This paper deals with the semantics of de dicto , de re and de se belief reports. First, I flesh out in some detail the established, classical theories (...) class='Hi'> that assume syntactic distinctions between all three types of reports. I then propose a new, unified analysis, based on two ideas discarded by the classical theory. These are: (i) modeling the de re/de dicto distinction as a difference in scope, and (ii) analyzing de se as merely a special case of relational de re attitudes. The resurrection of these ideas takes place in a dynamic setting. My formalization of the first idea involves a modification of the presupposition-as-anaphora resolution algorithm for DRT. The second involves treating acquaintance relations as second-order presuppositions, to be bound in the context by means of higher-order unification, or accommodated if necessary. The resulting framework requires no syntactic distinctions between different modes of attitude, with the exception of a specific subclass of de se reports characterized by special ‘ de se pronouns’ (i.e. PRO and logophors). These special pronouns are handled in syntax; everything alse is passed on to the pragmatic resolution module as it appears on the surface. The more sophisticated contextual resolution process nonetheless ensures adequate output truth conditions for a variety of classical and novel puzzles. In particular, I compare the new pragmasemantic system to the classical, syntactic analysis with respect to iterated and quantified reports, and monstrously shifted indexicals. (shrink)
ABSTRACT. Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jackson’s original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory (...) class='Hi'>of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically neutral, the account also explains why neither Lewis’s two gods nor Mary’s surprise in the Knowledge Argument violate physicalism. (shrink)
This thesis deals with the phenomenon of attitude reporting. More specifically, it provides a unified semantics of de re and de se belief reports. After arguing that (...) de se belief is best thought of as a special case of de re belief, I examine whether we can extend this unification to the realm of belief reports. I show how, despite very promising first steps, previous attempts in this direction ultimately fail with respect to some relatively recent linguistic data involving quantified and infinitival reports, logophoric constructions, and monstrously shifted indexicals. Formalizing my idea of a contextual resolution of acquaintance relations in a dynamic framework, I arrive at an alternative analysis that handles all these data. (shrink)
Shows that both anaphoricity and egocentric de se binding play a crucial role in the interpretation of tense in discourse. Uses the English backwards shifted reading of (...) the past tense in a mistaken time scenario to bring out the tension between these two features. Provides a suitable representational framework for the observed clash in the form of an extension of DRT in which updates of the common ground are accompanied by updates of each relevant agent's complex attitudinal state. (shrink)
I show how a de se belief ascription such as "Privatus believes that he himself is rich" may be dealt with by means of a scope (...) class='Hi'> distinction over and above that one separating de dicto and de re ascriptions. The idea is, roughly, that 'Privatus...himself' forms in this statement a unity, a single "spread" sign that is at the same time in a de re and de dicto position. If so, H-N. Castañeda's contention that the "quasi-indicator" 'he himself' ('she herself', 'it itself') belongs to a "unique, irreducible logical category" of singular terms is, at best, misleading. Further, my account is superior to the well-known theories of R. Chisholm and D. Lewis, according to which de se ascriptions state that the believer "directly attributes properties to himself or herself". 1. Introduction 2. Chisholm and Lewis on de se belief ascriptions 3. Fregean and Sellarsian theories of belief ascriptions 4. Geach on the reflexive pronoun 5. Admiring and self-admiring 6. A solution to the problem de se belief ascriptions 7. Belief de se 8. Conclusion. (shrink)
In this article we consider, relying in part upon comparative semantic evidence from English and Romanian, two contrasting dimensions of the sense in which our thoughts, including (...) the contents of imagination and memory, and extending to objects of fear, enjoyment, and other emotions directed toward worldly happenings, may be distinctively first-personal, or "de se," to use the terminology introduced in Lewis (1979), and exhibit the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification (hereafter: IEM) in the sense of Shoemaker (1968) and elsewhere. The different dimensions of the de se, we will argue, come apart in the following sense: some first-personal propositions, memories, and fears are about oneself as an experiencer of the contents in question, and others not; and some that are about the experiencer are not given as about oneself. (shrink)
Percus & Sauerland (2003) use quantified belief reports of the form 'Only Peter thinks he's...' to argue for dedicated de se LFs. The argument is targeted against (...) any reductionist account that sees de se as merely a particular subtype of de re, viz. a de re belief about oneself from a first person perspective, requiring nothing but an account of de re attitudes. My acquaintance resolution framework is an attempt at just such a reduction and in this paper I extend that theory with a projection mechanism to allow local accommodation of acquaintance relations. With this extension we can account for their data, as well as for some related data involving quantified belief reports familiar from arguments in the de se literature. Note: the embedded video of Peter's mistaken self-identity is urlhttp://ncs.ruhosting.nl/emar/dese.mpgavailable in .mpg here. (shrink)
Chierchia (1989) and others have used the contrast between George hopes that he will win and Georges hopes to win in mistaken-self-identity scenarios, to argue for (...) class='Hi'> dedicated de se LFs. The argument, further strengthened by evidence of shiftable indexicals, appears applicable against any reductionist account that sees de se as merely a particular subtype of de re. My Acquaintance Resolution framework is an attempt at such a reduction, and this paper seeks to extend that theory with a logical principle of introspection for belief, to account for the data within a unified treatment of de re and de se. (shrink)
For Perry and many authors, de se thoughts are a species of de re thought. In this paper, I argue that de se thoughts come in two (...) varieties: explicit and implicit. While explicit de se thoughts can be construed as a variety of de re thought, implicit de se thoughts cannot: their content is thetic, while the content of de re thoughts is categoric. The notion of an implicit de se thought is claimed to play a central role in accounting for the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. Lewis has attempted to unify de re and de se in the opposite direction: by reducing de re to de se . This, however, works only if we internalize the acquaintance relations. I criticize Lewis's internalization strategy on the grounds that it rests on Egocentrism (the view that every occurrent thought is ultimately about the thinker at the time of thinking). In the conclusion, I suggest another way of unifying de re and de se , by extending the implicit/explicit distinction to de re thoughts themselves. (shrink)
The Property Theory of attitudes holds that the contents of mental states --- especially de se states --- are properties. The "nonexistence problem" for the Property Theory (...) holds that the theory gives the wrong consequences as to which worlds "fit" which mental states: which worlds satisfy desires, make beliefs true, and so on. If I desire to not exist, since there is no world where I have the property of not existing, my desire is satisfied in no worlds. In this paper I argue that the problem can be solved with a suitable account of how properties as mental states fit worlds. The solution relies on a distinction between to kinds of property-instantiation at worlds inspired by Fine's distinction between "inner" and "outer" truth. (shrink)
This paper concerns two points of intersection between de se attitudes and the study of natural language: attitude ascription and communication. I first survey some recent work (...) on the semantics of de se attitude ascriptions, with particular attention to ascriptions that are true only if the subject of the ascription has the appropriate de se attitude. I then examine – and attempt to solve – some problems concerning the role of de se attitudes in linguistic communication. (shrink)
In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for the claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of (...) an omniscient being. I claim that the success of the argument depends upon whether it is possible for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), where (F) is a claim involving de se knowledge. I discuss one reply to this argument, proposed by Edward Wierenga, that appeals to first-person propositions and argue that this response is unsuccessful. I then consider David Lewis’s theory of de se attitudes involving the self-ascription of properties. I claim that, according to this theory, there are two senses in which someone else can know what I know in knowing (F). I then argue that the second sense allows for the compatibility of de se knowledge with the existence of an omniscient being. (shrink)
It has been long known (Perry in Philos Rev 86: 474–497, 1977 ; Noûs 13: 3–21, 1979 , Lewis in Philos Rev 88: 513–543 1981 ) that (...) de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself , call for a special treatment in theories of attitudinal content. The aim of this paper is to raise similar concerns for theories of asserted content. The received view, inherited from Kaplan ( 1989 ), has it that if Alma says “I am hungry,” the asserted content, or what is said , is the proposition that Alma is hungry (at a given time). I argue that the received view has difficulties handling de se assertion, i.e., contents that one expresses using the first person pronoun, to assert something about oneself. I start from the observation that when two speakers say “I am hungry,” one may truly report them as having said the same thing. It has often been held that the possibility of such reports comes from the fact that the two speakers are, after all, uttering the same words, and are in this sense “saying the same thing”. I argue that this approach fails, and that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to use the same words, or words endowed with the same meaning, in order to be truly reported as same-saying. I also argue that reports of same-saying in the case of de se assertion differ significantly from such reports in the case of two speakers merely implicating the same thing. (shrink)
Colin Howson (1995 ) offers a counter-example to the rule of conditionalization. I will argue that the counter-example doesn't hit its target. The problem is that (...) class='Hi'> Howson mis-describes the total evidence the agent has. In particular, Howson overlooks how the restriction that the agent learn 'E and nothing else' interacts with the de se evidence 'I have learnt E'. (shrink)
Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include (...) class='Hi'> appropriately de se elements or presuppose facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies. The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one. (shrink)
I have been dissatisfied with Walton’s make-believe model of appreciator engagement with fiction ever since my first encounter with it as a graduate student.1 What (...) I have always objected to is not the suggestion that such engagement is broadly speaking imaginative; rather, it is the suggestion that it specifically involves de se imaginative activity on the part of appreciators. That is, while I concede that appreciators imagine (de re) of the fictional works they experience that they are thus and so, I deny that they imagine (de se) experiencing an object that is thus and so.2 The main source of my dissatisfaction with the make-believe model is that it is phenomenologically unfamiliar; I have never been aware of de se imaginings of the requisite sort while appreciatively engaged with fiction.3 Of course, one could argue that it nevertheless occurs, albeit sub-consciously. But in order for this manoeuvre to be plausible, it would have to be established that there are appreciative phenomena that can only (or best) be explained by the supposition that appreciators engage in de se imagining, and which cannot be adequately explained by the supposition that they merely engage in de re imagining. Currie, for example, has argued that we need to make the former supposition in order to find a solution to the “problem of personality,” the problem of explaining why our emotional reactions to the plights of fictional characters often differ from our reactions to the similar plights of actual people.4 What I want to argue in this paper is that Currie’s defense of de se imaginative engagement is.. (shrink)
Patrick Grim argues that God cannot beomniscient because no one other than me canacquire knowledge de se of myself. Inparticular, according to Grim, God cannot knowwhat I (...) know in knowing that I am making amess. I argue, however, that given twoplausible principles regarding divineattributes there is no reason to accept Grim'sconclusion that God cannot be omniscient. Inthis paper I focus on the relationship betweendivine omniscience and necessaryimpossibilities, in contrast to the generaltrend of research since Aquinas, which hasconcentrated on the relationship between divineomnipotence and necessary impossibilities. (shrink)
The Sleeping Beauty puzzle has dramatized the divisive question of how de se beliefs should be integrated into formal theories of rational belief change. In this paper, (...) I look ahead to a related question: how should de se beliefs be integrated into formal theories of rational choice? I argue that standard decision theoretic frameworks fail in special cases of de se uncertainty, like Sleeping Beauty. The nature of the failure reveals that sometimes rational choices are determined independently of one’s credences in the kinds of ‘narrow’ de se propositions that Sleepy Beauty has set in relief. Consequently, in addition to pinpointing a failure of standard decision theoretic frameworks, this result casts doubt on a large class of strategies for determining principles for the rationally updating de se beliefs in cases like Sleeping Beauty, and also calls into question the importance of making such a determination at all. (shrink)
I have become more convinced, over the years, by the truth of Wittgenstein’s characterisation of philosophy as arising through misconceptions of grammar. Such a misconception of (...) class='Hi'>grammar characterises a very popular approach to indexicality which has been current since the 1970s, stemming from the work of Casteñeda, and Kaplan. Gareth Evans was inclined to allow, for instance, that one could say ‘“To the left (I am hot)” is true, as uttered by x at t iff there is someone moderately near to the left of x such that, if he were to utter the sentence “I am hot” at t, what he would thereby say is true’ (Evans 1985: 358). But not only does this disturb the proper relation between direct and indirect speech, it continues a Fregean tradition which these very cases show to be quite mistaken about the logic of intensions. In this paper, however, I want primarily to point out how this misconception of grammar has distorted our view of people. For some of the above thinkers have tried to make out that human motivation is related to the possession of a certain category of indexical belief, by Lewis called ‘de se beliefs’. I shall look here at how the matter arises in Hugh Mellor’s work on Time. In connection with Time, indexicality arises in McTaggart’s ‘A-series’, and Mellor treats this indexicality in parallel with Evans’ language. First, therefore, I aim to show how Mellor’s discussion of Time grammatically misconceives the situation, and leads to a misrepresentation of the motivation of human action. But a larger conclusion about Fregean intensions is also then immediately available. (shrink)
There are two parts to Lewis's account of the de se. First there is the idea that the objects of de se thought (and, by extension (...) class='Hi'>of de dicto thought too) are properties, not propositions. This is the idea that is center-stage in Lewis's discussion. Second there is the idea that the relation that thinkers bear to these properties is that of self-ascription. It is crucial to LewisÕs account that this is understood as a fundamental, unanalyzable, notion: self-ascription of a property is not ascription of a property to the self, on a par with ascription to someone else. This has been overlooked in much recent discussion, especially when Lewis's account is understood in terms of centered worlds. When it is back in focus it brings problems. An almost Cartesian starting point is required; and first-person plural ascriptions, and those with first person pronouns other than in subject position, become unmanageably complex. (shrink)
It has been long known (Perry (1977, 1979), Lewis (1981)) that de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself, call for a (...) special treatment in theories of attitudinal content. The aim of this paper is to raise similar concerns for theories of asserted content. The received view, inherited from Kaplan (1989), has it that if Alma says "I am hungry," the asserted content, or what is said, is the proposition that Alma is hungry (at a given time). I argue that the received view has difficulties handing de se assertion, i.e. contents that one expresses using the first person pronoun, to assert something about oneself. I start from the observation that when two speakers say "I am hungry," one may truly report them as having said the same thing. It has often been held that the possibility of such reports comes from the fact that the two speakers are, after all, uttering the same words, and are in this sense "saying the same thing". I argue that this approach fails, and that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to use the same words, or words endowed with the same meaning, in order to be truly reported as same-saying. I also argue that reports of same-saying in the case of de se assertion differ significantly from such reports in the case of two speakers merely implicating the same thing. Finally, I outline a new account of the content of assertion, similar to Lewis's account of de se attitudes. The proposal is, roughly, when Alma says "I am hungry", the asserted content just the property of being hungry, and it is a property that Alma asserts of herself. I then propose to generalize the account to the other cases in a way that departs from Lewis's account, and I close by showing how my proposal handles the cases discussed in the first part of the paper. (shrink)
This paper proposes a way of semantically representing de re belief ascriptions that involves contextual resolution of the acquaintance relation between the attitude holder and the object (...) about which the attitude is de re. A special case is that where the belief is about the believer herself. Here, we may discern two possibilities: the acquaintance relation is equality, in which case we end up with a de se belief, or, if the first option fails, we search the context for a different suitable relation of acquaintance between the believer and herself, like looking in a mirror or seeing yourself on TV. This second option leaves open the possibility that the believer herself is unaware of the fact that she's actually seeing herself, thereby accounting for the true reading (de re/non-de se) of ``Lain believes she will win'' in mistaken identity scenarios. To implement all this formally, I use a two-dimensionally modal extension of DRT, and second order binding and unification. (shrink)
Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style (...) class='Hi'>-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} Neste trabalho interessa-nos pensar a relaçáo entre unidade e multiplicidade, um problema fundamental tanto filosófico quanto teológico como lembra Beierwaltes (1989, p. 179), a partir do vocabulário filosófico-teológico cusano. Na primeira parte do texto fazemos uma leitura às avessas da obra cusana. Partimos da suposiçáo de que no De apice tehoriae Nicolau de Cusa sugere um princípio a partir do qual pode ser lida tanto a sua última obra quanto toda a sua especulaçáo. Uma correta interpretaçáo desse princípio pode ser construída ao pensarmos o modo de ser próprio das coisas criadas. O princípio primeiro se deixa ver e as coisas principiadas sáo sua manifestaçáo e apariçáo. Porém, apariçáo perfeita do princípio é o seu Verbo. Em termos filosóficos isso significa que a apariçáo perfeita da unidade náo é a pluralidade (sua explicatio ), mas a igualdade (sua imago ). Será o De mente a nos sugerir a diferença. Na segunda parte, portanto, refletiremos sobre a complicatio - explicatio como aposta cusana para se pensar o problema da unidade e da multiplicidade. Retomamos essa discussáo a partir do De docta ignorantia e da Apologia quando Nicolau deve se defender da acusaçáo feita por Wenck, no De ignota litteratura , de ter feito coincidir criador e criatura. (shrink)
Le philosophe mit le pied sur la première marche du futurotron. C'était la première fois qu'il utilisait cet appareil pour ses recherches. Bien qu'il vienne (...) seulement d'être mis au point et qu'il ne soit encore qu'à l'état de prototype, ce futurotron pouvait décidément rendre de grands services. De nombreux chercheurs de différentes disciplines l'avaient d'ailleurs déjà utilisé de manière très fructueuse. Le philosophe prit place aux côtés du pilote sur le siège avant de la machine. - Quel est le principe de fonctionnement de la machine? demanda-t-il. - Ce serait un peu long à vous expliquer. C'est basé sur la mécanique quantique. Le pilote demanda, pressé: - Quelle époque avez-vous choisie? - Je souhaite effectuer une investigation en l'an 2150. Le pilote plaça le sélecteur sur l'année 2150. - Bien. Nous allons commencer. Etes-vous prêt? - Oui. Le futurotron se mit à ronronner. Un flash lumineux intense s'ensuivit. Au bout de quelques minutes, une image floue apparut sur l'écran géant du prototype. Peu à peu, l'image devint plus nette, et puis finalement parfaitement précise. Le philosophe se mit à observer l'écran avec une extrême acuité. Il distinguait nettement des êtres, d'apparence humaine, qui étaient assis dans ce qui semblait être une salle de conférences. En les regardant attentivement, il constata que ceux-ci présentaient les caractéristiques de notre espèce actuelle. Leur physionomie était humaine, mais pourtant il y avait chez eux quelque chose de différent... Dans ce qui paraissait être une projection publique, le philosophe distinguait nettement un faisceau lumineux et coloré qui provenait du front de l'un des êtres placé au centre de la salle, et s'élargissait pour former ce qui constituait l'image projetée d'une véritable scène tridimensionnelle. Les autres individus, assis autour, regardaient attentivement la scène. La projection était d'une netteté parfaite, et d'un réalisme saisissant. On y distinguait nettement deux personnes qui déambulaient en conversant, dans un paysage représentant une plage superbe, battue par les vagues. Le pilote interrompit soudain: - Voilà, c'est fini.. (shrink)
t f I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat. If I heard (...) such a patter in another house, I might expect a cat but no particular cat. What I expect then seems to be a Meinongian incomplete cat. I expect winter, expect stormy weather, expect to shovel snow, expect fatigue ââ¬â a season, a phenomenon, an activity, a state. I expect that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. This time what I expect is a state of affairs. If we let surface grammar be our guide, the objects of expectation seem quite a miscellany. The same goes for belief, since expectation is one kind of belief. The same goes for desire: I could want Bruce, want a cat but no particular cat, want winter, want stormy weather, want to shovel snow, want fatigue, or want that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. The same goes for other attitudes to the extent that they consist partly of beliefs or desires or lacks thereof. But the seeming diversity of objects might be an illusion. Perhaps the objects of attitudes are uniform in category, and it is our ways of speaking elliptically about these uniform objects that are diverse. That indeed is our consensus. We mostly think that the attitudes uniformly have propositions as their objects. That is why we speak habitually of "propositional attitudes.". (shrink)
David Lewis argues that centered worlds give us a way to capture de se, or self-locating, contents in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. In (...) class='Hi'>recent years, centered worlds have also gained other uses in areas ranging widely from metaphysics to ethics. This paper raises a problem for centered worlds and discusses the costs and benefits of different solutions. The present investigation into the nature of centered worlds helps to explicate potentially problematic implicit commitments of the theories that employ them. In addition, this investigation reveals that the conception of centered worlds widely attributed to David Lewis is not only problematic, but in fact not his. (shrink)
This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David Lewis, and a third account defended (...) in this paper. It provides two reasons for preferring the third account. First, this account does a good job of capturing the temporal continuity of our beliefs, while the accounts favored by Elga and Lewis do not. Second, Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly counterintuitive consequences. The proposed account also leads to counterintuitive consequences, but they’re not as bad as those of Elga’s account, and no worse than those of Lewis’ account. (shrink)
Kaplan claims in Demonstratives that no operator may manipulate the context of evaluation of natural language indexicals. We show that this is not so. In fact, attitude (...) reports always manipulate a context parameter (or, rather, a context variable). This is shown by (i) the existence of De Se readings of attitude reports in English (which Kaplan has no account for), and (ii) the existence of a variety of indexicals across languages whose point of evaluation can be shifted, but only in attitude reports. We develop an alternative account within an extensional framework with overt quantification over times, worlds and contexts. Various typological facts are discussed, esp. the distinction between English, Amharic and Ewe pronouns, and that between English and Russian tenses. (shrink)
In this paper, I will argue that two kinds of first-person-oriented content are distinguished in more ways than usually thought and I propose an account that (...) class='Hi'> will shed new light on the distinction. The first kind consists of contents of attitudes de se (in a broad sense); the second kind consists of contents that give rise to intuitions of relative truth. I will present new data concerning the two kinds of first-person-oriented content, together with a novel account of propositional content in general, namely based on the notion of an attitudinal object. That notion solves two major problems with Lewis’s account of contents of attitudes de se and clarifies the difference between contents of attitudes de se and contents that give rise to intuitions of relative truth. I will propose an analysis of contents of the second kind in terms of what I call first-person-based genericity, a form of genericity most explicitly expressed by sentences with generic one . I show how the overall account explains the particular semantic properties of sentences giving rise to intuitions of relative truth that distinguish them from sentences with expressions interpreted de se . I will start by introducing Lewis’s account of attitudes de se and the problems that go along with that account. Introducing the notion of an attitudinal object, I will extend the account by an account of the truth conditions of the content of attitudes de se . I then discuss the second kind of first-person-oriented content, which is associated with intuitions of relative truth, and give an account of such contents on the basis of an analysis of generic one . Again making use of attitudinal objects, I will make clear what exactly distinguishes those contents from first-person-oriented contents of the first sort. (shrink)
This paper introduces a framework for direct surface composition by online update. The surface string is interpreted as is, with each morpheme in turn updating the input (...) state of information and attention. A formal representation language, Logic of Centering, is defined and some crosslinguistic constraints on lexical meanings and compositional operations are formulated. (shrink)
Such a misconception of grammar characterises a very popular approach to indexicality which has been current since the 1970s, stemming from the work of Casteñeda, and Kaplan. (...) Gareth Evans was inclined to allow, for instance, that one could say ‘“To the left (I am hot)” is true, as uttered by x at t iff there is someone moderately near to the left of x such that, if he were to utter the sentence “I am hot” at t, what he would thereby say is true’ (Evans 1985: 358). But not only does this disturb the proper relation between direct and indirect speech, it continues a Fregean tradition which these very cases show to be quite mistaken about the logic of intensions. (shrink)
This paper first expounds the Aristotelian conception of universals. Afterwards, it determines (a) that in the metaphysics of the Stagirite there is place for divine Ideas as (...) archetypes, and (b) which are the relations that exist between things and Ideas. It concludes, in the light of the above, with a reconsideration of the Aristotelian critique of Plato’s theory of anamnesis. (shrink)
En regardant en arriere ä l'itineraire philosophique de Ricceur, nous sommes tentes d'y saisir une logique de developpement qui semble decrire un mouvement en Spirale. C (...) class='Hi'>'est pourquoi dans des ouvrages les plus tardifs nous trouvons un retour de cette recherche sur la volonte - inscrite en fait dans le cadre d'une anthropologic philosophique - qui avait inspire son projet de jeunesse. Appelons-le 'mouvement en Spirale' et non : retour circulaire aux origines, car entre le debut et la fin i l n'y a pas de coincidence mais enrichissement apres un long detour ä travers l'univers du langage et de la textualite. II ne s'agit pas pour autant d'imaginer une suite du genre : Philosophie de la volonte, hermeneutique, ä nouveau Philosophie de la volonte ou de Taction. Le terrain de l'hermeneutique, une fois conquis, n'est en realite jamais abandonne, dans la mesure oü i l est impossible de se passer de la mediation du langage. Le phenomene se donnant grace au pouvoir revelatif du langage nous permet de saisir les multiples aspects de l'homme agissant et souffrant. La Philosophie de Ricceur, est, plus qu'une "Philosophie du langage", une "philosophie ä travers le langage", c'est-ä-dire qu'elle traverse le phenomene du langage dans toute sa richesse sans jamais oublier qu'ä travers le langage nous parlons de quelque chose et que le langage ne doit pas devenir - si non pour une abstraction deliberee et consciente - un Systeme clos en lui-meme sans reference au monde et aux interlocuteurs du discours : cette consideration reste valable meme par rapport au dernier ouvrage oü la dialectique entre memoire et histoire est toujours liee ä la dialectique entre discours oral et discours ecrit et done au double travail de l'ecriture et de la lecture. Notre hypothese de travail est qu'on pourrait retrouver dans cette traversee du langage une sequence ä la fois historique (selon l'ordre de la decouverte) et theorique (selon un certain ordre hermeneutique) de trois paradigmes : Symbole, texte, traduction, qui nous donnent une sorte de boussole pour nous orienter au cours du long voyage. (shrink)
Au XVIe siècle, le Saint Empire romain de nation allemande constitue un ensemble politique complexe, caractérisé par un système à plusieurs niveaux de représentation politique et par (...) l’existence de multiples États placés sous l’autorité impériale. L’étude des cartes et des descriptions géographiques de l’espace germanique produites à cette période met au jour la compréhension qu’avaient les contemporains des formes de souveraineté existant dans l’Empire et ses territoires. Elle montre notamment que le pouvoir impérial, à la différence des pouvoirs territoriaux, n’était pas conçu au premier chef comme une forme d’autorité s’exerçant sur un espace, mais comme une entité juridique et institutionnelle chargée d’assurer le fonctionnement politique et l’unité de l’Empire. (shrink)
This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...
Counterfactual attitudes like imagining, dreaming, and wishing create a problem for the standard formal semantic theory of de re attitude ascriptions. I show how the problem can (...) be avoided if we represent an agent's attitudinal possibilities using "multi-centered worlds", possible worlds with multiple distinguished individuals, each of which represents an individual with whom the agent is acquainted. I then present a compositional semantics for de re ascriptions according to which singular terms are "assignment-sensitive" expressions and attitude verbs are "assignment shifters". (shrink)
O presente artigo intenta perquirir o pensamento do abade e místico medieval Joaquim de Fiore (1132-1202), no que tange a concepção escatológica. O abade cisterciense e (...) class='Hi'>filósofo místico, defensor do milenarismo e do advento da idade do Espírito Santo deu origem a diversos movimentos filosóficos, com destaque para os joaquimitas. Seu pensamento foi combatido por Tomás de Aquino e condenado pelo Concílio de Laterão de 1215. Partindo de uma releitura dos escritos de Joaquim de Fiore (Liber Concordiae Novi ac Veteris Testamenti, Expositio in Apocalipsim e Psalterium Decem Chordarum) buscar-se-á ponderar o contributo de seu pensamento, a teologia como história trinitário-escatológica. O abade calabrês sente-se autorizado a superar o absolutismo crístico, favorecendo uma concepção mais trinitária da história com acentos escatológicos e apocalípticos. Por fim, o artigo busca contribuir positivamente no retorno aos escritos joaquinistas que muito podem contribuir para a teologia como história humano-Trintária. (shrink)
There are positive and negative lessons from Sartre: - Taking up some of his ideas one may arrive at a better model of consciousness in the analytic philosophy (...) class='Hi'> of mind; representing some of his ideas within the language and the models of a functionalist theory of mind makes them more accessible and inte¬grates them into the wider picture. - Sartre, as any philosopher, errs at some points, I believe; but these errors may be instruc¬tive, especially in as much as they mirror some errors in some current theories of consciousness. This paper, therefore, is not a piece of Sartre scholarship, but an attempt of a “friendly take¬over” of some ideas I ascribe to Sartre into current models in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)
The authors in this collection pursue a number of questions concerning self-consciousness, self and consciousness. Although the essays range rather broadly, there is a good deal (...) class='Hi'>of unity. In her introduction Liu organises the chapters under three headings: the Humean denial of self-awareness, the issue of self-knowledge, and the nature of persons or selves. This is helpful although it is worth bearing in mind that some chapters fall under more than one heading (for example, Shoemaker) and some don't fall neatly under any (for example, O'Brien). (shrink)
O presente texto procura colocar em diálogo reflexões do campo da Filosofia da Infância com os da Educação Infantil. Além das contribuições teóricas pretende fazer conexões com (...) situações observadas em uma pesquisa de doutorado na qual as relações com o espaço e o tempo são entrelaçadas com as do corpo como experiência que surgem nas relações que as crianças estabelecem com seus machucados, ou como elas definem, seus ‘dodóis’. Nessas relações duas particularidades podem ser observadas: uma primeira é que as crianças percebem o corpo como uma experiência contextualizada com o mundo social e material, ou seja, elas não percebem seus corpos separados dos espaços. Uma segunda particularidade é que as crianças trazem a possibilidade do tempo aión como uma aproximação à experiência, uma compreensão do tempo entrelaçado com pessoas, espaços, lugares e ações em que evidencia também relações, emoções e encontros. Dando seqüência as reflexões o texto pretende trazer para o diálogo também situações nas quais são tema entre as crianças as expressões dos sentimentos e das emoções e ainda situações que envolvem suas excreções como as ‘melecas’ e os ‘ranhos’ trazendo uma potencialidade para se pensar as relações entre corpo, infância e educação. A partir da compreensão de uma infância como experiência, como acontecimento que rompe com a história, pretende pensar indicações para uma infância da educação e não já apenas uma educação da infância. Essa necessidade de se pensar uma infância da educação, e não já apenas uma educação da infância parece simples, mas requer um outro ‘olhar’, requer ‘jogar fora’, ou pelo menos questionar, problematizar parte de nossa história para que seja possível pensar em condições de outras ordens, outros valores, enfim, outra educação. Ou seja, uma educação, em que se ‘olha’ não apenas os processos de desenvolvimento das crianças, mas também os seus conhecimentos, as suas produções, as suas manifestações, as suas preferências, as suas interações e particularmente as suas experiências. (shrink)
Lorsqu'il est question de distribuer les soins de santé de manière juste, le critère qui est le plus souvent spontanément proposé est le besoin. Il faut (...) class='Hi'>soigner chacun selon ses besoins. Dans cette étude, nous examinons la signification de ce critère et ses limites. Il apparaît en effet, dès qu'on entre dans les détails, qu'on rencontre de graves difficultés lorsqu'on veut l'appliquer. Ces difficultés sont conceptuelles (le besoin a plusieurs significations) et substantielles (le besoin est insuffisant comme critère). Nous concluons que la justice demande qu'on abandonne au moins partiellement l'approche de haut en bas (l'application d'un critère aux cas particuliers) au profit d'une approche de bas en haut, laissant plus de place au patient comme autorité de décision. When we consider just distribution of health care, the criterion we usually encounter is need. We must treat patients proportionally to their needs. In this paper, we examine the meaning and limits of this criterion. As soon as we go into the details, we encounter serious difficulties in its application. Those difficulties are conceptual (need has various meanings) and substantial (need is not enough as a criterion).We conclude that justice requires a partial renunciation to a top-down approach (application of a criterion to particular cases) on behalf of a bottom-up one, giving more weight to the patient, as an authority of choice. (shrink)
Análisis de dos testimonios medievales del rito celta de la ‘triple muerte’ en Hispania, donde hasta ahora no se había señalado. La leyenda gallega de Santa Marina (...) de Aguas Santas, en Orense, asocia este rito a una sauna iniciática galaico-lusitana, lo que parece indicar un origen prerromano, mientras que el relato del fijo del rey Alcarás en el Libro de Buen Amor constituye otro ejemplo de literatura celta hispana en el siglo XIV, probablemente llegado a través del círculo artúrico de Merlín, originado en Gales y Bretaña, pero con algún posible influjo persa, que acabó integrado en el imaginario celta hispano. (shrink)
O texto pretende discutir a maneira como Foucault trabalha o problema da constituição do sujeito do cuidado de si – tema que tomou conta de seus últimos livros (...) class='Hi'>, cursos, entrevistas e conferências. A problematização deste sujeito e das “técnicas de si” que o constitui surgem na obra do autor a partir do momento em que Foucault reorienta as suas pesquisas sobre as relações de poder ao final dos anos 70, dando início às investigações sobre as formas de governar (governo dos outros). Procura-se mostrar que o deslocamento operado pelo autor passa necessariamente por uma problematização das condições de possibilidade a partir das quais as relações de poder, em sua modalidade de “ações sobre ações”, tornam-se possíveis. A liberdade como condição de possibilidade das relações de poder surge na obra de Foucault ao mesmo tempo em que a investigação sobre as “técnicas de si” descortinam a formação de sujeitos éticos. (shrink)
Asumiendo junto con Heidegger que la filosofía es ontología por su objeto y fenomenología por su método, la intención es presentar algunas directrices para la hermenéutica de (...) la poesía mística; específicamente para el Cántico Espiritual. Para ello se realiza una descripción esencial de la poesía, destinada a esclarecer por qué ésta es lo hablado puro, seguida por la caracterización de la poesía mística. Posteriormente se muestra que la inefabilidad de la poesía mística es un rasgo que le pertenece por ser ésta palabra originaria que funda un modo de ser en el mundo, cuyo sentido es la unión entre el hombre y Dios. Por último, atendiendo a las advertencias que San Juan de la Cruz (SJC) hace sobre la interpretación de los textos místicos, se piensa sobre el temple de la conversión como disposición emocional instalado en la cual el hombre comienza la búsqueda del Amado. (shrink)
Trata-se de uma investigação sobre a teoria dos primeiros princípios da razão prática na obra de Tomás de Aquino. No centro dessa teoria está o termo “ (...) class='Hi'>sindérese”, cujo conteúdo foi elaborado nas discussões da filosofia e da teologia medievais, a partir de sua menção na Glosa de Jerônimo a Ezequiel. Tal termo designa um conceito que apresenta um caráter inovador dentro da teoria da ação moral em comparação com a ética aristotélica. Afinal, Tomás de Aquino o entende como o hábito dos primeiros princípios da moral, equivalente ao hábito dos primeiros princípios teóricos de Aristóteles. Dessa forma, o interesse é compreender como o conceito de sindérese é recebido e desenvolvido na filosofia moral de Tomás de Aquino através da análise das três questões tradicionais: de sua natureza, de sua infalibilidade e de sua extinção. (shrink)
Neste artigo defendo que a Teoria da Informação Fortemente Semântica de Floridi (2004) – TIFS – está correta ao assumir a Tese da Veracidade, que por sua vez (...) class='Hi'>orienta a definição de informação semântica como “p é informação se e somente se p é constituído por dados bem-formados, com significado e verdadeiros”. Argumento que a teoria não é arbitrária, pois dá conta do desembaraço de conundrums filosóficos importantes, principalmente por evitar o paradoxo de Bar-Hillel e Carnap (1953), que é gerado a partir da teoria clássica da informação semântica. Primeiro é discutido um dos principais resultados da teoria clássica, o de produzir “sentenças muito informativas para serem verdadeiras”. Depois são resumidas as motivações para a elaboração de uma “lógica de estar informado” e é mostrado como o sistema KTB-IL é montado e modelado mantendo-se entre os seus axiomas o da veracidade – K ou A4. Finalmente, a TIFS é examinada e defendida ao mostrar que ela restringe aleticamente a extensão do conceito clássico de informação para evitar problemas com tautologias e contradições. A TIFS oferece uma solução original ao capturar nossas intuições modais a respeito da informatividade como noção básica. (shrink)
Le conflit social autour de la réforme du régime d'assurance chômage des intermittents du spectacle a été marqué par son intensité et par sa durée. La (...) class='Hi'>thèse défendue ici est que la maîtrise du temps constitue l’un des enjeux majeurs de ce conflit. L'affrontement sur le terrain économique de la régulation de l'emploi et de l'industrie culturelle s'est doublé de l'affrontement sur le temps. La question du temps ne se limite pas à la régulation du temps de travail, elle concerne la maîtrise du temps et les « formes de vie » auxquelles les individus aspirent. Les deux plans de l'emploi et du temps ne sont pas exclusifs l’un de l’autre, ils coexistent, mais le conflit autour de la maîtrise du temps est relativement imperceptible. L'objectif de cet article est de lui donner de la visibilité et d'en questionner le sens. (shrink)
Este artigo discute a questão da responsabilidade moral em Aristóteles e, especialmente, em Harry Frankfurt e Alexandre de Afrodísia, buscando identificar se a mesma é compatível com (...) o determinismo. (shrink)
En este trabajo se estudia la sugerente posición de algunos pensadores que constituyen una excepción en la historia de la filosofía respecto de la interpretación del intelecto (...) agente, el gran hallazgo aristotélico: Francisco Canals, Leonardo Polo y sus discípulos, pues lo emplazan a nivel de “ac tus essendi hominis ”. (shrink)
Marsílio de Pádua foi um pensador da Idade Média que escreveu duas obras de filosofia política que influenciaram a modernidade. Este estudo analisa o capítulo 17 da (...) primeira parte do Defensor Pacis, onde se trata da unidade do governo ou do principado. Se houver muitos em número ou espécie, tal como acontece nas grandes cidades e, em particular, em um reino, aí deve haver então um supremo governante, a quem os demais estejam subordinados e por quem sejam dirigidos. Trata-se de uma unidade de ordem, não de uma unidade absoluta, ou seja, de muitos homens considerados ou de um conjunto de pessoas, que se afirma constituir algo único quantitativa- mente. (shrink)
Uno de los fenómenos característicos de la sociedad española, a partir del año simbólico de 1492, es la progresiva adopción de los estatutos de pureza de sangre (...) por parte de diversas administraciones. La Compañía de Jesús, sin embargo, se negó durante casi todo el siglo XVI a aplicar estos estatutos, alegando para ello la voluntad expresada en tal sentido por el mismo Ignacio de Loyola. Sin embargo, en 1593 la Quinta Congregación General decide implantar el examen de pureza para el ingreso en los Colegios de la Compañía. Este artículo describe la tenaz oposición que contra esta decisión realizó el jesuita español Pedro de Ribadeneyra, de origen judío, en una serie de cartas dirigidas al entonces General, Claudio Aquaviva. Asimismo, contextualiza la polémica jesuita en torno a los estatutos de pureza de sangre dentro del giro que la Compañía realiza tras el ascenso al generalato de Everardo Mercuriano y, después, con Aquaviva, y cuya principal característica es el alejamiento de los conversos de los puestos de poder. (shrink)
Cet article ne se veut pas un commentaire suivi de la réflexion de Wittgenstein sur les règles. Ce ne sera pas non plus un commentaire de l’ (...) class='Hi'>interprétation que Kripke fait du « suivi de la règle » chez Wittgenstein. Il ne sera pas davantage une application des thèses de Wittgenstein ni une tentative d’application directe d’une interprétation de ces thèses à l’épistémologie de la simulation du vivant ; ce qui serait, en soi, d’ailleurs contestable. Ce travail vise seulement à approfondir la réflexion sur le statut cognitif de la simulation informatique du vivant. À ce titre, qui est donc essentiellement épistémologique et ciblé, il se veut une suggestion d’interprétation conceptuelle de certaines formes de simulation informatique du vivant, suggestion elle-même adossée à une prolongation de certaines distinctions déjà effectuées par Wittgenstein et ses commentateurs au sujet des règles et de leur suivi. L’objectif est de chercher à voir si, par ce moyen, la simulation informatique du vivant, par contraste avec les pratiques plus traditionnelles de modélisation, ne pourrait pas être plus précisément expliquée et légitimée, dans ses apports épistémologiques, comme dans ses limites aussi. (shrink)
L’auteure présente ici un exemple des liens associant l’interprétation et la traduction, celui de la comédie ancienne d’Aristophane. Dans une première partie, elle expose les (...) problèmes généraux de la traduction, quelques-unes de ses théories et certains des obstacles qu’elle rencontre de manière permanente, avant de se concentrer progressivement sur les problèmes théoriques et pratiques particuliers que l’on rencontre en traduisant une comédie grecque ancienne, et la difficulté à proposer une méthode permanente. Dans une seconde partie, l’auteure expose des cas concrets de ces problèmes, en abordant la question de la traduction des noms propres « parlants » : elle présente plusieurs exemples de solutions proposées pour traduire ces noms, avec leurs intérêts et leurs limites dans chaque cas, et avec leurs présupposés théoriques. L’auteure conclut sur la nécessité de traduire ces noms de comédie au cas par cas, en se fondant sur la priorité donnée par M. de Launay à la traduction des « articulations de sens ». (shrink)
L'actuel débat sur l'« égalité face aux soins » et le « droit aux soins » est la conséquence directe des progrès techniques réalisés dans le domaine de (...) class='Hi'>la santé, mais il reste encore à fonder rationnellement les politiques suivies en la matière et à formuler une théorie adéquate de la justice distributive. Le présent article analyse le rôle et le statut du droit aux soins, ainsi que les considérations tenant à la justice qui vont à rencontre de la rentabilité et de l'utilité sociales. Les choix de répartition budgétaire sont décisifs pour la formulation de revendications au nom de l'existence d'un droit positif aux soins, et il convient de se demander si un tel droit existe et quelles en sont les limites. Discussions today of « equal access » and « the right to health care » are the direct descendants of advances in the technology of health care, and we are still in search of a rationale for our policies and a theory of distributive justice adequate to the task. The role and status of rights to health care, together with considerations of justice in conflict with social efficiency and utility are discussed in this paper. It is argued that allocation decisions are central to claims on behalf of a positive right to health care, which forces questions both of whether there is such a right and of the limits to the right. (shrink)
Au début du mois d'août 1934, Husserl fut invité par Emanuel Radl à prendre part au huitième Congrès international de philosophie qui devait se tenir à (...) class='Hi'>Prague du 2 au 7 septembre de la même année. La situation politique allemande interdisait que Husserl et d'autres philosophes se rendissent à l'étranger, aussi Radl demanda-t-il à Husserl de lui envoyer une communication épistolaire destinée à être lue lors des débats. Husserl rédigea donc une lettre, la « Lettre pragoise » — qu'on lut en séance et qui fut publiée d'abord dans le quotidien Prager Tageblatt, puis dans les Actes du colloque² —, mais, outre cela, un texte plus long consacré au même thème : la tâche actuelle de la philosophie. C'est ce texte dont on lira ici la traduction. De multiples péripéties et des circonstances diverses ont empêché que Husserl envoie à temps ce texte plus achevé; quelques indications données par lui-même dans sa correspondance³, avec Patocka notamment, montreni qu'il n'en était pas entièrement satisfait et qu'il souhaitait revoir au moins le début. Ces remaniements vont peu à peu déboucher sur la célèbre conférence de 1935 (Vienne) sur la crise des sciences européennes, qui est fort proche du présent texte bien que le point de départ n 'en soit plus désormais l'interrogation sur le rôle de la philosophie, mais la critique des sciences. Quoi qu'il en soit, la « conférence de Prague » inaugure la série des textes qui aboutiront à la dernière grande œuvre de Husserl, La Crise des sciences européennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale dont l'essai qu'on va lire est, en quelque sorte, la toute première esquisse. (shrink)
