Search results for 'determinables' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Olivier Massin (2013). Determinables and Brute Similarities. In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Ontos Verlag
    Ingvar Johansson has argued that there are not only determinate universals, but also determinable ones. I here argue that this view is misguided by reviving a line of argument to the following effect: what makes determinates falling under a same determinable similar cannot be distinct from what makes them different. If true, some similarities — imperfect similarities between simple determinate properties — are not grounded in any kind of property-sharing. I suggest that determinables are better understood as maximal disjunctions (...)
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  2. Jessica M. Wilson (2012). Fundamental Determinables. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (4).
    Contemporary philosophers commonly suppose that any fundamental entities there may be are maximally determinate. More generally, they commonly suppose that, whether or not there are fundamental entities, any determinable entities there may be are grounded in, hence less fundamental than, more determinate entities. So, for example, Armstrong takes the physical objects constituting the presumed fundamental base to be “determinate in all respects” (1961, 59), and Lewis takes the properties characterizing things “completely and without redundancy” to be “highly specific” (1986, 60). (...)
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  3.  84
    Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives (2005). The Nonexistence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis. Noûs 39 (3):483–504.
    An electron clearly has the property of having a charge of þ1.6 10 19 coulombs, but does it also have the property of being charged ? Philosophers have worried whether so-called ‘determinable’ predicates, such as ‘is charged’, actually refer to determinable properties in the way they are happy to say that determinate predicates, such as ‘has a charge of þ1.6 10 19 coulombs’, refer to determinate properties. The distinction between determinates and determinables is itself fairly new, dating only to (...)
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  4.  5
    Johannes Persson (1999). The Determinables of Explanatory Mechanisms. Synthese 120 (1):77-87.
    Sometimes instances of perceived causation turn out to lack causal relata. The reasons may vary. Causation may display itself as prevention, or as omission, and in some cases causation occurs within such complex environments that few of the things we associate with causes and effects are true of them, etc. But even then, there may be causal explanations to be had. This suggests that the explanatory power of causal reports have other sources than the relation between cause and effect. In (...)
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  5.  34
    Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives (2005). The Non-Existence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis. Noûs 39 (3):483-504.
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  6. Douglas E. Ehring (1996). Mental Causation, Determinables, and Property Instances. Noûs 30 (4):461-80.
  7.  81
    Sven Walter (2007). Determinables, Determinates, and Causal Relevance. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):217-244.
  8.  46
    Ingvar Johansson (2000). Determinables as Universals. The Monist 83 (1):101-121.
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  9. Arthur N. Prior (1949). Determinables, Determinates and Determinants (II). Mind 58 (230):178-194.
  10.  41
    David H. Sanford, Determinates Vs. Determinables. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Everything red is colored, and all squares are polygons. A square is distinguished from other polygons by being four-sided, equilateral, and equiangular. What distinguishes red things from other colored things? This has been understood as a conceptual rather than scientific question. Theories of wavelengths and reflectance and sensory processing are not considered. Given just our ordinary understanding of color, it seems that what differentiates red from other colors is only redness itself. The Cambridge logician W. E. Johnson introduced the terms (...)
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  11.  89
    Arthur N. Prior (1949). Determinables, Determinates and Determinants. Mind 58 (229):1-20.
  12.  12
    Olivier Massz'N. (2013). Determinables and Brute Similarities. In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Ontos Verlag 5--388.
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  13.  41
    Bence Nanay (2012). Bayes or Determinables? What Does the Bidirectional Hierarchical Model of Brain Functions Tell Us About the Nature of Perceptual Representation? Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 3.
    The focus of this commentary is what Andy Clark takes to be the most groundbreaking of the philosophical import of the ‘bidirectional hierarchical model of brain functions’, namely, the claim that perceptual representations represent probabilities. This is what makes his account Bayesian and this is a philosophical or theoretical conclusion that neuroscientists and psychologists are also quick and happy to draw. My claim is that nothing in the ‘bidirectional hierarchical models of brain functions’ implies that perceptual representations are probabilistic, or (...)
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  14.  13
    S. Körner & J. Searle (1959). Symposium: On Determinables and Resemblance. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 33:125 - 158.
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  15.  2
    Ingvar Johansson (2004). FrontmatterCONTENTSForeword to the Second editionPreface1. Ontology2. Irreductive Materialism3. States of Affairs and Qualities4. Exclusive and Inclusive Qualities5. Actions and Functions6. Patterns, Changes, and Pure Gestalten7. Self-Sustaining Gestalten and Gestalten Causa Sui8. External, Internal, and Grounded Relations9. Existential Dependence10. Container Space and Relational Space11. Tendency12. Efficient Causality13. Intentionality14. Nature: Parts and Wholes Without Intentionality15. Man and Society: Nested Intentionality16. Epistemological PositionsNotesBibliographyIndexAppendix 1: An Aphoristic Summary of Ontological InvestigationsAppendix 2: Determinables as UniversalsAppendix 3: Ontologies and Concepts. Two ProposalsBackmatter: An Inquiry Into the Categories of Nature, Man and Soceity. [REVIEW] In Ontological Investigations: An Inquiry Into the Categories of Nature, Man and Soceity. De Gruyter 1-21.
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  16. S. Körner & J. Searle (1959). On Determinables and Resemblance. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 33 (1):125-158.
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  17.  3
    Charles A. Baylis (1950). Review: Arthur N. Prior, Determinables, Determinates and Determinants. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 15 (2):147-148.
  18. Arthur N. Prior (1949). I.—determinables, determinates and determinants. Mind 58 (229):1-20.
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  19. Bence Nanay (2012). Bayes or Determinables? What Does the Bidirectional Hierarchical Model of Brain Functions Tell Us About the Nature of Perceptual Representation? Frontiers in Psychology 3.
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  20. Jessica M. Wilson (2009). Determination, Realization and Mental Causation. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):149 - 169.
    How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (henceforth, 'determination') provides the key to (...)
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  21. Jessica M. Wilson (2013). A Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy. Inquiry 56 (4):359–385.
    Many phenomena appear to be indeterminate, including material macro-object boundaries, predicates or properties admitting of borderline cases, and certain open future claims. Here I provide an account of indeterminacy in metaphysical, rather than semantic or epistemic, terms. Previous such accounts have been "meta-level" accounts, taking metaphysical indeterminacy (MI) to involve its being indeterminate which of various determinate states of affairs obtain. On my alternative, "object-level" account, MI involves its being determinate (or just plain true) that an indeterminate (less than maximally (...)
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  22. Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (2010). Introduction. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press
    The Introduction discusses determinables and similarity spaces and ties together the contributions to Color Ontology and Color Science.
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  23.  30
    Johanna Wolff (2015). Spin as a Determinable. Topoi 34 (2):379-386.
    In this paper I aim to answer two questions: Can spin be treated as a determinable? Can a treatment of spin as a determinable be used to understand quantum indeterminacy? In response to the first question I show that the relations among spin number, spin components and spin values cannot be captured by a single determination relation; instead we need to look at spin number and spin value separately. In response to the second question I discuss three ways in which (...)
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  24.  10
    Antti Hautamäki (forthcoming). Points of View: A Conceptual Space Approach. Foundations of Science:1-18.
    Points of view are a central phenomenon in human cognition. Although the concept of point of view is ambiguous, there exist common elements in different notions. A point of view is a certain way to look at things around us. In conceptual points of view, things are looked at or interpreted through conceptual lenses. Conceptual points of view are important for epistemology, cognitive science, and philosophy of science. In this article, a new method to formalize conceptual points of view is (...)
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  25.  90
    Sara Bernstein (2014). Two Problems for Proportionality About Omissions. Dialectica 68 (3):429-441.
    Theories of causation grounded in counterfactual dependence face the problem of profligate omissions: numerous irrelevant omissions count as causes of an outcome. A recent purported solution to this problem is proportionality, which selects one omission among many candidates as the cause of an outcome. This paper argues that proportionality cannot solve the problem of profligate omissions for two reasons. First: the determinate/determinable relationship that holds between properties like aqua and blue does not hold between negative properties like not aqua and (...)
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  26.  12
    Rik Peels & René van Woudenberg, The Metaphysics of Degrees.
    Degree-sentences, i.e. sentences that seem to refer to things that allow of degrees, are widely used both inside and outside of philosophy, even though the metaphysics of degrees is much of an untrodden field. This paper aims to fill this lacuna by addressing the following four questions: [A] Is there some one thing, such that it is degree sensitive? [B] Are there things x, y, and z that stand in a certain relation to each other, viz. the relation that x (...)
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  27. Nicholas K. Jones (2016). Object as a Determinable. In Mark Jago (ed.), Reality Making. OUP 121-151.
    This paper outlines a heterodox and largely unexplored conception of objecthood according to which the notion of an individual object is a determinable. §1 outlines the view. §2 argues that the view is incompatible with a natural analysis of kind membership and, as a consequence, undermines the Quinean distinction between ontology and ideology. The view is then used to alleviate one source of Quinean hostility towards non-trivial restrictions on de re possibility in §3, and to elucidate Fine’s neo-Aristoteltian, non-modal conception (...)
     
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  28. Robert K. Garcia (2015). Two Ways to Particularize a Property. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):635-652.
    Trope theory is an increasingly prominent contender in contemporary debates about the existence and nature of properties. But it suffers from ambiguity concerning the nature of a trope. Disambiguation reveals two fundamentally different concepts of a trope: modifier tropes and module tropes. These types of tropes are unequally suited for metaphysical work. Modifier tropes have advantages concerning powers, relations, and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes have advantages concerning perception, causation, character-grounding, and the ontology of substance. Thus, the choice between (...)
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  29. Keith Allen (2009). Inter-Species Variation in Colour Perception. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):197 - 220.
    Inter-species variation in colour perception poses a serious problem for the view that colours are mind-independent properties. Given that colour perception varies so drastically across species, which species perceives colours as they really are? In this paper, I argue that all do. Specifically, I argue that members of different species perceive properties that are determinates of different, mutually compatible, determinables. This is an instance of a general selectionist strategy for dealing with cases of perceptual variation. According to selectionist views, (...)
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  30.  88
    Paul Audi (2013). How to Rule Out Disjunctive Properties. Noûs 47 (4):748-766.
    Are there disjunctive properties? This question is important for at least two reasons. First, disjunctive properties are invoked in defense of certain philosophical theories, especially in the philosophy of mind. Second, the question raises the prior issue of what counts as a genuine property, a central concern in the metaphysics of properties. I argue here, on the basis of general considerations in the metaphysics of properties, that there are no disjunctive properties. Specifically, I argue that genuine properties must guarantee similarity-in-a-respect (...)
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  31. Max Kistler (2005). Necessary Laws. In Jan Faye, Paul Needham, Uwe Scheffler & Max Urchs (eds.), Nature’s Principles. Springer 201-227.
    In the first part of this paper, I argue against the view that laws of nature are contingent, by attacking a necessary condition for its truth within the framework of a conception of laws as relations between universals. I try to show that there is no independent reason to think that universals have an essence independent of their nomological properties. However, such a non-qualitative essence is required to make sense of the idea that different laws link the same universals in (...)
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  32. Walter R. Ott (2004). The Cartesian Context of Berkeley's Attack on Abstraction. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):407–424.
    I claim that Berkeley's main argument against abstraction comes into focus only when we see Descartes as one of its targets. Berkeley does not deploy Winkler's impossibility argument but instead argues that what is impossible is inconceivable. Since Descartes conceives of extension as a determinable, and since determinables cannot exist as such, he falls within the scope of Berkeley's argument.
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  33.  94
    Sara Worley (1997). Determination and Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 46 (3):281-304.
    Yablo suggests that we can understand the possibility of mental causation by supposing that mental properties determine physical properties, in the classic sense of determination according to which red determines scarlet. Determinates and their determinables do not compete for causal relevance, so if mental and physical properties are related as determinable and determinates, they should not compete for causal relevance either. I argue that this solution won''t work. I first construct a more adequate account of determination than that provided (...)
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  34.  73
    David A. Denby (2001). Determinable Nominalism. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):297--327.
    I present, motivate, and defend a theory of properties. Its novel feature is that it takes entire determinables-together-with-their-determinates as its units of analysis. This, I argue, captures the relations of entailment and exclusion among properties, solves the problem of extensionality, and points the way towards an actualist analysis of modality.
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  35.  37
    Roman Frigg, Models in Physics.
    In its most common use, the term ‘model’ refers to a simplified and stylised version of the socalled target system, the part or aspect of the world that we are interested in. For instance, in order to determine the orbit of a planet moving around the sun we model the planet and the sun as perfect homogenous spheres that gravitationally interact with each other but nothing else in the universe, and then apply Newtonian mechanics to this system, which reveals that (...)
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  36. Jessica M. Wilson (2010). From Constitutional Necessities to Causal Necessities. In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge
    Humeans and non-Humeans reasonably agree that there may be necessary connections between entities that are identical or merely partly distinct—between, e.g., sets and their individual members, fusions and their individual parts, instances of determinates and determinables, members of certain natural kinds and certain of their intrinsic properties, and (especially among physicalists) certain physical and mental states. Humeans maintain, however, that as per “Hume’s Dictum”, there are no necessary connections between entities that are wholly distinct;1 and in particular, no necessary (...)
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  37.  24
    Edward T. Cox (2008). Crimson Brain, Red Mind: Yablo on Mental Causation. Dialectica 62 (1):77–99.
    Stephen Yablo offers a solution to the problem of mental causation by claiming that the physical is a determinate of the mental's determinable, and therefore the mental and physical do not compete for causal relevance. I present Yablo's solution and argue that the mental‐physical relation cannot meet three necessary conditions for determination. That relation fails to meet the requirements that determinates of the same determinable be incompatible and that no property can be a determinate of more than one determinable. Further, (...)
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  38.  36
    Tracy Lupher (2010). Not Quite Particles, Not Quite Fields. Humana.Mente 13:155-173.
    There are significant problems involved in determining the ontology of quantum field theory (QFT). An ontology involving particles seems to be ruled out due to the problem of defining localized position operators, issues involving interactions in QFT, and, perhaps, the appearance of unitarily inequivalent representations. While this might imply that fields are the most natural ontology for QFT, the wavefunctional interpretation of QFT has significant drawbacks. A modified field ontology is examined where determinables are assigned to open bounded regions (...)
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  39.  14
    Ingvar Johansson (2009). Mathematical Vectors and Physical Vectors. Dialectica 63 (4):433-447.
    From a metaphysical point of view, it is important clearly to see the ontological difference between what is studied in mathematics and mathematical physics, respectively. In this respect, the paper is concerned with the vectors of classical physics. Vectors have both a scalar magnitude and a direction, and it is argued that neither conventionalism nor wholesale anti‐conventionalism holds true of either of these components of classical physical vectors. A quantification of a physical dimension requires the discovery of ontological order relations (...)
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  40.  22
    Roberto Poli (2004). W. E. Johnson's Determinable-Determinate Opposition and His Theory of Abstraction. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 82 (1):163-196.
    A reconstruction of Johnson's main contributions to philosophy is provided. Johnson's theories are grounded on his distinction between "substantives" and "adjectives", which governs the oppositions between (1) particular and universal, (2) determinandum and determinans in thought, (3) acts of separation and discrimination, (4) subject and predicate, (5) thing and quality, (6) substance and determination, (7) proposition and fact, (8) external and internal relations, (9) extension and intension. While substantives divide between continuants and occurrents, adjectives are fundamentally distinguishable into determinables (...)
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  41.  18
    P. von Morstein (1980). Kripke, Wittgenstein and the Private Language Argument. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:61-74.
    "Agreement" is the key notion in Wittgenstein's explanation of the possibility of public language. Agreement in judgements constitutes the justification for asserting agreement in definitions. The determinates of rules are empirical; rules as determinables are transcendental. Rules are on the limit of public language, and not within it. Wittgenstein's skeptical solutions to skepticism about language and about the given are transcendentalistic. His skeptical solutions in other areas are conventionalistic. Skepticism about mental phenomena is not solved because of a systematic (...)
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  42.  27
    Anthony B. Dardis (2002). A No Causal Rivalry Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 17 (28):69-77.
    Stephen Yablo has recently argued for a novel solution to the mental causation problem: the mental is related to the physical as determinables are related to determinates; determinables are not causal rivals with their determinates; so the mental and the physical are not causal rivals. Despite its attractions the suggestion seems hard to accept. In this paper I develop the idea that mental properties and physical properties are not causal rivals. Start with property dualism, supervenience, multiple realizability, and (...)
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  43.  14
    Brian R. Gaines (2009). Designing Visual Languages for Description Logics. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (2):217-250.
    Semantic networks were developed in cognitive science and artificial intelligence studies as graphical knowledge representation and inference tools emulating human thought processes. Formal analysis of the representation and inference capabilities of the networks modeled them as subsets of standard first-order logic (FOL), restricted in the operations allowed in order to ensure the tractability that seemed to characterize human reasoning capabilities. The graphical network representations were modeled as providing a visual language for the logic. Sub-sets of FOL targeted on knowledge representation (...)
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  44.  2
    Jens Harbecke (2005). A Realist Approach to Biological Events. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 27 (3/4):491 - 507.
    In this paper, I aim to show that the multiple realisability and the causal efficacy of biological events can best be explained by construing biological events as determinables of more determinate physical events. The determination relation itself is spelled out in terms of inclusive essence. In order to secure actual causation for biological events (in contrast to causal influence), two conditions are introduced such that for some events, biological events qualify as their cause. Finally, certain consequences of the presented (...)
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  45.  3
    Andreas Kamlah (2001). Reflexionen Über Die Struktur der Physikalischen Sprache. Erkenntnis 54 (1):39-53.
    The aim of this paper is to discuss how far physics differs frommathematics, and if a philosophy of science which uses mathematics or logicsas a model for physics would be unable to be aware of many importantfeatures of that natural science.Many functions in physics differ from those of mathematics in beingfunctional dependecies and in having a lawlike character.Physical quantities have the character of "`determinables"'', sets ofspecial entities which are presupposed by physical theories.One may suspect that physics also could not (...)
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  46. Antti Hautamäki (ed.) (1st ed. 2015). Temporal Points of View. Springer International Publishing.
    A “conceptual spaces” approach is used to formalize Aristotle’s main intuitions about time and change, and other ideas about temporal points of view. That approach has been used in earlier studies about points of view. Properties of entities are represented by locations in multidimensional conceptual spaces; and concepts of entities are identified with subsets or regions of conceptual spaces. The dimensions of the spaces, called “determinables”, are qualities in a very general sense. A temporal element is introduced by adding (...)
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  47. Ann Whittle (2003). The Causal Theory of Properties. Dissertation, UCL
    This thesis investigates the causal theory of properties (CTP). CTP states that properties must be understood via the complicated network of causal relations to which a property can contribute. If an object instantiates the property of being 900C, for instance, it will burn human skin on contact, feel warm to us if near, etc. In order to best understand CTP, I argue that we need to distinguish between properties and particular instances of them. Properties should be analysed via the causal (...)
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