Search results for 'deontic modals' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
See also:
  1.  30
    Fabrizio Cariani (forthcoming). Deontic Modals and Probability: One Theory to Rule Them All? In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press
    This paper motivates and develops a novel semantic framework for deontic modals. The framework is designed to shed light on two things: the relationship between deontic modals and substantive theories of practical rationality and the interaction of deontic modals with conditionals, epistemic modals and probability operators. I argue that, in order to model inferential connections between deontic modals and probability operators, we need more structure than is provided by classical intensional theories. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  55
    Alex Silk (2014). Evidence Sensitivity in Weak Necessity Deontic Modals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):691-723.
    Kolodny and MacFarlane have made a pioneering contribution to our understanding of how the interpretation of deontic modals can be sensitive to evidence and information. But integrating the discussion of information-sensitivity into the standard Kratzerian framework for modals suggests ways of capturing the relevant data without treating deontic modals as “informational modals” in their sense. I show that though one such way of capturing the data within the standard semantics fails, an alternative does not. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  3.  39
    Justin Snedegar (2012). Contrastive Semantics for Deontic Modals. In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in Philosophy: New Perspectives. Routledge
    This paper argues for contrastivism about the deontic modals, 'ought', 'must', and 'may'. A simple contrastivist semantics that predicts the desired entailment relations among these modals is offered.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4.  37
    Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). Cognitive Products and the Semantics of Attitude Verbs and Deontic Modals. In Friederike Moltmann & Mark Textor (eds.), Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press
    This paper outlines a semantic account of attitude reports and deontic modals based on cognitive and illocutionary products, mental states, and modal products, as opposed to the notion of an abstract proposition or a cognitive act.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2013). Flexible Contextualism About Deontic Modals: A Puzzle About Information-Sensitivity. Inquiry 56 (2-3):149-178.
    According to a recent challenge to Kratzer's canonical contextualist semantics for deontic modal expressions, no contextualist view can make sense of cases in which such a modal must be information-sensitive in some way. Here I show how Kratzer's semantics is compatible with readings of the targeted sentences that fit with the data. I then outline a general account of how contexts select parameter values for modal expressions and show, in terms of that account, how the needed, contextualist-friendly readings might (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  6.  7
    Ana Arregui (2011). Counterfactual-Style Revisions in the Semantics of Deontic Modals. Journal of Semantics 28 (2):171-210.
    The article argues for a parallelism between the interpretation of deontic modals and the interpretation of counterfactuals. The main claim is that dependencies between facts play a role in the resolution of both types of modality: in both cases, facts ‘stand and fall’ together. The article provides two types of evidence supporting this claim: (i) evidence that comes from the interaction between primary and secondary duties (as presented in contrary-to-duty imperatives) and (ii) evidence that comes from the possibility (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  7
    John Horty (2014). Deontic Modals: Why Abandon the Classical Semantics? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):424-460.
    I begin by reviewing classical semantics and the problems presented by normative conflicts. After a brief detour through default logic, I establish some connections between the treatment of conflicts in each of these two approaches, classical and default, and then move on to consider some further issues: priorities among norms, or reasons, conditional oughts, and reasons about reasons.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Zoltán Gendler Szabó & Joshua Knobe (2013). Modals with a Taste of the Deontic. Semantics and Pragmatics 6 (1):1-42.
    The aim of this paper is to present an explanation for the impact of normative considerations on people’s assessment of certain seemingly purely descriptive matters. The explanation is based on two main claims. First, a large category of expressions are tacitly modal: they are contextually equivalent to modal proxies. Second, the interpretation of predominantly circumstantial or teleological modals is subject to certain constraints which make certain possibilities salient at the expense of others.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  9.  79
    Fabrizio Cariani (2013). Epistemic and Deontic Should. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):73-84.
    Probabilistic theories of “should” and “ought” face a predicament. At first blush, it seems that such theories must provide different lexical entries for the epistemic and the deontic interpretations of these modals. I show that there is a new style of premise semantics that can avoid this consequence in an attractively conservative way.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.) (2016). Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press Uk.
    An extraordinary amount of recent work by philosophers of language, meta-ethicists, and semanticists has focused on the meaning and function of language expressing concepts having to do with what is allowed, forbidden, required, or obligatory, in view of the requirements of morality, the law, one's preferences or goals, or what an authority has commanded: in short, deontic modality. This volume gathers together new work by leading figures in the philosophy of language, meta-ethics, and linguistic semantics. The papers tackle issues (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Fabrizio Cariani (forthcoming). Consequence and Contrast in Deontic Semantics. Journal of Philosophy.
    Contrastivists view 'ought'-sentences as expressing comparisons among alternatives. Deontic actualists believe that the value of each alternative in such a comparison is determined by what would actually happen if that alternative were to be the case. One of the arguments that motivates actualism is a challenge to the principle of agglomeration over conjunction—the principle according to which if you ought to run and you ought to jump, then you ought to run and jump. I argue that there is no (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Nate Charlow (forthcoming). Decision Theory: Yes! Truth Conditions: No! In Nate Charlow Matthew Chrisman (ed.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press
    This essay makes the case for, in the phrase of <span class='Hi'>Angelika</span> Kratzer, packing the fruits of the study of rational decision-making into our semantics for deontic modals—specifically, for parametrizing the truth-condition of a deontic modal to things like decision problems and decision theories (and ultimately also things like moral and epistemological views). Then it knocks it down. While the fundamental relation of the semantic theory must relate deontic modals to things like decision problems and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  38
    Edwin D. Mares & Paul McNamara (1997). Supererogation in Deontic Logic: Metatheory for DWE and Some Close Neighbours. [REVIEW] Studia Logica 59 (3):397-415.
    In "Doing Well Enough: Toward a Logic for Common Sense Morality", Paul McNamara sets out a semantics for a deontic logic which contains the operator It is supererogatory that. As well as having a binary accessibility relation on worlds, that semantics contains a relative ordering relation, . For worlds u, v and w, we say that u w v when v is at least as good as u according to the standards of w. In this paper we axiomatize logics (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14.  83
    Aaron Bronfman & Janice Dowell, J. L., Contextualism About Deontic Conditionals.
  15. John Pittard & Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). Metanormative Contextualism and Normative Uncertainty. Mind.
    We offer a new argument in favor of metanormative contextualism, the thesis that the semantic value of a normative ‘ought’ claim of the form ‘S ought to Φ’ depends on the value of one or more parameters whose values vary in a way that is determined by the context of utterance. The debate over this contextualist thesis has centered on cases that involve ‘ought’ claims made in the face of uncertainty regarding certain descriptive facts. Contextualists, relativists, and invariantists all have (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Paul McNamara (1996). Must I Do What I Ought (or Will the Least I Can Do Do)? In Mark Brown & Jose' Carmo (eds.), Deontic Logic, Agency and Normative Systems. Berlin: Springer-Verlag 154-173.
    Some key pre-theoretic semantic and pragmatic phenomena that support a negative answer to the main title question are identified and a conclusion of some significance is drawn: a pervasive bipartisan presupposition of twentieth century ethical theory and deontic logic is false. Next, an intuitive model-theoretic framework for "must" and "ought" is hypothesized. It is then shown how this hypothesis helps to explain and predict all the pre-theoretic phenomena previously observed. Next, I show that the framework hypothesized possesses additional expressive (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  17. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2011). A Flexible Contextualist Account of Epistemic Modals. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (14):1-25.
    On Kratzer’s canonical account, modal expressions (like “might” and “must”) are represented semantically as quantifiers over possibilities. Such expressions are themselves neutral; they make a single contribution to determining the propositions expressed across a wide range of uses. What modulates the modality of the proposition expressed—as bouletic, epistemic, deontic, etc.—is context.2 This ain’t the canon for nothing. Its power lies in its ability to figure in a simple and highly unified explanation of a fairly wide range of language use. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  18. Mark Schroeder (2011). Ought, Agents, and Actions. Philosophical Review 120 (1):1 - 41.
    According to a naïve view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, ‘ought’ often expresses a relation between agents and actions – the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naïve view that ‘ought’ always expresses this relation – on the contrary, adherents of the naïve view are happy to allow that ‘ought’ also has an epistemic sense, on which it means, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  19. Nate Charlow (2015). Prospects for an Expressivist Theory of Meaning. Philosophers' Imprint 15 (23):1-43.
    Advocates of Expressivism about basically any kind of language are best-served by abandoning a traditional content-centric approach to semantic theorizing, in favor of an update-centric or dynamic approach (or so this paper argues). The type of dynamic approach developed here — in contrast to the content-centric approach — is argued to yield canonical, if not strictly classical, "explanations" of the core semantic properties of the connectives. (The cases on which I focus most here are negation and disjunction.) I end the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  83
    Malte Willer (2012). A Remark on Iffy Oughts. Journal of Philosophy 109 (7):449-461.
    Every adequate semantics for conditionals and deontic ought must offer a solution to the miners paradox about conditional obligations. Kolodny and MacFarlane have recently argued that such a semantics must reject the validity of modus ponens. I demonstrate that rejecting the validity of modus ponens is inessential for an adequate solution to the paradox.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  21.  62
    Alex Worsnip (2015). Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers. Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.
    Many philosophers think that requirements of rationality are “wide-scope”. That is to say: they are requirements to satisfy some material conditional, such that one counts as satisfying the requirement iff one either makes the conditional’s antecedent false or makes its consequent true. These contrast with narrow-scope requirements, where the requirement takes scope only over the consequent of the conditional. Many of the philosophers who have preferred wide-scope requirements to narrow-scope requirements have also endorsed a corresponding semantic claim, namely that ordinary (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22.  18
    Hotze Rullmann, Lisa Matthewson & Henry Davis (2008). Modals as Distributive Indefinites. Natural Language Semantics 16 (4):317-357.
    Modals in St’át’imcets (Lillooet Salish) show two differences from their counterparts in English. First, they have variable quantificational force, systematically allowing both possibility and necessity interpretations; and second, they lexically restrict the conversational background, distinguishing for example between deontic and (several kinds of) epistemic modality. We provide an analysis of the St’át’imcets modals according to which they are akin to specific indefinites in the nominal domain. They introduce choice function variables which select a subset of the accessible (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  23.  91
    Dilip Ninan (2005). Two Puzzles About Deontic Necessity. In J. Gajewski, V. Hacquard, B. Nickel & S. Yalcin (eds.), New Work on Modality, MIT Working Papers in Linguistics.
    The deontic modal must has two surprising properties: an assertion of must p does not permit a denial of p, and must does not take past tense complements. I first consider an explanation of these phenomena that stays within Angelika Kratzer’s semantic framework for modals, and then offer some reasons for rejecting that explanation. I then propose an alternative account, according to which simple must sentences have the force of an imperative.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  24.  24
    J. L. Dowell (forthcoming). Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language. Mind:fzv148.
  25. Stephen Finlay (2009). Oughts and Ends. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):315 - 340.
    This paper advances a reductive semantics for ‘ought’ and a naturalistic theory of normativity. It gives a unified analysis of predictive, instrumental, and categorical uses of ‘ought’: the predictive ‘ought’ is basic, and is interpreted in terms of probability. Instrumental ‘oughts’ are analyzed as predictive ‘oughts’ occurring under an ‘in order that’ modifer (the end-relational theory). The theory is then extended to categorical uses of ‘ought’: it is argued that they are special rhetorical uses of the instrumental ‘ought’. Plausible conversational (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  26. Stephen Finlay (2010). What Ought Probably Means, and Why You Can't Detach It. Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89.
    Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing 'detaching problems' by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number of senses for 'ought'. The semantics for 'ought' that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these problems, but I argue that an alternative approach combining an end-relational theory (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  27.  15
    Katharina Nieswandt (forthcoming). Anscombe on the Sources of Normativity. Journal of Value Inquiry 2016:1-23.
    Anscombe is usually seen as a critic of “Modern Moral Philosophy.” I attempt a systematic reconstruction and a defense of Anscombe’s positive theory. -/- Anscombe’s metaethics is a hybrid of social constructivism and Aristotelian naturalism. Her three main claims are the following: (1) We cannot trace all duties back to one moral principle; there is more than one source of normativity. (2) Whether I have a certain duty will often be determined by the social practices of my community. For instance, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2012). Contextualist Solutions to Three Puzzles About Practical Conditionals. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 7. Oxford
  29. Nate Charlow (2011). Practical Language: Its Meaning and Use. Dissertation, University of Michigan
    I demonstrate that a "speech act" theory of meaning for imperatives is—contra a dominant position in philosophy and linguistics—theoretically desirable. A speech act-theoretic account of the meaning of an imperative !φ is characterized, broadly, by the following claims. -/- LINGUISTIC MEANING AS USE !φ’s meaning is a matter of the speech act an utterance of it conventionally functions to express—what a speaker conventionally uses it to do (its conventional discourse function, CDF). -/- IMPERATIVE USE AS PRACTICAL !φ's CDF is to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  30. Aaron Bronfman & J. L. Dowell (forthcoming). The Language of Reasons and 'Ought'. In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons.
  31. Stephen Finlay & Justin Snedegar (2014). One Ought Too Many. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):102-124.
    Some philosophers hold that „ought‟ is ambiguous between a sense expressing a propositional operator and a sense expressing a relation between an agent and an action. We defend the opposing view that „ought‟ always expresses a propositional operator against Mark Schroeder‟s recent objections that it cannot adequately accommodate an ambiguity in „ought‟ sentences between evaluative and deliberative readings, predicting readings of sentences that are not actually available. We show how adopting an independently well-motivated contrastivist semantics for „ought‟, according to which (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  32. Robin McKenna (2014). Disagreeing About 'Ought'. Ethics 124 (3):589-597.
    In their ‘Metaethical contextualism defended’ (Ethics, 2010) Gunnar Björnsson & Stephen Finlay argue that metaethical contextualism - roughly, the view that 'ought' claims are semantically incomplete and require supplementation by certain parameters provided by the context in which they are uttered - can deal with two influential problems. The first concerns the connection between deliberation and advice (the 'practical integration problem'). The second concerns the way in which the expression ‘ought’ behaves in intra- and inter-contextual disagreement reports (the 'semantic assessment (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  59
    Paul McNamara (1996). Making Room for Going Beyond the Call. Mind 105 (419):415-450.
    In the latter half of this century, there have been two mostly separate threads within ethical theory, one on 'superogation', one on 'common-sense morality'. I bring these threads together by systematically reflecting on doing more than one has to do. A rich and coherent set of concepts at the core of common-sense morality is identified, along with various logical connections between these core concepts. Various issues in common-sense morality emerge naturally, as does a demonstrably productive definition of doing more than (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  34. Stephen Yablo (2010). Permission and (So-Called Epistemic) Possibility. In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. OUP Oxford
  35. Paul Portner (2007). Imperatives and Modals. Natural Language Semantics 15 (4):351-383.
    Imperatives may be interpreted with many subvarieties of directive force, for example as orders, invitations, or pieces of advice. I argue that the range of meanings that imperatives can convey should be identified with the variety of interpretations that are possible for non-dynamic root modals (what I call ‘priority modals’), including deontic, bouletic, and teleological readings. This paper presents an analysis of the relationship between imperatives and priority modals in discourse which asserts that, just as declaratives (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  36. Nate Charlow (2013). What We Know and What to Do. Synthese 190 (12):2291-2323.
    This paper discusses an important puzzle about the semantics of indicative conditionals and deontic necessity modals (should, ought, etc.): the Miner Puzzle (Parfit, ms; Kolodny and MacFarlane, J Philos 107:115–143, 2010). Rejecting modus ponens for the indicative conditional, as others have proposed, seems to solve a version of the puzzle, but is actually orthogonal to the puzzle itself. In fact, I prove that the puzzle arises for a variety of sophisticated analyses of the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals. A (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  37.  50
    Eric Swanson (2011). On the Treatment of Incomparability in Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (6):693-713.
    In his original semantics for counterfactuals, David Lewis presupposed that the ordering of worlds relevant to the evaluation of a counterfactual admitted no incomparability between worlds. He later came to abandon this assumption. But the approach to incomparability he endorsed makes counterintuitive predictions about a class of examples circumscribed in this paper. The same underlying problem is present in the theories of modals and conditionals developed by Bas van Fraassen, Frank Veltman, and Angelika Kratzer. I show how to reformulate (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  38. Ralph Wedgwood (forthcoming). Objective and Subjective 'Ought'. In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press
    This essay offers an account of the truth conditions of sentences involving deontic modals like ‘ought’, designed to capture the difference between objective and subjective kinds of ‘ought’ This account resembles the classical semantics for deontic logic: according to this account, these truths conditions involve a function from the world of evaluation to a domain of worlds (equivalent to a so-called “modal base”), and an ordering of the worlds in such domains; this ordering of the worlds itself (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39. Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane (2010). Ifs and Oughts. Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.
    We consider a paradox involving indicative conditionals (‘ifs’) and deontic modals (‘oughts’). After considering and rejecting several standard options for resolv- ing the paradox—including rejecting various premises, positing an ambiguity or hidden contextual sensitivity, and positing a non-obvious logical form—we offer a semantics for deontic modals and indicative conditionals that resolves the paradox by making modus ponens invalid. We argue that this is a result to be welcomed on independent grounds, and we show that rejecting the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   40 citations  
  40.  6
    Daniel Lassiter (2014). Modality, Scale Structure, and Scalar Reasoning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):461-490.
    Epistemic and deontic comparatives differ in how they interact with disjunction. I argue that this difference provides a compelling empirical argument against the semantics of Kratzer, which predicts that all modal comparatives should interact with disjunction in the same way. Interestingly, an identical distinction is found in the semantics of non-modal adjectives: additive adjectives like ‘heavy’ behave logically like epistemic comparatives, and intermediate adjectives like ‘hot’ behave like deontic comparatives. I characterize this distinction formally and argue that the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41. Stephen Finlay (2010). Normativity, Necessity and Tense: A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 5. Oxford University Press 57-85.
    Normative concepts have a special taste, which many consider to be proof that they cannot be reductively analyzed into entirely nonnormative components. This paper demonstrates that at least some intuitively normative concepts can be reductively analyzed. I focus on so-called ‘hypothetical imperatives’ or ‘anankastic conditionals’, and show that the availability of normative readings of conditionals is determined by features of grammar, specifically features of tense. Properly interpreted, these grammatical features suggest that these deontic modals are analyzable in terms (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  27
    Fabrizio Cariani (2014). Attitudes, Deontics and Semantic Neutrality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):491-511.
    It has been recently suggested that a semantic theory for deontic modals should be neutral between a very large range of normative and evaluative theories. This article aims to clarify this talk of neutrality, in particular its scope and motivation. My thesis is that neutrality is best understood as an empirical thesis about a fragment of natural language that includes deontic modals – not as a new, sui generis methodological constraint on natural language semantics.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  15
    Jennifer Carr (2014). The If P, Ought P Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):555-583.
    Kratzer semantics for modals and conditionals generates the prediction that sentences of the form if p, ought p are trivially true. As Frank and Zvolenszky show, for certain flavors of modality, like deontic modality, this prediction is false. I explain some conservative solutions to the problem, and then argue that they are inadequate to account for puzzle cases involving self-frustrating oughts. These cases illustrate a general problem: there are two forms of information-sensitivity in deontic modals. Even (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  14
    Melissa Fusco (2014). Free Choice Permission and the Counterfactuals of Pragmatics. Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (4):275-290.
    This paper addresses a little puzzle with a surprisingly long pedigree and a surprisingly large wake: the puzzle of Free Choice Permission. I begin by presenting a popular sketch of a pragmatic solution to the puzzle, due to Kratzer and Shimoyama, which has received a good deal of discussion, endorsement and elaboration in recent work :535–590, 2006; Fox, in: Sauerland and Stateva Presupposition and implicature in compositional semantics, 2007; Geurts, Mind Lang 24:51–79, 2009; von Fintel, Central APA session on (...) Modals, 2012). I then explain why the general form of the Kratzer and Shimoyama explanation is not extensionally adequate. This leaves us with two possibilities with regard to the original solution-sketch; either the suggested pragmatic route fails, or it succeeds in a particularly strange way: Free Choice permission is rendered a kind pragmatic illusion on the part of both speakers and hearers. Finally, I discuss some ramifications. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  26
    John Francis Horty (2001). Agency and Deontic Logic. Oxford University Press.
    John Horty effectively develops deontic logic (the logic of ethical concepts like obligation and permission) against the background of a formal theory of agency. He incorporates certain elements of decision theory to set out a new deontic account of what agents ought to do under various conditions over extended periods of time. Offering a conceptual rather than technical emphasis, Horty's framework allows a number of recent issues from moral theory to be set out clearly and discussed from a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   49 citations  
  46. Christian Straßer (2010). An Adaptive Logic Framework for Conditional Obligations and Deontic Dilemmas. Logic and Logical Philosophy 19 (1-2):95-128.
    Lou Goble proposed powerful conditional deontic logics (CDPM) that are able to deal with deontic conflicts by means of restricting the inheritance principle. One of the central problems for dyadic deontic logics is to properly treat the restricted applicability of the principle “strengthening the antecedent”. In most cases it is desirable to derive from an obligation A under condition B, that A is also obliged under condition B and C. However, there are important counterexamples. Goble proposed a (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47. Robert Trypuz & Piotr Kulicki (2011). A Norm-Giver Meets Deontic Action Logic. Logic and Logical Philosophy 20 (1-2):2011.
    In the paper we present a formal system motivated by a specific methodology of creating norms. According to the methodology, a norm-giver before establishing a set of norms should create a picture of the agent by creating his repertoire of actions. Then, knowing what the agent can do in particular situations, the norm-giver regulates these actions by assigning deontic qualifications to each of them. The set of norms created for each situation should respect (1) generally valid deontic principles (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48. Seth Yalcin (2007). Epistemic Modals. Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
    Epistemic modal operators give rise to something very like, but also very unlike, Moore's paradox. I set out the puzzling phenomena, explain why a standard relational semantics for these operators cannot handle them, and recommend an alternative semantics. A pragmatics appropriate to the semantics is developed and interactions between the semantics, the pragmatics, and the definition of consequence are investigated. The semantics is then extended to probability operators. Some problems and prospects for probabilistic representations of content and context are explored.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   75 citations  
  49.  50
    Benj Hellie (forthcoming). Rationalization and the Ross Paradox. In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. Oxford UP
    'Post this letter!' does not entail 'Post this letter or drink up my wine!' (the Ross Paradox) because one can be in a state with the content of the former without being in a state with the content of the latter; in turn, because the latter can rationalize drinking up my wine but the former cannot; in turn, because practical rationalization flows toward one's present situation, in contrast with the flow of theoretical rationalization from one's present situation. Formally, this is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Daniel Rönnedal (2010). Dyadic Deontic Logic and Semantic Tableaux. Logic and Logical Philosophy 18 (3-4):221-252.
    The purpose of this paper is to develop a class of semantic tableau systems for some dyadic deontic logics. We will consider 16 different pure dyadic deontic tableau systems and 32 different alethic dyadic deontic tableau systems. Possible world semantics is used to interpret our formal languages. Some relationships between our systems and well known dyadic deontic logics in the literature are pointed out and soundness results are obtained for every tableau system. Completeness results are obtained (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000