Search results for 'determinates' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  82
    Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives (2005). The Nonexistence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis. Noûs 39 (3):483–504.
    An electron clearly has the property of having a charge of þ1.6 10 19 coulombs, but does it also have the property of being charged ? Philosophers have worried whether so-called ‘determinable’ predicates, such as ‘is charged’, actually refer to determinable properties in the way they are happy to say that determinate predicates, such as ‘has a charge of þ1.6 10 19 coulombs’, refer to determinate properties. The distinction between determinates and determinables is itself fairly new, dating only to (...)
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  2.  62
    Christine Tappolet (2004). Through Thick and Thin: Good and its Determinates. Dialectica 58 (2):207–221.
    What is the relation between the concept good and more specific or ‘thick’ concepts such as admirable or courageous? I argue that good or more precisely good pro tanto is a general concept, but that the relation between good pro tanto and the more specific concepts is not that of a genus to its species. The relation of an important class of specific evaluative concepts, which I call ‘affective concepts’, to good pro tanto is better understood as one between a (...)
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  3.  17
    Edward N. Zalta (1998). Mally's Determinates and Husserl's Noemata. In A. Hieke (ed.), Ernst Mally - Versuch einer Neubewertung. Academia Verlag
    In this paper, the author compares passages from two philosophically important texts and concludes that they have fundamental ideas in common. What makes this comparison and conclusion interesting is that the texts come from two different traditions in philosophy, the analytic and the phenomenological. In 1912, Ernst Mally published *Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik*, an analytic work containing a combination of formal logic and metaphysics. In 1913, Edmund Husserl published *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, a seminal (...)
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  4.  30
    Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives (2005). The Non-Existence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis. Noûs 39 (3):483-504.
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  5.  67
    Sven Walter (2007). Determinables, Determinates, and Causal Relevance. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):217-244.
  6. Arthur N. Prior (1949). Determinables, Determinates and Determinants (II). Mind 58 (230):178-194.
  7.  39
    David H. Sanford, Determinates Vs. Determinables. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Everything red is colored, and all squares are polygons. A square is distinguished from other polygons by being four-sided, equilateral, and equiangular. What distinguishes red things from other colored things? This has been understood as a conceptual rather than scientific question. Theories of wavelengths and reflectance and sensory processing are not considered. Given just our ordinary understanding of color, it seems that what differentiates red from other colors is only redness itself. The Cambridge logician W. E. Johnson introduced the terms (...)
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  8.  86
    Arthur N. Prior (1949). Determinables, Determinates and Determinants. Mind 58 (229):1-20.
  9.  33
    Richmond H. Thomason (1969). Species, Determinates and Natural Kinds. Noûs 3 (1):95-101.
  10.  11
    John Woods (1967). On Species and Determinates. Noûs 1 (3):243-254.
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  11.  3
    Charles A. Baylis (1950). Review: Arthur N. Prior, Determinables, Determinates and Determinants. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 15 (2):147-148.
  12. Arthur N. Prior (1949). I.—determinables, determinates and determinants. Mind 58 (229):1-20.
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  13. Theodore Scaltsas (2006). Mixed Determinates : Pleasure, Good, and Truth. In T. D. J. Chappell (ed.), Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics. Oxford University Press
  14. T. Tappolet Christine (2004). Through Thick and Thin: Good and its Determinates. Dialectica 58:2.
     
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  15. Jessica M. Wilson (2009). Determination, Realization and Mental Causation. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):149 - 169.
    How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (henceforth, 'determination') provides the key to (...)
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  16.  11
    Rik Peels & René van Woudenberg, The Metaphysics of Degrees.
    Degree-sentences, i.e. sentences that seem to refer to things that allow of degrees, are widely used both inside and outside of philosophy, even though the metaphysics of degrees is much of an untrodden field. This paper aims to fill this lacuna by addressing the following four questions: [A] Is there some one thing, such that it is degree sensitive? [B] Are there things x, y, and z that stand in a certain relation to each other, viz. the relation that x (...)
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  17. Olivier Massin (2013). Determinables and Brute Similarities. In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Ontos Verlag
    Ingvar Johansson has argued that there are not only determinate universals, but also determinable ones. I here argue that this view is misguided by reviving a line of argument to the following effect: what makes determinates falling under a same determinable similar cannot be distinct from what makes them different. If true, some similarities — imperfect similarities between simple determinate properties — are not grounded in any kind of property-sharing. I suggest that determinables are better understood as maximal disjunctions (...)
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  18. Jessica M. Wilson (2013). A Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy. Inquiry 56 (4):359–385.
    Many phenomena appear to be indeterminate, including material macro-object boundaries, predicates or properties admitting of borderline cases, and certain open future claims. Here I provide an account of indeterminacy in metaphysical, rather than semantic or epistemic, terms. Previous such accounts have been "meta-level" accounts, taking metaphysical indeterminacy (MI) to involve its being indeterminate which of various determinate states of affairs obtain. On my alternative, "object-level" account, MI involves its being determinate (or just plain true) that an indeterminate (less than maximally (...)
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  19.  83
    Sara Bernstein (2014). Two Problems for Proportionality About Omissions. Dialectica 68 (3):429-441.
    Theories of causation grounded in counterfactual dependence face the problem of profligate omissions: numerous irrelevant omissions count as causes of an outcome. A recent purported solution to this problem is proportionality, which selects one omission among many candidates as the cause of an outcome. This paper argues that proportionality cannot solve the problem of profligate omissions for two reasons. First: the determinate/determinable relationship that holds between properties like aqua and blue does not hold between negative properties like not aqua and (...)
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  20. Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (2010). Introduction. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press
    The Introduction discusses determinables and similarity spaces and ties together the contributions to Color Ontology and Color Science.
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  21.  29
    Johanna Wolff (2015). Spin as a Determinable. Topoi 34 (2):379-386.
    In this paper I aim to answer two questions: Can spin be treated as a determinable? Can a treatment of spin as a determinable be used to understand quantum indeterminacy? In response to the first question I show that the relations among spin number, spin components and spin values cannot be captured by a single determination relation; instead we need to look at spin number and spin value separately. In response to the second question I discuss three ways in which (...)
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  22. Nicholas K. Jones (2016). Object as a Determinable. In Mark Jago (ed.), Reality Making. OUP 121-151.
    This paper outlines a heterodox and largely unexplored conception of objecthood according to which the notion of an individual object is a determinable. §1 outlines the view. §2 argues that the view is incompatible with a natural analysis of kind membership and, as a consequence, undermines the Quinean distinction between ontology and ideology. The view is then used to alleviate one source of Quinean hostility towards non-trivial restrictions on de re possibility in §3, and to elucidate Fine’s neo-Aristoteltian, non-modal conception (...)
     
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  23. Karen Bennett (2011). Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required). Philosophical Studies 154 (1):79-104.
    A variety of relations widely invoked by philosophers—composition, constitution, realization, micro-basing, emergence, and many others—are species of what I call ‘building relations’. I argue that they are conceptually intertwined, articulate what it takes for a relation to count as a building relation, and argue that—contra appearances—it is an open possibility that these relations are all determinates of a common determinable, or even that there is really only one building relation.
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  24. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Awareness of Abstract Objects. Noûs 47 (4):706-726.
    Awareness is a two-place determinable relation some determinates of which are seeing, hearing, etc. Abstract objects are items such as universals and functions, which contrast with concrete objects such as solids and liquids. It is uncontroversial that we are sometimes aware of concrete objects. In this paper I explore the more controversial topic of awareness of abstract objects. I distinguish two questions. First, the Existence Question: are there any experiences that make their subjects aware of abstract objects? (...)
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  25. Keith Allen (2009). Inter-Species Variation in Colour Perception. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):197 - 220.
    Inter-species variation in colour perception poses a serious problem for the view that colours are mind-independent properties. Given that colour perception varies so drastically across species, which species perceives colours as they really are? In this paper, I argue that all do. Specifically, I argue that members of different species perceive properties that are determinates of different, mutually compatible, determinables. This is an instance of a general selectionist strategy for dealing with cases of perceptual variation. According to selectionist views, (...)
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  26. Robert Schroer (2011). Can Determinable Properties Earn Their Keep? Synthese 183 (2):229-247.
    Sydney Shoemaker's "Subset Account" offers a new take on determinable properties and the realization relation as well as a defense of non-reductive physicalism from the problem of mental causation. At the heart of this account are the claims that (1) mental properties are determinable properties and (2) the causal powers that individuate a determinable property are a proper subset of the causal powers that individuate the determinates of that property. The second claim, however, has led to the accusation that (...)
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  27. Max Kistler (2005). Necessary Laws. In Jan Faye, Paul Needham, Uwe Scheffler & Max Urchs (eds.), Nature’s Principles. Springer 201-227.
    In the first part of this paper, I argue against the view that laws of nature are contingent, by attacking a necessary condition for its truth within the framework of a conception of laws as relations between universals. I try to show that there is no independent reason to think that universals have an essence independent of their nomological properties. However, such a non-qualitative essence is required to make sense of the idea that different laws link the same universals in (...)
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  28. Tim Crane (2008). Causation and Determinable Properties : On the Efficacy of Colour, Shape, and Size. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press
    This paper presents a puzzle or antinomy about the role of properties in causation. In theories of properties, a distinction is often made between determinable properties, like red, and their determinates, like scarlet (see Armstrong 1978, volume II). Sometimes determinable properties are cited in causal explanations, as when we say that someone stopped at the traffic light because it was red. If we accept that properties can be among the relata of causation, then it can be argued that there (...)
     
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  29.  92
    Sara Worley (1997). Determination and Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 46 (3):281-304.
    Yablo suggests that we can understand the possibility of mental causation by supposing that mental properties determine physical properties, in the classic sense of determination according to which red determines scarlet. Determinates and their determinables do not compete for causal relevance, so if mental and physical properties are related as determinable and determinates, they should not compete for causal relevance either. I argue that this solution won''t work. I first construct a more adequate account of determination than that (...)
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  30.  71
    David A. Denby (2001). Determinable Nominalism. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):297--327.
    I present, motivate, and defend a theory of properties. Its novel feature is that it takes entire determinables-together-with-their-determinates as its units of analysis. This, I argue, captures the relations of entailment and exclusion among properties, solves the problem of extensionality, and points the way towards an actualist analysis of modality.
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  31. Bence Nanay (2014). Natural Properties and Bottomless Determination. Americal Philosophical Quarterly 51:215-226.
    It is widely held that some properties are more natural than others and that, as David Lewis put it, “an adequate theory of properties is one that recognises an objective difference between natural and unnatural properties” (Lewis 1983, p. 347). The general line of thought is that such ‘elitism’ about properties is justified as it can give simple and elegant solutions to a number of old metaphysical and philosophical problems. My aim is to analyze what these natural properties are: super- (...) or determinable (or maybe both) and argue that all three of these options would lead to serious difficulties for metaphysical elitism and would prevent natural properties from fulfilling their supposed grand explanatory role. (shrink)
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  32.  17
    Alisa Bokulich (2014). Metaphysical Indeterminacy, Properties, and Quantum Theory. Res Philosophica 91 (3):449-475.
    It has frequently been suggested that quantum mechanics may provide a genuine case of ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy. However, discussions of quantum theory in the vagueness literature are often cursory and, as I shall argue, have in some respects been misguided. Hitherto much of the debate over ontic vagueness and quantum theory has centered on the “indeterminate identity” construal of ontic vagueness, and whether the quantum phenomenon of entanglement produces particles whose identity is indeterminate. I argue that this way (...)
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  33. Jessica M. Wilson (2010). From Constitutional Necessities to Causal Necessities. In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge
    Humeans and non-Humeans reasonably agree that there may be necessary connections between entities that are identical or merely partly distinct—between, e.g., sets and their individual members, fusions and their individual parts, instances of determinates and determinables, members of certain natural kinds and certain of their intrinsic properties, and (especially among physicalists) certain physical and mental states. Humeans maintain, however, that as per “Hume’s Dictum”, there are no necessary connections between entities that are wholly distinct;1 and in particular, no necessary (...)
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  34.  24
    Edward T. Cox (2008). Crimson Brain, Red Mind: Yablo on Mental Causation. Dialectica 62 (1):77–99.
    Stephen Yablo offers a solution to the problem of mental causation by claiming that the physical is a determinate of the mental's determinable, and therefore the mental and physical do not compete for causal relevance. I present Yablo's solution and argue that the mental‐physical relation cannot meet three necessary conditions for determination. That relation fails to meet the requirements that determinates of the same determinable be incompatible and that no property can be a determinate of more than one determinable. (...)
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  35.  14
    Ingvar Johansson (2009). Mathematical Vectors and Physical Vectors. Dialectica 63 (4):433-447.
    From a metaphysical point of view, it is important clearly to see the ontological difference between what is studied in mathematics and mathematical physics, respectively. In this respect, the paper is concerned with the vectors of classical physics. Vectors have both a scalar magnitude and a direction, and it is argued that neither conventionalism nor wholesale anti‐conventionalism holds true of either of these components of classical physical vectors. A quantification of a physical dimension requires the discovery of ontological order relations (...)
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  36.  35
    Jonas Christensen (2014). Determinable Properties and Overdetermination of Causal Powers. Philosophia 42 (3):695-711.
    Do determinable properties such as colour, mass, and height exist in addition to their corresponding determinates, being red, having a mass of 1 kilogram, and having a height of 2 metres? Optimists say yes, pessimists say no. Among the latter are Carl Gillett and Bradley Rives who argue that optimism leads to systematic overdetermination of causal powers and hence should be rejected on the grounds that the position is ontologically unparsimonious. In this paper I defend optimism against this charge (...)
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  37.  38
    Yon Pérez Laraudogoitia (1985). Interpretación modal de la mecánica cuántica. Theoria 1 (1):235-251.
    In this paper, we present a (propositionaI) modal-Iogic approximation to Quantum Mechanics from a reduced and characteristic number of “crucial experiments” and so independently of the lattice of subspaces of Hilbert space. Kripke’s semantics, which determinates this system, allows to define, from a new point of view, the notions of “measurement process” and “virtual world” and admits a natural interpretation which in turn can help us to understand the measurement problem. In this way, we can attempt a “many-worlds” interpretation (...)
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  38.  21
    Roberto Poli (2004). W. E. Johnson's Determinable-Determinate Opposition and His Theory of Abstraction. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 82 (1):163-196.
    A reconstruction of Johnson's main contributions to philosophy is provided. Johnson's theories are grounded on his distinction between "substantives" and "adjectives", which governs the oppositions between (1) particular and universal, (2) determinandum and determinans in thought, (3) acts of separation and discrimination, (4) subject and predicate, (5) thing and quality, (6) substance and determination, (7) proposition and fact, (8) external and internal relations, (9) extension and intension. While substantives divide between continuants and occurrents, adjectives are fundamentally distinguishable into determinables and (...)
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  39.  18
    P. von Morstein (1980). Kripke, Wittgenstein and the Private Language Argument. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:61-74.
    "Agreement" is the key notion in Wittgenstein's explanation of the possibility of public language. Agreement in judgements constitutes the justification for asserting agreement in definitions. The determinates of rules are empirical; rules as determinables are transcendental. Rules are on the limit of public language, and not within it. Wittgenstein's skeptical solutions to skepticism about language and about the given are transcendentalistic. His skeptical solutions in other areas are conventionalistic. Skepticism about mental phenomena is not solved because of a systematic (...)
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  40.  13
    Lorenzo Peña (1986). Notes on Bergmann's New Ontology and Account of Relations. Philosophy Research Archives 12:219-249.
    Recent work of Gustav Bergmann develops an ontological framework within which an account of relations has been sketched out. The approach is a kind of new logical atomism which has some of the features of an Aristotelian hylomorphism (of sorts). It recognizes a number of categories and groups of a hylomorphic kind, chiefly “determinates” and “subdeterminates”--the latter only indirectly or implicitly. Winsome though it is, the approach is flawed by certain difficulties it gives rise to, among them inability to (...)
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  41.  13
    William Harms (1997). Evolution and Ultimatum Bargaining. Theory and Decision 42 (2):147-175.
    Empirical research has discovered that experimental subjects in ultimatum bargaining situations generally fail to play the decision-theoretic optimum strategy, and instead play something between that strategy and a fair split. In evolutionary dynamics, fair division and nearly fair division strategies often go to fixation and weakly dominated strategies can do quite well. Computer simulations were done using three different ultimatum bargaining games as determinates of fitness. (1) No tendency toward the elimination of weakly dominated strategies was observed, with or (...)
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  42.  26
    Anthony B. Dardis (2002). A No Causal Rivalry Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 17 (28):69-77.
    Stephen Yablo has recently argued for a novel solution to the mental causation problem: the mental is related to the physical as determinables are related to determinates; determinables are not causal rivals with their determinates; so the mental and the physical are not causal rivals. Despite its attractions the suggestion seems hard to accept. In this paper I develop the idea that mental properties and physical properties are not causal rivals. Start with property dualism, supervenience, multiple realizability, and (...)
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  43.  3
    Yon Pérez Laraudogoitia (1985). Interpretación Modal de la Mecánica Cuántica. Theoria 1 (1):235-251.
    In this paper, we present a (propositionaI) modal-Iogic approximation to Quantum Mechanics from a reduced and characteristic number of “crucial experiments” and so independently of the lattice of subspaces of Hilbert space. Kripke’s semantics, which determinates this system, allows to define, from a new point of view, the notions of “measurement process” and “virtual world” and admits a natural interpretation which in turn can help us to understand the measurement problem. In this way, we can attempt a “many-worlds” interpretation (...)
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  44.  18
    Ernan McMullin (2007). Discemindo Caminhos em Filosofia da Ciência: O Contribute de Meio Século de Estudos (1950-2000). Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 63 (1/3):67 - 91.
    O presente artigo começa por reconhecer que a crítica ao cerne dos pressupostos do Positivismo Lógico acerca da natureza da Ciência começou alguns anos antes do aparecimento da obra de Thomas Kuhn A Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas, obra esta que se haveria de constituir como charneira na Filosofia da Ciência mais recente. Em vez de olhar para a Ciência como uma estrutura proposicional intemporal, Kuhn defende que ela deve ser tratada como um empreendimento essencialmente histórico, no qual a subjectividade humana (...)
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  45.  18
    Peter Koestenbaum (1958). The Phenomenology of Metaphysics: The Nature of Philosophical Differences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19 (2):183-197.
    The purpose of this article is to analyze the problem of metaphysical differences and to seek a pathway towards their resolution. Metaphysical conflicts have two meanings: first, Systems contradict one another by accepting different and opposite ultimate principles of explanation: second, Systems oppose one another by claiming various degrees of inclusiveness and coherence. It is maintained that both of these two views of metaphysical controversies are true. The author constructs a comprehensive scheme from which any possible metaphysics can be derived. (...)
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  46.  23
    Jill Graper Hernandez (2005). Divine Omniscience and Human Evil: Interpreting Leibniz Without Middle Knowledge. Philosophy and Theology 17 (1/2):107-120.
    The ‘middle knowledge’ doctrine salvages free will and divine omniscience by contending that God knows what agents will freely choose under any possible circumstances. I argue, however, that the Leibnizian problem of divine knowledge of human evil is best resolved by applying a Theodicy II distinction between determined, foreseen, and resolved action. This move eliminates deference to middle knowledge. Contingent action is indeed free, but not all action is contingent, and so not all action is free. For Leibniz, then, God’s (...)
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  47. Robert Richards (1982). The Emergence of Evolutionary Biology of Behaviour in the Early Nineteenth Century. British Journal for the History of Science 15 (3):241-280.
    The sciences of ethology and sociobiology have as premisses that certain dispositions and behavioural patterns have evolved with species and, therefore, that the acts of individual animals and men must be viewed in light of innate determinates. These ideas are much older than the now burgeoning disciplines of the biology of behaviour. Their elements were fused in the early constructions of evolutionary theory, and they became integral parts of the developing conception. Historians, however, have usually neglected close examination of (...)
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  48.  1
    Marcin Tkaczyk (2008). Temporalna interpretacja logiki modalnej. Roczniki Filozoficzne 56 (2):275-299.
    Temporal interpretation of modal logic consists in replacing possible worlds with temporal states of the world or any time determinates and the accessibility relation with a relation of passage of time. That issue has been raised by A. N. Prior, who was thinking of propositions as things which could change their truth-values (could become true or become false) with the passage of time. Under such interpretation Prior was reading a formula as: it (is and) will always be the case (...)
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  49. Ann Whittle (2003). The Causal Theory of Properties. Dissertation, UCL
    This thesis investigates the causal theory of properties (CTP). CTP states that properties must be understood via the complicated network of causal relations to which a property can contribute. If an object instantiates the property of being 900C, for instance, it will burn human skin on contact, feel warm to us if near, etc. In order to best understand CTP, I argue that we need to distinguish between properties and particular instances of them. Properties should be analysed via the causal (...)
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