Search results for 'deflationism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Tuomas E. Tahko (2013). Soames's Deflationism About Modality. Erkenntnis 78 (6):1367-1379.score: 18.0
    One type of deflationism about metaphysical modality suggests that it can be analysed strictly in terms of linguistic or conceptual content and that there is nothing particularly metaphysical about modality. Scott Soames is explicitly opposed to this trend. However, a detailed study of Soames’s own account of modality reveals that it has striking similarities with the deflationary account. In this paper I will compare Soames’s account of a posteriori necessities concerning natural kinds with the deflationary one, specifically Alan Sidelle’s (...)
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  2. Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Hard Cases for Combining Expressivism and Deflationist Truth: Conditionals and Epistemic Modals. In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), (unknown). Oxford.score: 18.0
    In this paper I will be concerned with the question as to whether expressivist theories of meaning can coherently be combined with deflationist theories of truth. After outlining what I take expressivism to be and what I take deflationism about truth to be, I’ll explain why I don’t take the general version of this question to be very hard, and why the answer is ‘yes’. Having settled that, I’ll move on to what I take to be a more pressing (...)
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  3. Arvid Båve (2010). Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer. Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.score: 18.0
    The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, (...)
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  4. Arvid Båve (2013). Formulating Deflationism. Synthese 190 (15):3287-3305.score: 18.0
    I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely, the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, ${\langle \text{p}\rangle}$ is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In particular, (...)
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  5. Glen Hoffmann (2007). A Dilemma for the Weak Deflationist About Truth. Sorites 18:129-137.score: 18.0
    The weak deflationist about truth is committed to two theses: one conceptual, the other ontological. On the conceptual thesis (what might be called a ‘triviality thesis’), the content of the truth predicate is exhausted by its involvement in some version of the ‘truth-schema’. On the ontological thesis, truth is a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I focus on weak deflationism’s ontological thesis, arguing that it generates an instability in its view of truth: the view threatens to (...)
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  6. Nicholas Unwin, Truthmakers, Deflationism and Weak Correspondence.score: 18.0
    A line of argument, presented by David Lewis, to show that the correspondence theory of truth is not a real alternative to deflationism is developed. It is shown that truthmakers, construed as concrete events or states of affairs, are unsatisfactory entities, since we do not know how to individuate them or how to identify their essential qualities. Furthermore, the real work is usually done by supervenience relations, which have little to do with truth. It is argued that the Equivalence (...)
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  7. Arvid Båve (2006). Deflationism: A Use-Theoretic Analysis of the Truth-Predicate. Dissertation, Stockholm Universityscore: 18.0
    I here develop a specific version of the deflationary theory of truth. I adopt a terminology on which deflationism holds that an exhaustive account of truth is given by the equivalence between truth-ascriptions and de-nominalised (or disquoted) sentences. An adequate truth-theory, it is argued, must be finite, non-circular, and give a unified account of all occurrences of “true”. I also argue that it must descriptively capture the ordinary meaning of “true”, which is plausibly taken to be unambiguous. Ch. 2 (...)
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  8. Christopher Gauker (2001). T-Schema Deflationism Versus Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem. Analysis 61 (270):129–136.score: 18.0
    I define T-schema deflationism as the thesis that a theory of truth for our language can simply take the form of certain instances of Tarski's schema (T). I show that any effective enumeration of these instances will yield as a dividend an effective enumeration of all truths of our language. But that contradicts Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem. So the instances of (T) constituting the T-Schema deflationist's theory of truth are not effectively enumerable, which casts doubt on the idea that (...)
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  9. Cezary Cieśliński (2007). Deflationism, Conservativeness and Maximality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):695 - 705.score: 18.0
    We discuss two desirable properties of deflationary truth theories: conservativeness and maximality. Joining them together, we obtain a notion of a maximal conservative truth theory - a theory which is conservative over its base, but can't be enlarged any further without losing its conservative character. There are indeed such theories; we show however that none of them is axiomatizable, and moreover, that there will be in fact continuum many theories of this sort. It turns out in effect that the deflationist (...)
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  10. Aladdin M. Yaqub (2008). Two Types of Deflationism. Synthese 165 (1):77 - 106.score: 18.0
    It is a fundamental intuition about truth that the conditions under which a sentence is true are given by what the sentence asserts. My aim in this paper is to show that this intuition captures the concept of truth completely and correctly. This is conceptual deflationism, for it does not go beyond what is asserted by a sentence in order to define the truth status of that sentence. This paper, hence, is a defense of deflationism as a conceptual (...)
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  11. Gurpreet Rattan (2007). The Two Worlds of Deflationism. Journal Of Philosophy 104 (12):609-638.score: 18.0
    A structural similarity between deflationism and a certain semantically excessive interpretation of the results of cognitive science is developed. Both views incorporate "two-worlds" accounts of the nature of representation. But two-worlds accounts are committed to what I call quasi-technically “the worst possible theory of truth”. This renders the semantically excessive interpretation committed to the worst possible theory of truth; but it renders deflationism internally inconsistent or incoherent.
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  12. Nicholas Unwin (2013). Deflationist Truth is Substantial. Acta Analytica 28 (3):257-266.score: 18.0
    Deflationism is usually thought to differ from the correspondence theory over whether truth is a substantial property. However, I argue that this notion of a ‘substantial property’ is tendentious. I further argue that the Equivalence Schema alone is sufficient to lead to idealism when combined with a pragmatist theory of truth. Deflationism thus has more powerful metaphysical implications than is generally thought and itself amounts to a kind of correspondence theory.
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  13. Massimiliano Vignolo (2008). Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism. Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):84-103.score: 18.0
    I will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness is consistent with a version of deflationsim. My line of argument assumes the use conception of meaning. This brings out an interesting consequence since mostly the philosophers who endorse the use conception of meaning, e.g. Paul Horwich, hold that deflationism is inconsistent with the strategy of implementing non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness and thereby urge a reformulation of non-factualism.
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  14. Sebastian Knell (2005). A Deflationist Theory of Intentionality? Brandom's Analysis of de Re Specifying Attitude-Ascriptions. Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):73-90.score: 18.0
    The paper presents an interpretation of Brandom¿s analysis of de re specifying attitude-ascriptions. According to this interpretation, his analysis amounts to a deflationist conception of intentionality. In the first section I sketch the specific role deflationist theories of truth play within the philosophical debate on truth. Then I describe some analogies between the contemporary constellation of competing truth theories and the current confrontation of controversial theories of intentionality. The second section gives a short summary of Brandom¿s analysis of attitude-ascription, focusing (...)
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  15. Andrea Strollo (2010). Subtle Truths. A Formal Investigation Into Deflationism and Conservativeness. Dissertation, University of Torino - Italyscore: 18.0
    At the end of the nineties some authors (Leon Horsten, Stewart Shapiro and Jeffrey Ketland) worked out a fairly technical argument against deflationary theories of truth. In a nutshell, deflationism, it was argued, is committed to conservativeness by the the claim that truth is not a substantial notion, a conservative theory (under the light of certain logico-mathematical facts) can not be an adequate theory of truth, therefore deflationism is an inadequate theory of truth. Beside the apparent simplicity of (...)
     
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  16. Christopher Gauker (2005). Semantics for Deflationists. In JC Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 15.0
    This paper spells out the positive theory sketched at the end of "Against Stepping Back".): According to deflationists, [p] is true is in some sense equivalent to p. The problem that the semantic paradoxes pose for the deflationist is to explicate this equivalence without relying on a semantics grounded in the sort of real reference relations that a deflationist thinks do not exist. More generally, the deflationist is challenged to give an account of logical validity that does not force us (...)
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  17. Riccardo Bruni (2012). Deflationism. Time for a Balance. Rivista di Filosofia 103 (2):305-326.score: 15.0
  18. Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan (2000). Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.score: 12.0
    Over the last three decades, truth-condition theories have earned a central place in the study of linguistic meaning. But their honored position faces a threat from recent deflationism or minimalism about truth. It is thought that the appeal to truth-conditions in a theory of meaning is incompatible with deflationism about truth, and so the growing popularity of deflationism threatens truth-condition theories of meaning.
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  19. Andrew Thomas (2011). Deflationism and the Dependence of Truth on Reality. Erkenntnis 75 (1):113-122.score: 12.0
    A common objection against deflationism is that it cannot account for the fact that truth depends on reality. Consider the question ‘On what does the truth of the proposition that snow is white depend?’ An obvious answer is that it depends on whether snow is white. Now, consider what answer, if any, a deflationist can offer. The problem is as follows. A typical deflationary analysis of truth consists of biconditionals of the form ‘The proposition that p is true iff (...)
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  20. Patrick Greenough (2010). Deflationism and Truth-Value Gaps. In Nikolaj Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), New Waves inTruth. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 12.0
    Central to any form of Deflationism concerning truth (hereafter ‘DT’) is the claim that truth has no substantial theoretical role to play. For this reason, DT faces the following immediate challenge: if truth can play no substantial theoretical role then how can we model various prevalent kinds of indeterminacy—such as the indeterminacy exhibited by vague predicates, future contingents, liar sentences, truth-teller sentences, incomplete stipulations, cases of presupposition failure, and such-like? It is too hasty to assume that these phenomena are (...)
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  21. Douglas Patterson (2005). Deflationism and the Truth Conditional Theory of Meaning. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):271 - 294.score: 12.0
    Controversy has arisen of late over the claim that deflationism about truth requires that we explain meaning in terms of something other than truth-conditions. This controversy, it is argued, is due to unclarity as to whether the basic deflationary claim that a sentence and a sentence that attributes truth to it are equivalent in meaning is intended to involve the truth-predicate of the object language for which we develop an account of meaning, or is intended to involve the truth-predicate (...)
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  22. Stewart Shapiro (2003). The Guru, the Logician, and the Deflationist: Truth and Logical Consequence. Noûs 37 (1):113–132.score: 12.0
    The purpose of this paper is to present a thought experiment and argument that spells trouble for “radical” deflationism concerning meaning and truth such as that advocated by the staunch nominalist Hartry Field. The thought experiment does not sit well with any view that limits a truth predicate to sentences understood by a given speaker or to sentences in (or translatable into) a given language, unless that language is universal. The scenario in question concerns sentences that are not understood (...)
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  23. Huw Price (1997). What Should a Deflationist About Truth Say About Meaning? Philosophical Issues 8:107-115.score: 12.0
    Paul Horwich aims to apply some the lessons of deflationism about truth to the debate about the nature of a theory of meaning. Having pacified the philosophical debate about truth to his satisfaction, he wants to use a bridge between truth and meaning to extend the same peace−making techniques into new territory. His goal is to make the debate about meaning more hospitable for an account based on use, by showing that certain apparent obstacles to such a theory are (...)
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  24. Jaroslav Peregrin, Deflationism and Inferentialism.score: 12.0
    After putting forward his celebrated deflationary theory of truth (Horwich, 1998a), Paul Horwich added a compatible theory of meaning (Horwich, 1998b). I am calling also this latter theory deflationism (although it may be a slightly misleading name in that, as Paul himself notes, his theory of meaning is deflationary more in the sense of being forced by the deflationary theory of truth than of being particularly deflationary in itself). In contrast, what I call inferentialism is the theory of meaning (...)
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  25. Daniel Whiting (2011). Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):607-624.score: 12.0
    Abstract: According to deflationism, grasp of the concept of truth consists in nothing more than a disposition to accept a priori (non-paradoxical) instances of the schema:(DS) It is true that p if and only if p.According to contextualism, the same expression with the same meaning might, on different occasions of use, express different propositions bearing different truth-conditions (where this does not result from indexicality and the like). On this view, what is expressed in an utterance depends in a non-negligible (...)
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  26. Dorit Bar-On, Claire Horisk & William G. Lycan (2000). Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1-28.score: 12.0
    Some deflationists about truth maintain that such deflationism undercuts truth-condition theories of meaning. We offer a deductive argument designed to show that meaning must at least include truth-condition. Deflationist replies are considered and rebutted. We conclude that either deflationism is false or it is not, after all, incompatible with truth-condition theories of meaning.
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  27. Alexis Burgess (2010). How to Reconcile Deflationism and Nonfactualism. Noûs 44 (3):433-450.score: 12.0
    There are three general ways to approach reconciliation: from the side of nonfactualism, from the side of deflationism, or from both sides at once. To approach reconciliation from a given side, as I will use the expression, just means to attend in the first instance to the details of that side’s position. (It will be important to keep in mind that the success of an approach from one side may ultimately require concessions from the other side.) The only attempts (...)
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  28. Timothy Bays (2009). Beth's Theorem and Deflationism. Mind 118 (472):1061-1073.score: 12.0
    In 1999, Jeffrey Ketland published a paper which posed a series of technical problems for deflationary theories of truth. Ketland argued that deflationism is incompatible with standard mathematical formalizations of truth, and he claimed that alternate deflationary formalizations are unable to explain some central uses of the truth predicate in mathematics. He also used Beth’s definability theorem to argue that, contrary to deflationists’ claims, the T-schema cannot provide an ‘implicit definition’ of truth. In this article, I want to challenge (...)
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  29. Bradley Armour-Garb (2012). Deflationism (About Theories of Truth). Philosophy Compass 7 (4):267-277.score: 12.0
    In this article, I provide a general account of deflationism. After doing so, I turn to truth-defla- tionism, where, after first describing some of the species, I highlight some challenges for those who wish to adopt it.
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  30. Matthew McGrath (2003). Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth. Philosophical Studies 112 (1):47 - 67.score: 12.0
    This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has the resources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussion centers on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one is incorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesn't state a fact about truth, it neednt be explained by deflationists. If it does,, it can be explained.
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  31. David Löwenstein (2012). Davidsonian Semantics and Anaphoric Deflationism. Dialectica 66 (1):23-44.score: 12.0
    Whether or not deflationism is compatible with truth-conditional theories of meaning has often been discussed in very broad terms. This paper only focuses on Davidsonian semantics and Brandom's anaphoric deflationism and defends the claim that these are perfectly compatible. Critics of this view have voiced several objections, the most prominent of which claims that it involves an unacceptable form of circularity. The paper discusses how this general objection applies to the case of anaphoric deflationism and Davidsonian semantics (...)
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  32. James R. Beebe (2006). Reliabilism and Deflationism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):495 – 510.score: 12.0
    In this article I examine several issues concerning reliabilism and deflationism. I critique Alvin Goldman's account of the key differences between correspondence and deflationary theories and his claim that reliabilism can be combined only with those truth theories that maintain a commitment to truthmakers. I then consider how reliability could be analysed from a deflationary perspective and show that deflationism is compatible with reliabilism. I close with a discussion of whether a deflationary theory of knowledge is possible.
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  33. Jeffrey Ketland (2005). Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena: Reply to Tennant. Mind 114 (453):75-88.score: 12.0
    Any (1-)consistent and sufficiently strong system of first-order formal arithmetic fails to decide some independent Gödel sentence. We examine consistent first-order extensions of such systems. Our purpose is to discover what is minimally required by way of such extension in order to be able to prove the Gödel sentence in a nontrivial fashion. The extended methods of formal proof must capture the essentials of the so-called 'semantical argument' for the truth of the Gödel sentence. We are concerned to show that (...)
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  34. J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.) (2006). Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 12.0
    In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox.
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  35. Patricia Marino (2005). Expressivism, Deflationism and Correspondence. Journal of Moral Philosophy 2 (2):171-191.score: 12.0
    On an expressivist view, ethical claims are not fact stating; instead they serve the alternative function of expressing our feelings, attitudes and values. On a deflationary view, truth is not a property with a nature to be analyzed, but merely a grammatical device to aid us in endorsing sentences. Views on the relationship between expressivism and deflationism vary widely: they are compatible; they are incompatible; they are a natural pair; they doom one another. Here I explain some of these (...)
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  36. Anil Gupta (2003). Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich's Use Theory of Meaning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):654–666.score: 12.0
    This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich’s use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles that are fundamental (...)
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  37. Matthew McGrath (2003). What the Deflationist May Say About Truthmaking. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):666–688.score: 12.0
    The correspondence theory of truth is often thought to be supported by the intuition that if a proposition (sentence, belief) is true, then something makes it true. I argue that this appearance is illusory and is sustained only by a conflation of two distinct notions of truthmaking, existential and non-existential. Once the conflation is exposed, I maintain, deflationism is seen to be adequate for accommodating truthmaking intuitions.
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  38. Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (2001). Can Deflationists Be Dialetheists? Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):593-608.score: 12.0
    Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his "Deflationary Truth and the Liar" (JPL 28:455-488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for inflationist conceptions. (...)
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  39. Douglas Patterson (2007). On the Determination Argument Against Deflationism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):243–250.score: 12.0
    (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 2007) > Another look at Bar-On, Horisk and Lycan’s criticism of deflationism. I claim that their argument turns on a simple confusion about definitions and thereby fails to establish that deflationism somehow requires meaning to be explained in terms of truth conditions.
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  40. Panu Raatikainen (2006). Problems of Deflationism. In Tuomo Aho Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (ed.), Acta Philosophica Fennica. 175.score: 12.0
    truth. However, it is not always altogether clear exactly what the essence of deflationism is — what theses are constitutive for it. Accordingly, one may distinguish at least four different issues that have been presented, together or separately, as the defining characteristics of deflationism (cf. Halbach 2001): (I) Truth is not a property, or, at least, not a genuine or substantial property. (2) T-sentences govern the meaning of the truth predicate and thus..
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  41. Claire Horisk (2005). What Should Deflationism Be When It Grows Up? Philosophical Studies 125 (3):371 - 397.score: 12.0
    I argue that a popular brand of deflationism about truth, disquotationalism, does not adequately account for some central varieties of truth ascription. For example, given Boyle’s Law is “The product of pressure and volume is exactly a constant for an ideal gas”, disquotationalism does not explain why the blind ascription “Boyle’s Law is true” implies that the product of pressure and volume is exactly a constant for an ideal gas, and given Washington said only “Birds sing”, disquotationalism does not (...)
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  42. Michael Glanzberg (2005). Minimalism, Deflationism, and Paradoxes. In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Clarendon Press.score: 12.0
  43. N. Tennant (2010). Deflationism and the Godel Phenomena: Reply to Cieslinski. Mind 119 (474):437-450.score: 12.0
    I clarify how the requirement of conservative extension features in the thinking of various deflationists, and how this relates to another litmus claim, that the truth-predicate stands for a real, substantial property. I discuss how the deflationist can accommodate the result, to which Cieslinski draws attention, that non-conservativeness attends even the generalization that all logical theorems in the language of arithmetic are true. Finally I provide a four-fold categorization of various forms of deflationism, by reference to the two claims (...)
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  44. Neil Tennant (2002). Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena. Mind 111 (443):551-582.score: 12.0
    consistent and sufficiently strong system of first-order formal arithmetic fails to decide some independent Gödel sentence. We examine consistent first-order extensions of such systems. Our purpose is to discover what is minimally required by way of such extension in order to be able to prove the Gödel sentence in a non-trivial fashion. The extended methods of formal proof must capture the essentials of the so-called ‘semantical argument’ for the truth of the Gödel sentence. We are concerned to show that the (...)
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  45. Duncan Pritchard (2004). Epistemic Deflationism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):103-134.score: 12.0
    It is argued that just as the deflationist programme in the theory of truth has been a fruitful research programme, so a similar deflationist programme should be instituted in the theory of knowledge. Three possible deflationist positions are developed and assessed in this regard—Crispin Sartwell’s view that knowledge is merely true belief, Richard Foley’s contention that knowledge is merely true belief plus other true beliefs, and the radical version of subject contextualism put forward by Michael Williams. It is argued that (...)
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  46. Jakob Hohwy (2002). Deflationism About Truth and Meaning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):217-242.score: 12.0
    Some philosophers argue that we should be deflationists about meaning. Such deflationism is an interesting new position in the debate about meaning. However, though deflationism about meaning has some attractive features, it will not be successful in giving an adequate account of meaning. The theory is intended to the deflationary in the sense that it is parallel to, and justified by, deflationism about truth. I show, focusing on Paul Horwich's recent very detailed notion of semantic deflationism, (...)
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  47. Amie L. Thomasson (forthcoming). Fictionalism Versus Deflationism. Mind:fzt055.score: 12.0
    Fictionalism has long presented an attractive alternative to both heavy-duty realist and simple eliminativist views about entities such as properties, propositions, numbers, and possible worlds. More recently, a different alternative to these traditional views has been gaining popularity: a form of deflationism that holds that trivial arguments may lead us from uncontroversial premisses to conclude that the relevant entities exist — but where commitment to the entities is a trivial consequence of other claims we accept, not a posit to (...)
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  48. By Nic Damnjanovic (2005). Deflationism and the Success Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):53–67.score: 12.0
    Deflationists about truth typically deny that truth is a causal-explanatory property. However, the now familiar 'success argument' attempts to show that truth plays an important causal-explanatory role in explanations of practical success. Deflationists have standardly responded that the truth predicate appears in such explanations merely as a logical device, and that therefore truth has not been shown to play a causal-explanatory role. I argue that if we accept Jackson and Pettit's account of causal explanations, the standard deflationist response is inconsistent, (...)
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  49. Massimiliano Vignolo (2010). Does Deflationism Lead Necessarily to Minimalism About Truth-Aptness? Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):81-98.score: 12.0
    I argue that deflationism about truth does not imply minimalism about truthaptness. The condition for truth-aptness can be strengthened and the disquotationalschema restricted without resorting to any inflationary conception of truth-theoretic notions.
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