Search results for 'conjunction fallacy' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. an Exclusive Conjunction (1998). Peter Simons MacColl and Many-Valued Logic: An Exclusive Conjunction. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (1):85-90.score: 120.0
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  2. Tomoji Shogenji (2012). The Degree of Epistemic Justification and the Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 184 (1):29-48.score: 90.0
    This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I argue that (...)
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  3. Rodrigo Moro (2009). On the Nature of the Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 171 (1):1 - 24.score: 90.0
    In a seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events (e.g., Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement) is more likely to occur than one of the conjuncts (e.g., Linda is a bank teller). This belief violates the conjunction rule in probability theory. Tversky and Kahneman called this phenomenon the “conjunction fallacy”. Since the discovery of the phenomenon in 1983, researchers (...)
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  4. Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi (2012). How the Conjunction Fallacy is Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation: Some Remarks on Schupbach (2009). Synthese 184 (1):3-12.score: 90.0
    Crupi et al. (Think Reason 14:182–199, 2008) have recently advocated and partially worked out an account of the conjunction fallacy phenomenon based on the Bayesian notion of confirmation. In response, Schupbach (2009) presented a critical discussion as following from some novel experimental results. After providing a brief restatement and clarification of the meaning and scope of our original proposal, we will outline Schupbach’s results and discuss his interpretation thereof arguing that they do not actually undermine our point of (...)
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  5. Jonah N. Schupbach (2012). Is the Conjunction Fallacy Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation? Synthese 184 (1):13-27.score: 90.0
    Crupi et al. (2008) offer a confirmation-theoretic, Bayesian account of the conjunction fallacy—an error in reasoning that occurs when subjects judge that Pr( h 1 & h 2 | e ) > Pr( h 1 | e ). They introduce three formal conditions that are satisfied by classical conjunction fallacy cases, and they show that these same conditions imply that h 1 & h 2 is confirmed by e to a greater extent than is h 1 (...)
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  6. Martin L. Jönsson & Elias Assarsson (2013). Shogenji's Measure of Justification and the Inverse Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 190 (15):3075-3085.score: 90.0
    This paper takes issue with a recent proposal due to Shogenji (Synthese 184:29–48, 2012). In his paper, Shogenji introduces J, a normatively motivated formal measure of justification (and of confirmation), and then proceeds to recruit it descriptively in an explanation of the conjunction fallacy. We argue that this explanation is undermined by the fact that it cannot be extended in any natural way to the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered, closely related fallacy. We (...)
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  7. Stephan Hartmann & Wouter Meijs (2012). Walter the Banker: The Conjunction Fallacy Reconsidered. [REVIEW] Synthese 184 (1):73-87.score: 87.0
    In a famous experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (Psychol Rev 90:293–315, 1983), featuring Linda the bank teller, the participants assign a higher probability to a conjunction of propositions than to one of the conjuncts, thereby seemingly committing a probabilistic fallacy. In this paper, we discuss a slightly different example featuring someone named Walter, who also happens to work at a bank, and argue that, in this example, it is rational to assign a higher probability to the conjunction (...)
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  8. Andreas Jarvstad & Ulrike Hahn (2011). Source Reliability and the Conjunction Fallacy. Cognitive Science 35 (4):682-711.score: 75.0
  9. Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori (2008). Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.score: 60.0
    The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of _confirmation_ relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. (...)
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  10. Giuseppe Mosconi & Laura Macchi (2001). The Role of Pragmatic Rules in the Conjunction Fallacy. Mind and Society 2 (1):31-57.score: 60.0
    We here report the findings of our investigation into the validity of the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), bearing in mind the role of conversational rules. Our first experiment showed that subjects found a logically correct answer unacceptable when it implied a violation of the conversational rules. We argue that tautological questions, such as those which concern the relationship of inclusion between a class and its sub-class, violate conversational rules because they are not informative. In this sense, (...)
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  11. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa (2010). The Whole Truth About Linda: Probability, Verisimilitude and a Paradox of Conjunction. In Marcello D'Agostino, Federico Laudisa, Giulio Giorello, Telmo Pievani & Corrado Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science. College Publications. 603--615.score: 54.0
    We provide a 'verisimilitudinarian' analysis of the well-known Linda paradox or conjunction fallacy, i.e., the fact that most people judge the probability of the conjunctive statement "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement" (B & F) as more probable than the isolated statement "Linda is a bank teller" (B), contrary to an uncontroversial principle of probability theory. The basic idea is that experimental participants may judge B & F a better hypothesis about Linda (...)
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  12. Nicolao Bonini, Katya Tentori & Daniel Osherson (2004). A Different Conjunction Fallacy. Mind and Language 19 (2):199–210.score: 48.0
    Because the conjunction pandq implies p, the value of a bet on pandq cannot exceed the value of a bet on p at the same stakes. We tested recognition of this principle in a betting paradigm that (a) discouraged misreading p as pandnotq, and (b) encouraged genuinely conjunctive reading of pandq. Frequent violations were nonetheless observed. The findings appear to discredit the idea that most people spontaneously integrate the logic of conjunction into their assessments of chance.
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  13. Sylvain Moutier & Olivier Houd (2003). Judgement Under Uncertainty and Conjunction Fallacy Inhibition Training. Thinking and Reasoning 9 (3):185 – 201.score: 48.0
    Intuitive predictions and judgements under uncertainty are often mediated by judgemental heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Our micro-developmental study suggests that a presumption of rationality is justified for adult subjects, in so far as their systematic judgemental biases appear to be due to a specific executive-inhibition failure in working memory, and not necessarily to a lack of understanding of the fundamental principles of probability. This hypothesis was tested using an experimental procedure in which 60 adult subjects were trained to (...)
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  14. Daniel Osherson, A Different Conjunction Fallacy.score: 48.0
    Because the conjunction p-and-q implies p, the value of a bet on p-and-q cannot exceed the value of a bet on p at the same stakes. We tested recognition of this principle in a betting paradigm that (a) discouraged misreading p as p-and-not-q, and (b) encouraged genuinely conjunctive reading of p-and-q. Frequent violations were nonetheless observed. The findings appear to discredit the idea that most people spontaneously integrate the logic of conjunction into their assessments of chance.
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  15. Daniel Osherson (2004). The Conjunction Fallacy: A Misunderstanding About Conjunction? Cognitive Science 28 (3):467-477.score: 48.0
    It is easy to construct pairs of sentences X, Y that lead many people to ascribe higher probability to the conjunction X-and-Y than to the conjuncts X, Y. Whether an error is thereby committed depends on reasoners’ interpretation of the expressions “probability” and “and.” We report two experiments designed to clarify the normative status of typical responses to conjunction problems. © 2004 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved.
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  16. Jeanne Peijnenburg (2012). A Case of Confusing Probability and Confirmation. Synthese 184 (1):101-107.score: 45.0
    Tom Stoneham put forward an argument purporting to show that coherentists are, under certain conditions, committed to the conjunction fallacy. Stoneham considers this argument a reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. I argue that Stoneham neglects the distinction between degrees of confirmation and degrees of probability. Once the distinction is in place, it becomes clear that no conjunction fallacy has been committed.
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  17. Branden Fitelson, Comparative Probability, Comparative Confirmation, and the “Conjunction Fallacy”.score: 45.0
    In the first edition of LFP, Carnap [2] undertakes a precise probabilistic explication of the concept of confirmation. This is where modern confirmation theory was born (in sin). Carnap was interested mainly in quantitative confirmation (which he took to be fundamental). But, he also gave (derivative) qualitative and comparative explications: • Qualitative. E inductively supports H. • Comparative. E supports H more strongly than E supports H . • Quantitative. E inductively supports H to degree r . Carnap begins by (...)
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  18. Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi (2013). Why Quantum Probability Does Not Explain the Conjunction Fallacy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):308-310.score: 45.0
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  19. Katya Tentori, Vincenzo Crupi & Selena Russo (2013). On the Determinants of the Conjunction Fallacy: Probability Versus Inductive Confirmation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):235.score: 45.0
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  20. K. Tentori (2004). The Conjunction Fallacy: A Misunderstanding About Conjunction? Cognitive Science 28 (3):467-477.score: 45.0
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  21. V. I. Yukalov & D. Sornette (2011). Decision Theory with Prospect Interference and Entanglement. Theory and Decision 70 (3):283-328.score: 45.0
    We present a novel variant of decision making based on the mathematical theory of separable Hilbert spaces. This mathematical structure captures the effect of superposition of composite prospects, including many incorporated intentions, which allows us to describe a variety of interesting fallacies and anomalies that have been reported to particularize the decision making of real human beings. The theory characterizes entangled decision making, non-commutativity of subsequent decisions, and intention interference. We demonstrate how the violation of the Savage’s sure-thing principle, known (...)
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  22. Daniel John Zizzo (2003). Verbal and Behavioral Learning in a Probability Compounding Task. Theory and Decision 54 (4):287-314.score: 45.0
    The conjunction fallacy occurs whenever probability compounds are thought of as more likely than its component probabilities alone. In the experiment we present, subjects chose between simple and compound lotteries after some practice. Depending on the condition, they were given more or less information about the nature of probability compounds. The conjunction fallacy was surprisingly robust. There was, however, a puzzling dissociation between verbal and behavioral learning: verbal responses were sensitive, but actual choices entirely insensitive, to (...)
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  23. Ralph Hertwig, Björn Benz & Stefan Krauss (2008). The Conjunction Fallacy and the Many Meanings of And. Cognition 108 (3):740-753.score: 45.0
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  24. Rodrigo Moro (2009). The Conjunction Fallacy and the Debate on Human Rationality. Philosophical Frontiers: A Journal of Emerging Thought 4 (2).score: 45.0
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  25. Katya Tentori, Nicolao Bonini & Daniel Osherson (forthcoming). Conjunction and the Conjunction Fallacy. Cognitive Science.score: 45.0
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  26. Michael Aristidou (2013). Irrationality Re-Examined: A Few Comments on the Conjunction Fallacy. Open Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):329-336.score: 45.0
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  27. N. Bonini, K. Tentori & D. Osherson (forthcoming). A New Conjunction Fallacy. Mind and Language.score: 45.0
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  28. Irwin D. Nahinsky, Daniel Ash & Brent Cohen (1986). The Conjunction Fallacy: Judgmental Heuristic or Faulty Extensional Reasoning? Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 24 (3):186-188.score: 45.0
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  29. Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi (2012). On the Conjunction Fallacy and the Meaning of and , yet Again: A Reply To. Cognition 122 (2):123-134.score: 45.0
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  30. K. Tentori, V. Crupi & S. Russo (2013). On the Determinants of the Conjunction Fallacy: Confirmation Versus Probability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142:235-55.score: 45.0
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  31. Douglas H. Wedell & Rodrigo Moro (2008). Testing Boundary Conditions for the Conjunction Fallacy: Effects of Response Mode, Conceptual Focus, and Problem Type. Cognition 107 (1):105-136.score: 45.0
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  32. G. Wolford, H. Taylor & R. Beck (1986). The Conjunction Fallacy. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 24 (5):351-351.score: 45.0
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  33. Håkan Nilsson, Jörg Rieskamp & Mirjam A. Jenny (2013). Exploring the Overestimation of Conjunctive Probabilities. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 33.0
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  34. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa, A Verisimilitudinarian Analysis of the Linda Paradox. VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.score: 30.0
    The Linda paradox is a key topic in current debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. We present a novel analysis of this paradox, based on the notion of verisimilitude as studied in the philosophy of science. The comparison with an alternative analysis based on probabilistic confirmation suggests how to overcome some problems of our account by introducing an adequately defined notion of verisimilitudinarian confirmation.
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  35. Emmanuel M. Pothos & Jerome R. Busemeyer (2011). Formalizing Heuristics in Decision-Making: A Quantum Probability Perspective. Frontiers in Psychology 2.score: 30.0
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  36. David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers, How to Confirm the Disconfirmed. On Conjunction Fallacies and Robust Confirmation.score: 24.0
    Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for nine different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.
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  37. Ralph Hertwig Valerie M. Chase (1998). Many Reasons or Just One: How Response Mode Affects Reasoning in the Conjunction Problem. Thinking and Reasoning 4 (4):319 – 352.score: 24.0
    Forty years of experimentation on class inclusion and its probabilistic relatives have led to inconsistent results and conclusions about human reasoning. Recent research on the conjunction "fallacy" recapitulates this history. In contrast to previous results, we found that a majority of participants adhere to class inclusion in the classic Linda problem. We outline a theoretical framework that attributes the contradictory results to differences in statistical sophistication and to differences in response mode-whether participants are asked for probability estimates or (...)
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  38. Keith E. Stanovich Richard & F. West (1998). Individual Differences in Framing and Conjunction Effects. Thinking and Reasoning 4 (4):289 – 317.score: 24.0
    Individual differences on a variety of framing and conjunction problems were examined in light of Slovic and Tversky's (1974) understanding/acceptance principle-that more reflective and skilled reasoners are more likely to affirm the axioms that define normative reasoning and to endorse the task construals of informed experts. The predictions derived from the principle were confirmed for the much discussed framing effect in the Disease Problem and for the conjunction fallacy on the Linda Problem. Subjects of higher cognitive ability (...)
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  39. Rebecca Bennett (2009). The Fallacy of the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. Bioethics 23 (5):265-273.score: 21.0
    The claim that we have a moral obligation, where a choice can be made, to bring to birth the 'best' child possible, has been highly controversial for a number of decades. More recently Savulescu has labelled this claim the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. It has been argued that this Principle is problematic in both its reasoning and its implications, most notably in that it places lower moral value on the disabled. Relentless criticism of this proposed moral obligation, however, has been (...)
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  40. Susanne Bobzien (2012). How to Give Someone Horns – Paradoxes of Presupposition in Antiquity. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 15:159-84.score: 18.0
    ABSTRACT: This paper discusses ancient versions of paradoxes today classified as paradoxes of presupposition and how their ancient solutions compare with contemporary ones. Sections 1-4 air ancient evidence for the Fallacy of Complex Question and suggested solutions, introduce the Horn Paradox, consider its authorship and contemporary solutions. Section 5 reconstructs the Stoic solution, suggesting the Stoics produced a Russellian-type solution based on a hidden scope ambiguity of negation. The difference to Russell’s explanation of definite descriptions is that in the (...)
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  41. Susanne Bobzien (2011). The Combinatorics of Stoic Conjunction. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 40 (1):157-188.score: 18.0
    ABSTRACT: The 3rd BCE Stoic logician "Chrysippus says that the number of conjunctions constructible from ten propositions exceeds one million. Hipparchus refuted this, demonstrating that the affirmative encompasses 103,049 conjunctions and the negative 310,952." After laying dormant for over 2000 years, the numbers in this Plutarch passage were recently identified as the 10th (and a derivative of the 11th) Schröder number, and F. Acerbi showed how the 2nd BCE astronomer Hipparchus could have calculated them. What remained unexplained is why Hipparchus’ (...)
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  42. Angelo Gilio & Giuseppe Sanfilippo (2013). Conjunction, Disjunction and Iterated Conditioning of Conditional Events. In R. Kruse (ed.), Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing. Springer.score: 18.0
    Starting from a recent paper by S. Kaufmann, we introduce a notion of conjunction of two conditional events and then we analyze it in the setting of coherence. We give a representation of the conjoined conditional and we show that this new object is a conditional random quantity, whose set of possible values normally contains the probabilities assessed for the two conditional events. We examine some cases of logical dependencies, where the conjunction is a conditional event; moreover, we (...)
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  43. Patrick Girard & Luca Moretti (2014). Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy: The Semantic Approach. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):761-783.score: 18.0
    The expression conditional fallacy identifies a family of arguments deemed to entail odd and false consequences for notions defined in terms of counterfactuals. The antirealist notion of truth is typically defined in terms of what a rational enquirer or a community of rational enquirers would believe if they were suitably informed. This notion is deemed to entail, via the conditional fallacy, odd and false propositions, for example that there necessarily exists a rational enquirer. If these consequences do indeed (...)
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  44. Julia Tanner (2006). The Naturalistic Fallacy. Richmond Journal of Philosophy 13.score: 18.0
    The naturalistic fallacy is a source of much confusion. In what follows I will explain what G. E. Moore meant by the naturalistic fallacy, give modern day examples of it then mention some of the different types of views it has spawned. Finally, I will consider a few criticisms of it.
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  45. David Sloan Wilson, Eric Dietrich & Anne B. Clark (2003). On the Inappropriate Use of the Naturalistic Fallacy in Evolutionary Psychology. Biology and Philosophy 18 (5):669-81.score: 18.0
    The naturalistic fallacy is mentionedfrequently by evolutionary psychologists as anerroneous way of thinking about the ethicalimplications of evolved behaviors. However,evolutionary psychologists are themselvesconfused about the naturalistic fallacy and useit inappropriately to forestall legitimateethical discussion. We briefly review what thenaturalistic fallacy is and why it is misusedby evolutionary psychologists. Then we attemptto show how the ethical implications of evolvedbehaviors can be discussed constructivelywithout impeding evolutionary psychologicalresearch. A key is to show how ethicalbehaviors, in addition to unethical behaviors,can evolve (...)
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  46. Adam Hochman (2013). The Phylogeny Fallacy and the Ontogeny Fallacy. Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):593-612.score: 18.0
    In 1990 Robert Lickliter and Thomas Berry identified the phylogeny fallacy, an empirically untenable dichotomy between proximate and evolutionary causation, which locates proximate causes in the decoding of ‘genetic programs’, and evolutionary causes in the historical events that shaped these programs. More recently, Lickliter and Hunter Honeycutt (Psychol Bull 129:819–835, 2003a) argued that Evolutionary Psychologists commit this fallacy, and they proposed an alternative research program for evolutionary psychology. For these authors the phylogeny fallacy is the proximate/evolutionary distinction (...)
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  47. E. J. Lowe (2002). Material Coincidence and the Cinematographic Fallacy: A Response to Olson. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):369-372.score: 18.0
    Eric T. Olson has argued that those who hold that two material objects can exactly coincide at a moment of time, with one of these objects constituting the other, face an insuperable difficulty in accounting for the alleged differences between the objects, such as their being of different kinds and possessing different persistence-conditions. The differences, he suggests, are inexplicable, given that the objects in question are composed of the same particles related in precisely the same way. In response, I show (...)
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  48. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2009). The Disjunction and Conjunction Theses. Mind 118 (470):427-443.score: 18.0
    This paper is a response to replies by Dan López de Sa and Mark Jago to my ‘Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjuction Thesis’. In that paper, my main aim was to argue against the Entailment Principle by arguing against the Conjunction Thesis, which is entailed by the Entailment Principle. In the course of so doing, although not essential for my project in that paper, I defended the Disjunction Thesis. López de Sa has objected both to my defence of the (...)
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  49. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjunction Thesis. Mind 115 (460):957-982.score: 18.0
    In this paper I undermine the Entailment Principle according to which if an entity is a truthmaker for a certain proposition and this proposition entails another, then the entity in question is a truthmaker for the latter proposition. I argue that the two most promising versions of the principle entail the popular but false Conjunction Thesis, namely that a truthmaker for a conjunction is a truthmaker for its conjuncts. One promising version of the principle understands entailment as strict (...)
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  50. Luca Moretti (2008). Brogaard and Salerno on Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):229 - 246.score: 18.0
    Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno's argument relies on a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, "Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association", 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, "Nous," 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism (...)
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