I argue that the contralife argument, which new natural law theorists have proposed as an argument against contraception, also would rule out altered nuclear transfer, which has been proposed as a way of procuring human stem cells without destroying human embryos.

The author uses the central insight of the principle of double effect—that the distinction between intended effects and foreseen side effects is morally significant—to distinguish contraception from natural family planning. After summarizing the contralife argument against contraception, the author identifies limitations of arguments presented by Pope John Paul II and by Martin Rhonheimer. To show that the contralife argument does not apply to NFP, the author argues that agents do not intend every effect that motivates their actions. This (...) argument supplements the action theory of Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis, and other proponents of new natural law theory. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.1 : 83–97. (shrink)

In a recent issue of this journal, Steven Dezort criticizes two versions of the contralife argument, including my version and a version defended by some prominent new natural law theorists. In this essay, I argue that people should accept the contralife argument even if they disagree with other principles of new natural law theory. To defend this thesis, I correct some misstatements about the contralife argument and identify basic disagreements about defining actions and respecting human life.

According to the contralife argument, because both contraception and natural family planning entail at least a contralife motivation to have marital intercourse but avoid pregnancy, both should be forbidden—a conclusion rejected by the natural law tradition and Church teaching, which forbid contraception but permit NFP. This paper argues that the principle of double effect can be applied to explain why contraception is forbidden but NFP is permissible. This double-effect analysis evaluates the good effect of procreation and unity against (...) the bad effect of lustful sexual pleasure. This paper argues that contraception fails to meet the conditions of the PDE, because it intends sexual pleasure in isolation from procreation and unity and is therefore forbidden. Conversely, NFP meets the conditions of the PDE because, as with all permissible sexual intercourse, it intends sexual pleasure in conjunction with procreation and unity and is therefore itself permissible. (shrink)

This paper discusses the analogies that proponents of contralife arguments have used to distinguish contraception from periodic abstinence or natural family planning. I criticize these analogies and present a new analogy that better illustrates how contraception can be contralife when periodic abstinence are not.

I respond to Rev. Jonah Pollock's criticisms of my argument about the contralife argument and the principle of double effect.

In “The Contralife Argument and the Principle of Double Effect” (NCBQ, Spring 2011), Lawrence Masek tries to use the principle of double effect to show that natural family planning (NFP) is morally justified. This essay presents a summary explanation of the principle of double effect. It demonstrates that Masek wrongly applies the principle of double effect to NFP. It presents the teaching of the 1968 papal encyclical Humanae vitae with regard to NFP, and contends that to apply the principle (...) of double effect to the case of NFP is not only incorrect but also contrary to teaching of Humanae vitae. Because Masek implies that NFP involves the (justified) permission of evil, his article also counteracts the efforts of the Catholic Church to promote the practice of NFP. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.4 (Winter 2011): 661–667. (shrink)