Search results for 'conjunction fallacy' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  89
    Tomoji Shogenji (2012). The Degree of Epistemic Justification and the Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 184 (1):29-48.
    This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I argue that (...)
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  2.  38
    Rodrigo Moro (2009). On the Nature of the Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 171 (1):1 - 24.
    In a seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events (e.g., Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement) is more likely to occur than one of the conjuncts (e.g., Linda is a bank teller). This belief violates the conjunction rule in probability theory. Tversky and Kahneman called this phenomenon the “conjunction fallacy”. Since the discovery of the phenomenon in 1983, researchers (...)
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  3.  47
    Jonah N. Schupbach (2012). Is the Conjunction Fallacy Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation? Synthese 184 (1):13-27.
    Crupi et al. (2008) offer a confirmation-theoretic, Bayesian account of the conjunction fallacy—an error in reasoning that occurs when subjects judge that Pr( h 1 & h 2 | e ) > Pr( h 1 | e ). They introduce three formal conditions that are satisfied by classical conjunction fallacy cases, and they show that these same conditions imply that h 1 & h 2 is confirmed by e to a greater extent than is h 1 (...)
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  4.  35
    Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi (2012). How the Conjunction Fallacy is Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation: Some Remarks on Schupbach (2009). Synthese 184 (1):3-12.
    Crupi et al. (Think Reason 14:182–199, 2008) have recently advocated and partially worked out an account of the conjunction fallacy phenomenon based on the Bayesian notion of confirmation. In response, Schupbach (2009) presented a critical discussion as following from some novel experimental results. After providing a brief restatement and clarification of the meaning and scope of our original proposal, we will outline Schupbach’s results and discuss his interpretation thereof arguing that they do not actually undermine our point of (...)
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  5.  17
    Martin L. Jönsson & Elias Assarsson (2013). Shogenji's Measure of Justification and the Inverse Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 190 (15):3075-3085.
    This paper takes issue with a recent proposal due to Shogenji (Synthese 184:29–48, 2012). In his paper, Shogenji introduces J, a normatively motivated formal measure of justification (and of confirmation), and then proceeds to recruit it descriptively in an explanation of the conjunction fallacy. We argue that this explanation is undermined by the fact that it cannot be extended in any natural way to the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered, closely related fallacy. We (...)
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  6.  5
    Martin L. Jönsson & Elias Assarsson (2016). A Problem for Confirmation Theoretic Accounts of the Conjunction Fallacy. Philosophical Studies 173 (2):437-449.
    This paper raises a principled objection against the idea that Bayesian confirmation theory can be used to explain the conjunction fallacy. The paper demonstrates that confirmation-based explanations are limited in scope and can only be applied to cases of the fallacy of a certain restricted kind. In particular; confirmation-based explanations cannot account for the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered form of the conjunction fallacy. Once the problem has been set out, the (...)
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  7.  78
    Stephan Hartmann & Wouter Meijs (2012). Walter the Banker: The Conjunction Fallacy Reconsidered. [REVIEW] Synthese 184 (1):73-87.
    In a famous experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (Psychol Rev 90:293–315, 1983), featuring Linda the bank teller, the participants assign a higher probability to a conjunction of propositions than to one of the conjuncts, thereby seemingly committing a probabilistic fallacy. In this paper, we discuss a slightly different example featuring someone named Walter, who also happens to work at a bank, and argue that, in this example, it is rational to assign a higher probability to the conjunction (...)
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  8.  24
    Andreas Jarvstad & Ulrike Hahn (2011). Source Reliability and the Conjunction Fallacy. Cognitive Science 35 (4):682-711.
  9. Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori (2008). Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.
    The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of _confirmation_ relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. (...)
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  10.  7
    Balazs Aczel, Aba Szollosi & Bence Bago (2015). Lax Monitoring Versus Logical Intuition: The Determinants of Confidence in Conjunction Fallacy. Thinking and Reasoning 22 (1):99-117.
    ABSTRACTThe general assumption that people fail to notice discrepancy between their answer and the normative answer in the conjunction fallacy task has been challenged by the theory of Logical Intuition. This theory suggests that people can detect the conflict between the heuristic and normative answers even if they do not always manage to inhibit their intuitive choice. This theory gained support from the finding that people report lower levels of confidence in their choice after they commit the (...) fallacy compared to when their answer is not in conflict with logic. In four experiments we asked the participants to give probability estimations to the options of the conflict and no-conflict versions of the tasks in the original set-up of the experiment or in a three-option design. We found that participants perceive probabilities for the options of the conflict version less similar than for the no-conflict version. As people are less confident when choosing between more similar options, this simil.. (shrink)
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  11.  7
    Giuseppe Mosconi & Laura Macchi (2001). The Role of Pragmatic Rules in the Conjunction Fallacy. Mind and Society 2 (1):31-57.
    We here report the findings of our investigation into the validity of the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), bearing in mind the role of conversational rules. Our first experiment showed that subjects found a logically correct answer unacceptable when it implied a violation of the conversational rules. We argue that tautological questions, such as those which concern the relationship of inclusion between a class and its sub-class, violate conversational rules because they are not informative. In this sense, (...)
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  12.  6
    an Exclusive Conjunction (1998). Peter Simons MacColl and Many-Valued Logic: An Exclusive Conjunction. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (1):85-90.
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  13. Balazs Aczel, Aba Szollosi & Bence Bago (forthcoming). Lax Monitoring Versus Logical Intuition: The Determinants of Confidence in Conjunction Fallacy. Lax Monitoring Versus Logical Intuition: The Determinants of Confidence in Conjunction Fallacy:1-19.
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  14. Martin Jönsson & James A. Hampton, The Inverse Conjunction Fallacy.
    If people believe that some property is true of all members of a class such as sofas, then they should also believe that the same property is true of all members of a conjunctively defined subset of that class such as uncomfortable handmade sofas. A series of experiments demonstrated a failure to observe this constraint, leading to what is termed the inverse conjunction fallacy. Not only did people often express a belief in the more general statement but not (...)
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  15.  21
    Nicolao Bonini, Katya Tentori & Daniel Osherson (2004). A Different Conjunction Fallacy. Mind and Language 19 (2):199–210.
    Because the conjunction pandq implies p, the value of a bet on pandq cannot exceed the value of a bet on p at the same stakes. We tested recognition of this principle in a betting paradigm that (a) discouraged misreading p as pandnotq, and (b) encouraged genuinely conjunctive reading of pandq. Frequent violations were nonetheless observed. The findings appear to discredit the idea that most people spontaneously integrate the logic of conjunction into their assessments of chance.
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  16.  19
    Daniel Osherson (2004). The Conjunction Fallacy: A Misunderstanding About Conjunction? Cognitive Science 28 (3):467-477.
    It is easy to construct pairs of sentences X, Y that lead many people to ascribe higher probability to the conjunction X-and-Y than to the conjuncts X, Y. Whether an error is thereby committed depends on reasoners’ interpretation of the expressions “probability” and “and.” We report two experiments designed to clarify the normative status of typical responses to conjunction problems. © 2004 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved.
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  17.  15
    Sylvain Moutier & Olivier Houd (2003). Judgement Under Uncertainty and Conjunction Fallacy Inhibition Training. Thinking and Reasoning 9 (3):185 – 201.
    Intuitive predictions and judgements under uncertainty are often mediated by judgemental heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Our micro-developmental study suggests that a presumption of rationality is justified for adult subjects, in so far as their systematic judgemental biases appear to be due to a specific executive-inhibition failure in working memory, and not necessarily to a lack of understanding of the fundamental principles of probability. This hypothesis was tested using an experimental procedure in which 60 adult subjects were trained to (...)
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  18.  19
    Daniel Osherson, A Different Conjunction Fallacy.
    Because the conjunction p-and-q implies p, the value of a bet on p-and-q cannot exceed the value of a bet on p at the same stakes. We tested recognition of this principle in a betting paradigm that (a) discouraged misreading p as p-and-not-q, and (b) encouraged genuinely conjunctive reading of p-and-q. Frequent violations were nonetheless observed. The findings appear to discredit the idea that most people spontaneously integrate the logic of conjunction into their assessments of chance.
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  19.  7
    Douglas H. Wedell & Rodrigo Moro (2008). Testing Boundary Conditions for the Conjunction Fallacy: Effects of Response Mode, Conceptual Focus, and Problem Type. Cognition 107 (1):105-136.
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  20.  5
    K. Tentori (2004). The Conjunction Fallacy: A Misunderstanding About Conjunction? Cognitive Science 28 (3):467-477.
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  21.  10
    Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi (2012). On the Conjunction Fallacy and the Meaning of and , yet Again: A Reply To. Cognition 122 (2):123-134.
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  22.  10
    Katya Tentori, Vincenzo Crupi & Selena Russo (2013). On the Determinants of the Conjunction Fallacy: Probability Versus Inductive Confirmation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):235.
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  23.  6
    Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi (2013). Why Quantum Probability Does Not Explain the Conjunction Fallacy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):308-310.
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  24.  8
    Ralph Hertwig, Björn Benz & Stefan Krauss (2008). The Conjunction Fallacy and the Many Meanings of And. Cognition 108 (3):740-753.
  25. K. Tentori, V. Crupi & S. Russo (2013). On the Determinants of the Conjunction Fallacy: Confirmation Versus Probability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142:235-55.
     
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  26. G. Wolford, H. Taylor & R. Beck (1986). The Conjunction Fallacy. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 24 (5):351-351.
     
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  27.  13
    Katya Tentori, Nicolao Bonini & Daniel Osherson (forthcoming). Conjunction and the Conjunction Fallacy. Cognitive Science.
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  28.  31
    Branden Fitelson, Comparative Probability, Comparative Confirmation, and the “Conjunction Fallacy”.
    In the first edition of LFP, Carnap [2] undertakes a precise probabilistic explication of the concept of confirmation. This is where modern confirmation theory was born (in sin). Carnap was interested mainly in quantitative confirmation (which he took to be fundamental). But, he also gave (derivative) qualitative and comparative explications: • Qualitative. E inductively supports H. • Comparative. E supports H more strongly than E supports H . • Quantitative. E inductively supports H to degree r . Carnap begins by (...)
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  29.  9
    Rodrigo Moro (2009). The Conjunction Fallacy and the Debate on Human Rationality. Philosophical Frontiers: A Journal of Emerging Thought 4 (2).
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  30.  5
    Michael Aristidou (2013). Irrationality Re-Examined: A Few Comments on the Conjunction Fallacy. Open Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):329-336.
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  31.  1
    Irwin D. Nahinsky, Daniel Ash & Brent Cohen (1986). The Conjunction Fallacy: Judgmental Heuristic or Faulty Extensional Reasoning? Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 24 (3):186-188.
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  32. N. Bonini, K. Tentori & D. Osherson (forthcoming). A New Conjunction Fallacy. Mind and Language.
     
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  33. Jack Copeland & Diane Proudfoot (2003). The Conjunction Fallacy. Logique Et Analyse 46.
     
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  34. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa (2010). The Whole Truth About Linda: Probability, Verisimilitude and a Paradox of Conjunction. In Marcello D'Agostino, Federico Laudisa, Giulio Giorello, Telmo Pievani & Corrado Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science. College Publications 603--615.
    We provide a 'verisimilitudinarian' analysis of the well-known Linda paradox or conjunction fallacy, i.e., the fact that most people judge the probability of the conjunctive statement "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement" (B & F) as more probable than the isolated statement "Linda is a bank teller" (B), contrary to an uncontroversial principle of probability theory. The basic idea is that experimental participants may judge B & F a better hypothesis about Linda (...)
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  35.  24
    V. I. Yukalov & D. Sornette (2011). Decision Theory with Prospect Interference and Entanglement. Theory and Decision 70 (3):283-328.
    We present a novel variant of decision making based on the mathematical theory of separable Hilbert spaces. This mathematical structure captures the effect of superposition of composite prospects, including many incorporated intentions, which allows us to describe a variety of interesting fallacies and anomalies that have been reported to particularize the decision making of real human beings. The theory characterizes entangled decision making, non-commutativity of subsequent decisions, and intention interference. We demonstrate how the violation of the Savage’s sure-thing principle, known (...)
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  36.  8
    Michael Schippers (forthcoming). Competing Accounts of Contrastive Coherence. Synthese:1-13.
    The proposition that Tweety is a bird coheres better with the proposition that Tweety has wings than with the proposition that Tweety cannot fly. This relationship of contrastive coherence is the focus of the present paper. Based on recent work in formal epistemology we consider various possibilities to model this relationship by means of probability theory. In a second step we consider different applications of these models. Among others, we offer a coherentist interpretation of the conjunction fallacy.
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  37.  12
    Daniel John Zizzo (2003). Verbal and Behavioral Learning in a Probability Compounding Task. Theory and Decision 54 (4):287-314.
    The conjunction fallacy occurs whenever probability compounds are thought of as more likely than its component probabilities alone. In the experiment we present, subjects chose between simple and compound lotteries after some practice. Depending on the condition, they were given more or less information about the nature of probability compounds. The conjunction fallacy was surprisingly robust. There was, however, a puzzling dissociation between verbal and behavioral learning: verbal responses were sensitive, but actual choices entirely insensitive, to (...)
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  38.  49
    Jeanne Peijnenburg (2012). A Case of Confusing Probability and Confirmation. Synthese 184 (1):101-107.
    Tom Stoneham put forward an argument purporting to show that coherentists are, under certain conditions, committed to the conjunction fallacy. Stoneham considers this argument a reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. I argue that Stoneham neglects the distinction between degrees of confirmation and degrees of probability. Once the distinction is in place, it becomes clear that no conjunction fallacy has been committed.
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  39.  1
    Guy Politzer & Jean Baratgin (forthcoming). Deductive Schemas with Uncertain Premises Using Qualitative Probability Expressions. Deductive Schemas with Uncertain Premises Using Qualitative Probability Expressions:1-21.
    The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning redirects the investigation of deduction conceptually and methodologically because the premises and the conclusion of the inferences are assumed to be uncertain. A probabilistic counterpart of the concept of logical validity and a method to assess whether individuals comply with it must be defined. Conceptually, we used de Finetti's coherence as a normative framework to assess individuals' performance. Methodologically, we presented inference schemas whose premises had various levels of probability that contained non-numerical (...)
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  40. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa, A Verisimilitudinarian Analysis of the Linda Paradox. VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.
    The Linda paradox is a key topic in current debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. We present a novel analysis of this paradox, based on the notion of verisimilitude as studied in the philosophy of science. The comparison with an alternative analysis based on probabilistic confirmation suggests how to overcome some problems of our account by introducing an adequately defined notion of verisimilitudinarian confirmation.
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  41.  21
    Ralph Hertwig Valerie M. Chase (1998). Many Reasons or Just One: How Response Mode Affects Reasoning in the Conjunction Problem. Thinking and Reasoning 4 (4):319 – 352.
    Forty years of experimentation on class inclusion and its probabilistic relatives have led to inconsistent results and conclusions about human reasoning. Recent research on the conjunction "fallacy" recapitulates this history. In contrast to previous results, we found that a majority of participants adhere to class inclusion in the classic Linda problem. We outline a theoretical framework that attributes the contradictory results to differences in statistical sophistication and to differences in response mode-whether participants are asked for probability estimates or (...)
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  42.  8
    Keith E. Stanovich Richard & F. West (1998). Individual Differences in Framing and Conjunction Effects. Thinking and Reasoning 4 (4):289 – 317.
    Individual differences on a variety of framing and conjunction problems were examined in light of Slovic and Tversky's (1974) understanding/acceptance principle-that more reflective and skilled reasoners are more likely to affirm the axioms that define normative reasoning and to endorse the task construals of informed experts. The predictions derived from the principle were confirmed for the much discussed framing effect in the Disease Problem and for the conjunction fallacy on the Linda Problem. Subjects of higher cognitive ability (...)
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  43. Rebecca Bennett (2009). The Fallacy of the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. Bioethics 23 (5):265-273.
    The claim that we have a moral obligation, where a choice can be made, to bring to birth the 'best' child possible, has been highly controversial for a number of decades. More recently Savulescu has labelled this claim the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. It has been argued that this Principle is problematic in both its reasoning and its implications, most notably in that it places lower moral value on the disabled. Relentless criticism of this proposed moral obligation, however, has been (...)
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  44. Susanne Bobzien (2012). How to Give Someone Horns. Paradoxes of Presupposition in Antiquity. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 15:159-84.
    ABSTRACT: This paper discusses ancient versions of paradoxes today classified as paradoxes of presupposition and how their ancient solutions compare with contemporary ones. Sections 1-4 air ancient evidence for the Fallacy of Complex Question and suggested solutions, introduce the Horn Paradox, consider its authorship and contemporary solutions. Section 5 reconstructs the Stoic solution, suggesting the Stoics produced a Russellian-type solution based on a hidden scope ambiguity of negation. The difference to Russell's explanation of definite descriptions is that in the (...)
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  45.  28
    Olaf Mueller (1998). Does the Quine/Duhem Thesis Prevent Us From Defining Analyticity? On Fallacy in Quine. Erkenntnis 48 (1):81 - 99.
    Quine claims that holism (i.e., the Quine-Duhem thesis) prevents us from defining synonymy and analyticity (section 2). In "Word and Object," he dismisses a notion of synonymy which works well even if holism is true. The notion goes back to a proposal from Grice and Strawson and runs thus: R and S are synonymous iff for all sentences T we have that the logical conjunction of R and T is stimulus-synonymous to that of S and T. Whereas Grice and (...)
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  46.  6
    Momme von Sydow (2016). Towards a Pattern-Based Logic of Probability Judgements and Logical Inclusion “Fallacies”. Thinking and Reasoning 22 (3):297-335.
    ABSTRACTProbability judgements entail a conjunction fallacy if a conjunction is estimated to be more probable than one of its conjuncts. In the context of predication of alternative logical hypothesis, Bayesian logic provides a formalisation of pattern probabilities that renders a class of pattern-based CFs rational. BL predicts a complete system of other logical inclusion fallacies. A first test of this prediction is investigated here, using transparent tasks with clear set inclusions, varying in observed frequencies only. Experiment 1 (...)
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  47.  7
    James A. Hampton (2013). Quantum Probability and Conceptual Combination in Conjunctions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):290 - 291.
    I consider the general problem of category conjunctions in the light of Pothos & Busemeyer (P&B)'s quantum probability (QP) account of the conjunction fallacy. I argue that their account as presented cannot capture the – the case in which a class is a better member of a conjunction A^B than it is of either A or B alone.
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  48.  64
    Vincenzo Crupi & Stephan Hartmann (2010). Formal and Empirical Methods in Philosophy of Science. In Friedrich Stadler et al (ed.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer 87--98.
    This essay addresses the methodology of philosophy of science and illustrates how formal and empirical methods can be fruitfully combined. Special emphasis is given to the application of experimental methods to confirmation theory and to recent work on the conjunction fallacy, a key topic in the rationality debate arising from research in cognitive psychology. Several other issue can be studied in this way. In the concluding section, a brief outline is provided of three further examples.
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  49.  3
    Valerie F. Reyna & Britain Mills (2007). Converging Evidence Supports Fuzzy-Trace Theory's Nested Sets Hypothesis, but Not the Frequency Hypothesis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):278-280.
    Evidence favors the nested sets hypothesis, introduced by fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) in the 1990s to explain effects and extended to many tasks, including conjunction fallacy, syllogistic reasoning, and base-rate effects (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna 1990; Reyna 1991; 2004; Reyna & Adam 2003; Reyna & Brainerd 1995). Crucial differences in mechanisms distinguish the FTT and Barbey & Sloman (B&S) accounts, but both contrast with frequency predictions (see Reyna & Brainerd, in press).
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  50.  4
    Guy Politzer & Jean Baratgin (2015). Deductive Schemas with Uncertain Premises Using Qualitative Probability Expressions. Thinking and Reasoning 22 (1):78-98.
    ABSTRACTThe new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning redirects the investigation of deduction conceptually and methodologically because the premises and the conclusion of the inferences are assumed to be uncertain. A probabilistic counterpart of the concept of logical validity and a method to assess whether individuals comply with it must be defined. Conceptually, we used de Finetti's coherence as a normative framework to assess individuals' performance. Methodologically, we presented inference schemas whose premises had various levels of probability that contained non-numerical (...)
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