Search results for 'de se' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Amodo de (2011). El axioma de igualdad o cómo «el jamás se convierte en hoy mismo». Res Publica 26:181-190.
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  2.  6
    Lo de (2005). Traducción española de la cueshon 4 cIeI artículo 32 i cIe la Suma (cuestiones ordinarias)(¿ Dice Io que se atribuye a Dios aIgo de éste de forma positiva o negativa?). [REVIEW] Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 11:143-160.
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  3.  39
    Stephan Torre (forthcoming). De Se Thought and Communication: An Introduction. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press 1-21.
    This chapter provides a critical overview of various influential accounts of de se attitudes including those proposed by Frege, Lewis and Perry. It also addresses the charge (...)
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  4. Alessandro Capone (2013). Consequences of the Pragmatics of 'de Se'. In Alessandro Capone & Neil Feit (eds.), Attitudes 'de se': linguistics, epistemology and metaphysics. 209-244..
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  5.  39
    Emar Maier (2016). Why My I is Your You: On the Communication of de Se Attitudes. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. OUP
    The communication of de se attitudes poses a problem forparticipant- neutralanalyses of communication in terms of propositions expressed or proposed updates to the common ground: (...)
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  6.  3
    Dirk Kindermann (2016). Varieties of Centering and De Se Communication. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself. De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press 307–40.
    There has recently been a wave of attempts to make sense of the role of de se thoughts in linguistic communication. A majority of the attempts assume (...)
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  7. Shen-yi Liao (2014). Collective De Se Thoughts and Centered Worlds. Ratio 27 (1):17-31.
    Two lines of investigation into the nature of mental content have proceeded in parallel until now. The first looks at thoughts that are attributable to collectives, such (...)
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  8. Emar Maier (2009). Presupposing Acquaintance: A Unified Semantics for de Dicto, de Re and de Se Belief Reports. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (5):429--474.
    This paper deals with the semantics of de dicto , de re and de se belief reports. First, I flesh out in some detail the established, classical theories (...) that assume syntactic distinctions between all three types of reports. I then propose a new, unified analysis, based on two ideas discarded by the classical theory. These are: (i) modeling the de re/de dicto distinction as a difference in scope, and (ii) analyzing de se as merely a special case of relational de re attitudes. The resurrection of these ideas takes place in a dynamic setting. My formalization of the first idea involves a modification of the presupposition-as-anaphora resolution algorithm for DRT. The second involves treating acquaintance relations as second-order presuppositions, to be bound in the context by means of higher-order unification, or accommodated if necessary. The resulting framework requires no syntactic distinctions between different modes of attitude, with the exception of a specific subclass of de se reports characterized by specialde se pronouns’ (i.e. PRO and logophors). These special pronouns are handled in syntax; everything alse is passed on to the pragmatic resolution module as it appears on the surface. The more sophisticated contextual resolution process nonetheless ensures adequate output truth conditions for a variety of classical and novel puzzles. In particular, I compare the new pragmasemantic system to the classical, syntactic analysis with respect to iterated and quantified reports, and monstrously shifted indexicals. (shrink)
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  9. Erich Rast (2012). De Se Puzzles, the Knowledge Argument, and the Formation of Internal Knowledge. Analysis and Metaphysics 11 (December):106-132.
    ABSTRACT. Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jacksons original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory (...)of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically neutral, the account also explains why neither Lewiss two gods nor Marys surprise in the Knowledge Argument violate physicalism. (shrink)
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  10.  48
    James R. Shaw (2013). De Se Belief and Rational Choice. Synthese 190 (3):491-508.
    The Sleeping Beauty puzzle has dramatized the divisive question of how de se beliefs should be integrated into formal theories of rational belief change. In this paper, (...)
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  11.  75
    Marie Guillot (2013). The Limits of Selflessness: Semantic Relativism and the Epistemology of de Se Thoughts. Synthese 190 (10):1793-1816.
    It has recently been proposed that the framework of semantic relativism be put to use to describe mental content, as deployed in some of the fundamental operations (...)
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  12.  55
    Corien Bary & Emar Maier (2009). The Dynamics of Tense Under Attitudes: Anaphoricity and de Se Interpretation in the Backward Shifted Past. In Hattori et al (ed.), New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence. Springer 146--160.
    Shows that both anaphoricity and egocentric de se binding play a crucial role in the interpretation of tense in discourse. Uses the English backwards shifted reading of (...)
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  13.  16
    Emar Maier (2011). On the Roads to de Se. Proceedings of Salt 21 (1):393--412.
    It is rather uncontroversial that there are different ways to report de se attitudes, but there is still disagreement about the number and the nature of the (...)
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  14.  36
    Emar Maier (2006). Belief in Context: Towards a Unified Semantics of De Re and De Se Attitude Reports. Dissertation, Radboud University Nijmegen
    This thesis deals with the phenomenon of attitude reporting. More specifically, it provides a unified semantics of de re and de se belief reports. After arguing that (...)
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  15.  45
    Marina Folescu & James Higginbotham (2012). Two Takes on the De Se. In Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press
    In this article we consider, relying in part upon comparative semantic evidence from English and Romanian, two contrasting dimensions of the sense in which our thoughts, including (...)
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  16.  21
    Emar Maier (2005). De Re and de Se in Quantified Belief Reports. In Sylvia Blaho, Luis Vicente & Erik Schoorlemmer (eds.), Proceedings of Console Xiii. 211-29.
    Percus & Sauerland (2003) use quantified belief reports of the form 'Only Peter thinks he's...' to argue for dedicated de se LFs. The argument is targeted against (...)
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  17. Alessandro Capone (2010). Between Scylla and Charibdis: The Semantics and Pragmatics of Attitudes 'de Se'. Intercultural Pragmatics 7 (3):471-503.
    'de se' attitudes and pragmatic intrusion. A critique of Higginbotham (2003).
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  18.  23
    Ari Maunu (2000). A Simple Solution to the Problem of De Se Belief Ascriptions. Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 33 (3-4):199-226.
    I show how a de se belief ascription such as "Privatus believes that he himself is rich" may be dealt with by means of a scope (...) distinction over and above that one separating de dicto and de re ascriptions. The idea is, roughly, that 'Privatus...himself' forms in this statement a unity, a single "spread" sign that is at the same time in a de re and de dicto position. If so, H-N. Castañeda's contention that the "quasi-indicator" 'he himself' ('she herself', 'it itself') belongs to a "unique, irreducible logical category" of singular terms is, at best, misleading. Further, my account is superior to the well-known theories of R. Chisholm and D. Lewis, according to which de se ascriptions state that the believer "directly attributes properties to himself or herself". 1. Introduction 2. Chisholm and Lewis on de se belief ascriptions 3. Fregean and Sellarsian theories of belief ascriptions 4. Geach on the reflexive pronoun 5. Admiring and self-admiring 6. A solution to the problem de se belief ascriptions 7. Belief de se 8. Conclusion. (shrink)
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  19.  15
    Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.) (2013). Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications.
    In English, we use the word "I" to express thoughts that we have about ourselves, and we use the reflexive pronouns "himself" and "herself (...)" to attribute such thoughts to others. Philosophers and linguists call such thoughts, and the statements we use to express them, de se. De se thoughts and statements, although they appear often in our day-to-day lives, pose a series of challenging problems for both linguists and philosophers. This interdisciplinary volume examines the structure of de se thought, various issues concerning the semantics and pragmatics of our discourse about it, and also what it reveals about how humans think about themselves and the world around them. (shrink)
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  20. Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.) (2016). About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press Uk.
    This volume addresses foundational issues concerning the nature of first-personal, or de se, thought and how such thoughts are communicated. Many have held that first-person thought (...) motivates a revision of traditional accounts of content or motivates positing special ways of accessing such contents. Gottlob Frege held that first-person thoughts involve a subject being 'presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else.' However, as Frege also noted, this raises many puzzling questions when we consider how we are able to communicate such thoughts. What happens when I communicate this thought to you, for instance? Do you come to believe the thing that I believe? Or is my first-person belief only entertained by me? If so, how does it relate to what you come to believe? It is these questions that the volume addresses and seeks to answer. (shrink)
     
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  21. Emar Maier (2005). De Se Reductionism Takes on Monsters. In Emar Maier, Corien Bary & Janneke Huitink (eds.), Proceedings of Sub9. 197-211.
    Chierchia (1989) and others have used the contrast between George hopes that he will win and Georges hopes to win in mistaken-self-identity scenarios, to argue for (...) dedicated de se LFs. The argument, further strengthened by evidence of shiftable indexicals, appears applicable against any reductionist account that sees de se as merely a particular subtype of de re. My Acquaintance Resolution framework is an attempt at such a reduction, and this paper seeks to extend that theory with a logical principle of introspection for belief, to account for the data within a unified treatment of de re and de se. (shrink)
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  22. Christopher J. G. Meacham (2008). Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of de Se Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):245-269.
    This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David Lewis, and a third account defended (...)
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  23. Dilip Ninan (2010). De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):551-567.
    This paper concerns two points of intersection between de se attitudes and the study of natural language: attitude ascription and communication. I first survey some recent work (...)
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  24.  61
    Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (2013). The Problem of De Se Attitudes: An Introduction to the Issues and the Essays. In Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.), Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications 1-25.
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  25. Daniel Giberman (2009). Who They Are and What de Se: Burge on Quasi-Memory. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):297 - 311.
    Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include (...) appropriately de se elements or presuppose facts about diachronic personal identityfacts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies. The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one. (shrink)
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  26. François Recanati (2009). De Re and De Se. Dialectica 63 (3):249-269.
    For Perry and many authors, de se thoughts are a species of de re thought. In this paper, I argue that de se thoughts come in two (...)
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  27.  12
    Erich Rast (2015). De Se Attitudes and Semiotic Aspects of Cognition. In J. Fonseca & J. Gonçalves (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on the Self. Peter Lang 121-146.
    Typical puzzles for de se attitudes by Perry and Lewis are laid out and contrasted with the original version of Jackson's Knowledge Argument. It is argued, (...)from an epistemic perspective, that de se attitudes can be explained by looking at the way internal/introspective knowledge is formed without resorting to acquaintance or making assumptions about the Mind/Body problem. (shrink)
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  28.  90
    Isidora Stojanovic (2012). The Problem of De Se Assertion. Erkenntnis 76 (1):49-58.
    It has been long known (Perry in Philos Rev 86: 474497, 1977 ; Noûs 13: 321, 1979 , Lewis in Philos Rev 88: 513543 1981 ) that (...)
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  29.  24
    Namjoong Kim (2015). Titelbaums Theory of De Se Updating and Two Versions of Sleeping Beauty. Erkenntnis 80 (6):1217-1236.
    In hisRelevance of Self-locating Belief”, Titelbaum suggests a general theory about how to update ones degrees of self-locating belief. He applies it to the (...)
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  30. Darren Bradley (2010). Conditionalization and Belief De Se. Dialectica 64 (2):247-250.
    Colin Howson (1995 ) offers a counter-example to the rule of conditionalization. I will argue that the counter-example doesn't hit its target. The problem is that (...) Howson mis-describes the total evidence the agent has. In particular, Howson overlooks how the restriction that the agent learn 'E and nothing else' interacts with the de se evidence 'I have learnt E'. (shrink)
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  31.  19
    Manuel García-Carpintero (forthcoming). De Se Thoughts and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. Synthese:1-23.
    I discuss an aspect of the relation between accounts of de se thought and the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I will argue that a (...)
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  32.  94
    Jason Turner (2010). Fitting Attitudes de Dicto and de Se. Noûs 44 (1):1-9.
    The Property Theory of attitudes holds that the contents of mental states --- especially de se states --- are properties. The "nonexistence problem" for the Property Theory (...)
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  33.  65
    Richard Holton (forthcoming). Primitive Self-Ascription: Lewis on the De Se. In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to David Lewis. Blackwell
    There are two parts to Lewis's account of the de se. First there is the idea that the objects of de se thought (and, by extension (...)of de dicto thought too) are properties, not propositions. This is the idea that is center-stage in Lewis's discussion. Second there is the idea that the relation that thinkers bear to these properties is that of self-ascription. It is crucial to LewisÕs account that this is understood as a fundamental, unanalyzable, notion: self-ascription of a property is not ascription of a property to the self, on a par with ascription to someone else. This has been overlooked in much recent discussion, especially when Lewis's account is understood in terms of centered worlds. When it is back in focus it brings problems. An almost Cartesian starting point is required; and first-person plural ascriptions, and those with first person pronouns other than in subject position, become unmanageably complex. (shrink)
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  34.  64
    Peter Alward (2006). Leave Me Out of It: De Re, but Not de Se, Imaginative Engagement with Fiction. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (4):451–459.
    I have been dissatisfied with Waltons make-believe model of appreciator engagement with fiction ever since my first encounter with it as a graduate student.1 What (...)
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  35.  77
    Stephan Torre (2006). De Se Knowledge and the Possibility of an Omniscient Being. Faith and Philosophy 23 (2):191-200.
    In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for the claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of (...)
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  36.  87
    Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Divine Omniscience and Knowledge de Se. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53 (2):73-82.
    Patrick Grim argues that God cannot beomniscient because no one other than me canacquire knowledge de se of myself. Inparticular, according to Grim, God cannot knowwhat I (...)
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  37.  17
    Igor Douven (2013). The Epistemology of 'de Se'Beliefs. In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes de Se. University of Chicago
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  38.  13
    Isidora Stojanovic, De Se Assertion.
    It has been long known (Perry (1977, 1979), Lewis (1981)) that de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself, call for a (...)
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  39.  33
    B. H. Slater, Motivation by de Se Beliefs.
    I have become more convinced, over the years, by the truth of Wittgensteins characterisation of philosophy as arising through misconceptions of grammar. Such a misconception of (...)grammar characterises a very popular approach to indexicality which has been current since the 1970s, stemming from the work of Casteñeda, and Kaplan. Gareth Evans was inclined to allow, for instance, that one could say ‘“To the left (I am hot)” is true, as uttered by x at t iff there is someone moderately near to the left of x such that, if he were to utter the sentenceI am hotat t, what he would thereby say is true’ (Evans 1985: 358). But not only does this disturb the proper relation between direct and indirect speech, it continues a Fregean tradition which these very cases show to be quite mistaken about the logic of intensions. In this paper, however, I want primarily to point out how this misconception of grammar has distorted our view of people. For some of the above thinkers have tried to make out that human motivation is related to the possession of a certain category of indexical belief, by Lewis calledde se beliefs’. I shall look here at how the matter arises in Hugh Mellors work on Time. In connection with Time, indexicality arises in McTaggartsA-series’, and Mellor treats this indexicality in parallel with Evanslanguage. First, therefore, I aim to show how Mellors discussion of Time grammatically misconceives the situation, and leads to a misrepresentation of the motivation of human action. But a larger conclusion about Fregean intensions is also then immediately available. (shrink)
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  40.  9
    Manuel García-Carpintero (2013). Self-Conception: Sosa on De Se Thought. In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer 73--99.
    Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued in the 1960s and 1970s that thoughts about oneselfas oneself” – de se thoughtsrequire special treatment, and advanced different (...)
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  41.  4
    I. Nakhimovsky (2003). The Enlightened Epicureanism of Jacques Abbadie: L'Art de Se Connoître Soi-Même and the Morality of Self-Interest. History of European Ideas 29 (1):1-14.
    Jacques Abbadie's LArt de se connoı̂tre soi-même was an influential attempt to describe an alternative to Jansenist moral theory. Abbadie drew upon René Descartestheory (...)
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  42. Wayne Davis (2013). Indexicals and 'de Se'Attitudes. In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes de Se. University of Chicago 29--58.
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  43. Aidan McGlynn (2016). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Epistemology of De Se Thought. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press 25-55.
  44.  7
    Christopher J. G. Meacham (2007). Chance and the Dynamics of de Se Beliefs. Dissertation, Rutgers
    How should our beliefs change over time? The standard answer to this question is the Bayesian one. But while the Bayesian account works well with respect to (...)
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  45. Dilip Ninan (2016). What is the Problem of De Se Attitudes? In Stephan Torre & Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press
     
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  46. François Recanati, De Re and de Se.
    For Perry and many authors, de se thoughts are a species of de re thought ; for Lewis, it is the other way round. To a large extent (...), the conflict between the two positions is merely apparent: it is due to insufficient appreciation of the crucial distinction between two types of de se thought. In view of this distinction, we can maintain both that de se thought is a special case of de re thought, and that de re thought is a special case of de se thought. Still, I argue, Lewis's position can be criticized on the grounds that it internalizes acquaintance relations. (shrink)
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  47.  8
    Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.) (2016). About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) showed that a specific variety of singular thoughts, thoughts about oneselfas oneself” – de se thoughts, as (...) Lewis called themraise special issues, and they advanced rival accounts. Their suggestive examples raise the problem of de se thoughtto wit, how to characterize it so as to give an accurate account of the data, tracing its relations to singular thoughts in general. After rehearsing the main tenets of two contrasting accountsa Lewisian one and a Perrian onein the first section of this paper, in the second I will present a proposal of my own, which is a specific elaboration of the Perrian account. In the first section I will indicate some weaknesses of Perrys presentation of his view; the proposal I will articulate in the second overcomes them. I will conclude with a brief discussion of reasons for preferring one or another account, in particular regarding the issue of the communication of de se thoughts. (shrink)
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  48. Isidora Stojanovic, De Se Assertion.
    The first part of the present paper has been published as an independent article, under the title "The Problem of De Se Assertion", Erkenntnis 76 : 49-58.
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  49. Isidora Stojanovic, The Problem of De Se Assertion.
    This paper, to appear in Erkenntnis, corresponds to the first or "negative" half of my longer paper De Se Assertion, in which, after presenting the problem, I (...)
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  50.  11
    Cristina Alayza (2012). Saber que se sabe o saber qué se sabe. Ensayo acerca de la dificultad de un conocimiento exclusivamente reflexivo a partir del Cármides de Platón. Estudios de Filosofía 8:11-53.
    El ensayo que presentamos a continuación consta de dos actos y un excurso. Los dos actos están dedicados al análisis del Cármides de Platón. En el primero, (...)
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