Search results for 'deterrence' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Sridhar Venkatapuram, Yvonne Terlingen, Alex J. Bellamy, Shareen Hertel, Democracy Deterrence & Leslie Vinjamuri (2010). Carnegie Council. Ethics and International Affairs 24.score: 30.0
     
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  2. Lisa J. Carlson & Raymond Dacey (2010). Social Norms and the Traditional Deterrence Game. Synthese 176 (1):105 - 123.score: 18.0
    Bicchieri (The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of norms, 2006, xi) presents a formal analysis of norms that answers the questions of "when, how, and to what degree" norms affect human behavior in the play of games. The purpose of this paper is to apply a variation of the Bicchieri norms analysis to generate a model of norms-based play of the traditional deterrence game (Zagare and Kilgour, Int Stud Q 37: 1-27, 1993; Morrow, Game theory for political (...)
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  3. Steven Sverdlik, The Permissibility of Deterrence.score: 18.0
    I examine the argument that designing punishment to achieve deterrence is morally objectionable because it uses the offender simply as a means. Using material from my book Motive and Rightness I show that Kant's Formula of Humanity cannot be interpreted as employing the concept of 'using a person simply as a means'. FH must instead be interpreted to mean that we must always treat people as ends. If this is correct the argument about deterrence is weakened. I apply (...)
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  4. Jakob von Holderstein Holtermann (2010). A “Slice of Cheese”—a Deterrence-Based Argument for the International Criminal Court. Human Rights Review 11 (3):289-315.score: 18.0
    Over the last decade, theorists have persistently criticised the assumption that the International Criminal Court (ICC) can produce a noteworthy deterrent effect. Consequently, consensus has emerged that we should probably look for different ways to justify the ICC or else abandon the prestigious project entirely. In this paper, I argue that these claims are ill founded and rest primarily on misunderstandings as to the idea of deterrence through punishment. They tend to overstate both the epistemic certainty as to and (...)
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  5. Duncan MacIntosh (1991). Retaliation Rationalized: Gauthier's Solution to the Deterrence Dilemma. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):9-32.score: 15.0
    Gauthier claims: (1) a non-maximizing action is rational if it maximized to intend it. If one intended to retaliate in order to deter an attack, (2) retaliation is rational, for it maximized to intend it. I argue that even on sympathetic theories of intentions, actions and choices, (1) is incoherent. But I defend (2) by arguing that an action is rational if it maximizes on preferences it maximized to adopt given one's antecedent preferences. (2) is true because it maximized to (...)
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  6. Daniel M. Farrell (forthcoming). Using Wrongdoers Rightly: Tadros on the Justification of General Deterrence. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-20.score: 15.0
    Some philosophers believe that punishing convicted criminals in order to deter other, potential criminals would be morally questionable even if we had good evidence that doing so would achieve its goal, at least to a substantial degree. And they believe this because they believe that doing so would be an instance of “using” convicted criminals in a morally objectionable way. Tadros aims to show that we would indeed be “using” convicted criminals in such cases but that, while “using” others is (...)
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  7. Duane L. Cady & Richard Werner (eds.) (1991). Just War, Nonviolence, and Nuclear Deterrence: Philosophers on War and Peace. Longwood Academic.score: 15.0
     
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  8. Geoffrey L. Goodwin (ed.) (1982). Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence. St. Martin's Press.score: 15.0
     
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  9. By Anthony Ellis (2005). Punishment as Deterrence: Reply to Sprague. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):98–101.score: 12.0
    In my 'A Deterrence Theory of Punishment', I argued that a deterrence system of punishment can avoid the charge that it illegitimately uses offenders if its punishments are carried out 'quasiautomatically': threats are issued by a legislature for deterrent purposes, but those who carry out the punishments have no authority to take deterrent considerations into account. Sprague has objected that under such a system, those who carry out punishments will be unable to justify their actions. I reply that (...)
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  10. Anthony Ellis (2005). Punishment as Deterrence: Reply to Sprague. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):98 - 101.score: 12.0
    In my 'A Deterrence Theory of Punishment', I argued that a deterrence system of punishment can avoid the charge that it illegitimately uses offenders if its punishments are carried out 'quasiautomatically': threats are issued by a legislature for deterrent purposes, but those who carry out the punishments have no authority to take deterrent considerations into account. Sprague has objected that under such a system, those who carry out punishments will be unable to justify their actions. I reply that (...)
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  11. Robert McKim (1985). An Examination of a Moral Argument Against Nuclear Deterrence. Journal of Religious Ethics 13 (2):279 - 297.score: 12.0
    After some preliminaries ("I") I examine the merits of an argument which is sometimes used in an attempt to show that nuclear deterrence is morally unacceptable ("II-V"). This is the argument that deterrence is wrong because it involves a threat to do something which it is wrong to do. My conclusion is that there is something to this argument, that it is sufficient to establish a "prima facie" case against nuclear deterrence, but that it is not sufficient (...)
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  12. By Michael Sprague (2004). Who May Carry Out Protective Deterrence? Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):445–447.score: 12.0
    Anthony Ellis argues that institutional punishment occurs automatically in a way analogous to mechanical deterrents, and given that issuing real threats is justified for self-defence, institutional punishment, intended to protect society via deterrence, can be justified without violating the Kantian constraint against using persons as means only. But institutional punishments are not in fact executed automatically: they must be carried out by moral agents. Ellis fails to provide a basis for those agents to justify the performance of their legal (...)
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  13. Richard B. Miller (1988). Love, Intention, and Proportion: Paul Ramsey on the Morality of Nuclear Deterrence. Journal of Religious Ethics 16 (2):201 - 221.score: 12.0
    This article assays Paul Ramsey's influential attempt to conceive possible nuclear deterrents within the confines of just war tenets. I look first at Ramsey's construction of just war ideas according to a protection paradigm, one in which agape is deontically defined. I also note a subtle sub-theme in Ramsey's construction of just war ideas, what I call a preservation motif. I then assess Ramsey's discussion of nuclear deterrence, closing with a critique of his treatments of intention and proportionality. I (...)
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  14. Marek Thee (1987). The Doctrine of Nuclear Deterrence: Impact on Contemporary International Relations. World Futures 24 (1):65-85.score: 12.0
    (1988). The doctrine of nuclear deterrence: Impact on contemporary international relations. World Futures: Vol. 24, Strategic Doctrines and Their Alternatives, pp. 65-85.
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  15. D. M. Kilgour & F. C. Zagare (1994). Uncertainty and the Role of the Pawn in Extended Deterrence. Synthese 100 (3):379 - 412.score: 12.0
    This paper develops an incomplete information model of extended deterrence relationships. It postulates players who are fully informed about the costs of war and all other relevant variables, save for the values their opponents place on the issues at stake, i.e., the pawn. We provide consistent and intuitively satisfying parallel definitions for two types of players, Hard and Soft, in terms of the parameters of our model. We also answer several particular questions about the strategy choices of players in (...)
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  16. Michael Sprague (2004). Who May Carry Out Protective Deterrence? Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):445 - 447.score: 12.0
    Anthony Ellis argues that institutional punishment occurs automatically in a way analogous to mechanical deterrents, and given that issuing real threats is justified for self-defence, institutional punishment, intended to protect society via deterrence, can be justified without violating the Kantian constraint against using persons as means only. But institutional punishments are not in fact executed automatically: they must be carried out by moral agents. Ellis fails to provide a basis for those agents to justify the performance of their legal (...)
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  17. Michael Dummett (2013). The Morality of Deterrence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (sup1):111-127.score: 12.0
    (1986). The Morality of Deterrence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 16, Supplementary Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament, pp. 111-127.
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  18. C. A. J. Coady (1989). Escaping From the Bomb: Immoral Deterrence and the Problem of Extrication. In Henry Shue (ed.), Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint. Cambridge University Press. 163--226.score: 12.0
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  19. G. R. Dunstan (1982). Theological Method in the Deterrence Debate. In Geoffrey L. Goodwin (ed.), Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence. St. Martin's Press.score: 12.0
     
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  20. John Finnis, Joseph Boyle & Germain Grisez (1988). Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism. Clarendon Press.score: 12.0
    Nuclear deterrence requires objective ethical analysis. In providing it, the authors face realities - the Soviet threat, possible nuclear holocaust, strategic imperatives - but they also unmask moral evasions - deterrence cannot be bluff, pure counterforce, the lesser (or greater) evil, or a step towards disarmament. They conclude that the deterrent is unjustifiable and examine the new question of conscience that this raises for everyone.
     
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  21. Alan Gewirth (2013). Reason and Nuclear Deterrence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (sup1):129-159.score: 12.0
    (1986). Reason and Nuclear Deterrence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 16, Supplementary Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament, pp. 129-159.
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  22. Geoffrey Goodwin (1982). Deterrence and Détente. In Geoffrey L. Goodwin (ed.), Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence. St. Martin's Press.score: 12.0
     
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  23. Russell Hardin (2013). Deterrence and Moral Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (sup1):161-193.score: 12.0
    (1986). Deterrence and Moral Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 16, Supplementary Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament, pp. 161-193.
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  24. Arthur Hockaday (1982). In Defence of Deterrence. In Geoffrey L. Goodwin (ed.), Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence. St. Martin's Press.score: 12.0
     
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  25. Jan Narveson (2013). On Defense by Nuclear Deterrence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (sup1):195-211.score: 12.0
    (1986). On Defense by Nuclear Deterrence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 16, Supplementary Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament, pp. 195-211.
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  26. Steven C. Patten (2013). Individual Responsibility, Nuclear Deterrence, and Excusing Political Inaction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (sup1):213-236.score: 12.0
    (1986). Individual Responsibility, Nuclear Deterrence, and Excusing Political Inaction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 16, Supplementary Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament, pp. 213-236.
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  27. Anthony Ellis (2003). A Deterrence Theory of Punishment. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):337–351.score: 10.0
    I start from the presupposition that the use of force against another is justified only in self-defence or in defence of others against aggression. If so, the main work of justifying punishment must rely on its deterrent effect, since most punishments have no other significant self-defensive effect. It has often been objected to the deterrent justification of punishment that it commits us to using offenders unacceptably, and that it is unable to deliver acceptable limits on punishment. I describe a sort (...)
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  28. Ernest Van Den Haag (1968). On Deterrence and the Death Penalty. Ethics 78 (4):280-288.score: 9.0
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  29. B. Sharon Byrd (1989). Kant's Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat, Retribution in its Execution. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 8 (2):151 - 200.score: 9.0
    Kant's theory of punishment is commonly regarded as purely retributive in nature, and indeed much of his discourse seems to support that interpretation. Still, it leaves one with certain misgivings regarding the internal consistency of his position. Perhaps the problem lies not in Kant's inconsistency nor in the senility sometimes claimed to be apparent in the Metaphysic of Morals, but rather in a superimposed, modern yet monistic view of punishment. Historical considerations tend to show that Kant was discussing not one, (...)
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  30. Ernest van den Haag (1970). Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Rejoinder. Ethics 81 (1):74-75.score: 9.0
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  31. Richard Wasserstrom (1985). War, Nuclear War, and Nuclear Deterrence: Some Conceptual and Moral Issues. Ethics 95 (3):424-444.score: 9.0
  32. David A. Conway (1974). Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Considerations in Dialogue Form. Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 (4):431-443.score: 9.0
  33. Gregory S. Kavka (1978). Some Paradoxes of Deterrence. Journal of Philosophy 75 (6):285-302.score: 9.0
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  34. Ernest Den Haavang (1968). On Deterrence and the Death Penalty. Ethics 78 (4):280-.score: 9.0
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  35. Duncan MacIntosh (1992). Preference-Revision and the Paradoxes of Instrumental Rationality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):503-529.score: 9.0
    To the normal reasons that we think can justify one in preferring something, x (namely, that x has objectively preferable properties, or has properties that one prefers things to have, or that x's obtaining would advance one's preferences), I argue that it can be a justifying reason to prefer x that one's very preferring of x would advance one's preferences. Here, one prefers x not because of the properties of x, but because of the properties of one's having the preference (...)
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  36. Steven Lee (1985). The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence: Hostage Holding and Consequences. Ethics 95 (3):549-566.score: 9.0
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  37. Daniel M. Farrell (1985). The Justification of General Deterrence. Philosophical Review 94 (3):367-394.score: 9.0
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  38. Douglas P. Lackey (1982). Missiles and Morals: A Utilitarian Look at Nuclear Deterrence. Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (3):189-231.score: 9.0
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  39. Thomas Donaldson (1985). Nuclear Deterrence and Self-Defense. Ethics 95 (3):537-548.score: 9.0
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  40. David Gauthier (1984). Deterrence, Maximization, and Rationality. Ethics 94 (3):474-495.score: 9.0
  41. Theodore Roszak (1963). A Just War Analysis of Two Types of Deterrence. Ethics 73 (2):100-109.score: 9.0
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  42. Leslie Stevenson (1986). Is Nuclear Deterrence Ethical? Philosophy 61 (236):193 - 214.score: 9.0
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  43. Jeff McMahan (1989). Is Nuclear Deterrence Paradoxical?:Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism. John Finnis, Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez; Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence. Gregory Kavka. [REVIEW] Ethics 99 (2):407-.score: 9.0
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  44. William H. Shaw (1984). Nuclear Deterrence and Deontology. Ethics 94 (2):248-260.score: 9.0
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  45. Maimon Schwarzschild (2002). Retribution, Deterrence, and the Death Penalty: A Response to Hugo Bedau. Criminal Justice Ethics 21 (2):9-11.score: 9.0
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  46. Eric Reitan (1993). Why the Deterrence Argument for Capital Punishment Fails. Criminal Justice Ethics 12 (1):26-33.score: 9.0
  47. Jeff McMahan (1985). Deterrence and Deontology. Ethics 95 (3):517-536.score: 9.0
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  48. Alan Wertheimer (1976). Deterrence and Retribution. Ethics 86 (3):181-199.score: 9.0
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  49. Jeff McMahan (1985). Book Review:Conventional Deterrence. John J. Mearsheimer. [REVIEW] Ethics 95 (2):376-.score: 9.0
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