Search results for 'dialetheism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Francesco Berto (2014). Absolute Contradiction, Dialetheism, and Revenge. Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):193-207.
    Is there a notion of contradiction—let us call it, for dramatic effect, “absolute”—making all contradictions, so understood, unacceptable also for dialetheists? It is argued in this paper that there is, and that spelling it out brings some theoretical benefits. First it gives us a foothold on undisputed ground in the methodologically difficult debate on dialetheism. Second, we can use it to express, without begging questions, the disagreement between dialetheists and their rivals on the nature of truth. Third, dialetheism (...)
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  2. Francesco Berto (2007). Is Dialetheism an Idealism? The Russellian Fallacy and the Dialetheist's Dilemma. Dialectica 61 (2):235–263.
    In his famous work on vagueness, Russell named “fallacy of verbalism” the fallacy that consists in mistaking the properties of words for the properties of things. In this paper, I examine two (clusters of) mainstream paraconsistent logical theories – the non-adjunctive and relevant approaches –, and show that, if they are given a strongly paraconsistent or dialetheic reading, the charge of committing the Russellian Fallacy can be raised against them in a sophisticated way, by appealing to the intuitive reading of (...)
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  3.  49
    John N. Williams (2015). Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox. Theoria 81 (1):27-47.
    John Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “G. E. Moore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that of Ellie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd. Nor does she seem irrational if the sincerity of her assertion requires her to believe its content. A commissive counterpart of (...)
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  4.  35
    Wenfang Wang (2011). Against Classical Dialetheism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):492-500.
    Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions. Classical dialetheism holds further the view that the law of excluded middle is indeed a logical law. Most famous dialetheists, such as G. Priest and J. Beall, are classical dialetheists; they take classical dialetheism to be the only plausible solution to the semantic paradoxes. The main contention of the paper is, however, that their views should be rejected. Based on inspecting Priest’s and Beall’s dialetheist theories from a special (...)
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  5.  26
    Elena Ficara (2013). Dialectic and Dialetheism. History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (1):35-52.
    In this article, I consider the possibility of interpreting Hegel’s dialectic as dialetheism. After a first basic recapitulation about the meaning of the words ‘dialetheism’ and ‘dialectic’ and a consideration of Priest’s own account of the relation between dialectical and dialetheic logic in 1989, I discuss some controversial issues, not directly considered by Priest. As a matter of fact, the reflection on paraconsistent logics and dialetheism has enormously grown in recent years. In addition, the reception of Hegel’s (...)
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  6.  21
    Nicholas D. McGinnis (2013). The Unexpected Applicability of Paraconsistent Logic: A Chomskyan Route to Dialetheism. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 18 (4):625-640.
    Paraconsistent logics are characterized by rejection of ex falso quodlibet, the principle of explosion, which states that from a contradiction, anything can be derived. Strikingly these logics have found a wide range of application, despite the misgivings of philosophers as prominent as Lewis and Putnam. Such applications, I will argue, are of significant philosophical interest. They suggest ways to employ these logics in philosophical and scientific theories. To this end I will sketch out a ‘naturalized semantic dialetheism’ following Priest’s (...)
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  7. Francesco Berto & Graham Priest (2008). Dialetheism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008).
    A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth-bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.
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  8.  41
    Greg Littmann (2012). Dialetheism and the Graphic Liar. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):15-27.
    A Liar sentence is a sentence that, paradoxically, we cannot evaluate for truth in accordance with classical logic and semantics without arriving at a contradiction. For example, consider L If we assume that L is true, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is false. On the other hand, if we assume that L is false, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is true. Thus, L (...)
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  9.  2
    Wang Wenfang (2011). Against Classical Dialetheism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):492-500.
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  10. Mark Sainsbury (1997). Can Rational Dialetheism Be Refuted By Considerations About Negation and Denial? ProtoSociology 10.
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  11. Bruno Whittle (2004). Dialetheism, Logical Consequence and Hierarchy. Analysis 64 (4):318–326.
    I argue that dialetheists have a problem with the concept of logical consequence. The upshot of this problem is that dialetheists must appeal to a hierarchy of concepts of logical consequence. Since this hierarchy is akin to those invoked by more orthodox resolutions of the semantic paradoxes, its emergence would appear to seriously undermine the dialetheic treatments of these paradoxes. And since these are central to the case for dialetheism, this would represent a significant blow to the position itself.
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  12.  90
    Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2006). Dialetheism, Semantic Pathology, and the Open Pair. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):395 – 416.
    Over the past 25 years, Graham Priest has ably presented and defended dialetheism, the view that certain sentences are properly characterized as true with true negations. Our goal here is neither to quibble with the tenability of true, assertable contradictions nor, really, with the arguments for dialetheism. Rather, we wish to address the dialetheist's treatment of cases of semantic pathology and to pose a worry for dialetheism that has not been adequately considered. The problem that we present (...)
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  13.  30
    Ben Martin (2014). Dialetheism and the Impossibility of the World. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):61-75.
    This paper first offers a standard modal extension of dialetheic logics that respect the normal semantics for negation and conjunction, in an attempt to adequately model absolutism, the thesis that there are true contradictions at metaphysically possible worlds. It is shown, however, that the modal extension has unsavoury consequences for both absolutism and dialetheism. While the logic commits the absolutist to dialetheism, it commits the dialetheist to the impossibility of the actual world. A new modal logic AV is (...)
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  14.  40
    David Liggins (2014). Constructive Methodological Deflationism, Dialetheism and the Liar. Analysis 74 (4):566-574.
    Thanks to the work of Kendall Walton, appeals to the notion of pretence (or make-believe) have become popular in philosophy. Now the notion has begun to appear in accounts of truth. My aim here is to assess one of these accounts, namely the ‘constructive methodological deflationism’ put forward by Jc Beall. After introducing the view, I argue that Beall does not manage to overcome the problem of psychological implausibility. Although Beall claims that constructive methodological deflationism supports dialetheism, I argue (...)
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  15.  19
    Luis Estrada-González (2014). On the Possibility of Realist Dialetheism. SATS 15 (2):197-217.
    Realist dialetheism is the view that there are contradictions in reality. One argument against this idea says that it is impossible because it has to make room for the possibility of a trivial reality, which is metaphysically impossible. Another argument against it says that the metaphysical structure of reality is such that it is impossible to have contradictions in it. I argue here that both arguments fail to establish the impossibility of realist dialetheism because they are based on (...)
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  16.  64
    Manuel Bremer (2008). Why and How to Be a Dialetheist. Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):208-227.
    In the first part the paper rehearses the main arguments why to be a dialetheist (i.e. why to assume that some contradictions are true). Dialetheism, however, has been criticised as irrational or self-refutating. Therefore the second part of the paper outlines one way to make dialetheism rational assertable. True contradictions turn out to be both believable and assertable. The argument proceeds by setting out basic principles of assertion and denial, and employing bivalent truth value operators.
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  17.  18
    Constance Kassor (2013). Is Gorampa's "Freedom From Conceptual Proliferations" Dialetheist? Philosophy East and West 63 (3):399-410.
    This essay presents a critique of dialetheist readings of Madhyamaka based on the philosophy of the fifteenth-century Tibetan scholar, Gorampa Sonam Senge (Go rams pa bSod nams Seng ge) (1429-1489). In brief, dialetheism is the acceptance that in a logical system there can be at least some cases in which a statement and its negation are true; that is, it involves the acceptance of true contradictions. Jay Garfield and Graham Priest's "Nāgārjuna and the Limits of Thought" attempts to reconcile (...)
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  18. Greg Littman & Keith Simmons (2004). A Critique of Dialetheism. In G. Priest, J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Oxford University Press 1-226.
    This dissertation is a critical examination of dialetheism, the view that there are true contradictions. Dialetheism's proponents argue that adopting the view will allow us to solve hitherto unsolved problems, including the well-known logical paradoxes. ;Dialetheism faces three kinds of challenge. Challenges of the first kind put in doubt the intrinsic coherence of dialetheism. It can be claimed, for example, that it is incoherent for a claim to be both true and false; that claims known to (...)
     
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  19. Laurence Goldstein (1986). A Problem For The Dialetheist. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 15 (1):10-13.
    There has recently been revived logical interest, particularly in the context of attempts to solve the logico-semantical paradoxes, of the idea that there are true contracistions, and of semantics accomodating the glut value both true and false. By considering some generally accepted claims about assertion. I attempt to show that this dialetheist idea is untenable.
     
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  20. Conrad Amus (2012). Paraconsistency on the Rocks of Dialetheism. Logique Et Analyse 55 (217):3-21.
  21. Lorenzo Peña (1996). Graham Priest's «Dialetheism» -- Is It Althogether True? Sorites 7:28-56.
    Graham Priest's book In Contradiction is a bold defense of the existence of true contradictions. Although Priest's case is impressive, and many of his arguments are correct, his approach is not the only one allowing for true contradictions. As against Priest's, there is at least one contradictorialist approach which establishes a link between true contradictions and degrees of truth. All in all, such an alternative is more conservative, closer to mainstream analytical philosophy. The two approaches differ as regards the floodgate (...)
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  22.  69
    Graham Priest, Dialetheism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and (...)
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  23. Jc Beall & David Ripley (2004). Analetheism and Dialetheism. Analysis 64 (281):30–35.
  24. Jay Garfield & Graham Priest (2008). The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism. Philosophy East and West 58 (3):395 - 402.
    Anyone who is accustomed to the view that contradictions cannot be true, and cannot be accepted, and who reads texts in the Buddhists traditions will be struck by the fact that they frequently contain contradictions. Just consider, for example.
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  25.  99
    Francesco Berto (2006). Characterizing Negation to Face Dialetheism. Logique Et Analyse 49 (195):241-263.
  26.  51
    Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Garfield & Graham Priest (2008). The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism. Philosophy East and West 58 (3):395 - 402.
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  27. Frederick Kroon (2004). Realism and Dialetheism. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press
     
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  28.  46
    Bradley Armour-Garb (2005). Wrestling with (and Without) Dialetheism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):87 – 102.
  29.  25
    Brook Ziporyn (2013). A Comment on" The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism," by Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Garfield, and Graham Priest. Philosophy East and West 63 (3):344-352.
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  30.  12
    Richard Sylvan & Graham Priest (1988). Answering Another Alleged Dilemma Destroying Dialetheism. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 17 (1):42-48.
    To leave matters in no doubt, we obligingly assert that the Russell class R, i.e. {x : x 6∈ x}, both belongs to itself and also does not belong to itself; in short, we assert R ∈ R & ∼ . To be quite explicit, we assert the contradiction r & ∼ r, where r abbreviates R ∈ R. Thus, in convenient symbols, `δ r & ∼ r, where δ is the group of dialethicians comprising Priest and Routley. Now Goldstein (...)
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  31.  4
    J. Beall & D. Ripley (2004). Analetheism and Dialetheism. Analysis 64 (1):30-35.
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  32.  4
    B. Whittle (2004). Dialetheism, Logical Consequence and Hierarchy. Analysis 64 (4):318-326.
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  33.  3
    Graham Stevens (2008). Truthmaker-Dialetheism. Logique Et Analyse 51 (203):293-302.
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  34.  23
    Takashi Yagisawa (2013). THE Way OF THE MOdal REalisT: dialETHEisM aNd BUddHisT PHilOsOPHy. Philosophy East and West 63 (3):359-369.
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  35.  41
    Graham Priest (1990). Was Marx a Dialetheist? Science and Society 54 (4):468 - 475.
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  36. Vann McGee (2004). Ramsey's Dialetheism. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press
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  37. Neil Tennant (2004). An Anti-Realist Critique of Dialetheism. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press
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  38.  32
    Yasuo Deguchi Jay L. Garfield Graham Priest (2008). The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism. Philosophy East and West 58 (3):pp. 395-402.
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  39.  21
    Josh Parsons & Jon Cogburn (2005). Wrestling with (and Without) Dialetheism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):87 – 102.
    Neil Tennant and Joseph Salerno have recently attempted to rigorously formalize Michael Dummett's argument for logical revision. Surprisingly, both conclude that Dummett commits elementary logical errors, and hence fails to offer an argument that is even prima facie valid. After explicating the arguments Salerno and Tennant attribute to Dummett, I show how broader attention to Dummett's writings on the theory of meaning allows one to discern, and formalize, a valid argument for logical revision. Then, after correctly providing a rigorous statement (...)
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  40. Bradley Armour-Garb (2004). Diagnosing Dialetheism. In Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press 113--25.
     
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  41. Jon Cogburn (2004). The Philosophical Basis of What? The Anti-Realist Route to Dialetheism. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press
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  42. Edwin D. Mares (2004). Semantic Dialetheism. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press
     
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  43.  22
    Nicholas Denyer (1989). Dialetheism and Trivialization. Mind 98 (390):259-263.
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  44.  4
    J. C. Beall (2001). Dialetheism and the Probability of Contradictions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):114-118.
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  45. Uwe Petersen (1992). Dialetheism and Paradoxes of the Berry Family. Logique Et Analyse 35:273-89.
     
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  46. Silvia Gaio (2006). The Principle of Non Contradiction. The Debate on Dialetheism. Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 35 (1-2).
     
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  47. Francesco Berto (2008). Adynaton and Material Exclusion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):165 – 190.
    Philosophical dialetheism, whose main exponent is Graham Priest, claims that some contradictions hold, are true, and it is rational to accept and assert them. Such a position is naturally portrayed as a challenge to the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). But all the classic formulations of the LNC are, in a sense, not questioned by a typical dialetheist, since she is (cheerfully) required to accept them by her own theory. The goal of this paper is to develop a formulation of (...)
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  48.  35
    Marcus Rossberg (2013). Too Good to Be “Just True”. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-8.
    Paraconsistent and dialetheist approaches to a theory of truth are faced with a problem: the expressive resources of the logic do not suffice to express that a sentence is just true—i.e., true and not also false—or to express that a sentence is consistent. In his recent book, Spandrels of Truth, Jc Beall proposes a ‘just true’-operator to identify sentences that are true and not also false. Beall suggests seven principles that a ‘just true’-operator must fulfill, and proves that his operator (...)
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  49. David Ripley (2015). Embedding Denial. In Colin Caret & Ole Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford University Press 289-309.
    Suppose Alice asserts p, and the Caterpillar wants to disagree. If the Caterpillar accepts classical logic, he has an easy way to indicate this disagreement: he can simply assert ¬p. Sometimes, though, things are not so easy. For example, suppose the Cheshire Cat is a paracompletist who thinks that p ∨ ¬p fails (in familiar (if possibly misleading) language, the Cheshire Cat thinks p is a gap). Then he surely disagrees with Alice's assertion of p, but should himself be unwilling (...)
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  50. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2012). Liars, Truthtellers and Naysayers: A Broader View of Semantic Pathology I. Language and Communication 32 (4):293-311.
    Semantic pathology is most widely recognized in the liar paradox, where an apparent inconsistency arises in ‘‘liar sentences’’ and their ilk. But the phenomenon of semantic pathology also manifests a sibling symptom—an apparent indeterminacy—which, while not largely discussed (save for the occasional nod to ‘‘truthteller sentences’’), is just as pervasive as, and exactly parallels, the symptom of inconsistency. Moreover, certain ‘‘dual symptom’’ cases, which we call naysayers, exhibit both inconsistency and indeterminacy and also manifest a higher-order indeterminacy between them. In (...)
     
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