Search results for 'determinable determinate relation' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Eric Funkhouser (2006). The Determinable-Determinate Relation. Noûs 40 (3):548–569.
    The properties colored and red stand in a special relation. Namely, red is a determinate of colored, and colored is determinable relative to red. Many other properties are similarly related. The determination relation is an interesting topic of logical investigation in its own right, and the prominent philosophical inquiries into this relation have, accordingly, operated at a high level of abstraction.1 It is time to return to these investigations, not just as a logical amusement, but (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   44 citations  
  2. Jessica M. Wilson (2009). Determination, Realization and Mental Causation. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):149 - 169.
    How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (henceforth, 'determination') provides (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  3.  81
    Matthew C. Haug (2010). Realization, Determination, and Mechanisms. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):313-330.
    Several philosophers (e.g., Ehring (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 30:461–480, 1996 ); Funkhouser (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 40:548–569, 2006 ); Walter (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37:217–244, 2007 ) have argued that there are metaphysical differences between the determinable-determinate relation and the realization relation between mental and physical properties. Others have challenged this claim (e.g., Wilson (Philosophical Studies, 2009 ). In this paper, I argue that there are indeed such differences and propose a “mechanistic” account of realization that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4. Jessica M. Wilson (2013). A Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy. Inquiry 56 (4):359–385.
    Many phenomena appear to be indeterminate, including material macro-object boundaries, predicates or properties admitting of borderline cases, and certain open future claims. Here I provide an account of indeterminacy in metaphysical, rather than semantic or epistemic, terms. Previous such accounts have been "meta-level" accounts, taking metaphysical indeterminacy (MI) to involve its being indeterminate which of various determinate states of affairs obtain. On my alternative, "object-level" account, MI involves its being determinate (or just plain true) that an indeterminate (less (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  5. Jessica M. Wilson (2012). Fundamental Determinables. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (4).
    Contemporary philosophers commonly suppose that any fundamental entities there may be are maximally determinate. More generally, they commonly suppose that, whether or not there are fundamental entities, any determinable entities there may be are grounded in, hence less fundamental than, more determinate entities. So, for example, Armstrong takes the physical objects constituting the presumed fundamental base to be “determinate in all respects” (1961, 59), and Lewis takes the properties characterizing things “completely and without redundancy” to be (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  6. Max Kistler (2005). Necessary Laws. In Jan Faye, Paul Needham, Uwe Scheffler & Max Urchs (eds.), Nature’s Principles. Springer 201-227.
    In the first part of this paper, I argue against the view that laws of nature are contingent, by attacking a necessary condition for its truth within the framework of a conception of laws as relations between universals. I try to show that there is no independent reason to think that universals have an essence independent of their nomological properties. However, such a non-qualitative essence is required to make sense of the idea that different laws link the same universals in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Jessica M. Wilson (forthcoming). Metaphysical Emergence: Weak and Strong. In Tomasz Bigaj & Christian Wuthrich (eds.), Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities
    Motivated by the seeming structure of the sciences, metaphysical emergence combines broadly synchronic dependence coupled with some degree of ontological and causal autonomy. Reflecting the diverse, frequently incompatible interpretations of the notions of dependence and autonomy, however, accounts of emergence diverge into a bewildering variety. Here I argue that much of this apparent diversity is superficial. I first argue, by attention to the problem of higher-level causation, that two and only two strategies for addressing this problem accommodate the genuine emergence (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  8.  20
    Roberto Poli (2004). W. E. Johnson's Determinable-Determinate Opposition and His Theory of Abstraction. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 82 (1):163-196.
    A reconstruction of Johnson's main contributions to philosophy is provided. Johnson's theories are grounded on his distinction between "substantives" and "adjectives", which governs the oppositions between (1) particular and universal, (2) determinandum and determinans in thought, (3) acts of separation and discrimination, (4) subject and predicate, (5) thing and quality, (6) substance and determination, (7) proposition and fact, (8) external and internal relations, (9) extension and intension. While substantives divide between continuants and occurrents, adjectives are fundamentally distinguishable into determinables and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9. Kit Fine (2011). An Abstract Characterization of the Determinate/Determinable Distinction. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):161-187.
  10.  13
    Charles M. Myers (1958). The Determinate and Determinable Modes of Appearing. Mind 67 (265):32-49.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Jessica Wilson (forthcoming). The Unity and Priority Arguments for Grounding. In Ken Aizawa & Carl Gillett (eds.), Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground. Palgrave MacMillan
    Grounding, understood as a primitive posit operative in contexts where metaphysical dependence is at issue, is not able on its own to do any substantive work in characterizing or illuminating metaphysical dependence---or so I argue in 'No Work for a Theory of Grounding' (Inquiry, 2014). Such illumination rather requires appeal to specific metaphysical relations---type or token identity, functional realization, the determinable-determinate relation, the mereological part-whole relation, and so on---of the sort typically at issue in these contexts. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Jessica M. Wilson (2014). No Work for a Theory of Grounding. Inquiry 57 (5-6):535–579.
    It has recently been suggested that a distinctive metaphysical relation---"Grounding"---is ultimately at issue in contexts where some goings-on are said to hold "in virtue of"", be (constitutively) "metaphysically dependent on", or be "nothing over and above" some others (see Fine 2001, Schaffer 2009, and Rosen 2010). Grounding is supposed to do good work (better than merely modal notions, in particular) in illuminating metaphysical dependence. I argue that Grounding is also unsuited to do this work. To start, Grounding alone cannot (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  13.  46
    Ross P. Cameron (forthcoming). Do We Need Grounding? Inquiry:1-13.
    Many have been tempted to invoke a primitive notion of grounding to describe the way in which some features of reality give rise to others. Jessica Wilson argues that such a notion is unnecessary to describe the structure of the world: that we can make do with specific dependence relations such as the part–whole relation or the determinatedeterminable relation, together with a notion of absolute fundamentality. In this paper I argue that such resources are inadequate to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Jessica M. Wilson (2011). Non-Reductive Realization and the Powers-Based Subset Strategy. The Monist (Issue on Powers) 94 (1):121-154.
    I argue that an adequate account of non-reductive realization must guarantee satisfaction of a certain condition on the token causal powers associated with (instances of) realized and realizing entities---namely, what I call the 'Subset Condition on Causal Powers' (first introduced in Wilson 1999). In terms of states, the condition requires that the token powers had by a realized state on a given occasion be a proper subset of the token powers had by the state that realizes it on that occasion. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  15.  82
    Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives (2005). The Nonexistence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis. Noûs 39 (3):483–504.
    An electron clearly has the property of having a charge of þ1.6 10 19 coulombs, but does it also have the property of being charged ? Philosophers have worried whether so-called ‘determinable’ predicates, such as ‘is charged’, actually refer to determinable properties in the way they are happy to say that determinate predicates, such as ‘has a charge of þ1.6 10 19 coulombs’, refer to determinate properties. The distinction between determinates and determinables is itself fairly new, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  16. Simone Gozzano (2008). Tropes' Simplicity and Mental Causation. Ontos Verlag.
    In this paper I first try to clarify the essential features of tropes and then I use the resulting analysis to cope with the problem of mental causation. As to the first step, I argue that tropes, beside being essentially particular and abstract, are simple, where such a simplicity can be considered either from a phenomenal point of view or from a structural point of view. Once this feature is spelled out, the role tropes may play in solving the problem (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Timothy Chappell, There Are No Thin Concepts.
    “Thin concepts” are dubious entities. Careful analysis of the usual examples of thick and thin raises serious doubts about both their conceptuality and their thinness. Confusions aside, there is little obvious use for them in ethics or metaethics. The very idea that there could be a naturally-occurring purely evaluative moral concept, with no descriptive content, no cultural setting, and no capacity for distanced or ironic use, is as chimerical as any other ahistorical illusion. Our concentration on thick and thin has (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Kathrin Koslicki (2015). The Coarse-Grainedness of Grounding. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2015:306-344.
    After many years of enduring the drought and famine of Quinean ontology and Carnapian meta-ontology, the notion of ground, with its distinctively philosophical flavor, finally promises to give metaphysicians something they can believe in again and around which they can rally: their very own metaphysical explanatory connection which apparently cannot be reduced to, or analyzed in terms of, other familiar idioms such as identity, modality, parthood, supervenience, realization, causation or counterfactual dependence. Often, phenomena such as the following are cited as (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  22
    Edward T. Cox (2008). Crimson Brain, Red Mind: Yablo on Mental Causation. Dialectica 62 (1):77–99.
    Stephen Yablo offers a solution to the problem of mental causation by claiming that the physical is a determinate of the mental's determinable, and therefore the mental and physical do not compete for causal relevance. I present Yablo's solution and argue that the mental‐physical relation cannot meet three necessary conditions for determination. That relation fails to meet the requirements that determinates of the same determinable be incompatible and that no property can be a determinate (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  20.  4
    Stephen Makin (2014). II—Ethics, Fixity and Flux. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):169-183.
    This paper engages with the idea at the core of my co-symposiast's paper ‘Ethics of Substance’ : that the Aristotelian concept of substantial being has ethical implications, and an alternative understanding of existence in terms of affecting and being affected will help us more easily to accommodate relational values, which are thought to sit uneasily within the Aristotelian framework. I focus on two questions. First, is there really is a tension between an Aristotelian metaphysics of substance and concern for others? (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  1
    Giovanni Matteucci (2012). “Der Artist Valéry” nella teoria estetica di Adorno. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 5 (1).
    This paper aims to outline the importance of Valéry with respect to some cornerstones of Adorno’s aesthetic theory as a negative-dialectical thought. Adorno’s concept of aesthetic experience finds in Valéry as an “Artist” (not simply as a “Künstler”) a sort of lieutenant: he helps to specify notions like “apparition”, “form”, “configuration”, and above all the idea of the aesthetic as a relation by which something happens in the field of human experience without being a determinate, or determinable, (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  5
    Rom Harre (2006). Resolving the Emergence-Reduction Debate. Synthese 151 (3):499-509.
    The debate between emergentists and reductionists rests on the observation that in many situations, in which it seems desirable to work with a coherent and unified discourse, key predicates fall into different groups, such that pairs of members one taken from each group, cannot be co-predicated of some common subject. Must we settle for 'island' discourses in science and human affairs or is some route to a unified discourse still open? To make progress towards resolving the issue the conditions under (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23. Robert Schroer (2011). Can Determinable Properties Earn Their Keep? Synthese 183 (2):229-247.
    Sydney Shoemaker's "Subset Account" offers a new take on determinable properties and the realization relation as well as a defense of non-reductive physicalism from the problem of mental causation. At the heart of this account are the claims that (1) mental properties are determinable properties and (2) the causal powers that individuate a determinable property are a proper subset of the causal powers that individuate the determinates of that property. The second claim, however, (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Bence Nanay (2015). Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1723-1736.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that the phenomenal similarity between perceiving and visualizing can be explained by the similarity between the structure of the content of these two different mental states. And this puts important constraints on how we should think about perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  25.  96
    William Jaworski (2009). The Logic of How-Questions. Synthese 166 (1):133 - 155.
    Philosophers and scientists are concerned with the why and the how of things. Questions like the following are so much grist for the philosopher’s and scientist’s mill: How can we be free and yet live in a deterministic universe?, How do neural processes give rise to conscious experience?, Why does conscious experience accompany certain physiological events at all?, How is a three-dimensional perception of depth generated by a pair of two-dimensional retinal images?. Since Belnap and Steel’s pioneering work on the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  26.  24
    Johanna Wolff (2015). Spin as a Determinable. Topoi 34 (2):379-386.
    In this paper I aim to answer two questions: Can spin be treated as a determinable? Can a treatment of spin as a determinable be used to understand quantum indeterminacy? In response to the first question I show that the relations among spin number, spin components and spin values cannot be captured by a single determination relation; instead we need to look at spin number and spin value separately. In response to the second question I discuss three (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Tim Crane (2008). Causation and Determinable Properties : On the Efficacy of Colour, Shape, and Size. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press
    This paper presents a puzzle or antinomy about the role of properties in causation. In theories of properties, a distinction is often made between determinable properties, like red, and their determinates, like scarlet (see Armstrong 1978, volume II). Sometimes determinable properties are cited in causal explanations, as when we say that someone stopped at the traffic light because it was red. If we accept that properties can be among the relata of causation, then it can be argued that (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  28.  47
    Bence Nanay (2014). Natural Properties and Bottomless Determination. Americal Philosophical Quarterly 51:215-226.
    It is widely held that some properties are more natural than others and that, as David Lewis put it, “an adequate theory of properties is one that recognises an objective difference between natural and unnatural properties” (Lewis 1983, p. 347). The general line of thought is that such ‘elitism’ about properties is justified as it can give simple and elegant solutions to a number of old metaphysical and philosophical problems. My aim is to analyze what these natural properties are: super-determinates (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  88
    Lydia Patton (2010). Review: Hyder, The Determinate World: Kant and Helmholtz on the Physical Meaning of Geometry. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (7).
    Hyder constructs two historical narratives. First, he gives an account of Helmholtz's relation to Kant, from the famous Raumproblem, which preoccupied philosophers, geometers, and scientists in the mid-19th century, to Helmholtz's arguments in his four papers on geometry from 1868 to 1878 that geometry is, in some sense, an empirical science (chapters 5 and 6). The second theme is the argument for the necessity of central forces to a determinate scientific description of physical reality, an abiding concern of (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Kathrin Koslicki (2016). Where Grounding and Causation Part Ways: Comments on Schaffer. Philosophical Studies 173 (1):101-112.
    Does the notion of ground, as it has recently been employed by metaphysicians, point to a single unified phenomenon? Jonathan Schaffer holds that the phenomenon of grounding exhibits the unity characteristic of a single genus. In defense of this hypothesis, Schaffer proposes to take seriously the analogy between causation and grounding. More specifically, Schaffer argues that both grounding and causation are best approached through a single formalism, viz., that utilized by structural equation models of causation. In this paper, I (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  65
    Joshua Gert (2006). A Realistic Colour Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):565 – 589.
    Whether or not one endorses realism about colour, it is very tempting to regard realism about determinable colours such as green and yellow as standing or falling together with realism about determinate colours such as unique green or green31. Indeed some of the most prominent representatives of both sides of the colour realism debate explicitly endorse the idea that these two kinds of realism are so linked. Against such theorists, the present paper argues that one can be a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  32.  8
    Vassilios Karakostas (2014). Correspondence Truth and Quantum Mechanics. Axiomathes 24 (3):343-358.
    The logic of a physical theory reflects the structure of the propositions referring to the behaviour of a physical system in the domain of the relevant theory. It is argued in relation to classical mechanics that the propositional structure of the theory allows truth-value assignment in conformity with the traditional conception of a correspondence theory of truth. Every proposition in classical mechanics is assigned a definite truth value, either ‘true’ or ‘false’, describing what is actually the case at a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33. Anita Konzelmann Ziv (2009). The Semantics of Shared Emotion. Universitas Philosophica 52:81-106.
    The paper investigates semantic properties of expressions that suggest the possibility that emotions are shared. An example is the saying that a sorrow shared is a sorrow halved. I assume that such expressions on sharing an emotion refer to a specific mode of subjective experience, displayed in first person attributions of the form 'We share E'. Subjective attributions of this form are intrinsically ambiguous on all levels of their semantic elements: 'emotion', 'sharing' and 'We'. One question the paper seeks to (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34.  9
    Christopher V. Mirus (2012). Order and the Determinate. Review of Metaphysics 65 (3):499-523.
    Aristotle twice affirms that being is better than nonbeing. Throughout the corpus—in both practical and theoretical works—he explicates this claim in terms of three main concepts, each of which serves to link being with goodness. These include completeness and self-sufficiency, which are well-known from Aristotle’s ethics and politics. Even more fundamental, however, are the closely related concepts of order and determinacy, which the present essay explores. Beginning with the causal role of the good in Aristotle’s accounts of nature and human (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  31
    Mark Q. Gardiner (1995). Operational Constraints and the Model-Theoretic Argument. Erkenntnis 43 (3):395 - 400.
    Putnam's Model-Theoretic argument purports to show that, contrary to what the metaphysical realist is committed to, an epistemically ideal theory which satisfies all operational and theoretical constraints can be guaranteed to be true. He draws the additional antirealist conclusion that there can be no single privileged relation of reference. I argue that the very possibility of a so-called ideal theory satisfying all operational constraints presupposes a determinate relation of reference, and hence Putnam must assume precisely what he (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Karen Bennett (2011). Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required). Philosophical Studies 154 (1):79-104.
    A variety of relations widely invoked by philosophers—composition, constitution, realization, micro-basing, emergence, and many others—are species of what I call ‘building relations’. I argue that they are conceptually intertwined, articulate what it takes for a relation to count as a building relation, and argue that—contra appearances—it is an open possibility that these relations are all determinates of a common determinable, or even that there is really only one building relation.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   31 citations  
  37.  29
    Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter (forthcoming). The Basing Relation and the Impossibility of the Debasing Demon. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Descartes’ demon is a deceiver: the demon makes things appear to you other than as they really are. However, as Descartes famously pointed out in the Second Meditation, not all knowledge is imperilled by this kind of deception. You still know you are a thinking thing. Perhaps, though, there is a more virulent demon in epistemic hell, one from which none of our knowledge is safe. Jonathan Schaffer (2010) thinks so. The “Debasing Demon” he imagines threatens knowledge not via the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  27
    Jessica Wilson (forthcoming). Are There Indeterminate States of Affairs? Yes. In Elizabeth Barnes (ed.), Current Controversies in Metaphysics. Taylor and Francis
    Here I compare two accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI): first, the 'meta-level' approach described by Elizabeth Barnes and Ross Cameron in the companion to this paper, on which every state of affairs (SOA) is itself precise/determinate, and MI is a matter of its being indeterminate which determinate SOA obtains; second, my preferred 'object-level' determinable-based approach, on which MI is a matter of its being determinate---or just plain true---that an indeterminate SOA obtains, where an indeterminate SOA is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Awareness of Abstract Objects. Noûs 47 (4):706-726.
    Awareness is a two-place determinable relation some determinates of which are seeing, hearing, etc. Abstract objects are items such as universals and functions, which contrast with concrete objects such as solids and liquids. It is uncontroversial that we are sometimes aware of concrete objects. In this paper I explore the more controversial topic of awareness of abstract objects. I distinguish two questions. First, the Existence Question: are there any experiences that make their subjects aware of abstract objects? Second, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  40. Bence Nanay (2010). Attention and Perceptual Content. Analysis 70 (2):263-270.
    I argue that perceptual content is always affected by the allocation of one’s attention. Perception attributes determinable and determinate properties to the perceived scene. Attention makes (or tries to make) our perceptual attribution of properties more determinate. Hence, a change in our attention changes the determinacy of the properties attributed to the perceived scene.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  41. Peter Winch (2015). The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy. Routledge.
    In the fiftieth anniversary of this book’s first release, Winch’s argument remains as crucial as ever. Originally published in 1958, _The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy_ was a landmark exploration of the social sciences, written at a time when that field was still young and had not yet joined the Humanities and the Natural Sciences as the third great domain of the Academy. A passionate defender of the importance of philosophy to a full understanding (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  42.  29
    Peter Winch (2008/2007). The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy. Routledge.
    The problems dealt with in The Idea of a Social Science are philosophical. It is an attempt to place the social science, considered as a single group, on the intellectual map, with special attention to the relations of the discipline to philosophy on the one hand and the natural sciences on the other. The author holds that the relation between the social sciences and philosophy is commonly misunderstood because of certain fashionable misconceptions about the nature of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   105 citations  
  43.  92
    Jc Beall, Ross Brady, J. Michael Dunn, A. P. Hazen, Edwin Mares, Robert K. Meyer, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, David Ripley, John Slaney & Richard Sylvan (2012). On the Ternary Relation and Conditionality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):595 - 612.
    One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley-Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  44. Ian Evans (2013). The Problem of the Basing Relation. Synthese 190 (14):2943-2957.
    In days past, epistemologists expended a good deal of effort trying to analyze the basing relation—the relation between a belief and its basis. No satisfying account was offered, and the project was largely abandoned. Younger epistemologists, however, have begun to yearn for an adequate theory of basing. I aim to deliver one. After establishing some data and arguing that traditional accounts of basing are unsatisfying, I introduce a novel theory of the basing relation: the dispositional theory. It (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  45.  48
    Kim Frost (2014). On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit. Philosophical Review 123 (4):429-484.
    Direction of fit theories usually claim that beliefs are such that they “aim at truth” or “ought to fit” the world and desires are such that they “aim at realization” or the world “ought to fit” them. This essay argues that no theory of direction of fit is correct. The two directions of fit are supposed to be determinations of one and the same determinable two-place relation, differing only in the ordering of favored terms. But there is no (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  46. Kevin McCain (2012). The Interventionist Account of Causation and the Basing Relation. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):357-382.
    It is commonplace to distinguish between propositional justification (having good reasons for believing p) and doxastic justification (believing p on the basis of those good reasons).One necessary requirement for bridging the gap between S’s merely having propositional justification that p and S’s having doxastic justification that p is that S base her belief that p on her reasons (propositional justification).A plausible suggestion for what it takes for S’s belief to be based on her reasons is that her reasons must contribute (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  47. Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Schmidtke (2012). In Defense of Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality About Color. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):547-558.
    Are the following propositions true of the colors: No object can be more than one determinable or determinate color all over at the same time (Incompatibility); the colors of objects are mind-independent (Objectivism); and most human observers usually perceive the colors of objects veridically in typical conditions (Veridicality)? One reason to think not is that the empirical literature appears to support the proposition that there is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects amongst human observers in typical (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  48.  78
    Sara Bernstein (2014). Two Problems for Proportionality About Omissions. Dialectica 68 (3):429-441.
    Theories of causation grounded in counterfactual dependence face the problem of profligate omissions: numerous irrelevant omissions count as causes of an outcome. A recent purported solution to this problem is proportionality, which selects one omission among many candidates as the cause of an outcome. This paper argues that proportionality cannot solve the problem of profligate omissions for two reasons. First: the determinate/determinable relationship that holds between properties like aqua and blue does not hold between negative properties like not (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49. Sean Cordell (2011). Virtuous Persons and Social Roles. Journal of Social Philosophy 42 (3):254-272.
    The article discusses the characteristics of virtuous persons in relation to their social role(s). It explores the key features of the neo-Aristotelian account of right action and some problems for this account in the context of a certain social role. The problem can be characterized as a dilemma. When evaluating an action in some role, one view is that the obligations and requirements of roles could be taken as something already given by social or professional role descriptions, such that (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50.  27
    Kay Herrmann (1994). Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843): Eine Philosophie der Exakten Wissenschaften. Tabula Rasa. Jenenser Zeitschrift Für Kritisches Denken (6).
    Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843): A Philosophy of the Exact Sciences -/- Shortened version of the article of the same name in: Tabula Rasa. Jenenser magazine for critical thinking. 6th of November 1994 edition -/- 1. Biography -/- Jakob Friedrich Fries was born on the 23rd of August, 1773 in Barby on the Elbe. Because Fries' father had little time, on account of his journeying, he gave up both his sons, of whom Jakob Friedrich was the elder, to the Herrnhut Teaching (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000