Search results for 'conceptual analysis' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Frank Jackson (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford University Press.
    Frank Jackson champions the cause of conceptual analysis as central to philosophical inquiry. In recent years conceptual analysis has been undervalued and widely misunderstood, suggests Jackson. He argues that such analysis is mistakenly clouded in mystery, preventing a whole range of important questions from being productively addressed. He anchors his argument in discussions of specific philosophical issues, starting with the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and moving on, via free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, (...)
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  2. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis: Experimental Philosophy's Place Under the Sun. In D. Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics. Bloomsbury
    What is the rationale for the methodological innovations of experimental philosophy? This paper starts from the contention that common answers to this question are implausible. It then develops a framework within which experimental philosophy fulfills a specific function in an otherwise traditionalist picture of philosophical inquiry. The framework rests on two principal ideas. The first is Frank Jackson’s claim that conceptual analysis is unavoidable in ‘serious metaphysics’. The second is that the psychological structure of concepts is extremely intricate, (...)
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    Gregory Stoutenburg (2016). Vicious Regresses, Conceptual Analysis, and Strong Awareness Internalism. Ratio 29 (2):115-129.
    That a philosophical thesis entails a vicious regress is commonly taken to be decisive evidence that the thesis is false. In this paper, I argue that the existence of a vicious regress is insufficient to reject a proposed analysis provided that certain constraints on the analysis are met. When a vicious regress is present, some further consequence of the thesis must be established that, together with the presence of the vicious regress, shows the thesis to be false. The (...)
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  4.  90
    Michael T. Stuart (2015). Philosophical Conceptual Analysis as an Experimental Method. In Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen (eds.), Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf University Press 267-292.
    Philosophical conceptual analysis is an experimental method. Focusing on this helps to justify it from the skepticism of experimental philosophers who follow Weinberg, Nichols & Stich. To explore the experimental aspect of philosophical conceptual analysis, I consider a simpler instance of the same activity: everyday linguistic interpretation. I argue that this, too, is experimental in nature. And in both conceptual analysis and linguistic interpretation, the intuitions considered problematic by experimental philosophers are necessary but epistemically (...)
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  5. Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.
    The explanatory gap . Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states. Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested for visual consciousness. .) (...)
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  6. Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis (2003). Concepts and Conceptual Analysis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):253-282.
    Conceptual analysis is undergoing a revival in philosophy, and much of the credit goes to Frank Jackson. Jackson argues that conceptual analysis is needed as an integral component of so-called serious metaphysics and that it also does explanatory work in accounting for such phenomena as categorization, meaning change, communication, and linguistic understanding. He even goes so far as to argue that opponents of concep- tual analysis are implicitly committed to it in practice. We show that (...)
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  7.  76
    Maël Lemoine (2013). Defining Disease Beyond Conceptual Analysis: An Analysis of Conceptual Analysis in Philosophy of Medicine. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34 (4):309-325.
    Conceptual analysis of health and disease is portrayed as consisting in the confrontation of a set of criteria—a “definition”—with a set of cases, called instances of either “health” or “ disease.” Apart from logical counter-arguments, there is no other way to refute an opponent’s definition than by providing counter-cases. As resorting to intensional stipulation is not forbidden, several contenders can therefore be deemed to have succeeded. This implies that conceptual analysis alone is not likely to decide (...)
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  8. Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (2013). Conceptual Analysis and Epistemic Progress. Synthese 190 (15):3053-3074.
    This essay concerns the question of how we make genuine epistemic progress through conceptual analysis. Our way into this issue will be through consideration of the paradox of analysis. The paradox challenges us to explain how a given statement can make a substantive contribution to our knowledge, even while it purports merely to make explicit what one’s grasp of the concept under scrutiny consists in. The paradox is often treated primarily as a semantic puzzle. However, in “Sect. (...)
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  9.  62
    Joachim Horvath (2016). Conceptual Analysis and Natural Kinds: The Case of Knowledge. Synthese 193 (1):167-184.
    There is a line of reasoning in metaepistemology that is congenial to naturalism and hard to resist, yet ultimately misguided: that knowledge might be a natural kind, and that this would undermine the use of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge. In this paper, I first bring out various problems with Hilary Kornblith’s argument from the causal–explanatory indispensability of knowledge to the natural kindhood of knowledge. I then criticize the argument from the natural kindhood of knowledge against (...)
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  10.  99
    Janet Levin (2002). Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):571-591.
    In this paper I discuss the claim that the successful reduction of qualitative to physical states requires some sort of intelligible connection between our qualitative and physical concepts, which in turn requires a conceptual analysis of our qualitative concepts in causal-functional terms. While I defend this claim against some of its recent critics, I ultimately dispute it, and propose a different way to get the requisite intelligible connection between qualitative and physical concepts.
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  11.  32
    Michael J. Shaffer (2015). The Problem of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions and Conceptual Analysis. Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):555-563.
    In this article the standard philosophical method involving intuition-driven conceptual analysis is challenged in a new way. This orthodox approach to philosophy takes analysanda to be the specifications of the content of concepts in the form of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. Here it is argued that there is no adequate account of what necessary and sufficient conditions are. So, the targets of applications of the standard philosophical method so understood are not sufficiently well understood for this (...)
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  12. Laura Schroeter (2004). The Limits of Conceptual Analysis. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):425-453.
    It would be nice if good old a priori conceptual analysis were possible. For many years conceptual analysis was out of fashion, in large part because of the excessive ambitions of verificationist theories of meaning._ _However, those days are over._ _A priori conceptual analysis is once again part of the philosophical mainstream._ _This renewed popularity, moreover, is well-founded. Modern philosophical analysts have exploited developments in philosophical semantics to formulate analyses which avoid the counterintuitive consequences (...)
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  13. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2008). A Priori Entailment and Conceptual Analysis: Making Room for Type-C Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):93 – 111.
    One strategy for blocking Chalmers's overall case against physicalism has been to deny his claim that showing that phenomenal properties are in some sense physical requires an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones. Here I avoid this well-trodden ground and argue instead that an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones does not require an analysis in the Jackson/Chalmers sense. This is to sever the dualist's link between conceptual (...) and a priori entailment by showing that the lack of the former does not imply the absence of the latter. Moreover, given the role of the argument from conceptual analysis in Chalmers's overall case for dualism, undermining that argument effectively undermines that case as a whole in a way that, I'll argue, undermining the conceivability arguments as stand-alone arguments does not. (shrink)
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  14. Konrad Banicki (2012). Connective Conceptual Analysis and Psychology. Theory and Psychology 22 (3):310-323.
    Conceptual analysis, like any exclusively theoretical activity, is far from overrated in current psychology. Such a situation can be related both to the contingent influences of contextual and historical character and to the more essential metatheoretical reasons. After a short discussion of the latter it is argued that even within a strictly empirical psychology there are non-trivial tasks that can be attached to well-defined and methodologically reliable, conceptual work. This kind of method, inspired by the ideas of (...)
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  15. Konrad Banicki (2009). The Berlin Wisdom Paradigm: A Conceptual Analysis of a Psychological Approach to Wisdom. History and Philosophy of Psychology 11 (2):25-35.
    The main purpose of this article is to undertake a conceptual investigation of the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm: a psychological project initiated by Paul Baltes and intended to study the complex phenomenon of wisdom. Firstly, in order to provide a wider perspective for the subsequent analyses, a short historical sketch is given. Secondly, a meta-theoretical issue of the degree to which the subject matter of the Baltesian study can be identified with the traditional philosophical wisdom is addressed. The main result (...)
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  16. William Ramsey (1992). Prototypes and Conceptual Analysis. Topoi 11 (1):59-70.
    In this paper, I explore the implications of recent empirical research on concept representation for the philosophical enterprise of conceptual analysis. I argue that conceptual analysis, as it is commonly practiced, is committed to certain assumptions about the nature of our intuitive categorization judgments. I then try to show how these assumptions clash with contemporary accounts of concept representation in cognitive psychology. After entertaining an objection to my argument, I close by considering ways in which (...) analysis might be altered to accord better with the empirical work. (shrink)
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  17. Alexander S. Harper (2012). An Oblique Epistemic Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Metaphilosophy 43 (3):235-256.
    This article argues, against contemporary experimentalist criticism, that conceptual analysis has epistemic value, with a structure that encourages the development of interesting hypotheses which are of the right form to be valuable in diverse areas of philosophy. The article shows, by analysis of the Gettier programme, that conceptual analysis shares the proofs and refutations form Lakatos identified in mathematics. Upon discovery of a counterexample, this structure aids the search for a replacement hypothesis. The search is (...)
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  18.  19
    Kenneth Einar Himma (2015). Conceptual Jurisprudence. An Introduction to Conceptual Analysis and Methodology in Legal Theory. Revus 26.
    This essay attempts to provide an accessible introduction to the topic area of conceptual analysis of legal concepts and its methodology. I attempt to explain, at a fairly foundational level, what conceptual analysis is, how it is done and why it is important in theorizing about the law. I also attempt to explain how conceptual analysis is related to other areas in philosophy, such as metaphysics and epistemology. Next, I explain the enterprise of (...) jurisprudence, as concerned to provide an account of those properties that distinguish things that are law from things that are not law which constitute the former things as law, illustrating this explanation with what I hope are intuitive examples. Three different methodological approaches are also explained and evaluated. Finally, the practical importance of conceptual jurisprudence is discussed. (shrink)
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  19.  22
    Mark Balaguer (2015). Conceptual Analysis and X-Phi. Synthese:1-22.
    This paper does two things. First, it argues for a metaphilosophical view of conceptual analysis questions; in particular, it argues that the facts that settle conceptual-analysis questions are facts about the linguistic intentions of ordinary folk. The second thing this paper does is argue that if this metaphilosophical view is correct, then experimental philosophy is a legitimate methodology to use in trying to answer conceptual-analysis questions.
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  20. Per Sandin (2006). Has Psychology Debunked Conceptual Analysis? Metaphilosophy 37 (1):26–33.
    The philosophical method of conceptual analysis has been criticised on the grounds that empirical psychological research has cast severe doubt on whether concepts exist in the form traditionally assumed, and that conceptual analysis therefore is doomed. This objection may be termed the Charge from Psychology. After a brief characterisation of conceptual analysis, I discuss the Charge from Psychology and argue that it is misdirected.
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  21. Jussi Haukioja (2009). Intuitions, Externalism, and Conceptual Analysis. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):81-93.
    Semantic externalism about a class of expressions is often thought to make conceptual analysis about members of that class impossible. In particular, since externalism about natural kind terms makes the essences of natural kinds empirically discoverable, it seems that mere reflection on one's natural kind concept will not be able to tell one anything substantial about what it is for something to fall under one's natural kind concepts. Many hold the further view that one cannot even know anything (...)
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  22.  71
    Daniel F. Hartner (2013). Conceptual Analysis as Armchair Psychology: In Defense of Methodological Naturalism. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):921-937.
    Three proponents of the Canberra Plan, namely Jackson, Pettit, and Smith, have developed a collective functionalist program—Canberra Functionalism—spanning from philosophical psychology to ethics. They argue that conceptual analysis is an indispensible tool for research on cognitive processes since it reveals that there are some folk concepts, like belief and desire, whose functional roles must be preserved rather than eliminated by future scientific explanations. Some naturalists have recently challenged this indispensability argument, though the point of that challenge has been (...)
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  23.  37
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). The Problem of Universals and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis. Philosophical Papers 31 (1):39-47.
    In this paper I argue, contra Fraser MacBride, that conceptual analysis, and in particular the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity, can solve the Problem of Universals, whether understood as the One over Many or the as the Many over One. In this paper I show why the solutions needed to solve either version of the problem must be in terms of truthmakers, and that the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity is not sufficient to solve them.
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  24.  45
    James Franklin (2012). Science by Conceptual Analysis. Studia Neoaristotelica 9 (1):3-24.
    The late scholastics, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries, contributed to many fields of knowledge other than philosophy. They developed a method of conceptual analysis that was very productive in those disciplines in which theory is relatively more important than empirical results. That includes mathematics, where the scholastics developed the analysis of continuous motion, which fed into the calculus, and the theory of risk and probability. The method came to the fore especially in the social sciences. (...)
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    Albert Casullo (2014). Uncovering Buried Treasure: Henderson and Horgan on Conceptual Analysis. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):509-523.
    David Henderson and Terry Horgan offer a detailed account of the structure of conceptual analysis that is embedded within a more general account of a priori justification. Their account highlights an important feature of conceptual analysis that has been overlooked in the recent debate. Although it is generally recognized that conceptual analysis involves an inference from premises to the effect that some concept does (or does not) apply to a range of particular cases to (...)
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    Karlheinz Lüdeking (2010). The Limits of Conceptual Analysis in Aesthetics. Nordic Journal of Aesthetics 21 (39).
    In order to understand why analytic aesthetics has lost a lot of its former intellectual stature it is necessary to combine historical reconstruction with systematic consideration. In the middle of the twentieth century analytic philosophers came to the conclusion that essentialist theories of the “nature” of art are no longer tenable. As a consequence they felt compelled to move to the meta-level of conceptual analysis. Then they tried to show how a purely classificatory concept of art is used. (...)
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  27. David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson (2001). Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation. Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.
    Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes . Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no.
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  28. Brie Gertler (2002). Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments About the Mind. Noûs 36 (1):22-49.
    My aim here is threefold: to show that conceptual facts play a more significant role in justifying explanatory reductions than most of the contributors to the current debate realize; to furnish an account of that role, and to trace the consequences of this account for conceivability arguments about the mind.
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  29. Greg Bamford (1991). Design, Science and Conceptual Analysis. In Jim Plume (ed.), Architectural Science and Design in Harmony: Proceedings of the joint ANZAScA / ADTRA conference, Sydney, 10-12 July, 1990. School of Architecture, University of NSW
    Philosophers expend considerable effort on the analysis of concepts, but the value of such work is not widely appreciated. This paper principally analyses some arguments, beliefs, and presuppositions about the nature of design and the relations between design and science common in the literature to illustrate this point, and to contribute to the foundations of design theory.
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  30. Theodore Sider (2001). Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis. Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):189-209.
    When is there no fact of the matter about a metaphysical question? When multiple candidate meanings are equally eligible, in David Lewis's sense, and fit equally well with ordinary usage. Thus given certain ontological schemes, there is no fact of the matter whether the criterion of personal identity over time is physical or psychological. But given other ontological schemes there is a fact of the matter; and there is a fact of the matter about which ontological scheme is correct.
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  31. Neil Levy & Yasuko Kitano (2011). We're All Folk: An Interview with Neil Levy About Experimental Philosophy and Conceptual Analysis. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 19:87-98.
    The following is a transcript of the interview I (Yasuko Kitano) conducted with Neil Levy (The Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, CAPPE) on the 23rd in July 2009, while he was in Tokyo to give a series of lectures on neuroethics at The University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy. I edited his words for publication with his approval.
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  32. Antony Eagle (2008). Mathematics and Conceptual Analysis. Synthese 161 (1):67–88.
    Gödel argued that intuition has an important role to play in mathematical epistemology, and despite the infamy of his own position, this opinion still has much to recommend it. Intuitions and folk platitudes play a central role in philosophical enquiry too, and have recently been elevated to a central position in one project for understanding philosophical methodology: the so-called ‘Canberra Plan’. This philosophical role for intuitions suggests an analogous epistemology for some fundamental parts of mathematics, which casts a number of (...)
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  33. Henry Jackman (2009). Semantic Intuitions, Conceptual Analysis, and Cross-Cultural Variation. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):159 - 177.
    While philosophers of language have traditionally relied upon their intuitions about cases when developing theories of reference, this methodology has recently been attacked on the grounds that intuitions about reference, far from being universal, show significant cultural variation, thus undermining their relevance for semantic theory. I’ll attempt to demonstrate that (1) such criticisms do not, in fact, undermine the traditional philosophical methodology, and (2) our underlying intuitions about the nature of reference may be more universal than the authors suppose.
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  34. David Plunkett (2011). Expressivism, Representation, and the Nature of Conceptual Analysis. Philosophical Studies 156 (1):15-31.
  35.  23
    Gal Yehezkel (2005). A Model of Conceptual Analysis. Metaphilosophy 36 (5):668-687.
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  36.  51
    Roland Bluhm (2013). Don't Ask, Look! Linguistic Corpora as a Tool for Conceptual Analysis. In Migue Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico 7-15.
    Ordinary Language Philosophy has largely fallen out of favour, and with it the belief in the primary importance of analyses of ordinary language for philosophical purposes. Still, in their various endeavours, philosophers not only from analytic but also from other backgrounds refer to the use and meaning of terms of interest in ordinary parlance. In doing so, they most commonly appeal to their own linguistic intuitions. Often, the appeal to individual intuitions is supplemented by reference to dictionaries. In recent times, (...)
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  37. Crawford L. Elder (2003). Kripkean Externalism Versus Conceptual Analysis. Facta Philosophica 5 (1):75-86.
  38. Andrew Melnyk (2008). Conceptual and Linguistic Analysis: A Two-Step Program. Noûs 42 (2):267–291.
    This paper argues against both conceptual and linguistic analysis as sources of a priori knowledge. The key claim is that none of the main views about what concepts are can underwrite the possibility of such knowledge.
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  39. David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.) (2008). Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. A Bradford Book.
    Many philosophical naturalists eschew analysis in favor of discovering metaphysical truths from the a posteriori, contending that analysis does not lead to philosophical insight. A countercurrent to this approach seeks to reconcile a certain account of conceptual analysis with philosophical naturalism; prominent and influential proponents of this methodology include the late David Lewis, Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit, and David Armstrong. Naturalistic analysis is a tool for locating in the scientifically given world objects and (...)
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    P. P. M. Harteloh (2003). The Meaning of Quality in Health Care: A Conceptual Analysis. Health Care Analysis 11 (3):259-267.
    During the past three decades, there has been an ongoing debate on the quality of health care. Defining quality is an important part of it. This paper offers a review of definitions and a conceptual analysis in order to understand and explain the differences between them. The analysis results in a semantic rule, expressing the meaning of quality as an optimal balance between possibilities realised and a framework of norms and values. This rule is postulated as a (...)
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    David K. Henderson & Terence Horgan (2011). The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis. OUP Oxford.
    Henderson and Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology. They defend the roles of the a priori and conceptual analysis, but with an essential empirical dimension. 'Transglobal reliability' is the key to epistemic justification. The question of which cognitive processes are reliable depends on contingent facts about human capacities.
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  42. Patricia A. Blanchette (2007). Frege on Consistency and Conceptual Analysis. Philosophia Mathematica 15 (3):321-346.
    Gottlob Frege famously rejects the methodology for consistency and independence proofs offered by David Hilbert in the latter's Foundations of Geometry. The present essay defends against recent criticism the view that this rejection turns on Frege's understanding of logical entailment, on which the entailment relation is sensitive to the contents of non-logical terminology. The goals are (a) to clarify further Frege's understanding of logic and of the role of conceptual analysis in logical investigation, and (b) to point out (...)
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  43. Michael Rescorla (2007). Church's Thesis and the Conceptual Analysis of Computability. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 48 (2):253-280.
    Church's thesis asserts that a number-theoretic function is intuitively computable if and only if it is recursive. A related thesis asserts that Turing's work yields a conceptual analysis of the intuitive notion of numerical computability. I endorse Church's thesis, but I argue against the related thesis. I argue that purported conceptual analyses based upon Turing's work involve a subtle but persistent circularity. Turing machines manipulate syntactic entities. To specify which number-theoretic function a Turing machine computes, we must (...)
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  44. Mark Balaguer (2009). The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis). Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):1-24.
    It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human decision-making processes—for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will—except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questions—namely, the conceptual-analysis question of what free will is and the question that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility—are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical (...)
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  45.  14
    Jack Martin & Ann-Marie McLellan (2008). The Educational Psychology of Self-Regulation: A Conceptual and Critical Analysis. Studies in Philosophy and Education 27 (6):433-448.
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  46.  48
    Gus Breytspraak (2008). Polanyi's Role in Poteat's Teaching Cultural Conceptual Analysis: 1967-1976. Tradition and Discovery 35 (2):14-18.
    The influence of Michael Polanyi on William H. Poteat’s teaching from 1967 to 1976 was apparent but not paramount. Cultural conceptual analysis as taught and practiced by Poteat during this period included Polanyian texts, themes, and concepts, but drew extensively from other major conceptual innovators who provided radical alternatives to key cultural conceptual commitments of modernity. This was the period roughly between the completion of Intellect and Hope and the writing of Polanyian Meditations.
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  47. Simon Blackburn (2000). Critical Notice of Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):119 – 124.
    (2000). Critical notice of Frank Jackson, from metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 119-124. doi: 10.1080/00048400012349401.
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    Justin C. Fisher, The Authority of Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis.
    This paper defends Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis , a proposed empirical methodology for explicating philosophical concepts. This methodology attributes to our shared concepts whatever application conditions they would need to have in order best to continue delivering benefits in the ways they have regularly delivered benefits in the past. In the first stage of my argument I argue that Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis has what I call normative authority : we have practical and epistemic reason to adopt the (...)
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    Frank Jackson (2010). Conceptual Analysis for Representationalists. Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):173-188.
    We use words to mark out patterns in nature. This is why a word like 'nutritious' is so useful. One way of thinking about conceptual analysis is as the business of capturing the structure in the patterns so picked out, for it is not credible that the patterns are one and all sui generis. This paper spells out this way of thinking about conceptual analysis. Along the way we discuss: the role of intuitions about possible cases (...)
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  50.  52
    F. Jenč (1979). The Conceptual Analysis (CA) Method in Theories of Microchannels: Application to Quantum Theory. Part III. Idealizations. Hilbert Space Representation. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 9 (11-12):897-928.
    We illustrate the application of the conceptual analysis (CA) method outlined in Part I by the example of quantum mechanics. In the present part the Hilbert space structure of conventional quantum mechanics is deduced as a consequence of postulates specifying further idealized concepts. A critical discussion of the idealizations of quantum mechanics is proposed. Quantum mechanics is characterized as a “statistically complete” theory and a simple and elegant formal recipe for the construction of the fundamental mathematical apparatus of (...)
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