Search results for 'descriptions' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Mark Timmons (1998). Decision Procedures, Moral Criteria, and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions in Kant's Ethics. In B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka & Jan C. Joerdan (eds.), Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethik (Annual for Law and Ethics). Duncker & Humblot.score: 24.0
    I argue that the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative is best interpreted as a test or decision procedure of moral rightness and not as a criterion intended to explain the deontic status of actions. Rather, the Humanity formulation is best interpreted as a moral criterion. I also argue that because the role of a moral criterion is to explain, and thus specify what makes an action right or wrong, Kant's Humanity formulation yields a theory of relevant descriptions.
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  2. Carlo Penco (2010). Essentially Incomplete Descriptions. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (2):47 - 66.score: 24.0
    In this paper I offer a defence of a Russellian analysis of the referential uses of incomplete (mis)descriptions, in a contextual setting. With regard to the debate between a unificationist and an ambiguity approach to the formal treatment of definite descriptions (introduction), I will support the former against the latter. In 1. I explain what I mean by "essentially" incomplete descriptions: incomplete descriptions are context dependent descriptions. In 2. I examine one of the best versions (...)
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  3. Anders Johan Schoubye (2013). Ghosts, Murderers, and the Semantics of Descriptions. Noûs 47 (3):496-533.score: 24.0
    It is widely agreed that sentences containing a non-denoting description embedded in the scope of a propositional attitude verb have true de dicto interpretations, and Russell's (1905) analysis of definite descriptions is often praised for its simple analysis of such cases, cf. e.g. Neale (1990). However, several people, incl. Elbourne (2005, 2009), Heim (1991), and Kripke (2005), have contested this by arguing that Russell's analysis yields incorrect predictions in non-doxastic attitude contexts. Heim and Elbourne have subsequently argued that once (...)
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  4. John-Michael Kuczynski (2006). Review of "Descriptions and Beyond&Quot;. Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (1):196-204.score: 24.0
    In order to understand a sentence, one must know the relevant semantic rules. Those rules are not learned in a vacuum; they are given to one through one's senses. (One sees Smith; one is told that his name is "Smith.") As a result, knowledge of semantic rules sometimes comes bundled with semantically irrelevant, but cognitively non-innocuous, knowledge of the circumstances in which those rules were learned. Thus, one must work through non-semantic information in order to know what is literally meant (...)
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  5. Stavroula Glezakos (2009). Public Proper Names, Idiolectal Identifying Descriptions. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (3):317-326.score: 24.0
    Direct reference theorists tell us that proper names have no semantic value other than their bearers, and that the connection between name and bearer is unmediated by descriptions or descriptive information. And yet, these theorists also acknowledge that we produce our name-containing utterances with descriptions on our minds. After arguing that direct reference proponents have failed to give descriptions their due, I show that appeal to speaker-associated descriptions is required if the direct reference portrayal of speakers (...)
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  6. Philipp Koralus (2013). Descriptions, Ambiguity, and Representationalist Theories of Interpretation. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):275-290.score: 24.0
    Abstract Theories of descriptions tend to involve commitments about the ambiguity of descriptions. For example, sentences containing descriptions are widely taken to be ambiguous between de re , de dicto , and intermediate interpretations and are sometimes thought to be ambiguous between the former and directly referential interpretations. I provide arguments to suggest that none of these interpretations are due to ambiguities (or indexicality). On the other hand, I argue that descriptions are ambiguous between the above (...)
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  7. Max Rosenkrantz (2009). The Tractatus Theory of Descriptions. Theoria 75 (4):252-271.score: 24.0
    In this article I construe Russell's definite description notation as a fragment of an "ideal language"– a language in which, as Russell puts it in the "Logical Atomism" lectures, "the words in a proposition correspond one by one with the components of the corresponding fact." Russell's notation – containing as it does variables, quantifiers and the identity sign – commits him to an ontology that is lavish indeed. It thus conflicts with the spirit of the theory of descriptions, which (...)
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  8. Paul Elbourne (2010). The Existence Entailments of Definite Descriptions. Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (1):1-10.score: 24.0
    Contrary to a claim made by Kaplan (Mind 114:933–1003, 2005) and Neale (Mind 114:809–871, 2005), the readings available to sentences containing definite descriptions embedded under propositional attitude verbs and conditionals do pose a significant problem for the Russellian theory of definite descriptions. The Fregean theory of descriptions, on the other hand, deals easily with the relevant data.
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  9. Edward Kanterian (2011). Kripke's Metalinguistic Apparatus and the Analysis of Definite Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 156 (3):363-387.score: 24.0
    This article reconsiders Kripke’s ( 1977 , in: French, Uehling & Wettstein (eds) Contemporary perspectives in the philosophy of language, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis) pragmatic, univocal account of the attributive-referential distinction in terms of a metalinguistic apparatus consisting of semantic reference and speaker reference. It is argued that Kripke’s strongest methodological argument supporting the pragmatic account, the parallel applicability of the apparatus to both names and definite descriptions, is successful only if descriptions are treated as designators in (...)
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  10. Brian Rabern (forthcoming). Descriptions Which Have Grown Capital Letters. Mind and Language.score: 24.0
    Almost entirely ignored in the linguistic theorising on names and descriptions is a hybrid form of expression which, like definite descriptions, begin with 'the' but which, like proper names, are capitalised and seem to lack descriptive content. These are expressions such as the following, 'the Holy Roman Empire', 'the Mississippi River', or 'the Space Needle'. Such capitalised descriptions are ubiquitous in natural language, but to which linguistic categories do they belong? Are they simply proper names? Or are (...)
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  11. Anne Bezuidenhout & Marga Reimer (eds.) (2004). Descriptions and Beyond. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    In 1905, Bertrand Russell published 'On Denoting' in which he proposed and defended a quantificational account of definite descriptions. Forty-five years later, in 'On Referring', Peter Strawson claimed that Russell was mistaken: definite descriptions do not function as quantifiers but (paradigmatically) as referring expressions. Ever since, scores of theorists have attempted to adjudicate this debate. Others have gone beyond the question of the proper analysis of definite descriptions, focusing instead on the complex relations between definites, indefinites, and (...)
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  12. William K. Blackburn (1988). Wettstein on Definite Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 53 (2):263 - 278.score: 24.0
    I critically examine an argument, due to howard wettstein, purporting to show that sentences containing definite descriptions are semantically ambiguous between referential and attributive readings. Wettstein argues that many sentences containing nonidentifying descriptions--descriptions that apply to more than one object--cannot be given a Russellian analysis, and that the descriptions in these sentences should be understood as directly referential terms. But because Wettstein does not justify treating referential uses of nonidentifying descriptions differently than attributive uses of (...)
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  13. William Lanier (2014). Intentional Identity and Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):289-302.score: 24.0
    What is the semantic contribution of anaphoric links in sentences like, ‘A physicist was late to the party. He brought some bongos’? A natural first thought is that the passage entails a wide-scope existential claim that there is something that both (i) was late to the party and (ii) brought some bongos. Intentional identity sentences are counter-examples to this natural thought applied to anaphora in general. Some have tried to rescue the thought and accommodate the counter-examples by positing mythical objects. (...)
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  14. Graham Priest (1999). Semantic Closure, Descriptions and Non-Triviality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):549--558.score: 24.0
    It is known that a semantically closed theory with description may well be trivial if the principles concerning denotation and descriptions are formulated in certain ways, even if the underlying logic is paraconsistent. This paper establishes the nontriviality of a semantically closed theory with a natural, but non-extensional, description operator.
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  15. Charlotte Werndl (2011). On the Observational Equivalence of Continuous-Time Deterministic and Indeterministic Descriptions. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):193-225.score: 24.0
    On the observational equivalence of continuous-time deterministic and indeterministic descriptions Content Type Journal Article Pages 193-225 DOI 10.1007/s13194-010-0011-5 Authors Charlotte Werndl, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE UK Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 2.
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  16. Paolo Santorio (2013). Descriptions as Variables. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):41-59.score: 24.0
    On a popular view dating back to Russell, descriptions, both definite and indefinite alike, work syntactically and semantically like quantifiers. I have an argument against Russell's view. The argument supports a different picture: descriptions can behave syntactically and semantically like variables. This basic idea can be implemented in very different systematic analyses, but, whichever way one goes, there will be a significant departure from Russell. The claim that descriptions are variables is not new: what I offer is (...)
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  17. John-Michael Kuczynski (2004). Non-Declarative Sentences and the Theory of Descriptions. Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 8 (1).score: 24.0
    A consequence of Russell's Theory of Descriptions is that non-indicative sentences (questions and imperatives) either have meanings that are obviously distinct from their actual meanings, even after all pragmatic and contextual variables are allowed for, or are categorically non-sensical. Therefore, the Theory of Descriptions is false.
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  18. John Michael Kuczynski (2010). Non-Declarative Sentences and the Theory of Definite Descriptions. Principia 8 (1):119-154.score: 24.0
    This paper shows that Russell’s theory of descriptions gives the wrong semantics for definite descriptions occurring in questions and imperatives. Depending on how that theory is applied, it either assigns nonsense to perfectly meaningful questions and assertions or it assigns meanings that diverge from the actual semantics of such sentences, even after all pragmatic and contextual variables are allowed for. Given that Russell’s theory is wrong for questions and assertions, it must be wrong for assertoric statements; for the (...)
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  19. Laura Carlson, Marjorie Skubic, Jared Miller, Zhiyu Huo & Tatiana Alexenko (2014). Strategies for Human‐Driven Robot Comprehension of Spatial Descriptions by Older Adults in a Robot Fetch Task. Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (3):513-533.score: 24.0
    This contribution presents a corpus of spatial descriptions and describes the development of a human-driven spatial language robot system for their comprehension. The domain of application is an eldercare setting in which an assistive robot is asked to “fetch” an object for an elderly resident based on a natural language spatial description given by the resident. In Part One, we describe a corpus of naturally occurring descriptions elicited from a group of older adults within a virtual 3D home (...)
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  20. Wojciech Rostworowski (forthcoming). Definite Descriptions and the Argument From Inference. Philosophia:1-11.score: 24.0
    This article discusses the “Argument from Inference” raised against the view that definite descriptions are semantically referring expressions. According to this argument, the indicated view is inadequate since it evaluates some invalid inferences with definite descriptions as “valid” and vice versa. I argue that the Argument from Inference is basically wrong. Firstly, it is crucially based on the assumption that a proponent of the view that definite descriptions are referring expressions conceives them as directly referring terms, i.e., (...)
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  21. Joanna Golińska-Pilarek & Taneli Huuskonen (2012). Logic. Of Descriptions. A New Approach to the Foundations of Mathematics and Science. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 27:63-94.score: 22.0
    We study a new formal logic LD introduced by Prof. Grzegorczyk. The logic is based on so-called descriptive equivalence, corresponding to the idea of shared meaning rather than shared truth value. We construct a semantics for LD based on a new type of algebras and prove its soundness and complete- ness. We further show several examples of classical laws that hold for LD as well as laws that fail. Finally, we list a number of open problems.
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  22. Ray Buchanan (2014). Names, Descriptions, and Assertion. In Zsu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer. 03-15.score: 22.0
    According to Millian Descriptivism, while the semantic content of a linguistically simple proper name is just its referent, we often use sentences containing such expressions “to make assertions…that are, in part, descriptive” (Soames 2008). Against this view, I show, following Ted Sider and David Braun (2006), that simple sentences containing names are never used to assert descriptively enriched propositions. In addition, I offer a diagnosis as to where the argument for Millian Descriptivism goes wrong. Once we appreciate the distinctive way (...)
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  23. Barbara Abbott, The Difference Between Definite and Indefinite Descriptions.score: 21.0
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  24. Jan Heylen (2010). Descriptions and Unknowability. Analysis 70 (1):50-52.score: 21.0
  25. Barbara Abbott, Issues in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Definite Descriptions in English.score: 21.0
  26. Barbara Abbott (2008). Issues in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Definite Descriptions in English. In Nancy Hedberg & Jeanette Gundel (eds.), Reference: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 61-72.score: 21.0
  27. John Collins, Names, Descriptions and Quantifiers.score: 21.0
  28. Marián Zouhar (2007). Definite Descriptions, Reference, and Inference. Theoria 73 (1):28-45.score: 21.0
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  29. Barbara Abbott (2003). A Reply to Szabó's “Descriptions and Uniqueness”. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):223 - 231.score: 21.0
  30. Thomas O. Nelson, Jacqueline Metzler & David A. Reed (1974). Role of Details in the Long-Term Recognition of Pictures and Verbal Descriptions. Journal of Experimental Psychology 102 (1):184.score: 21.0
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  31. Gillian Cohen (1969). Pattern Recognition: Differences Between Matching Patterns to Patterns and Matching Descriptions to Patterns. Journal of Experimental Psychology 82 (3):427.score: 21.0
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  32. Benjamin E. Hilbig Andreas Glöckner, Susann Fiedler, Guy Hochman, Shahar Ayal (2012). Processing Differences Between Descriptions and Experience: A Comparative Analysis Using Eye-Tracking and Physiological Measures. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 20.0
    Do decisions from description and from experience trigger different cognitive processes? We investigated this general question using cognitive modeling, eye-tracking, and physiological arousal measures. Three novel findings indeed suggest qualitatively different processes between the two types of decisions. First, comparative modeling indicates that evidence accumulation models assuming averaging of all fixation-sampled outcomes predict choices best in decisions from experience, whereas Cumulative Prospect Theory predicts choices best in decisions from descriptions. Second, arousal decreased with increasing difference in expected value between (...)
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  33. Keith S. Donnellan (1966). Reference and Definite Descriptions. Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.score: 18.0
    Definite descriptions, I shall argue, have two possible functions. 1] They are used to refer to what a speaker wishes to talk about, but they are also used quite differently. Moreover, a definite description occurring in one and the same sentence may, on different occasions of its use, function in either way. The failure to deal with this duality of function obscures the genuine referring use of definite descriptions. The best known theories of definite descriptions, those of (...)
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  34. Murali Ramachandran (2008). Descriptions and Pressupositions: Strawson Vs. Russel. South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):242-257.score: 18.0
    A Russellian theory of (definite) descriptions takes an utterance of the form ‘The F is G' to express a purely general proposition that affirms the existence of a (contextually) unique F: there is exactly one F [which is C] and it is G. Strawson, by contrast, takes the utterer to presuppose in some sense that there is exactly one salient F, but this is not part of what is asserted; rather, when the presupposition is not met the utterance simply (...)
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  35. Stephen Schiffer (2005). Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions. Mind 114 (456):1135-1183.score: 18.0
    The proper statement and assessment of Russell's theory depends on one's semantic presuppositions. A semantic framework is provided, and Russell's theory formulated in terms of it. Referential uses of descriptions raise familiar problems for the theory, to which there are, at the most general level of abstraction, two possible Russellian responses. Both are considered, and both found wanting. The paper ends with a brief consideration of what the correct positive theory of definite descriptions might be, if it is (...)
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  36. Jan Heylen (2010). Carnap's Theory of Descriptions and its Problems. Studia Logica 94 (3):355-380.score: 18.0
    Carnap’s theory of descriptions was restricted in two ways. First, the descriptive conditions had to be non-modal. Second, only primitive predicates or the identity predicate could be used to predicate something of the descriptum . The motivating reasons for these two restrictions that can be found in the literature will be critically discussed. Both restrictions can be relaxed, but Carnap’s theory can still be blamed for not dealing adequately with improper descriptions.
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  37. Thomas D. Bontly (2005). Conversational Implicature and the Referential Use of Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 125 (1):1 - 25.score: 18.0
    This paper enters the continuing fray over the semantic significance of Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction. Some holdthat the distinction is at bottom a pragmatic one: i.e., that the difference between the referential use and the attributive use arises at the level of speaker’s meaning rather the level of sentence-or utterance-meaning. This view has recently been challenged byMarga Reimer andMichael Devitt, both of whom argue that the fact that descriptions are regularly, that is standardly, usedto refer defeats the pragmatic approach. The (...)
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  38. Hans Primas (2007). Non-Boolean Descriptions for Mind-Matter Problems. Mind and Matter 5 (1):7-44.score: 18.0
    A framework for the mind-matter problem in a holistic universe which has no parts is outlined. The conceptual structure of modern quantum theory suggests to use complementary Boolean descriptions as elements for a more comprehensive non-Boolean description of a world without an a priori mind-matter distinction. Such a description in terms of a locally Boolean but globally non-Boolean structure makes allowance for the fact that Boolean descriptions play a privileged role in science. If we accept the insight that (...)
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  39. Kent Bach (2004). Descriptions: Points of Reference. In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond. Clarendon Press.score: 18.0
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  40. Adam Sennet (2002). An Ambiguity Test for Definite Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 111 (1):81 - 95.score: 18.0
    Donnellan (1966) makes a convincing case for two distinct uses ofdefinite descriptions. But does the difference between the usesreflects an ambiguity in the semantics of descriptions? This paperapplies a linguistic test for ambiguity to argue that the differencebetween the uses is not semantically significant.
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  41. Anders J. Schoubye (2009). Descriptions, Truth Value Intuitions, and Questions. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (6):583-617.score: 18.0
    Since the famous debate between Russell (Mind 14: 479–493, 1905, Mind 66: 385–389, 1957) and Strawson (Mind 59: 320–344, 1950; Introduction to logical theory, 1952; Theoria, 30: 96–118, 1964) linguistic intuitions about truth values have been considered notoriously unreliable as a guide to the semantics of definite descriptions. As a result, most existing semantic analyses of definites leave a large number of intuitions unexplained. In this paper, I explore the nature of the relationship between truth value intuitions and non-referring (...)
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  42. Howard K. Wettstein (1981). Demonstrative Reference and Definite Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 40 (2):241--57.score: 18.0
    A distinction is developed between two uses of definite descriptions, the "attributive" and the "referential." the distinction exists even in the same sentence. several criteria are given for making the distinction. it is suggested that both russell's and strawson's theories fail to deal with this distinction, although some of the things russell says about genuine proper names can be said about the referential use of definite descriptions. it is argued that the presupposition or implication that something fits the (...)
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  43. Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Bernard Linsky (2009). Russell Vs. Frege on Definite Descriptions as Singular Terms. In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting". Routledge.score: 18.0
    In ‘On Denoting’ and to some extent in ‘Review of Meinong and Others, Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie’, published in the same issue of Mind (Russell, 1905a,b), Russell presents not only his famous elimination (or contextual defi nition) of defi nite descriptions, but also a series of considerations against understanding defi nite descriptions as singular terms. At the end of ‘On Denoting’, Russell believes he has shown that all the theories that do treat defi nite descriptions as (...)
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  44. Ernest Lepore, An Abuse of Context in Semantics: The Case of Incomplete Definite Descriptions.score: 18.0
    Critics and champions alike have fussed and fretted for well over fifty years about whether Russell’s treatment is compatible with certain alleged acceptable uses of incomplete definite descriptions,[2] where a description (the F( is incomplete just in case more than one object satisfies its nominal F, as in (1).
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  45. Richard Sharvy (1980). A More General Theory of Definite Descriptions. Philosophical Review 89 (4):607-624.score: 18.0
    A unified theory is offered to account for three types of definite descriptions: with singular, plural, & mass predicates, & to provide an account for the word the in descriptions. It is noted that B. Russell's analysis ("On Denoting," Mind, 1905, 14, 479-493) failed to account for plural & mass descriptions. The proposed theory differs from Russell's only by the substitution of the notation (less than or equal to) for Russell's =. It is suggested that for every (...)
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  46. Francesco Pupa (2008). Ambiguous Articles: An Essay On The Theory Of Descriptions. Dissertation, The Graduate Center, CUNYscore: 18.0
    What, from a semantic perspective, is the difference between singular indefinite and definite descriptions? Just over a century ago, Russell provided what has become the standard philosophical response. Descriptions are quantifier phrases, not referring expressions. As such, they differ with respect to the quantities they denote. Indefinite descriptions denote existential quantities; definite descriptions denote uniquely existential quantities. Now around the 1930s and 1940s, some linguists, working independently of philosophers, developed a radically different response. Descriptions, linguists (...)
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  47. Marga Reimer (1992). Incomplete Descriptions. Erkenntnis 37 (3):347 - 363.score: 18.0
    Standard attempts to defend Russell's Theory of Descriptions against the problem posed by incomplete descriptions, are discussed and dismissed as inadequate. It is then suggested that one such attempt, one which exploits the notion of a contextually delimited domain of quantification, may be applicable to incomplete quantifier expressions which are typically treated as quantificational: expressions of the form AllF's, NoF's, SomeF's, Exactly eightF's, etc. In this way, one is able to retain the plausible claim that such expressions ought (...)
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  48. Peter Millican (1990). Content, Thoughts, and Definite Descriptions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64:167 - 220.score: 18.0
    In this paper,[1] I shall address the much-discussed issue of how definite descriptions should be analysed: whether they should be given a quantificational analysis in the style of Russell’s theory of descriptions,[2] or whether they should be seen instead, at least in some cases, as “genuine singular terms” or “genuine referring expressions”, whose function is to pick out a particular object in order to say something about that very object.
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  49. Berit Brogaard (2010). Descriptions. In Oxford Annotated Bibliographies Online.score: 18.0
    Descriptions are phrases of the form ‘an F’, ‘the F’, ‘Fs’ and ‘the Fs’. They can be indefinite (e.g., ‘an F’ and ‘Fs’), definite (e.g. ‘the F’ and ‘the Fs’), singular (e.g., ‘an F’, ‘the F’) and plural (e.g., ‘the Fs’, ‘Fs’). In English plural indefinite descriptions lack an article and are for that reason also known as ‘bare plurals’.
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  50. Berit Brogaard (2010). Descriptions: An Annotated Bibliography. Oxford Annotated Bibliographies Online.score: 18.0
    Descriptions are phrases of the form ‘an F’, ‘the F’, ‘Fs’, ‘the Fs’ and NP's F (e.g. ‘John's mother’). They can be indefinite (e.g., ‘an F’ and ‘Fs’), definite (e.g. ‘the F’ and ‘the Fs’), singular (e.g., ‘an F’, ‘the F’) or plural (e.g., ‘the Fs’, ‘Fs’). In English plural indefinite descriptions lack an article and are for that reason also known as ‘bare plurals’. How to account for the semantics and pragmatics of descriptions has been one (...)
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