concepts. Philosophical Studies 140 (3):359 - 384.score: 24.0
    Certain of our concepts are innate, but many others are learned. Despite the plausibility of this claim, some have argued that the very idea of concept learning is incoherent. I present a conception of learning that sidesteps the arguments against the possibility of concept learning, and sketch several mechanisms that result in the generation of new primitive concepts. Given the rational considerations that motivate their deployment, I argue that these deserve to be called learning mechanisms. I conclude by (...)
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  18. Olga Ramirez (2012). ‘BOGHOSSIAN's BLIND REASONING’, CONDITIONALIZATION AND THICK CONCEPTS A FUNCTIONAL MODEL. Ethics in Progress Quarterly 3 (1):31-52.score: 24.0
    Boghossian’s (2003) proposal to conditionalize concepts as a way to secure their legitimacy in disputable cases applies well, not just to pejoratives – on whose account Boghossian first proposed it – but also to thick ethical concepts. It actually has important advantages when dealing with some worries raised by the application of thick ethical terms, and the truth and facticity of corresponding statements. In this paper, I will try to show, however, that thick ethical concepts present a (...)
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  19. Christine Tappolet, The Normativity of Evaluative Concepts. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan.score: 24.0
    It is generally accepted that there are two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. The question that is raised by this distinction is how it is possible to claim that evaluative concepts are normative. Given that deontic concepts appear to be at the heart of normativity, the bigger the gap between evaluative and deontic concepts, the less it appears plausible to say that evaluative concepts (...)
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  20. Pekka Väyrynen (2011). Thick Concepts and Variability. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (1):1-17.score: 24.0
    Some philosophers hold that so-called "thick" terms and concepts in ethics (such as 'cruel,' 'selfish,' 'courageous,' and 'generous') are contextually variable with respect to the valence (positive or negative) of the evaluations that they may be used to convey. Some of these philosophers use this variability claim to argue that thick terms and concepts are not inherently evaluative in meaning; rather their use conveys evaluations as a broadly pragmatic matter. I argue that one sort of putative examples of (...)
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  21. Bradley Rives (2010). Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts. Acta Analytica 25 (4):369-391.score: 24.0
    Recognitional concepts have the following characteristic property: thinkers are disposed to apply them to objects merely on the basis of undergoing certain perceptual experiences. I argue that a prominent strategy for defending the existence of constitutive connections among concepts, which appeals to thinkers’ semantic-cum-conceptual intuitions, cannot be used to defend the existence of recognitional concepts. I then outline and defend an alternative argument for the existence of recognitional concepts, which appeals to certain psychological laws.
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  22. Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.) (1999). Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press.score: 24.0
    The first part of the book centers around the fall of the Classical Theory of Concepts in the face of attacks by W. V. O. Quine, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Eleanor ...
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  23. Agustin Vicente & Fernando Martínez-Manrique (forthcoming). The Big Concepts Paper: A Defence of Hybridism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.score: 24.0
    The renewed interest in concepts and their role in psychological theorizing is partially motivated by Machery’s claim that concepts are so heterogeneous that they have no explanatory role. Against this, pluralism argues that there is multiplicity of different concepts for any given category, while hybridism argues that a concept is constituted by a rich common representation. This paper aims to advance the understanding of the hybrid view of concepts. First, we examine the main arguments against hybrid (...)
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  24. Pekka Väyrynen (2012). Thick Concepts: Where's Evaluation? In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 7. Oxford University Press. 235-70.score: 24.0
    This paper presents an alternative to the standard view that the evaluations that the so-called "thick" terms and concepts in ethics may be used to convey belong to their sense or semantic meaning. I describe a large variety of linguistic data that are well explained by the alternative view that the evaluations that (at least a very wide range of) thick terms and concepts may be used to convey are a certain kind of defeasible implications of their utterances (...)
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  25. Robert Schroer (2010). Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.score: 24.0
    One popular materialist response to the explanatory gap identifies phenomenal concepts with type-demonstrative concepts. This kind of response, however, faces a serious challenge: that our phenomenal concepts seem to provide a richer characterization of their referents than just the demonstrative characterization of 'that quality'. In this paper, I develop a materialist account that beefs up the contents of phenomenal concepts while retaining the idea that these contents contain demonstrative elements. I illustrate this account by focusing on (...)
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  26. Paul Elbourne (2008). Demonstratives as Individual Concepts. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (4):409-466.score: 24.0
    Using a version of situation semantics, this article argues that bare and complex demonstratives are interpreted as individual concepts.
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  27. Marco Mazzone & Elisabetta Lalumera (2010). Concepts: Stored or Created? [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (1):47-68.score: 24.0
    Are concepts stable entities, unchanged from context to context? Or rather are they context-dependent structures, created on the fly? We argue that this does not constitute a genuine dilemma. Our main thesis is that the more a pattern of features is general and shared, the more it qualifies as a concept. Contextualists have not shown that conceptual structures lack a stable, general core, acting as an attractor on idiosyncratic information. What they have done instead is to give a contribution (...)
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  28. Martina Fürst (2004). Qualia and Phenomenal Concepts as Basis of the Knowledge Argument. Acta Analytica 19 (32):143-152.score: 24.0
    The central attempt of this paper is to explain the underlying intuitions of Frank Jackson’s “Knowledge Argument” that the epistemic gap between phenomenal knowledge and physical knowledge points towards a corresponding ontological gap. The first step of my analysis is the claim that qualia are epistemically special because the acquisition of the phenomenal concept of a quale x requires the experience of x. Arguing what is so special about phenomenal concepts and pointing at the inherence-relation with the (...) they pick out, I give compelling reasons for the existence of ontologically distinct entities. Finally I conclude that phenomenal knowledge is caused by phenomenal properties and the instantiation of these properties is a specific phenomenal fact, which can not be mediated by any form of descriptive information. So it will be shown that phenomenal knowledge must count as the possession of very special information necessarily couched in subjective, phenomenal conceptions. (shrink)
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  29. Alexandra Newton (2012). Kant on the Logical Origin of Concepts. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.score: 24.0
    In his lectures on general logic Kant maintains that the generality of a representation (the form of a concept) arises from the logical acts of comparison, reflection and abstraction. These acts are commonly understood to be identical with the acts that generate reflected schemata. I argue that this is mistaken, and that the generality of concepts, as products of the understanding, should be distinguished from the classificatory generality of schemata, which are products of the imagination. A Kantian concept does (...)
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  30. Logi Gunnarsson (2008). The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):305 - 326.score: 24.0
    The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—moral (...)
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  31. Christine Tappolet (forthcoming). Evaluative Vs. Deontic Concepts. In Hugh Lafollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 24.0
    Ethical thought is articulated around normative concepts. Standard examples of normative concepts are good, reason, right, ought, and obligatory. Theorists often treat the normative as an undifferentiated domain. Even so, it is common to distinguish between two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative or axiological concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. This encyclopedia entry discusses the many differences between the two kinds of concepts.
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  32. Helen Yetter-Chappell (2013). Circularity in the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):553-572.score: 24.0
    The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts purports to give physicalists a way of understanding phenomenal concepts that will allow them to (1) accept the zombie intuition, (2) accept that conceivability is generally a good guide to possibility, and yet (3) reject the conclusion that zombies are metaphysically possible. It does this by positing that whether phenomenal concepts refer to physical or nonphysical states depends on what the actual world is like. In this paper, I offer support for (...)
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  33. Kevin Connolly (2011). Does Perception Outstrip Our Concepts in Fineness of Grain? Ratio 24 (3):243-258.score: 24.0
    We seem perfectly able to perceive fine-grained shades of colour even without possessing precise concepts for them. The same might be said of shapes. I argue that this is in fact not the case. A subject can perceive a colour or shape only if she possesses a concept of that type of colour or shape. I provide new justification for this thesis, and do not rely on demonstrative concepts such as THIS SHADE or THAT SHAPE, a move first (...)
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  34. Kristina Musholt (2012). Concepts or Metacognition - What is the Issue? Commentary on Stephane Savanah’s “The Concept Possession Hypothesis of Self-Consciousness”. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):721-722.score: 24.0
    The author claims that concept possession is not only necessary but also sufficient for self-consciousness, where self-consciousness is understood as the awareness of oneself as a self. Further, he links concept possession to intelligent behavior. His ultimate aim is to provide a framework for the study of self-consciousness in infants and non-human animals. I argue that the claim that all concepts are necessarily related to the self-concept remains unconvincing and suggest that what might be at issue here are not (...)
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  35. Darren Bradley (2011). Justified Concepts and the Limits of the Conceptual Approach to the A Priori. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):267-274.score: 24.0
    Please don't be put off by the journal - I would like people to read this paper. Carrie Jenkins (2005, 2008) has developed a theory of the a priori that she claims solves the problem of how justification regarding our concepts can give us justification regarding the world. She claims that concepts themselves can be justified, and that beliefs formed by examining such concepts can be justified a priori. I object that we can have a priori justified (...)
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  36. Alessandro Lanteri (2012). Three-and-a-Half Folk Concepts of Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):17-30.score: 24.0
    Fiery Cushman and Alfred Mele recently proposed a ‘two-and-a-half rules’ theory of folk intentionality. They suggested that laypersons attribute intentionality employing: one rule based on desire, one based on belief, and another principle based on moral judgment, which may either reflect a folk concept (and so count as a third rule) or a bias (and so not count as a rule proper) and which they provisionally count as ‘half a rule’. In this article, I discuss some cases in which an (...)
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  37. Emmett L. Holman (2013). Phenomenal Concepts as Bare Recognitional Concepts: Harder to Debunk Than You Thought, …but Still Possible. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):807-827.score: 24.0
    A popular defense of physicalist theories of consciousness against anti-physicalist arguments invokes the existence of ‘phenomenal concepts’. These are concepts that designate conscious experiences from a first person perspective, and hence differ from physicalistic concepts; but not in a way that precludes co-referentiality with them. On one version of this strategy phenomenal concepts are seen as (1) type demonstratives that have (2) no mode of presentation. However, 2 is possible without 1-call this the ‘bare recognitional concept’ (...)
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  38. Edouard Machery (2009). Doing Without Concepts. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. -/- In Doing without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic (...)
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  39. Sonja Schierbaum (2011). Knowing Lions and Understanding Lion: Two Jobs for Concepts in Ockham? Vivarium 48 (3-4):327-348.score: 24.0
    Externalist readings of Ockham are currently most prominent in the literature. For instance, an externalist interpretation with respect both to mental content and the meaning of expressions is advocated by prominent scholars. In this paper, I want to argue that although this externalist picture is certainly not incorrect, it is nonetheless incomplete. As I show, Ockham distinguishes between two ways of acquiring concepts: one of them can be accounted for in wholly externalist terms while the other involves the understanding (...)
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  40. Robert Schroer (2013). Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in All Worlds? Dialectica 67 (4):561-577.score: 24.0
    A slew of conceivability arguments have been given against physicalism. Many physicalists try to undermine these arguments by offering accounts of phenomenal concepts that explain how there can be an epistemic gap, but not an ontological gap, between the phenomenal and the physical. Some complain, however, that such accounts fail to do justice to the nature of our introspective grasp of phenomenal properties. A particularly influential version of this complaint comes from David Chalmers (1996; 2003), who claims, in opposition (...)
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  41. Vladimir Kuznetsov (1997). On Triplet Classification of Concepts. Knowledge Organization 24 (3):163-175.score: 24.0
    The scheme for classifications of concepts is introduced. It has founded on the triplet model of concepts. In this model a concept is depicted by means of three kinds of knowledge: a concept base, a concept representing part and the linkage between them. The idea of triplet classifications of concepts is connected with a usage of various specifications of these knowledge kinds as classification criteria.
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  42. Vladimir M. Sloutsky (2010). From Perceptual Categories to Concepts: What Develops? Cognitive Science 34 (7):1244-1286.score: 24.0
    People are remarkably smart: They use language, possess complex motor skills, make nontrivial inferences, develop and use scientific theories, make laws, and adapt to complex dynamic environments. Much of this knowledge requires concepts and this study focuses on how people acquire concepts. It is argued that conceptual development progresses from simple perceptual grouping to highly abstract scientific concepts. This proposal of conceptual development has four parts. First, it is argued that categories in the world have different structure. (...)
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  43. Rocco Gennaro (2007). Consciousness and Concepts: An Introductory Essay. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 9-10):1-19.score: 24.0
    This is an introductory essay from The Interplay between Consciousness and Concepts, which I guest edited as a special double issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies (vol. 14, Sept/Oct). It is also sold separately as a book by Imprint Academic.
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  44. Cathal O'Madagain (2014). Can Groups Have Concepts? Semantics for Collective Intentions. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):347-363.score: 24.0
    A substantial literature supports the attribution of intentional states such as beliefs and desires to groups. But within this literature, there is no substantial account of group concepts. Since on many views, one cannot have an intentional state without having concepts, such a gap undermines the cogency of accounts of group intentionality. In this paper I aim to provide an account of group concepts. First I argue that to fix the semantics of the sentences groups use to (...)
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  45. Nenad Miščević (2006). Moral Concepts: From Thickness to Response-Dependence. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 21 (1):3-32.score: 24.0
    The paper examines three tenets of Dancy’s meta-ethics, finds them incompatible, and proposes a response-dependentist (or response-dispositional) solution. The first tenet is the central importance of thick concepts and properties. The second is that such concepts essentially involve response(s) of observers, which Dancy interprets in a way that fits the pattern of context-dependent resultance: thick concepts are well suited for the particularist grounding of moral theory. However, and this is the third tenet, in his earlier paper (1986) (...)
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  46. Susan L. Epstein (1992). The Role of Memory and Concepts in Learning. Minds and Machines 2 (3):239-265.score: 24.0
    The extent to which concepts, memory, and planning are necessary to the simulation of intelligent behavior is a fundamental philosophical issue in Artificial Intelligence. An active and productive segement of the AI community has taken the position that multiple low-level agents, properly organized, can account for high-level behavior. Empirical research on these questions with fully operational systems has been restricted to mobile robots that do simple tasks. This paper recounts experiments with Hoyle, a system in a cerebral, rather than (...)
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  47. Joseph Shieber (2010). On the Possibility of Conceptually Structured Experience: Demonstrative Concepts and Fineness of Grain. Inquiry 53 (4):383-397.score: 24.0
    In this paper I consider one of the influential challenges to the notion that perceptual experience might be completely conceptually structured, a challenge that rests on the idea that conceptual structure cannot do justice to the fineness of grain of perceptual experience. In so doing, I canvass John McDowell's attempt to meet this challenge by appeal to the notion of demonstrative concepts and review some criticisms recently leveled at McDowell's deployment of demonstrative concepts for this purpose by Sean (...)
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  48. Mark Textor (2009). 'Demonstrative' Colour Concepts: Recognition Versus Preservation. Ratio 22 (2):234-249.score: 24.0
    Arguments for and against the existence of demonstrative concepts of shades and shapes turn on the assumption that demonstrative concepts must be recognitional capacities. The standard argument for this assumption is based on the widely held view that concepts are those constituents of propositional attitudes that account for an attitude's inferential potential. Only if demonstrative concepts of shades are recognitional capacities, the standard argument goes, can they account for the inferential potential of demonstrative judgements about shades. (...)
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  49. Krista Lawlor (2001). New Thoughts About Old Things: Cognitive Policies as the Ground of Singular Concepts. Garland Pub..score: 24.0
    This book defends a novel theory of singular concepts, emphasizing the pragmatic requirements of singular concept possession and arguing that these requirements must be understood to institute traditions and policies of thought.
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  50. Peter Fazekas (2011). Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism Without Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophia 39 (1):21-29.score: 24.0
    The novel approach presented in this paper accounts for the occurrence of the epistemic gap and defends physicalism against anti-physicalist arguments without relying on so-called phenomenal concepts. Instead of concentrating on conceptual features, the focus is shifted to the special characteristics of experiences themselves. To this extent, the account provided is an alternative to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. It is argued that certain sensory representations, as accessed by higher cognition, lack constituent structure. Unstructured representations could freely exchange their causal (...)
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