Search results for 'counterfactual conditionals' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  8
    Samuel Fillenbaum (1974). Information Amplified: Memory for Counterfactual Conditionals. Journal of Experimental Psychology 102 (1):44-49.
    Conducted 2 experiments with undergraduates which demonstrated that, in a recognition memory task, Ss recognized the negated antecedent and consequent propositions of previously encountered counterfactual conditionals significantly more often than control items, the latter effect being distinctly stronger (Exp I, n = 110). A similar result was obtained for causals related to previously encountered counterfactual conditionals and counterfactual conditionals related to previously encountered causals, the latter being the stronger effect (Exp II, n = 92). (...)
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  2.  23
    Matthias Unterhuber (2013). Possible Worlds Semantics for Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals? A Formal Philosophical Inquiry Into Chellas-Segerberg Semantics. Ontos (Now de Gruyter).
    Conditional structures lie at the heart of the sciences, humanities, and everyday reasoning. It is hence not surprising that conditional logics – logics specifically designed to account for natural language conditionals – are an active and interdisciplinary area. The present book gives a formal and a philosophical account of indicative and counterfactual conditionals in terms of Chellas-Segerberg semantics. For that purpose a range of topics are discussed such as Bennett’s arguments against truth value based semantics for indicative (...)
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  3.  28
    Lance J. Rips (2010). Two Causal Theories of Counterfactual Conditionals. Cognitive Science 34 (2):175-221.
    Bayes nets are formal representations of causal systems that many psychologists have claimed as plausible mental representations. One purported advantage of Bayes nets is that they may provide a theory of counterfactual conditionals, such as If Calvin had been at the party, Miriam would have left early. This article compares two proposed Bayes net theories as models of people's understanding of counterfactuals. Experiments 1-3 show that neither theory makes correct predictions about backtracking counterfactuals (in which the event of (...)
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  4. Sungho Choi (2008). Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals. Mind 117 (468):795-841.
    For the last several decades, dispositional properties have been one of the main topics in metaphysics. Still, however, there is little agreement among contemporary metaphysicians on the nature of dispositional properties. Apparently, though, the majority of them have reached the consensus that dispositional ascriptions cannot be analysed in terms of simple counterfactual conditionals. In this paper it will be brought to light that this consensus is wrong. Specifically, I will argue that the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, which (...)
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  5.  90
    Robert J. Fogelin (1998). David Lewis on Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals. Analysis 58 (4):286–289.
    David Lewis has argued that there must be a difference between indicative and counterfactual conditionals beyond an indication of truth-value commitments. He cites the following contrast to show this: If Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, then someone else did. If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, then someone else would have. In response, it is shown that this difference is better explained by shifts in context. Keep context fixed, the contrast disappears. EG: If Oswald was not the one who (...)
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  6.  40
    Ana Cristina Quelhas & Ruth Byrne (2003). Reasoning with Deontic and Counterfactual Conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning 9 (1):43 – 65.
    We report two new phenomena of deontic reasoning: (1) For conditionals with deontic content such as, "If the nurse cleaned up the blood then she must have worn rubber gloves", reasoners make more modus tollens inferences (from "she did not wear rubber gloves" to "she did not clean up the blood") compared to conditionals with epistemic content. (2) For conditionals in the subjunctive mood with deontic content, such as, "If the nurse had cleaned up the blood then (...)
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  7.  41
    A. C. Lloyd (1952). Mr. Anderson on Subjunctive and Counterfactual Conditionals. Analysis 12 (5):113 - 115.
    The author takes anderson to task for resting his argument on an "appeal to english usage," without analyzing that usage in relation to his point that subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals belong in one class. (staff).
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  8.  24
    William Todd (1964). Counterfactual Conditionals and the Presuppositions of Induction. Philosophy of Science 31 (2):101-110.
    In this paper I will argue that Professor Goodman was correct in thinking that there is a problem concerning counterfactual conditionals, but that it is somewhat different from the problem he thought it to be, and is one that is even more basic. I will also try to show that this problem is distinct from Hume's "problem" of induction, and that additional assumptions have to be made for counterfactual induction beyond those required for other kinds of induction.
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  9.  3
    J. De Greef (1973). Professor Halberstadt on Counterfactual Conditionals and Modality. International Logic Review 7:126.
    Following halberstadt ("int. log. rev." 1970, i) a counterfactual may be meaningless, the antecedent being syntactically faulty. the author thinks this to be pointless, since indicative and subjunctive mood may, in certain cases, present no apparent difference. halberstadt does not distinguish between subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals. the author thinks that this distinction is needed, and proposes a time factor as distinctive factor. so, the counterfactual 'i a had been the case, b would have happened' is expressible (...)
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  10. Jonathan Ichikawa, Inference in Imagination and Counterfactual Conditionals.
    I propose an explanation for reasoning about counterfactual conditionals. We reason properly to a counterfactual if A, C, when we imagine A along with cotenable background conditions, then properly infer C. Proper inference in my sense is just the same sort of inference that is proper in cases of theoretical reasoning with beliefs. (Roughly: a proper inference is warrant-transferring from belief in A and the background conditions to C.) Cotenability for counterfactuals is explained by reference to our (...)
     
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  11. Andrea Sauchelli (2010). Concrete Possible Worlds and Counterfactual Conditionals: Lewis Versus Williamson on Modal Knowledge. Synthese 176 (3):345-359.
    The epistemology of modality is gradually coming to play a central role in general discussions about modality. This paper is a contribution in this direction, in particular I draw a comparison between Lewis’s Modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s recent account of modality in terms of counterfactual thinking. In order to have criteria of evaluation, I also formulate four requirements which are supposed to be met by any theory of modality to be epistemologically adequate.
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  12.  61
    Sungho Choi (2005). Do Categorical Ascriptions Entail Counterfactual Conditionals? Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):495–503.
    Stephen Mumford, in his book on dispositions, argues that we can distinguish between dispositional and categorical properties in terms of entailing his 'conditional conditionals', which involve the concept of ideal conditions. I aim at defending Mumford's criterion for distinguishing between dispositional and categorical properties. To be specific, no categorical ascriptions entail Mumford's 'conditional conditionals'.
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  13.  73
    Wayne A. Davis (1980). Lowe on Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals. Analysis 40 (4):184 - 186.
    Lowe claims that "if oswald did not kill kennedy, someone else did" is a material conditional. he also claims that the difference in truth-value between this indicative conditional and the subjunctive "if oswald had not killed kennedy, someone else would have" does not support the conclusion of lewis and others that corresponding indicative and subjunctive conditionals are not always equivalent. i dispute both claims.
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  14.  7
    Katrin Schulz (2011). "If You'd Wiggled A, Then B Would've Changed" Causality and Counterfactual Conditionals. Synthese 179 (2):239-251.
    This paper deals with the truth conditions of conditional sentences. It focuses on a particular class of problematic examples for semantic theories for these sentences. I will argue that the examples show the need to refer to dynamic, in particular causal laws in an approach to their truth conditions. More particularly, I will claim that we need a causal notion of consequence. The proposal subsequently made uses a representation of causal dependencies as proposed in Pearl to formalize a causal notion (...)
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  15.  2
    Andrea Sauchelli, Concrete Possible Worlds and Counterfactual Conditionals : Lewis Vs. Williamson on Modal Knowledge.
    The epistemology of modality is gradually coming to play a central role in general discussions about modality. This paper is a contribution in this direction, in particular I draw a comparison between Lewis’s Modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s recent account of modality in terms of counterfactual thinking. In order to have criteria of evaluation, I also formulate four requirements which are supposed to be met by any theory of modality to be epistemologically adequate.
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  16. Marc Lange (2004). A Note on Scientific Essentialism, Laws of Nature, and Counterfactual Conditionals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):227 – 241.
    Scientific essentialism aims to account for the natural laws' special capacity to support counterfactuals. I argue that scientific essentialism can do so only by resorting to devices that are just as ad hoc as those that essentialists accuse Humean regularity theories of employing. I conclude by offering an account of the laws' distinctive relation to counterfactuals that portrays laws as contingent but nevertheless distinct from accidents by virtue of possessing a genuine variety of necessity.
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  17. Antony Eagle (2009). Causal Structuralism, Dispositional Actualism, and Counterfactual Conditionals. In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press 65--99.
    Dispositional essentialists are typically committed to two claims: that properties are individuated by their causal role (‘causal structuralism’), and that natural necessity is to be explained by appeal to these causal roles (‘dispositional actualism’). I argue that these two claims cannot be simultaneously maintained; and that the correct response is to deny dispositional actualism. Causal structuralism remains an attractive position, but doesn’t in fact provide much support for dispositional essentialism.
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  18. Nelson Goodman (1947). The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals. Journal of Philosophy 44 (5):113-128.
  19.  61
    David Lewis (1971). Completeness and Decidability of Three Logics of Counterfactual Conditionals. Theoria 37 (1):74-85.
  20.  5
    Karl Schlechta & David Makinson (2012). Local and Global Metrics for the Semantics of Counterfactual Conditionals. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 4 (2):129-140.
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  21.  91
    Alan Ross Anderson (1951). A Note on Subjunctive and Counterfactual Conditionals. Analysis 12 (2):35 - 38.
  22. Philip P. Hallie (1954). On so-Called "Counterfactual Conditionals". Journal of Philosophy 51 (9):273-278.
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  23. Marc Lange (1996). Inductive Confirmation, Counterfactual Conditionals, and Laws of Nature. Philosophical Studies 85 (1):1-36.
  24.  37
    Keith DeRose (1994). Lewis on 'Might' and 'Would' Counterfactual Conditionals. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):413 - 418.
  25.  2
    Jonathan Cohen (1955). III.—A Relation of Counterfactual Conditionals to Statements of What Makes Sense. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55 (1):45-82.
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  26.  60
    E. J. Lowe (1979). Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals. Analysis 39 (3):139 - 141.
  27.  9
    Jonathan Bennett (2001). On Forward and Backward Counterfactual Conditionals. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman and Littlefield 177--202.
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  28.  5
    R. J. Fogelin (1998). David Lewis on Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals. Analysis 58 (4):286-289.
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  29.  19
    N. A. Blue (1981). A Metalinguistic Interpretation of Counterfactual Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (2):179 - 200.
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  30.  9
    Katrin Schulz (2014). Minimal Models Vs. Logic Programming: The Case of Counterfactual Conditionals. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24 (1-2):153-168.
    This article aims to propagate Logic Programming as a formal tool to deal with non-monotonic reasoning. In philosophy and linguistics non-monotonic reasoning is modelled using Minimal Models as standard, i.e., by imposing an order (or selection function) on the class of all models and then by defining entailment as only caring about the minimal models of the premises with respect to the order. In this article we investigate the question whether instead of minimal models we should use logic programming to (...)
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  31.  21
    B. J. Diggs (1952). Counterfactual Conditionals. Mind 61 (244):513-527.
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  32.  12
    Nicholas Rescher (1960). A Factual Analysis of Counterfactual Conditionals. Philosophical Studies 11 (4):49 - 54.
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  33.  14
    Gabriel Nuchelmans (1955). The Analysis of Counterfactual Conditionals. Synthese 9 (1):48 - 63.
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  34.  19
    William Tuthill Parry (1957). Reexamination of the Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals. Journal of Philosophy 54 (4):85-94.
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  35.  14
    Robert Brown & John Watling (1952). Counterfactual Conditionals. Mind 61 (242):222-233.
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  36.  7
    Ronald Polansky & Kurt Torell (1990). Power, Liberty, and Counterfactual Conditionals in Hobbes' Thought. Hobbes Studies 3 (1):3-17.
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  37.  8
    Jonathan Cohen (1954). A Relation of Counterfactual Conditionals to Statements of What Makes Sense. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55:45 - 82.
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  38.  2
    Alan Ross Anderson (1954). Review: B. J. Diggs, Counterfactual Conditionals. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 19 (1):68-68.
  39.  7
    J. A. Eisenberg (1969). The Logical Form of Counterfactual Conditionals. Dialogue 7 (4):568-583.
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  40.  1
    J. C. C. McKinsey (1947). Review: Nelson Goodman, The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):139-139.
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  41.  2
    John Watling (1957). Review: G. Nuchelmans, "Counterfactual Conditionals" and Singular Causal Statements. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 22 (4):389-390.
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  42.  1
    Charles A. Baylis (1953). Review: Alan Ross Anderson, A Note on Subjunctive and Counterfactual Conditionals. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 18 (4):338-338.
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  43. John Watling (1957). Review: Philip P. Hallie, On So-Called "Counterfactual Conditionals.". [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 22 (3):321-321.
     
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  44.  1
    Alan Ross Anderson (1954). Review: Robert Brown, John Watling, Counterfactual Conditionals; Robert Brown, John Watling, Hypothetical Statements and Phenomenalism. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 19 (1):70-71.
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  45. Alan Ross Anderson (1954). Brown Robert and Watling John. Counterfactual Conditionals. Mind, N. S. Vol. 61 , P.P 222–233.Brown Robert and Watling John. Hypothetical Statements and Phenomenalism. Synthese, Vol. 8 , Pp. 355–366. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 19 (1):70-71.
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  46. Alan Ross Anderson (1954). Diggs B. J.. Counterfactual Conditionals. Mind, N. S. Vol. 61 , Pp. 513–527. Journal of Symbolic Logic 19 (1):68.
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  47. Charles A. Baylis (1953). Lloyd A. C.. Mr. Anderson on Subjunctive and Counterfactual Conditionals. Analysis , Vol. 12 , Pp. 113–115. Journal of Symbolic Logic 18 (4):338-339.
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  48. Charles A. Baylis (1953). Review: A. C. Lloyd, Mr. Anderson on Subjunctive and Counterfactual Conditionals. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 18 (4):338-339.
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  49. Frank Jackson (1982). Brand Myles. Introduction: Defining “Causes.” The Nature of Causation, Edited and with an Introduction by Brand Myles, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, Pp. 1–44.Nagel Ernest. The Logical Character of Scientific Laws. The Nature of Causation, Edited and with an Introduction by Brand Myles, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, Pp. 77–110. , Pp. 47–78.)Chisholm Roderick M.. Law Statements and Counterfactual Inference. A Reprint of XXI 86. The Nature of Causation, Edited and with an Introduction by Brand Myles, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, Pp. 111–121.Goodman Nelson. The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals. A Reprint of XII 139. The Nature of Causation, Edited and with an Introduction by Brand Myles, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1976, Pp. 123–149.Stalnaker Robert. A Theory of Conditionals. The Nature of Causation, Edited and with an Introduction by Brand Myles, U. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (2):470-473.
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  50. J. C. C. McKinsey & Nelson Goodman (1947). The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals. Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):139.
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