Search results for 'constitutivism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Paul Katsafanas (2011). Deriving Ethics From Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):620-660.score: 24.0
    This paper has two goals. First, I offer an interpretation of Nietzsche’s puzzling claims about will to power. I argue that the will to power thesis is a version of constitutivism. Constitutivism is the view that we can derive substantive normative conclusions from an account of the nature of agency; in particular, constitutivism rests on the idea that all actions are motivated by a common, higher-order aim, whose presence generates a standard of assessment for actions. Nietzsche’s version (...)
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  2. Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). Constitutivism About Practical Reasons. In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford.score: 24.0
    This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature – a constitutive aim, principle, or standard – that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to derive normative claims. In short, the authority of (...)
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  3. Paul Katsafanas (2013). Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Constitutivism is the view that we can derive substantive normative conclusions from an account of the nature of action. Agency and the Foundations of Ethics explains the constitutivist strategy and argues that the attractions of this view are considerable: constitutivism promises to resolve longstanding philosophical puzzles about the metaphysics, epistemology, and practical grip of normative claims. Yet constitutivism faces a challenge: it must employ a conception of action that is minimal enough to be independently plausible, but substantial (...)
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  4. Dorit Bar-On (2009). First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 71 (1):53 - 71.score: 18.0
    What I call “Rorty’s Dilemma” has us caught between the Scylla of Cartesian Dualism and the Charybdis of eliminativism about the mental. Proper recognition of what is distinctively mental requires accommodating incorrigibility about our mental states, something Rorty thinks materialists cannot do. So we must either countenance mental states over and above physical states in our ontology, or else give up altogether on the mental as a distinct category. In section 2, “Materialist Introspectionism—Independence and Epistemic Authority”, I review reasons for (...)
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  5. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2006). Basic Self-Knowledge: Answering Peacocke's Criticisms of Constitutivism. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):337-379.score: 18.0
    Constitutivist accounts of self-knowledge argue that a noncontingent, conceptual relation holds between our first-order mental states and our introspective awareness of them. I explicate a constitutivist account of our knowledge of our own beliefs and defend it against criticisms recently raised by Christopher Peacocke. According to Peacocke, constitutivism says that our second-order introspective beliefs are groundless. I show that Peacocke’s arguments apply to reliabilism not to constitutivism per se, and that by adopting a functionalist account of direct accessibility (...)
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  6. Stefano Bertea (2013). Constitutivism and Normativity: A Qualified Defence. Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):81 - 95.score: 18.0
    In this article, I defend a meta-normative account of constitutivism by specifically addressing what I take to be a fundamental criticism of the constitutivist stance, namely, the objection that constitutive standards have conceptual, not normative, force, and so that no practical normativity can be extracted from them as constitutive of agency. In reply to this objection, I argue that the conceptual role of the standards constitutive of agency ? their applying to us by virtue of our being the kinds (...)
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  7. Larry A. Herzberg (2008). Constitutivism, Belief, and Emotion. Dialectica 62 (4):455-482.score: 18.0
    Constitutivists about one's cognitive access to one's mental states often hold that for any rational subject S and mental state M falling into some specified range of types, necessarily, if S believes that she has M , then S has M . Some argue that such a principle applies to beliefs about all types of mental state. Others are more cautious, but offer no criterion by which the principle's range could be determined. In this paper I begin to develop such (...)
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  8. Luca Ferrero (2009). Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:303-333.score: 15.0
  9. Emer O.’Hagan (2014). Shmagents, Realism and Constitutivism About Rational Norms. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (1):17-31.score: 15.0
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  10. Walter Wietzke (2011). Kierkegaard's Constitutivism: Agency, the Stages of Existence and the Issue of Motivation. Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2011 (1).score: 15.0
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  11. P. Katsafanas (2007). Constitutivism and Self-Knowledge. APA Proceedings and Addresses 80 (3).score: 15.0
     
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  12. Luca Ferrero (2009). Constitutivism and the Schmagency Challenge. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Four. Oup Oxford.score: 15.0
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  13. David Enoch (2011). Shmagency Revisited. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 9.0
    1. The Shmagency Challenge to Constitutivism In metaethics – and indeed, meta-normativity – constitutivism is a family of views that hope to ground normativity in norms, or standards, or motives, or aims that are constitutive of action and agency. And mostly because of the influential work of Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman (and, some would say, because of the also-influential work of Kant and Aristotle), constitutivism seems to be gaining grounds in the current literature. The promises of (...)
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  14. Alessandra Tanesini (2012). Nietzsche on the Diachronic Will and the Problem of Morality. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):n/a-n/a.score: 9.0
    In this paper I offer an innovative interpretation of Nietzsche's metaethical theory of value which shows him to be a kind of constitutivist. For Nietzsche, I argue, valuing is a conative attitude which institutes values, rather than tracking what is independently of value. What is characteristic of those acts of willing which institute values is that they are owned or authored. Nietzsche makes this point using the vocabulary of self-mastery. One crucial feature of those who have achieved this feat, and (...)
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  15. Cynthia Macdonald (2014). In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge. Synthese:1-26.score: 9.0
    It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I (...)
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  16. Matthew Silverstein (forthcoming). The Shmagency Question. Philosophical Studies:1-16.score: 7.0
    Constitutivists hope to locate the foundations of ethics in the nature of action. They hope to find norms that are constitutive of agency. Recently David Enoch has argued that even if there are such norms, they cannot provide the last word when it comes to normativity, since they cannot tell us whether we have reason to be agents rather than shmagents. I argue that the force of the shmagency objection has been considerably overestimated, because philosophers on both sides of the (...)
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  17. Nicholas Silins (2012). Judgment as a Guide to Belief. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 6.0
  18. Declan Smithies (2012). A Simple Theory of Introspection. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 6.0
    This chapter develops a simple theory of introspection on which a mental state is introspectively accessible just by virtue of the fact that one is in that mental state. This theory raises two questions: first, a generalization question: which mental states are introspectively accessible; and second, an explanatory question: why are some mental states introspectively accessible, rather than others, or none at all? In response to the generalization question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only (...)
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  19. John Hacker-Wright (2012). Ethical Naturalism and the Constitution of Agency. Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (1):13-23.score: 6.0
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  20. Nathaniel Sharadin (forthcoming). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.score: 6.0
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the `right' kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the `wrong' kind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the problem of explaining the difference between the `right' (...)
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  21. Ariela Tubert (2011). Korsgaard's Constitutive Arguments and the Principles of Practical Reason. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):343-362.score: 6.0
    Constitutive arguments for the principles of practical reason attempt to justify normative requirements by claiming that we already accept them in so far as we are believers or agents. In two constitutive arguments for the requirement that we must will universally, Korsgaard attempts first to arrive at the requirement that we will universally from observations about the causality of the will, and secondly to establish that willing universally is constitutive of having a self. Some rational requirements may be established by (...)
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  22. Masahiro Yamada (2010). A New Argument for Evidentialism? Philosophia 38 (2):399-404.score: 6.0
    In his “A new argument for evidentialism” (Shah, Philos Q 56(225): 481–498, 2006 ), Nishi Shah argues that the best explanation of a feature of deliberation whether to believe that p which he calls transparency entails that only evidence can be reason to believe that p. I show that his argument fails because a crucial lemma that his argument appeals to cannot be supported without assuming evidentialism to be true in the first place.
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  23. Dorit Bar-On (2010). Précis of Dorit Bar-On's Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 25 (1):1-7.score: 6.0
  24. Matthew Silverstein (2010). The Standards of Practical Reasoning. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):631-638.score: 6.0
    A critical study of Kieran Setiya's *Reasons without Rationalism*.
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  25. Maura Tumulty (2010). Showing by Avowing. Acta Analytica 25 (1):35-46.score: 6.0
    Dorit Bar-On aims to account for the distinctive security of avowals by appealing to expression. She officially commits herself only to a negative characterization of expression, contending that expressive behavior is not epistemically based in self-judgments. I argue that her account of avowals, if it relies exclusively on this negative account of expression, can't achieve the explanatory depth she claims for it. Bar-On does explore the possibility that expression is a kind of perception-enabling showing. If she endorsed this positive account, (...)
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  26. Laura Papish (2011). The Changing Shape of Korsgaard's Understanding of Constructivism. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (4):451-463.score: 6.0
    The goal of the following paper is to consider the development and viability of Korsgaard’s latest work, Self-Constitution. More specifically, I show that we should understand this book as a response to difficulties with both Korsgaard’s argument in 1996’s The Sources of Normativity and Korsgaard’s earlier attempts to explain what marks the difference between realist and constructivist approaches to ethical theory. I begin by focusing primarily on her essay “Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy.” Here I consider exactly how (...)
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  27. Giovanni Boniolo & Silvio Valentini (2012). Objects: A Study in Kantian Formal Epistemology. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 53 (4):457-478.score: 6.0
    We propose a formal representation of objects , those being mathematical or empirical objects. The powerful framework inside which we represent them in a unique and coherent way is grounded, on the formal side, in a logical approach with a direct mathematical semantics in the well-established field of constructive topology, and, on the philosophical side, in a neo-Kantian perspective emphasizing the knowing subject’s role, which is constructive for the mathematical objects and constitutive for the empirical ones.
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  28. Michael Smith (2010). Beyond the Error Theory. In Richard Joyce & Simon Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values. Springer.score: 3.0
    Mackie's argument for the Error Theory is described. Four ways of responding to Mackie's argument—the Instrumental Approach, the Universalization Approach, the Reasons Approach, and the Constitutivist Approach—are outlined and evaluated. It emerges that though the Constitutivist Approach offers the most promising response to Mackie's argument, it is difficult to say whether that response is adequate or not.
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  29. Bradford Cokelet (2008). Ideal Agency and the Possibility of Error. Ethics 118 (2):315-323.score: 3.0
    Lavin’s conclusion—that strong imperativalism and constitutivism are incompatible—spells trouble for contemporary Kantians who, like Korsgaard, hope to combine these two doctrines. I aim to offer them some solace by showing that Lavin’s criticism rests on a mistaken conception of ideal rational agency.
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  30. Jonathan M. Weinberg & Stephen J. Crowley (2009). Loose Constitutivity and Armchair Philosophy. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):177-195.score: 3.0
    Standard philosophical methodology which proceeds by appeal to intuitions accessible "from the armchair" has come under criticism on the basis of empirical work indicating unanticipated variability of such intuitions. Loose constitutivity---the idea that intuitions are partly, but not strictly, constitutive of the concepts that appear in them---offers an interesting line of response to this empirical challenge. On a loose constitutivist view, it is unlikely that our intuitions are incorrect across the board, since they partly fix the facts in question. But (...)
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  31. Jennifer M. Morton (2011). Toward an Ecological Theory of the Norms of Practical Deliberation. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):561-584.score: 3.0
    Abstract: Practical deliberation is deliberation concerning what to do governed by norms on intention (e.g. means-end coherence and consistency), which are taken to be a mark of rational deliberation. According to the theory of practical deliberation I develop in this paper we should think of the norms of rational practical deliberation ecologically: that is, the norms that constitute rational practical deliberation depend on the complex interaction between the psychological capacities of the agent in question and the agent's environment. I argue (...)
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  32. Carla Bagnoli (2012). Self-Deception: A Constructivist Account. Humana.Mente 20:93-116.score: 3.0
    This paper takes a constitutivist approach to self-deception, and argues that this phenomenon should be evaluated under several dimensions of rationality. The constitutivist approach has the merit of explaining the selective nature of self-deception as well as its being subject to moral sanction. Self-deception is a pragmatic strategy for maintaining the stability of the self, hence continuous with other rational activities of self-constitution. However, its success is limited, and it costs are high: it protects the agent’s self by undermining the (...)
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  33. David Alm (2011). Defending Fundamental Requirements of Practical Reason. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:77-102.score: 3.0
    In this paper I offer a partial defense of a constitutivist view according to which it is possible to defend fundamental requirements of practical reason by appeal to facts about what is constitutive of rational agency. I show how it is possible for that approach to circumvent the ‘is’/’ought’ problem as well as the requirement that it be possible to act contrary to practical reason. But I do not attempt to establish any particular fundamental requirement. The key ideas are that (...)
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  34. Evan Tiffany (2012). Why Be an Agent? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):223 - 233.score: 3.0
    Constitutivism is the view that it is possible to derive contentful, normatively binding demands of practical reason and morality from the constitutive features of agency. Whereas much of the debate has focused on the constitutivist's ability to derive content, David Enoch has challenged her ability to generate normativity. Even if one can derive content from the constitutive aims of agency, one could simply demur: ?Bah! Agency, shmagency?. The ?Why be moral?? question would be replaced by the ?Why be an (...)
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  35. Dorit Bar-On & James Sias (2013). Varieties of Expressivism. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):699-713.score: 3.0
    After offering a characterization of what unites versions of ‘expressivism’, we highlight a number of dimensions along which expressivist views should be distinguished. We then separate four theses often associated with expressivism – a positive expressivist thesis, a positive constitutivist thesis, a negative ontological thesis, and a negative semantic thesis – and describe how traditional expressivists have attempted to incorporate them. We argue that expressivism in its traditional form may be fatally flawed, but that expressivists nonetheless have the resources for (...)
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  36. Amie L. Thomasson (2012). Experimental Philosophy and the Methods of Ontology. The Monist 95 (2):175-199.score: 3.0
    Those working in experimental philosophy have raised a number of arguments against the use of conceptual analysis in philosophical inquiries. But they have typically focused on a model that pursues conceptual analysis by taking intuitions as a kind of (defeasible) evidence for philosophical hypotheses. Little attention has been given to the constitutivist alternative, which sees metaphysical modal facts as reflections of constitutive semantic rules. I begin with a brief overview of the constitutivist approach and argue that we can defend a (...)
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  37. María G. Navarro (2011). Epistemología, razonamiento y cognición en el debate historiográfico constructivismo vs reconstructivismo. Universitas Philosophica 57 (28):163-187.score: 3.0
    Some authors sustain that historical research is an effect of a specific historiographical context (Jenkins, 1991; González de Oleaga, 2009). An approach to the historiographical debate between constructivism and recontructivism is presented in this paper. Two theses are here defended. The first one affirms that the above mentioned debate is deeply related to epistemological questions (study of mental representations, different conceptions about historical reasoning functions, historical reasoning, cognitive bias, and informal falacies). The second thesis affirms that each historiographical conception can (...)
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  38. Sophie Djigo (2013). Auto-interprétation, délibération et expression. Moran, Finkelstein et la connaissance de soi. Methodos 13 (13).score: 1.0
    Partant de l'idée énoncée par le philosophe Charles Taylor, selon laquelle les êtres humains sont « des animaux capables d'auto-interprétation », cet article vise à comprendre le rôle constitutif de l'auto-interprétation dans la connaissance de soi. Une conception satisfaisante de l'auto-interprétation devrait à la fois rendre compte de l'autorité de la connaissance de soi en première personne et satisfaire les exigences du réalisme ordinaire. Si la version constitutiviste de l'auto-interprétation semble incompatible avec de telles exigences, c'est parce qu'elle considère ce (...)
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