Search results for 'deterrence' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Sridhar Venkatapuram, Yvonne Terlingen, Alex J. Bellamy, Shareen Hertel, Democracy Deterrence & Leslie Vinjamuri (2010). Carnegie Council. Ethics and International Affairs 24.
     
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  2.  13
    Steven Sverdlik (forthcoming). Kantianism, Consequentialism and Deterrence. In Christian Seidel (ed.), Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems? Oxford University Press
    It is often argued that Kantian and consequentialist approaches to the philosophy of punishment differ on the question of whether using punishment to achieve deterrence is morally acceptable. I show that this is false: both theories judge it to be acceptable. Showing this requires attention to what the Formula of Humanity in Kant requires agents to do. If we use the correct interpretation of this formula we can also see that an anti-consequentialist moral principle used by Victor Tadros to (...)
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  3. Jakob von Holderstein Holtermann (2010). A “Slice of Cheese”—a Deterrence-Based Argument for the International Criminal Court. Human Rights Review 11 (3):289-315.
    Over the last decade, theorists have persistently criticised the assumption that the International Criminal Court (ICC) can produce a noteworthy deterrent effect. Consequently, consensus has emerged that we should probably look for different ways to justify the ICC or else abandon the prestigious project entirely. In this paper, I argue that these claims are ill founded and rest primarily on misunderstandings as to the idea of deterrence through punishment. They tend to overstate both the epistemic certainty as to and (...)
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  4.  9
    Steven Sverdlik (forthcoming). The Permissibility of Deterrence. In Christian Seidel (ed.), Consequentialism: New Directions, New problems? Oxford University Press
    Many philosophers argue that is morally objectionable in principle to punish people in order to deter others from committing crimes. Such punishment is said to treat the offender simply as a means to benefit others. This Kantian argument rests on a certain reading of the Formula of Humanity. However, the central concept in that formula is not ‘treating a person simply as a means’, but rather ‘treating a person as an end’. This conclusion speaks against the moral principle that Victor (...)
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  5.  42
    Lisa J. Carlson & Raymond Dacey (2010). Social Norms and the Traditional Deterrence Game. Synthese 176 (1):105 - 123.
    Bicchieri (The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of norms, 2006, xi) presents a formal analysis of norms that answers the questions of "when, how, and to what degree" norms affect human behavior in the play of games. The purpose of this paper is to apply a variation of the Bicchieri norms analysis to generate a model of norms-based play of the traditional deterrence game (Zagare and Kilgour, Int Stud Q 37: 1-27, 1993; Morrow, Game theory for political (...)
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  6. Duncan MacIntosh (1991). Retaliation Rationalized: Gauthier's Solution to the Deterrence Dilemma. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):9-32.
    Gauthier claims: (1) a non-maximizing action is rational if it maximized to intend it. If one intended to retaliate in order to deter an attack, (2) retaliation is rational, for it maximized to intend it. I argue that even on sympathetic theories of intentions, actions and choices, (1) is incoherent. But I defend (2) by arguing that an action is rational if it maximizes on preferences it maximized to adopt given one's antecedent preferences. (2) is true because it maximized to (...)
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  7. Anthony Kenny, Avner Cohen & Steven Lee (1987). The Logic of Deterrence. Ethics 97 (3):638-653.
     
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  8.  20
    Daniel M. Farrell (2015). Using Wrongdoers Rightly: Tadros on the Justification of General Deterrence. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (1):1-20.
    Some philosophers believe that punishing convicted criminals in order to deter other, potential criminals would be morally questionable even if we had good evidence that doing so would achieve its goal, at least to a substantial degree. And they believe this because they believe that doing so would be an instance of “using” convicted criminals in a morally objectionable way. Tadros aims to show that we would indeed be “using” convicted criminals in such cases but that, while “using” others is (...)
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  9. Duane L. Cady & Richard Werner (eds.) (1991). Just War, Nonviolence, and Nuclear Deterrence: Philosophers on War and Peace. Longwood Academic.
     
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  10. Geoffrey L. Goodwin (ed.) (1982). Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence. St. Martin's Press.
     
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  11. John Finnis, Joseph Boyle & Germain Grisez (1988). Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism. Clarendon Press.
    Nuclear deterrence requires objective ethical analysis. In providing it, the authors face realities - the Soviet threat, possible nuclear holocaust, strategic imperatives - but they also unmask moral evasions - deterrence cannot be bluff, pure counterforce, the lesser (or greater) evil, or a step towards disarmament. They conclude that the deterrent is unjustifiable and examine the new question of conscience that this raises for everyone.
     
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  12. Thomas E. Hill (1997). Kant On Punishment: A Coherent Mix Of Deterrence And Retribution? Jahrbuch für Recht Und Ethik 5.
    Kant is often regarded as an extreme retributivist, but recently commentators emphasize the importance of deterrence in Kant's basic justification of punishment. Kant's combination of deterrence and retributive elements, however, must be distinguished from others that are less plausible. To interpret Kant as merely adding retributive side-constraints to a basic deterrence aim fails to capture fully the retributive strain in Kant's thought. The basic questions are: who should be punished, how much, in what manner, and why? Kant (...)
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  13.  13
    Jan Narveson (1988). Reason and Morality in the Age of Nuclear Deterrence. Analyse & Kritik 10 (2):206-232.
    The argument in this paper is that althaugh rationality and morality are distinguishable concepts, there is nevertheless a rational morality, a set of principles, namely, which it is rational of all to require of all. The argument of this paper is that such a morality would certainly issue in a general condemnation of aggressive war. Correlatively, it would issue in a strong right of defense. Would this right be sufficient to include resort to nuclear deterrence, if need be? It (...)
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  14.  3
    Michael Sprague (2004). Who May Carry Out Protective Deterrence? Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):445 - 447.
    Anthony Ellis argues that institutional punishment occurs automatically in a way analogous to mechanical deterrents, and given that issuing real threats is justified for self-defence, institutional punishment, intended to protect society via deterrence, can be justified without violating the Kantian constraint against using persons as means only. But institutional punishments are not in fact executed automatically: they must be carried out by moral agents. Ellis fails to provide a basis for those agents to justify the performance of their legal (...)
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  15.  9
    By Michael Sprague (2004). Who May Carry Out Protective Deterrence? Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):445–447.
    Anthony Ellis argues that institutional punishment occurs automatically in a way analogous to mechanical deterrents, and given that issuing real threats is justified for self-defence, institutional punishment, intended to protect society via deterrence, can be justified without violating the Kantian constraint against using persons as means only. But institutional punishments are not in fact executed automatically: they must be carried out by moral agents. Ellis fails to provide a basis for those agents to justify the performance of their legal (...)
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  16.  16
    Anthony Ellis (2005). Punishment as Deterrence: Reply to Sprague. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):98 - 101.
    In my 'A Deterrence Theory of Punishment', I argued that a deterrence system of punishment can avoid the charge that it illegitimately uses offenders if its punishments are carried out 'quasiautomatically': threats are issued by a legislature for deterrent purposes, but those who carry out the punishments have no authority to take deterrent considerations into account. Sprague has objected that under such a system, those who carry out punishments will be unable to justify their actions. I reply that (...)
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  17.  11
    Michael Dummett (2013). The Morality of Deterrence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (sup1):111-127.
    (1986). The Morality of Deterrence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 16, Supplementary Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament, pp. 111-127.
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  18.  6
    Jan Narveson (2013). On Defense by Nuclear Deterrence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (sup1):195-211.
    (1986). On Defense by Nuclear Deterrence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 16, Supplementary Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament, pp. 195-211.
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  19.  11
    Douglas P. Lackey (1985). Immoral Risks: A Deontological Critique of Nuclear Deterrence. Social Philosophy and Policy 3 (1):154.
    I. Beyond Utilitarianism In the summer of 1982, I published an article called “Missiles and Morals,” in which I argued on utilitarian grounds that nuclear deterrence in its present form is not morally justifiable. The argument of “Missiles and Morals” compared the most likely sort of nuclear war to develop under nuclear deterrence with the most likely sort of nuclear war to develop under American unilateral nuclear disaramament. For a variety of reasons, I claimed diat the number of (...)
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  20.  17
    Robert McKim (1985). An Examination of a Moral Argument Against Nuclear Deterrence. Journal of Religious Ethics 13 (2):279 - 297.
    After some preliminaries ("I") I examine the merits of an argument which is sometimes used in an attempt to show that nuclear deterrence is morally unacceptable ("II-V"). This is the argument that deterrence is wrong because it involves a threat to do something which it is wrong to do. My conclusion is that there is something to this argument, that it is sufficient to establish a "prima facie" case against nuclear deterrence, but that it is not sufficient (...)
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  21.  22
    By Anthony Ellis (2005). Punishment as Deterrence: Reply to Sprague. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):98–101.
    In my 'A Deterrence Theory of Punishment', I argued that a deterrence system of punishment can avoid the charge that it illegitimately uses offenders if its punishments are carried out 'quasiautomatically': threats are issued by a legislature for deterrent purposes, but those who carry out the punishments have no authority to take deterrent considerations into account. Sprague has objected that under such a system, those who carry out punishments will be unable to justify their actions. I reply that (...)
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  22.  4
    Henry Shue (1985). Conflicting Conceptions of Deterrence. Social Philosophy and Policy 3 (1):43.
    The Baptism of the Bomb Here is a two-step plan to rescue nuclear war from immorality. First, the United States should build the most moral offensive nuclear weapons that money can buy and bring nuclear warfare into compliance with the principle of noncombatant immunity. Then it should build a defensive “shield” that will make offensive nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete” and take the world “beyond deterrence.” In this second stage, called the “Strategic Defense Initiative” by believers and “Star Wars” (...)
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  23.  11
    Richard B. Miller (1988). Love, Intention, and Proportion: Paul Ramsey on the Morality of Nuclear Deterrence. Journal of Religious Ethics 16 (2):201 - 221.
    This article assays Paul Ramsey's influential attempt to conceive possible nuclear deterrents within the confines of just war tenets. I look first at Ramsey's construction of just war ideas according to a protection paradigm, one in which agape is deontically defined. I also note a subtle sub-theme in Ramsey's construction of just war ideas, what I call a preservation motif. I then assess Ramsey's discussion of nuclear deterrence, closing with a critique of his treatments of intention and proportionality. I (...)
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  24.  11
    D. M. Kilgour & F. C. Zagare (1994). Uncertainty and the Role of the Pawn in Extended Deterrence. Synthese 100 (3):379 - 412.
    This paper develops an incomplete information model of extended deterrence relationships. It postulates players who are fully informed about the costs of war and all other relevant variables, save for the values their opponents place on the issues at stake, i.e., the pawn. We provide consistent and intuitively satisfying parallel definitions for two types of players, Hard and Soft, in terms of the parameters of our model. We also answer several particular questions about the strategy choices of players in (...)
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  25.  2
    Russell Hardin (2013). Deterrence and Moral Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (sup1):161-193.
    (1986). Deterrence and Moral Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 16, Supplementary Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament, pp. 161-193.
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  26. C. A. J. Coady (1989). Escaping From the Bomb: Immoral Deterrence and the Problem of Extrication. In Henry Shue (ed.), Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint. Cambridge University Press 163--226.
     
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  27.  11
    Marek Thee (1987). The Doctrine of Nuclear Deterrence: Impact on Contemporary International Relations. World Futures 24 (1):65-85.
    (1988). The doctrine of nuclear deterrence: Impact on contemporary international relations. World Futures: Vol. 24, Strategic Doctrines and Their Alternatives, pp. 65-85.
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  28.  10
    Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour (1985). Optimal Deterrence. Social Philosophy and Policy 3 (1):118.
    1. Introduction The policy of deterrence, at least to avert nuclear war between the superpowers, has been a controversial one. The main controversy arises from the threat of each side to visit destruction on the other in response to an initial attack. This threat would seem irrational if carrying it out would lead to a nuclear holocaust – the worst outcome for both sides. Instead, it would seem better for the side attacked to suffer some destruction rather than to (...)
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  29.  1
    Steven C. Patten (2013). Individual Responsibility, Nuclear Deterrence, and Excusing Political Inaction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (sup1):213-236.
    (1986). Individual Responsibility, Nuclear Deterrence, and Excusing Political Inaction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 16, Supplementary Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament, pp. 213-236.
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  30.  2
    Robert L. Pfaltzgraff (1985). Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control: Ethical Issues for the 1980s. Social Philosophy and Policy 3 (1):74.
    The threat of atomic destruction has heightened the criminal irresponsibility of aggression, the employment of war as an instrument of national or bloc policy. Correspondingly, the moral obligation to discourage such a crime or, if it occurs, to deny it victory, has been underscored. The consequences of a successful defense are fearful to contemplate, but the consequences of a successful aggression, with tyrannical monopoly of the weapons of mass destruction, are calculated to be worse. While the avoidance of excessive and (...)
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  31.  2
    Steven Lee (1985). Morality and Paradoxical Deterrence. Social Philosophy and Policy 3 (1):136.
    Nuclear deterrence is paradoxical. One paradox of nuclear deterrence we may call the rationality paradox: While it is a rational policy to threaten nuclear retaliation against an opponent armed with nuclear weapons, it would not be rational to carry out the retaliation should the threat fail to deter; and what would not be rational to do is not, in the circumstances characteristic of nuclear deterrence, rational to threaten to do. This is a paradox in the standard sense (...)
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  32. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour (1987). Is Nuclear Deterrence Rational, and Will Star Wars Help? Analyse & Kritik 9 (1-2):62-74.
    Deterrence means threatening to retaliate against an attack in order to deter it in the first place. The central problem with a policy of deterrence is that the threat of retaliation may not be credible if retaliation leads to a worse outcome - perhaps a nuclear holocaust - than a side would suffer from absorbing a limited first strike and not retaliating. - The optimality of deterrence is analyzed by means of a Deterrence Game based on (...)
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  33. Victoria M. Davion (1989). Nuclear Deterrence and Wrongful Intentions. Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    My thesis explores the possibility that the wrongful intentions principle might not apply in certain deterrent situations. WIP states that if it is wrong to do something under certain conditions, it is wrong to intend to do it should those conditions arise. Questions about applications of WIP are frequently raised in discussions about the morality of nuclear deterrence. Some philosophers, such as Gregory Kavka, maintain that in certain situations where gaining deterrence is important, it is morally permissible, and (...)
     
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  34. G. R. Dunstan (1982). Theological Method in the Deterrence Debate. In Geoffrey L. Goodwin (ed.), Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence. St. Martin's Press
     
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  35. Alan Gewirth (2013). Reason and Nuclear Deterrence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (sup1):129-159.
    (1986). Reason and Nuclear Deterrence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 16, Supplementary Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament, pp. 129-159.
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  36. Geoffrey Goodwin (1982). Deterrence and Détente. In Geoffrey L. Goodwin (ed.), Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence. St. Martin's Press
     
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  37. Arthur Hockaday (1982). In Defence of Deterrence. In Geoffrey L. Goodwin (ed.), Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence. St. Martin's Press
     
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  38. Amir Lupovici (2016). The Power of Deterrence: Emotions, Identity and American and Israeli Wars of Resolve. Cambridge University Press.
    Why do states persist in using force to enhance their deterrent posture, even though it is not clear that it is effective? This book develops an innovative framework to answer this question, viewing deterrence as an idea. This allows the author to explain how countries institutionalize deterrence strategy, and how this internalization affects policy. He argues that the US and Israel have both internalized deterrence ideas and become attached to these practices. For them, deterrence is not (...)
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  39. Robert L. Phillips (1987). Nuclear Deterrence and Just War Theory. Analyse & Kritik 9 (1-2):142-154.
    The just war tradition stands as the moral and prudential alternatie to both pacifism and realism. It forms the only reasonable ethical basis for the understanding of state initiated force. As applied to questions of nuclear deterrence, just war theory is incompatible with Mutual Assured Destruction and with the threat of MAD. Just war theory entails a move toward counterforce with discriminate targeting of military capabilities and away from city targeting. This is now becoming possible technically and is morally (...)
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  40. Molly J. Crockett, Yagiz Özdemir & Ernst Fehr (2014). The Value of Vengeance and the Demand for Deterrence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 143 (6):2279-2286.
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  41. Anthony Ellis (2003). A Deterrence Theory of Punishment. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):337–351.
    I start from the presupposition that the use of force against another is justified only in self-defence or in defence of others against aggression. If so, the main work of justifying punishment must rely on its deterrent effect, since most punishments have no other significant self-defensive effect. It has often been objected to the deterrent justification of punishment that it commits us to using offenders unacceptably, and that it is unable to deliver acceptable limits on punishment. I describe a sort (...)
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  42. Ernest Van Den Haag (1968). On Deterrence and the Death Penalty. Ethics 78 (4):280-288.
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  43. B. Sharon Byrd (1989). Kant's Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat, Retribution in its Execution. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 8 (2):151 - 200.
    Kant's theory of punishment is commonly regarded as purely retributive in nature, and indeed much of his discourse seems to support that interpretation. Still, it leaves one with certain misgivings regarding the internal consistency of his position. Perhaps the problem lies not in Kant's inconsistency nor in the senility sometimes claimed to be apparent in the Metaphysic of Morals, but rather in a superimposed, modern yet monistic view of punishment. Historical considerations tend to show that Kant was discussing not one, (...)
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  44. Richard Wasserstrom (1985). War, Nuclear War, and Nuclear Deterrence: Some Conceptual and Moral Issues. Ethics 95 (3):424-444.
  45.  95
    Peter Lawler (1988). Reviews : Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, Doomsday or Deterrence? (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1986). Thesis Eleven 20 (1):142-147.
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  46. Daniel M. Farrell (1985). The Justification of General Deterrence. Philosophical Review 94 (3):367-394.
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  47.  77
    M. W. Howard (1984). Michael W. Howard -- Utopianism and Nuclear Deterrence. Philosophy and Social Criticism 10 (3-4):53-65.
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  48. J. C. Kunkel (1984). Joseph C. Kunkel -- Right Intention, Deterrence, and Nuclear Alternatives. Philosophy and Social Criticism 10 (3-4):143-155.
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  49.  3
    Leslie Stevenson (1989). G. S. Kavka, "Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence". [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 39 (55):250.
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  50. Steven Lee (1985). The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence: Hostage Holding and Consequences. Ethics 95 (3):549-566.
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