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Search results for 'deontic modals' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Alex Silk (2014). Evidence Sensitivity in Weak Necessity Deontic Modals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):691-723.score: 180.0
    Kolodny and MacFarlane have made a pioneering contribution to our understanding of how the interpretation of deontic modals can be sensitive to evidence and information. But integrating the discussion of information-sensitivity into the standard Kratzerian framework for modals suggests ways of capturing the relevant data without treating deontic modals as “informational modals” in their sense. I show that though one such way of capturing the data within the standard semantics fails, an alternative does not. (...)
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  2. Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). Cognitive Products and the Semantics of Attitude Verbs and Deontic Modals. In Friederike Moltmann & Mark Textor (eds.), Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content. Contemporary and Historical Contributions. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
    This paper argues for a semantic account of attitude reports and deontic modals based on the notion of a cognitive product, as opposed to the notion of an abstract proposition or a cognitive act.
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  3. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2013). Flexible Contextualism About Deontic Modals: A Puzzle About Information-Sensitivity. Inquiry 56 (2-3):149-178.score: 164.0
    According to a recent challenge to Kratzer's canonical contextualist semantics for deontic modal expressions, no contextualist view can make sense of cases in which such a modal must be information-sensitive in some way. Here I show how Kratzer's semantics is compatible with readings of the targeted sentences that fit with the data. I then outline a general account of how contexts select parameter values for modal expressions and show, in terms of that account, how the needed, contextualist-friendly readings might (...)
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  4. Justin Snedegar (2012). Contrastive Semantics for Deontic Modals. In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in Philosophy: New Perspectives. Routledge.score: 150.0
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  5. Ana Arregui (2011). Counterfactual-Style Revisions in the Semantics of Deontic Modals. Journal of Semantics 28 (2):171-210.score: 120.0
    The article argues for a parallelism between the interpretation of deontic modals and the interpretation of counterfactuals. The main claim is that dependencies between facts play a role in the resolution of both types of modality: in both cases, facts ‘stand and fall’ together. The article provides two types of evidence supporting this claim: (i) evidence that comes from the interaction between primary and secondary duties (as presented in contrary-to-duty imperatives) and (ii) evidence that comes from the possibility (...)
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  6. Fabrizio Cariani (2013). Epistemic and Deontic Should. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):73-84.score: 102.0
    Probabilistic theories of “should” and “ought” face a predicament. At first blush, it seems that such theories must provide different lexical entries for the epistemic and the deontic interpretations of these modals. I show that there is a new style of premise semantics that can avoid this consequence in an attractively conservative way.
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  7. Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.) (forthcoming). Deontic Modals. Oxford UP.score: 90.0
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  8. Edwin D. Mares & Paul McNamara (1997). Supererogation in Deontic Logic: Metatheory for DWE and Some Close Neighbours. [REVIEW] Studia Logica 59 (3):397-415.score: 84.0
    In "Doing Well Enough: Toward a Logic for Common Sense Morality", Paul McNamara sets out a semantics for a deontic logic which contains the operator It is supererogatory that. As well as having a binary accessibility relation on worlds, that semantics contains a relative ordering relation, . For worlds u, v and w, we say that u w v when v is at least as good as u according to the standards of w. In this paper we axiomatize logics (...)
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  9. Zoltán Gendler Szabó & Joshua Knobe (forthcoming). Modals with a Taste of the Deontic. Semantics and Pragmatics.score: 78.0
    The aim of this paper is to present an explanation for the impact of normative considerations on people’s assessment of certain seemingly purely descriptive matters. The explanation is based on two main claims. First, a large category of expressions are tacitly modal: they are contextually equivalent to modal proxies. Second, the interpretation of predominantly circumstantial or teleological modals is subject to certain constraints which make certain possibilities salient at the expense of others.
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  10. Aaron Bronfman & Janice Dowell, J. L., Contextualism About Deontic Conditionals.score: 78.0
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  11. Dilip Ninan (2005). Two Puzzles About Deontic Necessity. In J. Gajewski, V. Hacquard, B. Nickel & S. Yalcin (eds.), New Work on Modality, MIT Working Papers in Linguistics.score: 74.0
    The deontic modal must has two surprising properties: an assertion of must p does not permit a denial of p, and must does not take past tense complements. I first consider an explanation of these phenomena that stays within Angelika Kratzer’s semantic framework for modals, and then offer some reasons for rejecting that explanation. I then propose an alternative account, according to which simple must sentences have the force of an imperative.
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  12. Paul McNamara (1996). Must I Do What I Ought (or Will the Least I Can Do Do)? In Mark Brown & Jose' Carmo (eds.), Deontic Logic, Agency and Normative Systems. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 154-173.score: 72.0
    Some key pre-theoretic semantic and pragmatic phenomena that support a negative answer to the main title question are identified and a conclusion of some significance is drawn: a pervasive bipartisan presupposition of twentieth century ethical theory and deontic logic is false. Next, an intuitive model-theoretic framework for "must" and "ought" is hypothesized. It is then shown how this hypothesis helps to explain and predict all the pre-theoretic phenomena previously observed. Next, I show that the framework hypothesized possesses additional expressive (...)
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  13. Mark Schroeder (2011). Ought, Agents, and Actions. Philosophical Review 120 (1):1 - 41.score: 66.0
    According to a naïve view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, ‘ought’ often expresses a relation between agents and actions – the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naïve view that ‘ought’ always expresses this relation – on the contrary, adherents of the naïve view are happy to allow that ‘ought’ also has an epistemic sense, on which it means, (...)
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  14. Stephen Yablo (2010). Permission and (So-Called Epistemic) Possibility. In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oup Oxford.score: 62.0
  15. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2012). Contextualist Solutions to Three Puzzles About Practical Conditionals. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 7. Oxford.score: 60.0
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  16. Stephen Finlay (2010). What Ought Probably Means, and Why You Can't Detach It. Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89.score: 60.0
    Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing 'detaching problems' by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number of senses for 'ought'. The semantics for 'ought' that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these problems, but I argue that an alternative approach combining an end-relational theory (...)
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  17. Stephen Finlay (2009). Oughts and Ends. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):315 - 340.score: 60.0
    This paper advances a reductive semantics for ‘ought’ and a naturalistic theory of normativity. It gives a unified analysis of predictive, instrumental, and categorical uses of ‘ought’: the predictive ‘ought’ is basic, and is interpreted in terms of probability. Instrumental ‘oughts’ are analyzed as predictive ‘oughts’ occurring under an ‘in order that’ modifer (the end-relational theory). The theory is then extended to categorical uses of ‘ought’: it is argued that they are special rhetorical uses of the instrumental ‘ought’. Plausible conversational (...)
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  18. Robin McKenna (2014). Disagreeing About 'Ought'. Ethics 124 (3):589-597.score: 60.0
    In their ‘Metaethical contextualism defended’ (Ethics, 2010) Gunnar Björnsson & Stephen Finlay argue that metaethical contextualism - roughly, the view that 'ought' claims are semantically incomplete and require supplementation by certain parameters provided by the context in which they are uttered - can deal with two influential problems. The first concerns the connection between deliberation and advice (the 'practical integration problem'). The second concerns the way in which the expression ‘ought’ behaves in intra- and inter-contextual disagreement reports (the 'semantic assessment (...)
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  19. Stephen Finlay & Justin Snedegar (2013). One Ought Too Many. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):102-124.score: 60.0
    Some philosophers hold that „ought‟ is ambiguous between a sense expressing a propositional operator and a sense expressing a relation between an agent and an action. We defend the opposing view that „ought‟ always expresses a propositional operator against Mark Schroeder‟s recent objections that it cannot adequately accommodate an ambiguity in „ought‟ sentences between evaluative and deliberative readings, predicting readings of sentences that are not actually available. We show how adopting an independently well-motivated contrastivist semantics for „ought‟, according to which (...)
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  20. Aaron Bronfman & J. L. Dowell, Janice (forthcoming). The Language of Reasons and 'Ought'. In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons.score: 60.0
  21. Paul McNamara (1996). Making Room for Going Beyond the Call. Mind 105 (419):415-450.score: 60.0
    In the latter half of this century, there have been two mostly separate <span class='Hi'>threads</span> within ethical theory, one on 'superogation', one on 'common-sense morality'. I bring these <span class='Hi'>threads</span> together by systematically reflecting on doing more than one has to do. A rich and coherent set of concepts at the core of common-sense morality is identified, along with various logical connections between these core concepts. Various issues in common-sense morality emerge naturally, as does a demonstrably productive definition of doing (...)
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  22. Nate Charlow (2011). Practical Language: Its Meaning and Use. Dissertation, University of Michiganscore: 60.0
    I demonstrate that a "speech act" theory of meaning for imperatives is—contra a dominant position in philosophy and linguistics—theoretically desirable. A speech act-theoretic account of the meaning of an imperative !φ is characterized, broadly, by the following claims. -/- LINGUISTIC MEANING AS USE !φ’s meaning is a matter of the speech act an utterance of it conventionally functions to express—what a speaker conventionally uses it to do (its conventional discourse function, CDF). -/- IMPERATIVE USE AS PRACTICAL !φ's CDF is to (...)
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  23. Benj Hellie (forthcoming). How We Do. In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modals. Oxford UP.score: 56.0
    Anscombean action theory hits the semantics and pragmatics of practical language with some assistance from mindset semantics. Hilites: an intention is an attitude toward an action-type, implemented by another intention; the structural order of intentions is recognized in knowhow; knowhow is grasp of an 'instruction' -- a conditional with imperative antecedent and consequent; the content of an imperative is an action-type; a command involving a certain imperative manifests an intention of our collective agency regarding the content of the imperative; a (...)
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  24. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2011). A Flexible Contextualist Account of Epistemic Modals. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (14):1-25.score: 54.0
    On Kratzer’s canonical account, modal expressions (like “might” and “must”) are represented semantically as quantifiers over possibilities. Such expressions are themselves neutral; they make a single contribution to determining the propositions expressed across a wide range of uses. What modulates the modality of the proposition expressed—as bouletic, epistemic, deontic, etc.—is context.2 This ain’t the canon for nothing. Its power lies in its ability to figure in a simple and highly unified explanation of a fairly wide range of language use. (...)
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  25. Hotze Rullmann, Lisa Matthewson & Henry Davis (2008). Modals as Distributive Indefinites. Natural Language Semantics 16 (4):317-357.score: 54.0
    Modals in St’át’imcets (Lillooet Salish) show two differences from their counterparts in English. First, they have variable quantificational force, systematically allowing both possibility and necessity interpretations; and second, they lexically restrict the conversational background, distinguishing for example between deontic and (several kinds of) epistemic modality. We provide an analysis of the St’át’imcets modals according to which they are akin to specific indefinites in the nominal domain. They introduce choice function variables which select a subset of the accessible (...)
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  26. Nate Charlow (2013). What We Know and What to Do. Synthese 190 (12):2291-2323.score: 52.0
    This paper discusses an important puzzle about the semantics of indicative conditionals and deontic necessity modals (should, ought, etc.): the Miner Puzzle (Parfit, ms; Kolodny and MacFarlane, J Philos 107:115–143, 2010). Rejecting modus ponens for the indicative conditional, as others have proposed, seems to solve a version of the puzzle, but is actually orthogonal to the puzzle itself. In fact, I prove that the puzzle arises for a variety of sophisticated analyses of the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals. A (...)
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  27. Heinrich Wansing (1998). Nested Deontic Modalities: Another View of Parking on Highways. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 49 (2):185-199.score: 48.0
    A suggestion is made for representing iterated deontic modalities in stit theory, the “seeing-to-it-that” theory of agency. The formalization is such that normative sentences are represented as agentive sentences and therefore have history dependent truth conditions. In contrast to investigations in alethic modal logic, in the construction of systems of deontic logic little attention has been paid to the iteration... of the deontic modalities.
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  28. Paul Portner (2007). Imperatives and Modals. Natural Language Semantics 15 (4):351-383.score: 46.0
    Imperatives may be interpreted with many subvarieties of directive force, for example as orders, invitations, or pieces of advice. I argue that the range of meanings that imperatives can convey should be identified with the variety of interpretations that are possible for non-dynamic root modals (what I call ‘priority modals’), including deontic, bouletic, and teleological readings. This paper presents an analysis of the relationship between imperatives and priority modals in discourse which asserts that, just as declaratives (...)
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  29. Zsófia Zvolenszky (2007). The Lost Pillar of Deontic Modality Naming with Necessity (Part of the Dissertation Portfolio Modality, Names and Descriptions). Dissertation, New York Universityscore: 46.0
    This paper concerns a thorny problem posed by conditional requirements: we expect some modal conditionals of the form ‘if p, then it must be that p’ to be false, yet they all come out true given two basic assumptions needed to account for ordinary conditional requirement like ‘If the light turns red, then cars must stop’. The first assumption is a semantic expectation linking conditional requirements with absolute ones, the second is the possible-worlds-based definition of modal sentences. Keeping the former (...)
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  30. Alessio Moretti (2009). The Geometry of Standard Deontic Logic. Logica Universalis 3 (1):19-57.score: 44.0
    Whereas geometrical oppositions (logical squares and hexagons) have been so far investigated in many fields of modal logic (both abstract and applied), the oppositional geometrical side of “deontic logic” (the logic of “obligatory”, “forbidden”, “permitted”, . . .) has rather been neglected. Besides the classical “deontic square” (the deontic counterpart of Aristotle’s “logical square”), some interesting attempts have nevertheless been made to deepen the geometrical investigation of the deontic oppositions: Kalinowski (La logique des normes, PUF, Paris, (...)
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  31. Kam Sing Leung & R. E. Jennings (2005). A Deontic Counterpart of Lewis's S1. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 46 (2):217-230.score: 42.0
    In this paper we investigate nonnormal modal systems in the vicinity of the Lewis system S1. It might be claimed that Lewis's modal systems (S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5) are the starting point of modern modal logics. However, our interests in the Lewis systems and their relatives are not (merely) historical. They possess certain syntactical features and their frames certain structural properties that are of interest to us. Our starting point is not S1, but a weaker logic S1 (S1 (...)
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  32. Eric Swanson (2011). On the Treatment of Incomparability in Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (6):693-713.score: 36.0
    In his original semantics for counterfactuals, David Lewis presupposed that the ordering of worlds relevant to the evaluation of a counterfactual admitted no incomparability between worlds. He later came to abandon this assumption. But the approach to incomparability he endorsed makes counterintuitive predictions about a class of examples circumscribed in this paper. The same underlying problem is present in the theories of modals and conditionals developed by Bas van Fraassen, Frank Veltman, and Angelika Kratzer. I show how to reformulate (...)
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  33. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1966). Iterated Deontic Modalities. Mind 75 (300):580-582.score: 36.0
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  34. Johan Benthem, Davide Grossi & Fenrong Liu (2014). Priority Structures in Deontic Logic. Theoria 80 (2):116-152.score: 36.0
    This article proposes a systematic application of recent developments in the logic of preference to a number of topics in deontic logic. The key junction is the well-known Hansson conditional for dyadic obligations. These conditionals are generalized by pairing them with reasoning about syntactic priority structures. The resulting two-level approach to obligations is tested first against standard scenarios of contrary-to-duty obligations, leading also to a generalization for the Kanger-Anderson reduction of deontic logic. Next, the priority framework is applied (...)
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  35. Stefania Centrone (2013). Notes on Mally's Deontic Logic and the Collapse of {Varvec{Seinsollen}} and {Varvec{Sein}}. [REVIEW] Synthese 190 (18):4095-4116.score: 36.0
    This paper analyzes Mally’s system of deontic logic, introduced in his The Basic Laws of Ought: Elements of the Logic of Willing (1926). We discuss Mally’s text against the background of some contributions in the literature which show that Mally’s axiomatic system for deontic logic is flawed, in so far as it derives, for an arbitrary A, the theorem “A ought to be the case if and only if A is the case”, which represents a collapse of obligation. (...)
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  36. Daniel Rönnedal (2010). Dyadic Deontic Logic and Semantic Tableaux. Logic and Logical Philosophy 18 (3-4):221-252.score: 36.0
    The purpose of this paper is to develop a class of semantic tableau systems for some dyadic deontic logics. We will consider 16 different pure dyadic deontic tableau systems and 32 different alethic dyadic deontic tableau systems. Possible world semantics is used to interpret our formal languages. Some relationships between our systems and well known dyadic deontic logics in the literature are pointed out and soundness results are obtained for every tableau system. Completeness results are obtained (...)
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  37. Jean-Louis Gardies (1998). Basic Logic for Ontic and Deontic Modalities. Logica Trianguli 2:31-47.score: 36.0
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  38. L. F. Goble (1966). The Iteration of Deontic Modalities. Logique Et Analyse 9:197-209.score: 36.0
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  39. Krister Segerberg (1969). Review: Ruth Barcan Marcus, Iterated Deontic Modalities. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (3):500-500.score: 36.0
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  40. Logica Trianguli (1998). Basic Logic for Ontic and Deontic Modalities Jean-Louis GARDIES. Logica Trianguli: Logic in Łódź, Nantes, Santiago de Compostela 2:31.score: 36.0
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  41. Ana Arregui (2010). Detaching If-Clauses From Should. Natural Language Semantics 18 (3):241-293.score: 34.0
    This paper investigates some aspects of the semantics of deontic should-conditionals. The main objective is to understand which actual world facts make deontic statements true. The starting point for the investigation is a famous puzzle known as Chisholm’s Paradox. It is important because making sense of the data in Chisholm-style examples involves arriving at some conclusion regarding the interaction between what we consider ideal and what is actually true. I give an account of how facts affect the evaluation (...)
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  42. Jeroen van Den Hoven & Gert-Jan Lokhorst (2002). Deontic Logic and Computer-Supported Computer Ethics. In James Moor & Terrell Ward Bynum (eds.), Cyberphilosophy: The Intersection of Philosophy and Computing. Blackwell Pub.. 376-386.score: 32.0
  43. Lennart Åqvist (2014). Deontic Tense Logic With Historical Necessity, Frame Constants, and a Solution to the Epistemic Obligation Paradox (The “Knower”). Theoria 80 (2).score: 32.0
    In an earlier paper by the author, Åqvist (1999), I presented an approach to the logic of historical necessity, or inevitability, in the sense of a “two-dimensional” combination of tense and modal logic for worlds, or histories, with the same time order, known as T × W logic. Distinctive features of that approach were, apart from its two-dimensionality, its being based on discrete and finite time, and its use of so-called systematic frame constants in order to enable us to indicate (...)
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  44. Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane (2010). Ifs and Oughts. Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.score: 30.0
    We consider a paradox involving indicative conditionals (‘ifs’) and deontic modals (‘oughts’). After considering and rejecting several standard options for resolv- ing the paradox—including rejecting various premises, positing an ambiguity or hidden contextual sensitivity, and positing a non-obvious logical form—we offer a semantics for deontic modals and indicative conditionals that resolves the paradox by making modus ponens invalid. We argue that this is a result to be welcomed on independent grounds, and we show that rejecting the (...)
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  45. Ralph Wedgwood, Objective and Subjective 'Ought'.score: 30.0
    Over the years, several philosophers have argued that deontic modals, like ‘ought’ and ‘should’ in English, and their closest equivalents in other languages, are systematically polysemous and context-sensitive. Specifically, one way in which these ‘ought’-concepts differ from each other is that some of these concepts are more “objective”, while others are more “subjective” or “information-relative”: when ‘ought’ expresses one of these more objective concepts, what an agent “ought” to do in a given situation may be determined by facts (...)
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  46. Alan Ross Anderson (1958). A Reduction of Deontic Logic to Alethic Modal Logic. Mind 67 (265):100-103.score: 30.0
  47. Mark Fisher (1962). A System of Deontic-Alethic Modal Logic. Mind 71 (282):231-236.score: 30.0
  48. Rosja Mastop (2011). Norm Performatives and Deontic Logic. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (2):83-105.score: 30.0
    Deontic logic is standardly conceived as the logic of true statements about the existence of obligations and permissions. In his last writings on the subject, G. H. von Wright criticized this view of deontic logic, stressing the rationality of norm imposition as the proper foundation of deontic logic. The present paper is an attempt to advance such an account of deontic logic using the formal apparatus of update semantics and dynamic logic. That is, we first define (...)
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  49. V. Wiegel, M. J. Van den Hoven & G. J. C. Lokhorst (2005). Privacy, Deontic Epistemic Action Logic and Software Agents. Ethics and Information Technology 7 (4):251-264.score: 30.0
    In this paper we present an executable approach to model interactions between agents that involve sensitive, privacy-related information. The approach is formal and based on deontic, epistemic and action logic. It is conceptually related to the Belief-Desire-Intention model of Bratman. Our approach uses the concept of sphere as developed by Waltzer to capture the notion that information is provided mostly with restrictions regarding its application. We use software agent technology to create an executable approach. Our agents hold beliefs about (...)
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  50. John Bryant (1980). The Logic of Relative Modality and the Paradoxes of Deontic Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 21 (1):78-88.score: 30.0
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