Search results for 'difference principle' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Zoltan Miklosi (2010). How Does the Difference Principle Make a Difference? Res Publica 16 (3):263-280.score: 240.0
    The paper examines the relationship between the two parts of Rawls’ second principle of justice. More specifically, it explores the ways in which the Difference Principle (DP) may constrain the range of acceptable social arrangements in light of the stated lexical priority of the requirement of fair equality of opportunity (FEO) over the DP. The paper discusses two possibilities. First, it examines the role the DP may play within an institutional scheme that satisfies the requirement of FEO. (...)
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  2. Attila Tanyi (2007). Rawls különbözeti elve (Rawls’ Difference Principle). Hungarian Review of Political Science (Politikatudomanyi Szemle) 16 (2):125-150.score: 240.0
    This paper deals with the third and most disputed principle of John Rawls’s theory of justice: the so-called difference principle. My reasoning has three parts. I first present and examine the principle. My investigation is driven by three questions: what considerations lead Rawls to the acceptance of the principle; what the principle’s relation to effectiveness is; and what and how much the principle demands. A proper understanding of the principle permits me to (...)
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  3. Jan Narveson (2014). Reiman on Labor, Value, and the Difference Principle. Journal of Ethics 18 (1):47-74.score: 240.0
    In As Free and as Just as Possible: The Theory of Marxian Liberalism, Jeffrey Reiman proposes to develop a theory of “Marxian Liberalism.” ‘Liberalism’ here is defined by the principle that “sane adult human beings should be free in the sense of free from coercion that would block their ability to act on the choices they make.” While the idea of coercion could use some glossing, it is not obvious that poverty, unemployment, racism, and sexism are as such coercive. (...)
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  4. Samuel Arnold (2011). The Difference Principle at Work. Journal of Political Philosophy 20 (1):94-118.score: 210.0
  5. Gillian Brock (2005). The Difference Principle, Equality of Opportunity, and Cosmopolitan Justice. Journal of Moral Philosophy 2 (3):333-351.score: 180.0
    What kinds of principles of justice should a cosmopolitan support? In recent years some have argued that a cosmopolitan should endorse a Global Difference Principle. It has also been suggested that a cosmopolitan should support a Principle of Global Equality of Opportunity. In this paper I examine how compelling these two suggestions are. I argue against a Global Difference Principle, but for an alternative Needs-Based Minimum Floor Principle (where these are not co-extensive, as I (...)
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  6. Luca Ferrero, The Difference Principle: Incentives or Equality?score: 180.0
    1.1.1 In a recent series of papers, G.A. Cohen has presented an egalitarian interpretation of the Difference Principle (hereafter, DP).1 According to this principle—first introduced by Rawls in A Theory of Justice2—inequalities in the distribution of primary goods3 are legitimate only to the extent that they maximize the prospects of the least advantaged members of society. Cohen argues that, once it is properly applied, DP does not legitimate any departure from equality. According to him, the distribution that (...)
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  7. Daniel Attas (2008). The Difference Principle and Time. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (2):209-232.score: 180.0
    Rawls's difference principle contains a certain normative ambiguity, so that opposing views, including strong inegalitarian ones, might find a home under it. The element that introduces this indeterminacy is the absence of an explicit reference to time . Thus, a society that agrees on the difference principle as the proper justification of basic political-economic institutions, might nevertheless disagree on whether their specific institutions are justified by that principle. Such disagreement would most often centre on issues (...)
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  8. Steven Wall (2003). Just Savings and the Difference Principle. Philosophical Studies 116 (1):79-102.score: 180.0
    The issue of just savings between generations presents an important,and for the most part unappreciated, problem for Rawls's theory ofdistributive justice. This paper argues that the just savingsprinciple, as Rawls formulates it in his recent work, standsin tension with the difference principle. When thought through,the just savings principle – and more precisely the foundationon which it rests – give us reason to reject the differenceprinciple in favor of a less egalitarian principle ofdistributive justice.
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  9. Allan F. Gibbard (1979). Disparate Goods and Rawls' Difference Principle: A Social Choice Theoretic Treatment. Theory and Decision 11 (3):267-288.score: 180.0
    Rawls' Difference Principle asserts that a basic economic structure is just if it makes the worst off people as well off as is feasible. How well off someone is is to be measured by an ‘index’ of ‘primary social goods’. It is this index that gives content to the principle, and Rawls gives no adequate directions for constructing it. In this essay a version of the difference principle is proposed that fits much of what Rawls (...)
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  10. Colin Farrelly (2004). The Genetic Difference Principle. American Journal of Bioethics 4 (2):21 – 28.score: 180.0
    In the newly emerging debates about genetics and justice three distinct principles have begun to emerge concerning what the distributive aim of genetic interventions should be. These principles are: genetic equality, a genetic decent minimum, and the genetic difference principle. In this paper, I examine the rationale of each of these principles and argue that genetic equality and a genetic decent minimum are ill-equipped to tackle what I call the currency problem and the problem of weight. The genetic (...)
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  11. Rupert Read (2011). The Difference Principle is Not Action-Guiding. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (4):487-503.score: 180.0
    Utilitarianism would allow any degree of inequality whatsoever productive of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But it does not guide political action, because determining what level of inequality would produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number is opaque due to well-known psychological coordination problems. Does Rawlsian liberalism, as is generally assumed, have some superiority to Utilitarianism in this regard? This paper argues not; for Rawls?s ?difference principle? would allow any degree of inequality whatsoever that best (...)
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  12. Lawrence Alexander (1984). Reiman's Libertarian Interpretation of Rawls' Difference Principle. Philosophy Research Archives 10:13-18.score: 180.0
    John Rawls’ Difference Principle, which requires that primary goods--income, wealth, and opportunities--be distributed so as to maximize the primary goods of the least advantaged class, has both a libertarian and a welfarist interpretation. The welfarist interpretation, which fits somewhat more easily with Rawls’ method for deriving principles of justice--rational contractors choosing principles behind the veil of ignorance--and with Rawls’ contention that there is a natural affirmative duty to aid others and to help establish and maintain just institutions, is (...)
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  13. Derek Bell (2004). Environmental Justice and Rawls' Difference Principle. Environmental Ethics 26 (3):287-306.score: 152.0
    It is widely acknowledged that low-income and minority communities in liberal democratic societies suffer a disproportionate burden of environmental hazards. Is “environmental injustice” a necessary feature of liberal societies or is its prevalence due to the failure of existing liberal democracies to live up to liberal principles of justice? One leading version of liberalism, John Rawls’ “justice as fairness,” can be “extended” to accommodate the concerns expressed by advocates of environmental justice. Moreover, Rawlsian environmental justice has some significant advantages over (...)
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  14. Paul Voice (1999). Rawls's Difference Principle and a Problem of Sacrifice. In Henry R. Richardson Paul J. Weithman (ed.), The Two Principles and their Justifications. 28-35.score: 152.0
  15. Alan H. Goldman (1976). Rawls's Original Position and the Difference Principle. Journal of Philosophy 73 (21):845-849.score: 150.0
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  16. Walter E. Schaller (1998). Rawls, the Difference Principle, and Economic Inequality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):368–391.score: 150.0
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  17. J. E. J. Altham (1973). Rawls's Difference Principle. Philosophy 48 (183):75 - 78.score: 150.0
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  18. Steven Strasnick (1976). Social Choice and the Derivation of Rawls's Difference Principle. Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):85-99.score: 150.0
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  19. D. W. Haslett (1985). Does the Difference Principle Really Favour the Worst Off? Mind 94 (373):111-115.score: 150.0
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  20. Christine Swanton (1981). Is the Difference Principle a Principle of Justice? Mind 90 (359):415-421.score: 150.0
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  21. Andrew D. Williams (1995). The Revisionist Difference Principle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):257 - 281.score: 150.0
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  22. Pat Shaw (1992). Rawls, the Lexical Difference Principle and Equality. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):71-77.score: 150.0
  23. Jeffrey H. Reiman (1983). The Labor Theory of the Difference Principle. Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (2):133-159.score: 150.0
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  24. David Copp (1974). Justice and the Difference Principle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):229 - 240.score: 150.0
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  25. Prakash P. Shenoy & Rex Martin (1983). Two Interpretations of the Difference Principle in Rawls's Theory of Justice. Theoria 49 (3):113-141.score: 150.0
  26. Robert Paul Wolff (1976). On Strasnick's "Derivation" of Rawls's "Difference Principle". Journal of Philosophy 73 (21):849-858.score: 150.0
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  27. Jeffrey Reiman (2014). Reply to Narveson, “Reiman on Labor, Value and the Difference Principle”. Journal of Ethics 18 (3):229-237.score: 150.0
    Jan Narveson (2014) presents a lengthy critique of my book, As Free and as Just as Possible: The Theory of Marxian Liberalism. Central to the disagreement between Narveson and myself is the Marxian notion, endorsed by me and rejected by Narveson, that private property is coercive, in particular, that capitalist ownership of productive resources coerces workers to work for capitalists. In As Free and as Just as Possible, I hold that people have a natural right to liberty understood as freedom (...)
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  28. Nollaig MacKenzie (1974). An Alternative Derivation of the Difference Principle. Dialogue 13 (04):787-793.score: 150.0
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  29. Christopher McMahon (1989). The Better Endowed and the Difference Principle. Analysis 49 (4):213 - 216.score: 150.0
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  30. Nollaig Mackenzie (1977). A Note on Rawls' ?Decision-Theoretic? Argument for the Difference Principle. Theory and Decision 8 (4):381-385.score: 150.0
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  31. Alison Hills, Christopher Mcmahon & Once More Friends (2003). Knowledge and Psychological Explanation 37–52 Sanford C. Goldberg/Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism 53–78 Steven Wall/Just Savings and the Difference Principle 79–102. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 116:325-326.score: 150.0
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  32. Mark R. Reiff (2012). The Difference Principle, Rising Inequality, and Supply-Side Economics: How Rawls Got Hijacked by the Right. Revue de Philosophie Économique 13 (2):119.score: 150.0
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  33. Daniel Attas (2009). A Trans-Generational Difference Principle. In Axel Gosseries & Lukas H. Meyer (eds.), Intergenerational Justice. Oup Oxford.score: 150.0
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  34. Tom L. Beauchamp (1980). Distributive Justice and the Difference Principle. In Gene Blocker & Elizabeth Smith (eds.), John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice. Ohio University Press. 132--161.score: 150.0
     
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  35. Marita Brčić (2010). The Difference Principle. The Key to a Just Democratic Society. Filozofska Istrazivanja 30 (1-2):61-78.score: 150.0
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  36. Richard Oxenberg (forthcoming). Locke and the Right to (Acquire) Property: A Lockean Argument for the Rawlsian Difference Principle. Social Philosophy Today.score: 150.0
     
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  37. R. Mohindra (2009). Positing a Difference Between Acts and Omissions: The Principle of Justice, Rachels' Cases and Moral Weakness. Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (5):293-299.score: 144.0
    The difficulty in discovering a difference between killing and letting die has led many philosophers to deny the distinction. This paper seeks to develop an argument defending the distinction between killing and letting die. In relation to Rachels’ cases, the argument is that (a) even accepting that Smith and Jones may select equally heinous options from the choices they have available to them, (b) the fact that the choices available to them are different is morally relevant, and (c) this (...)
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  38. Timothy Chappell (2002). Two Distinctions That Do Make a Difference: The Action/Omission Distinction and the Principle of Double Effect. Philosophy 77 (2):211-233.score: 126.0
    The paper outlines and explores a possible strategy for defending both the action/omission distinction (AOD) and the principle of double effect (PDE). The strategy is to argue that there are degrees of actionhood, and that we are in general less responsible for what has a lower degree of actionhood, because of that lower degree. Moreover, what we omit generally has a lower degree of actionhood than what we actively do, and what we do under known-but-not-intended descriptions generally has a (...)
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  39. R. Lance Factor (1982). The Principle of Singular Difference. Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):35-40.score: 120.0
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  40. Terrance King (forthcoming). Peirce's Principle of Continuity and the Difference Between Normative and Cognitive Knowledge. Semiotics:270-276.score: 120.0
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  41. Jason Brennan (2007). Rawls' Paradox. Constitutional Political Economy 18:287-299.score: 90.0
    Rawls’ theory of justice is paradoxical, for it requires a society to aim directly to maximize the basic goods received by the least advantaged even if directly aiming is self-defeating. Rawls’ reasons for rejecting capitalist systems commit him to holding that a society must not merely maximize the goods received by the least advantaged, but must do so via specific institutions. By Rawls’ own premises, in the long run directly aiming to satisfy the difference principle is contrary to (...)
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  42. Rodney G. Peffer, A Modified Rawlsian Theory of Social Justice: 'Justice as Fair Rights'.score: 90.0
    In my 1990 work – Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice – I argued for four modifications of Rawls’s principles of social justice and rendered a modified version of his theory in four principles, the first of which is the Basic Rights Principle demanding the protection of people’s security and subsistence rights. In both his Political Liberalism (1993) and Justice as Fairness (2001) Rawls explicitly refers to my version of his theory, clearly accepting three of my four proposed modifications but (...)
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  43. Robert S. Taylor (2011). Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness. Penn State University Press.score: 90.0
    With the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, John Rawls not only rejuvenated contemporary political philosophy but also defended a Kantian form of Enlightenment liberalism called “justice as fairness.” Enlightenment liberalism stresses the development and exercise of our capacity for autonomy, while Reformation liberalism emphasizes diversity and the toleration that encourages it. These two strands of liberalism are often mutually supporting, but they conflict in a surprising number of cases, whether over the accommodation of group difference, the (...)
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  44. Gillian Brock (2005). Egalitarianism, Ideals, and Cosmopolitan Justice. Philosophical Forum 36 (1):1–30.score: 90.0
    Cosmopolitans believe that all human beings have equal moral worth and that our responsibilities to others do not stop at borders. Various cosmopolitans offer different interpretations of how we should understand what is entailed by that equal moral worth and what responsibilities we have to each other in taking our equality seriously. Two suggestions are that a cosmopolitan should endorse a 'global difference principle' and a 'principle of global equality of opportunity'. In the first part of this (...)
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  45. Oliver Feeney (2006). Equality of Whom? A Genetic Perspective on Equality (of Opportunity). Res Publica 12 (4):357-383.score: 90.0
    Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity has been regularly discussed and criticized for being inadequate regarding natural inequalities. In so far as this egalitarian goal is sound, the purpose of the paper is to see how the prospect of radical genetic intervention might affect this particular inadequacy. I propose that, in a post-genetic setting, an appropriate response would be to extend the same rules regulating societal inequalities to a regulation of comparable genetic inequalities. I defend this stance against (...)
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  46. Douglas MacKay (2013). Incentive Inequalities and Talents: A Reply to Shiffrin. Philosophia 41 (2):521-526.score: 90.0
    In a recent article, Seana Valentine Shiffrin offers a distinctive egalitarian critique of the types of incentive inequalities that are permitted by John Rawls's difference principle. She argues that citizens of a well-ordered society, who publicly accept Rawls's two principles of justice and their justifications, may not demand incentives to employ their talents in productive ways since such demands are inconsistent with a major justification for the difference principle: the moral arbitrariness of talent. I argue that (...)
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  47. D. Clayton Hubin (1980). Minimizing Maximin. Philosophical Studies 37 (4):363 - 372.score: 90.0
    In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls provides several arguments contractors in the original position using maximin reasoning, which leads directly to the difference principle. These arguments are inadequate to support the claim that maximin reasoning is the uniquely rational approach to choice in the original position.
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  48. Sanja Petkovska (2011). Democracy and Politics of Difference: Through the Prism of Current Situation. Filozofija I Društvo 22 (3):95-119.score: 78.0
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  49. Brad Weslake (forthcoming). Difference-Making, Closure and Exclusion. In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Huw Price (eds.), Making a Difference. Oxford University Press.score: 72.0
    Consider the following causal exclusion principle: For all distinct properties F and F* such that F* supervenes on F, F and F* do not both cause a property G. Peter Menzies and Christian List have proven that it follows from a natural conception of causation as difference-making that this exclusion principle is not generally true. Rather, it turns out that whether the principle is true is a contingent matter. In addition, they have shown that in a (...)
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