This book suggests a bold comparative approach to broad cultural differences between Africa and Melanesia. Its theme is personhood, understood in terms of what anthropologists call embodiment. These concepts are applied to questions ranging from the meanings of spirit possession, to the logics of witchcraft and kinship relations, the use of rituals in healing, and even the impact of capitalism. Questioning common assumptions about the huge differences among these discrete areas, the contributions document surprising continuities.

If cultures are always in the making, this book catches one kind of culture on the make. Academics will be familiar with audit in the form of research and teaching assessments - they may not be aware how pervasive practices of 'accountability' are or of the diversity of political regimes under which they flourish. Twelve social anthropologists from across Europe and the Commonwealth chart an influential and controversial cultural phenomenon.

The anthropological sensibility has often been seen as growing out of opposition to Enlightenment universalism. Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) is often cited as an ancestor of modern cultural relativism, in which cultures exist in the plural. This article argues that Herder’s anthropology, and anthropology generally, are more closely related to Enlightenment thought than is generally considered. Herder certainly attacks Enlightenment abstraction, the arrogance of its Eurocentric historical teleology, and argues the case for a proto-hermeneutical approach which emphasizes (...) embeddedness, horizon, the usefulness of prejudice. His suspicion of the ideology of progress and of associated theories of stadial development leads to a critique of cosmopolitanism and, particularly, of colonialism. But a comparison with a central Enlightenment figure like the natural historian Buffon (1708-88) reveals shared anthropological assumptions: human beings are characterized by the flexibility of their relationship to their environment, and by their ability to transmit and receive social knowledge. Herder’s critique of progress is thus an unstable one: culture [Kultur] as the process through which humanity develops can also be called Enlightenment [Aufklärung]. Herder’s definition of culture is much closer to a unitary Enlightenment model of civilization than is frequently suggested. Herder’s relativism is thus open to question: he holds on to certain universal criteria for transcultural judgements. This reassessment of Herder’s place in Enlightenment anthropology raises questions of contemporary relevance regarding cultural relativism on the one hand, and modernization and globalization on the other. (shrink)

Alfred Schutz’s scattered remarks about cultural anthropology can be related to the rubrics of disciplinary definition, basic concepts, and distinctive methods and also to his notion of the theoretical level in social science by consulting current textbooks. This shows a way in which a theory of this particular science can be developed that would fit into a general Schutzian Wissenschaftslehre of the cultural sciences.

The outburst of antiracist protests in the USA in 2020 demonstrates how deeply this society’s present-day problems are rooted in its past. From this perspective, a study of the cultural memory of the time of the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, the key moment in the contemporary American nation formation, is especially relevant and important. The cultural frontier between the North and the South that had appeared as an outcome of differences in US history has not (...) disappeared up to now. By example of the complexity and inconsistency of the historical memory of the Civil War, slavery, and its abolition in the USA manifested in their visual representations, the article documents how through collective memory, history does not just invade modernity but is present in it, particularly in the form of memorials, monuments, museum expositions, and therefore determines the nation’s modernity to a large degree. (shrink)

Erich Rothacker (1888–1965) was a key figure in early-twentieth-century philosophy in Germany. In this paper, I examine the development of Rothacker’s philosophy of culture from 1907 to 1945. Rothacker began his philosophical career with a völkerpsychological dissertation on history, outlining his early biologistic conception of culture (1907–1913). In his mid-career work, he then turned to Wilhelm Dilthey’s (1833–1911) Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life), advancing a hermeneutic approach to culture (1919–1928). In his later work (1929–1945), Rothacker developed a cultural anthropology. (...) I shall argue that Rothacker’s later theory of culture retained key motifs of his earlier works. In this way, I trace central aspects of Rothacker’s reception of both Völkerpsychologie and Lebensphilosophie. The paper focuses on two aspects of Rothacker’s philosophical development that deserve more attention than they have received to date: his reception of Völkerpsychologie and the political character of his theories of culture. Rothacker’s theoretical work was closely connected to his political conservatism, which culminated in his engagement with National Socialism. The paper unearths problematic aspects of the legacy of Völkerpsychologie and Lebensphilosophie in early twentieth-century German thought. (shrink)

In this book, Samuel Collins argues not only for the importance of the future of culture, but also stresses its centrality in anthropological thought over the ...

This article highlights the difficulty of creating a code of ethics in anthropology, particularly one that appropriately addresses the nuanced nature of the military and the anthropologists who con...

Those—other social scientists as well as laymen—who have read recent studies of national character and culture by anthropologists, while not having had experience in this field themselves, often seem to believe that the results which such anthropological investigators obtain are interesting, but that the methods used were intuitional, magical, or just invisible. The status of the work is cast in doubt, as falling short of an ideal that scientific description and analysis must be reproducible by any observer to whom a (...) set of techniques of the discipline has been communicated. This paper attempts to show why and how such a belief is erroneous, and then to describe some of the fundamentals of method in current cultural anthropology as used in research and as related to the general structure of scientific method today. (shrink)

In today’s globalized world anthropology is a transdisciplinary and trans-cultural field of research. In the here-proposed concept it encompasses five paradigms: 1) hominization/evolution, 2) philosophical anthropology, 3) historical anthropology/mentality research, 4) cultural anthropology, 5) historical cultural anthropology. Anthropology contributes to the understanding of the human being at the beginning of the 21st century. Anthropology is characterized by a double historicity and culturality; it encompasses a great variety of research questions, methods (...) and approaches and includes philosophical thinking and self-criticism. (shrink)

On one meaning of the term “historicism” to be a historicist is to be committed to the claim that the human sciences have a methodology of their own that is distinct in kind and not only in degree from that of the natural sciences. In this sense of the term Collingwood certainly was a historicist, for he defended the view that history is an autonomous discipline with a distinctive method and subject matter against the claim for methodological unity in the (...) sciences. On another interpretation historicism is a relativist way of thinking which denies the possibility of universal and fundamental interpretations of historical or cultural phenomena. In the following I argue that at least in this second sense of “historicism” Collingwood was everything but a historicist. Quine, on the contrary, was nothing but a historicist. The goal of the comparison, however, is not to establish just who, on this definition, was or was not a historicist, but to draw a few conclusions about what a commitment to or rejection of historicism in this sense, tells us about the nature of understanding. (shrink)

This article reviews and contrasts research findings in a variety of disciplines seeking corroboration for theories of settlement in Madagascar. Evidence is considered from the fields of linguistics, archaeology (studies of pottery), cultural anthropology and genetic analysis, leading to conclusions broadly supporting the thesis of Austronesian migrations directly to Madagascar from Kalimantan and Sulawesi around the 5th and 7th centuries CE, which combined with a Bantu group originating from the region of Mozambique. The article nevertheless warns against attributing (...) too much to individual discipline studies, concluding that only genetic analysis can provide conclusive proof, and this only when informed by prior anthropological and historical indicators. (shrink)

Human experience has a symbolic structure. By focusing on the symbolism of human action, this essay considers the reciprocal influences and the essential differences between Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutics and Clifford Geertz’s cultural anthropology. Through reference to Ricœur’s Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, the section on “Ideology, Utopia, and Politics” in From Text to Action, and Geertz’s 1973 book The Interpretation of Cultures, this paper aims at reconstructing the dialogue between these thinkers. I begin with a broad framing of (...) the encounter between Ricœur and Geertz, and then turn to the notion of the symbolic mediation of action, considering it as the shared key concept between these authors. These reflections will lead to an examination of the semiotic conception of culture, opening up the discussion of a nonpejorative dimension of ideology. (shrink)

ArgumentEvolutionary psychologists argue that because humans are biological creatures, cultural explanationsmustinclude biology. They thus offer to unify the natural and social sciences. Evolutionary psychologists rely on a specific history of cultural anthropology, particularly the work of Alfred Kroeber to make this point. A close examination of the history of cultural anthropology reveals that Kroeber acknowledged that humans were biological and culture had a biological foundation; however, he argued that we should treat culture as autonomous because (...) that would bring benefits to the biological sciences as well as the human sciences. Hence, the historical caricature of his work by evolutionary psychology fails. The paper concludes that cultural anthropologists were successful in creating their discipline, at least in part, because they argued by pragmatic definition. Evolutionary psychology, on the other hand, offers an essentialist definition of “culture” and thus offers a much less promising vision of interdisciplinary collaboration. (shrink)

Alina Branda, Repere în antropologia culturalã Ed. Fundatiei pentru Studii Europene, Cluj-Napoca, 2002, 272p.

The aim is to offer a fundamental outline of a human being, which could be the backbone of the conception of open culture. By analyzing the focal points of philosophical and cultural anthropology: A) philosophical anthropology : a) passivist conception, b) activist conception; B) cultural anthropology : a) closed culture, b) open culture; we must ensure the conception of an open vs. the closed culture. In multicultural associations, it would seem that the latter often hinders (...) progress, so it is necessary to find parameters open cultures can use for early recognition of the negative attributes of patriarchal culture. (shrink)

The semantic confusion in Europe about the term “anthropology” has of late been considerable. On the one hand there is meant by it, and quite justifiably, human biology and medical anthropology. On the other hand, the work of some contemporary thinkers, under the name of “philosophical anthropology,” has recently gone beyond the narrower compass. This has been noticeable at both the German and the international European philosophical conventions since the last war. In addition to this, there appeared (...) the term “Kulturanthropologie,”—for the first time probably as the title of E. Rothacker's contribution to Systematische Philosophie, a collection of essays edited by Nicolai Hartmann and published in 1942. But “Kulturanthropologie,” in Rothacker's sense, is not a translation of “cultural anthropology,” which has in recent years grown to such eminence among scholarly fields in England and America. In the United States, “anthropology” designates a group of scholarly fields ranging on the one hand from biological anthropology to archaeology and the study of the beginnings of history on the other, often including history, linguistics, and other realms of research; it is neither one of the natural sciences nor of the humanities but one of the social sciences; and the actually new results of this young discipline, especially at Harvard, Yale, and the University of Chicago, are arrived at by means of team work by anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists, which in Germany has not been the case so far. (shrink)

Ethnographic research, anthropological theory, and the understanding of the objects of inquiry, are co-created through figuration (using tropes and rhetorical figures) and techniques of persuasion. Delving into descriptive ethnography and theoretical texts spanning across classical monographs and recent texts in cultural anthropology, Culture Figures places rhetoric and rhetoricity as central to the discipline's self-understanding. It focuses on how understandings of 'culture' and social life are shaped and conveyed in cultural anthropology through textual rhetoric. The book demonstrates (...) how processes of using tropes and modes of persuasion underlie the creation of meanings or misunderstandings in society. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

Rothacker’s concept of humanities is based on the cohesive idea of participation (»Teilhabe«; by perception, in tradition, in community) which is not modified in his works all over the years. His texts offer dimensions of ›characteristic form‹ (»geprägte Form«: J. W. Goethe, »Urworte. Orphisch«), which bind the style of life (»Lebensstil«) of individuals and nations. The structure of Rothacker’s approach allows modifications (for example in adressing national socialistic thought) without the necessity to rearrange the concept itself. Rothacker’s interpretation of ›characteristic (...) form‹ is founded on values concerning worthy cultural developments. (shrink)

The role of the cultural anthropologist in studying the results of information technology and artificial intelligence should be to contribute and reaffirm a sense of life which considers the human being in his or her totality, and to recognize the role of diversity and the imaginary. Technical revolutions have also proved to be cultural revolutions.The skills required by one culture, the identification and creation of problems and the solutions are interrelated. These interrelationships are worked out in a (...) class='Hi'>cultural context endowed with its own experiences, knowledge and needs which define and make it different from other societies. The advanced technologies require new competences and new skills.This paper examines imaginary from two different viewpoints: (a) the imaginary aspect of body-mind relations, influenced by research into artificial intelligence and its prospects for the future; and (b) the roles and forms assumed by the imaginary in human-computer relations. (shrink)