Search results for 'dispositions' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Toby Handfield (2009). The Metaphysics of Dispositions and Causes. In , Dispositions and Causes. Clarendon Press. 1--30.score: 21.0
    This article gives a general overview of recent metaphysical work on dispositional properties and causal relations. It serves as an introduction to the edited volume, Dispositions and Causes.
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  2. Markus Schrenk (2010). Hic Rhodos, Hic Salta: From Reductionist Semantics to a Realist Ontology of Forceful Dispositions. In G. Damschen, K. Stueber & R. Schnepf (eds.), Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. De Gruyter.score: 21.0
    It is widely believed that at least two developments in the last third of the 20th century have given dispositionalism—the view that powers, capacities, potencies, etc. are irreducible real properties—new credibility: (i) the many counterexamples launched against reductive analyses of dispositional predicates in terms of counterfactual conditionals and (ii) a new anti-Humean faith in necessary connections in nature which, it is said, owes a lot to Kripke’s arguments surrounding metaphysical necessity. I aim to show in this paper that necessity is, (...)
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  3. David Lewis (1997). Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.score: 18.0
    Many years ago, C.B. Martin drew our attention to the possibility of ‘finkish’ dispositions: dispositions which, if put to the test would not be manifested, but rather would disappear. Thus if x if finkishly disposed to give response r to stimulus s, it is not so that if x were subjected to stimulus r, x would give response z; so finkish dispositions afford a counter‐example to the simplest conditional analysis of dispositions. Martin went on to suggest (...)
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  4. Andrea Guardo (2012). Rule-Following, Ideal Conditions and Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):195-209.score: 18.0
    This paper employs some outcomes (for the most part due to David Lewis) of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of dispositions to evaluate those dispositional analyses of meaning that make use of the concept of a disposition in ideal conditions. The first section of the paper explains why one may find appealing the notion of an ideal-condition dispositional analysis of meaning and argues that Saul Kripke’s well-known argument against such analyses is wanting. The second section focuses on Lewis’ (...)
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  5. Gabriele Contessa (2012). Do Extrinsic Dispositions Need Extrinsic Causal Bases? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):622-638.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I distinguish two often-conflated theses—the thesis that all dispositions are intrinsic properties and the thesis that the causal bases of all dispositions are intrinsic properties—and argue that the falsity of the former does not entail the falsity of the latter. In particular, I argue that extrinsic dispositions are a counterexample to first thesis but not necessarily to the second thesis, because an extrinsic disposition does not need to include any extrinsic property in its causal (...)
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  6. Toby Handfield (2008). Unfinkable Dispositions. Synthese 160 (2):297 - 308.score: 18.0
    This paper develops two ideas with respect to dispositional properties: (1) Adapting a suggestion of Sungho Choi, it appears the conceptual distinction between dispositional and categorical properties can be drawn in terms of susceptibility to finks and antidotes. Dispositional, but not categorical properties, are not susceptible to intrinsic finks, nor are they remediable by intrinsic antidotes. (2) If correct, this suggests the possibility that some dispositions—those which lack any causal basis—may be insusceptible to any fink or antidote. Since finks (...)
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  7. Corine Besson, Understanding the Logical Constants and Dispositions. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication (2010).score: 18.0
    Many philosophers claim that understanding a logical constant (e.g. ‘if, then’) fundamentally consists in having dispositions to infer according to the logical rules (e.g. Modus Ponens) that fix its meaning. This paper argues that such dispositionalist accounts give us the wrong picture of what understanding a logical constant consists in. The objection here is that they give an account of understanding a logical constant which is inconsistent with what seem to be adequate manifestations of such understanding. I then outline (...)
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  8. Toby Handfield & Alexander Bird (2008). Dispositions, Rules, and Finks. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):285 - 298.score: 18.0
    This paper discusses the prospects of a dispositional solution to the Kripke–Wittgenstein rule-following puzzle. Recent attempts to employ dispositional approaches to this puzzle have appealed to the ideas of finks and antidotes—interfering dispositions and conditions—to explain why the rule-following disposition is not always manifested. We argue that this approach fails: agents cannot be supposed to have straightforward dispositions to follow a rule which are in some fashion masked by other, contrary dispositions of the agent, because in all (...)
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  9. Tyler Hildebrand (2014). Can Bare Dispositions Explain Categorical Regularities? Philosophical Studies 167 (3):569-584.score: 18.0
    One of the traditional desiderata for a metaphysical theory of laws of nature is that it be able to explain natural regularities. Some philosophers have postulated governing laws to fill this explanatory role. Recently, however, many have attempted to explain natural regularities without appealing to governing laws. Suppose that some fundamental properties are bare dispositions. In virtue of their dispositional nature, these properties must be (or are likely to be) distributed in regular patterns. Thus it would appear that an (...)
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  10. J. McKitrick (2003). A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):155 – 174.score: 18.0
    Many philosophers think that dispositions are necessarily intrinsic. However, there are no good positive arguments for this view. Furthermore, many properties (such as weight, visibility, and vulnerability) are dispositional but are not necessarily shared by perfect duplicates. So, some dispositions are extrinsic. I consider three main objections to the possibility of extrinsic dispositions: the Objection from Relationally Specified Properties, the Objection from Underlying Intrinsic Properties, and the Objection from Natural Properties. These objections ultimately fail.
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  11. James Franklin (1986). Are Dispositions Reducible to Categorical Properties? Philosophical Quarterly 36 (142):62-64.score: 18.0
    Dispostions, such as solubility, cannont be reduced to categorical properties, such as molecular structure, without some element of dipositionaity remaining. Democritus did not reduce all properties to the geometry of atoms - he had to retain the rigidity of the atoms, that is, their disposition not to change shape when a force is applied. So dispositions-not-to, like rigidity, cannot be eliminated. Neither can dispositions-to, like solubility.
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  12. Luke Robinson (2011). Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):289-309.score: 18.0
    What are moral principles? In particular, what are moral principles of the sort that (if they exist) ground moral obligations or—at the very least—particular moral truths? I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of such principles as real, irreducibly dispositional properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and actions. Such moral dispositions (or moral powers) are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations and of (...)
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  13. Sungho Choi (2010). Dispositions and Bogus Counterexamples: Reply to Lee. [REVIEW] Philosophia 38 (3):579-588.score: 18.0
    This paper discusses Lee’s argument that Lewis’s reformed conditional analysis of dispositions is preferable to the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. Lee’s argument is basically that there are some examples that can be adequately handled by Lewis’s analysis but cannot by the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. But I will reveal that, when carefully understood, they spell no trouble for the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, failing to serve a motivating role for Lewis’s analysis.
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  14. Justin C. Fisher (2013). Dispositions, Conditionals and Auspicious Circumstances. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):443-464.score: 18.0
    A number of authors have suggested that a conditional analysis of dispositions must take roughly the following form: Thing X is disposed to produce response R to stimulus S just in case, if X were exposed to S and surrounding circumstances were auspicious, then X would produce R. The great challenge is cashing out the relevant notion of ‘auspicious circumstances’. I give a general argument which entails that all existing conditional analyses fail, and that there is no satisfactory way (...)
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  15. D. Manley & R. Wasserman (2012). Dispositions, Conditionals, and Counterexamples. Mind 120 (480):1191-1227.score: 18.0
    In an earlier paper in these pages (2008), we explored the puzzling link between dispositions and conditionals. First, we rehearsed the standard counterexamples to the simple conditional analysis and the refined conditional analysis defended by David Lewis. Second, we attacked a tempting response to these counterexamples: what we called the ‘getting specific strategy’. Third, we presented a series of structural considerations that pose problems for many attempts to understand the link between dispositions and conditionals. Finally, we developed our (...)
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  16. Jason Bridges (2011). Dispositions and Rational Explanation. In Jason Bridges Niko Kolodny & Wai-Hung Wong (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Some philosophers hold that rational explanations­—explanations of people’s attitudes and actions that cite their reasons for forming these attitudes or performing these actions—are dispositional. The hold that rational explanations do their explanatory work by representing these attitudes and actions as the product of dispositions on the part of the subject. I challenge arguments to this effect by Barry Stroud and Michael Smith. And I argue that human beings do not possess, and could not possess, the dispositions required for (...)
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  17. A. Bird & T. Handfield (2008). Dispositions, Rules and Finks. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):285-98.score: 18.0
    This paper discusses the prospects of a dispositional solution to the Kripke-Wittgenstein rule-following puzzle. Recent attempts to repair dispositional approaches to this puzzle have appealed to the ideas of finks and antidotes - interfering dispositions and conditions - to explain why the rule-following disposition is not always manifested. We argue that this approach fails: agents cannot be supposed to have straightforward dispositions to follow a rule which are in some fashion masked by other, contrary dispositions of the (...)
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  18. Tomasz Bigaj (2012). Ungrounded Dispositions in Quantum Mechanics. Foundations of Science 17 (3):205-221.score: 18.0
    General metaphysical arguments have been proposed in favour of the thesis that all dispositions have categorical bases (Armstrong; Prior, Pargetter, Jackson). These arguments have been countered by equally general arguments in support of ungrounded dispositions (Molnar, Mumford). I believe that this controversy cannot be settled purely on the level of abstract metaphysical considerations. Instead, I propose to look for ungrounded dispositions in specific physical theories, such as quantum mechanics. I explain why non-classical properties such as spin are (...)
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  19. Jan Hauska (2008). Dispositions and Normal Conditions. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):219 - 232.score: 18.0
    It is agreed on all hands that the original version of the conditional analysis of dispositions is defeated by so-called finks and maskers. Some have responded to this predicament by contending that the counterfactual on the right-hand side of the analysis should be expected to hold only when the property it purports to describe is in normal conditions. The essay argues that at the end of the day this idea must presuppose that one is able to arrive at specific (...)
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  20. Preston J. Werner (2013). Seemings: Still Dispositions to Believe. Synthese:1-14.score: 18.0
    According to phenomenal conservatism, seemings can provide prima facie justification for beliefs. In order to fully assess phenomenal conservatism, it is important to understand the nature of seemings. Two views are that (SG) seemings are a sui generis propositional attitude, and that (D2B) seemings are nothing over and above dispositions to believe. Proponents of (SG) reject (D2B) in large part by providing four distinct objections against (D2B). First, seemings have a distinctive phenomenology, but dispositions to believe do not. (...)
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  21. Felipe Romero & Carl F. Craver (forthcoming). Dispositions. In The Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 18.0
    It is common in psychiatry and other sciences to describe an individual or a type of individual in terms of its disposition to manifest specific effects in a particular range of circumstances. According to one understanding, dispositions are statistical regularities of an individual or type of individual in specific circumstances. According to another understanding, dispositions are properties of individuals in virtue of which such regularities hold. This entry considers a number of ways of making each of these senses (...)
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  22. Victor P. Lau & Yin Yee Wong (2009). Direct and Multiplicative Effects of Ethical Dispositions and Ethical Climates on Personal Justice Norms: A Virtue Ethics Perspective. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 90 (2):279 - 294.score: 18.0
    From virtue ethics and interactionist perspectives, we hypothesized that personal justice norms (distributive and procedural justice norms) were shaped directly and multiplicatively by ethical dispositions (equity sensitivity and need for structure) and ethical climates (egoistic, benevolent, and principle climates). We collected multisource data from 123 companies in Hong Kong, with personal factors assessed by participants’ self-reports and contextual factors by aggregations of their peers. In general, LISREL analyses with latent product variables supported the direct and multiplicative relationships. Our findings (...)
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  23. James Franklin (1988). Reply to Armstrong on Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):86-87.score: 18.0
    Defends the arguments for the irredicibility of dispositions to categorical properties in "Are dispositions reducible to categorical properties?" (Philosophical Quarterly 36, 1986) against the criticisms of D.M. Armstrong (Philosophical Quarterly 38, 1988).
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  24. William A. Bauer (2012). Four Theories of Pure Dispositions. In Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers, and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge. 139-162.score: 18.0
    The dispositional properties encountered in everyday experience seem to have causal bases in other properties, e.g., the microstructure of a vase is the causal basis of its fragility. In contrast, the Pure Dispositions Thesis maintains that some dispositions require no causal basis. This thesis faces the Problem of Being: without a causal basis, there appears to be no grounds for the existence of pure dispositions. This paper establishes criteria for evaluating the problem, critically examines four theories of (...)
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  25. Albert Goldfain, Barry Smith & Lindsay Cowell (2010). Dispositions and the Infectious Disease Ontology. In Formal Ontology in Information Systems. Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference (FOIS 2010). IOS Press.score: 18.0
    This paper addresses the use of dispositions in the Infectious Disease Ontology (IDO). IDO is an ontology constructed according to the principles of the Open Biomedical Ontology (OBO) Foundry and uses the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) as an upper ontology. After providing a brief introduction to disposition types in BFO and IDO, we discuss three general techniques for representing combinations of dispositions under the headings blocking dispositions, complementary dispositions, and collective dispositions. Motivating examples for each (...)
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  26. Gabriele Contessa (2013). Dispositions and Interferences. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):401-419.score: 16.0
    The Simple Counterfactual Analysis (SCA) was once considered the most promising analysis of disposition ascriptions. According to SCA, disposition ascriptions are to be analyzed in terms of counterfactual conditionals. In the last few decades, however, SCA has become the target of a battery of counterexamples. In all counterexamples, something seems to be interfering with a certain object’s having or not having a certain disposition thus making the truth-values of the disposition ascription and of its associated counterfactual come apart. Intuitively, however, (...)
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  27. Toby Handfield (ed.) (2009). Dispositions and Causes. Clarendon Press.score: 16.0
    In recent decades, the analysis of causal relations has become a topic of central importance in analytic philosophy. More recently, dispositional properties have also become objects of intense study. Both of these phenomena appear to be intimately related to counterfactual conditionals and other modal phenomena such as objective chance, but little work has been done to directly relate them. This collection contains ten essays by scholars working in both metaphysics and in philosophy of science, examining the relation between dispositional and (...)
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  28. Ludger Jansen (2007). Dispositions, Laws, and Categories. Metaphysica 8 (2):211-220.score: 16.0
    After a short sketch of Lowe’s account of his four basic categories, I discuss his theory of formal ontological relations and how Lowe wants to account for dispositional predications. I argue that on the ontic level Lowe is a pan-categoricalist, while he is a language dualist and an exemplification dualist with regard to the dispositional/categorical distinction. I argue that Lowe does not present an adequate account of disposition. From an Aristotelian point of view, Lowe conflates dispositional predication with hôs epi (...)
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  29. Rachael Briggs & Daniel Nolan (2012). Epistemic Dispositions. Logos and Episteme 3 (4):629-636.score: 15.0
  30. C. B. Martin (1994). Dispositions and Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.score: 15.0
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  31. Troy Cross (2012). Recent Work on Dispositions. Analysis 72 (1):115-124.score: 15.0
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  32. Joel Katzav (2013). Dispositions, Causes, Persistence As Is, and General Relativity. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):41 - 57.score: 15.0
    I argue that, on a dispositionalist account of causation and indeed on any other view of causation according to which causation is a real relation, general relativity (GR) does not give causal principles a role in explaining phenomena. In doing so, I bring out a surprisingly substantial constraint on adequate views about the explanations and ontology of GR, namely the requirement that such views show how GR can explain motion that is free of disturbing influences.
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  33. Wilfrid Sellars (1957). Counterfactuals, Dispositions, and the Causal Modalities. In Herbert Feigl Michael Scriven & Grover Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in The Philosophy of Science, Vol. II. University of Minnesota Press.score: 15.0
    [p.225] Introduction (i) Although the following essay attempts to deal in a connected way with a number of connected conceptual tangles, it is by no means monolithic in design. It divides roughly in two, with the first half (Parts I and II) devoted to certain puzzles which have their source in a misunderstanding of the more specific structure of the language in which we describe and explain natural phenomena; while the second half (Parts III and IV) attempts to resolve the (...)
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  34. Nicky Kroll (2012). Events in Progress, Dispositions, and Teleology. Dissertation, Yale Universityscore: 15.0
  35. Andreas Hüttemann (2007). Causation, Laws and Dispositions. In Max Kistler & Bruno Gnassounou (eds.), Dispositions and Causal Powers. Ashgate.score: 15.0
    In this paper I take a look at what I take to be the best argument for dispositions. According to this argument we need dispositions in order to understand certain features of scientific practice. I point out that these dispositions have to be continuously manifestable. Furthermore I will argue that dispositions are not the causes of their manifestations. However, dispositions and causation are closely connected. What it is to be a cause can best be understood (...)
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  36. D. H. Mellor (1974). In Defense of Dispositions. Philosophical Review 83 (2):157-181.score: 15.0
  37. Andreas Hüttemann (2009). Dispositions in Physics. In Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf & Karsten Stueber (eds.), Debating Dispositions. De Gruyter.score: 15.0
    I will argue firstly that law-statements should be understood as attributing dispositional properties. Second, the dispositions I am talking about should not be conceived as causes of their manifestations but rather as contributors to the behavior of compound systems. And finally I will defend the claim that dispositional properties cannot be reduced in any straightforward sense to non-dispositional (categorical) properties and that they need no categorical bases in the first place.
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  38. Janna Hastings, Werner Ceusters, Barry Smith & Kevin Mulligan (2011). Dispositions and Processes in the Emotion Ontology. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Biomedical Ontology. CEUR Workshop Proceedings, 833.score: 15.0
    Affective science conducts interdisciplinary research into the emotions and other affective phenomena. Currently, such research is hampered by the lack of common definitions of te rms used to describe, categorise and report both individual emotional experiences and the results of scientific investigations of such experiences. High quality ontologies provide formal definitions for types of entities in reality and for the relationships between such entities, definitions which can be used to disambiguate and unify data across different disciplines. Heretofore, there has been (...)
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  39. Alexander Rosenberg (1984). Mackie and Shoemaker on Dispositions and Properties. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 76 (1):77-91.score: 15.0
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  40. Jennifer McKitrick (2009). Dispositions, Causes, and Reduction. In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.score: 15.0
    Dispositionality and causation are both modal concepts which have implications not just for how things are, but for how they will be or, in some sense, must be. Some philosophers are suspicious of modal concepts and would like to make do with fewer of them.1 But what are our reductive options, and how viable are they? In this paper, I try to shut down one option: I argue that dispositions are not reducible to causes. In doing so, I try (...)
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  41. Sungho Choi (2003). The Simple Conditional Analysis of Dispositions. Unpublished Article.score: 15.0
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  42. Frederick R. Fosmire & W. Lynn Brown (1951). The Effect of Training Procedures on the Relative Strength of Place and Direction Dispositions. Journal of Experimental Psychology 41 (6):450.score: 15.0
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  43. Randolph Clarke (2009). Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism. Mind 118 (470):323-351.score: 14.0
    This paper examines recent attempts to revive a classic compatibilist position on free will, according to which having an ability to perform a certain action is having a certain disposition. Since having unmanifested dispositions is compatible with determinism, having unexercised abilities to act, it is held, is likewise compatible. Here it is argued that although there is a kind of capacity to act possession of which is a matter of having a disposition, the new dispositionalism leaves unresolved the main (...)
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  44. Jesse R. Steinberg (2010). Dispositions and Subjunctives. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):323 - 341.score: 14.0
    It is generally agreed that dispositions cannot be analyzed in terms of simple subjunctive conditionals (because of what are called “masked dispositions” and “finkish dispositions”). I here defend a qualified subjunctive account of dispositions according to which an object is disposed to Φ when conditions C obtain if and only if, if conditions C were to obtain, then the object would Φ ceteris paribus . I argue that this account does not fall prey to the objections (...)
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  45. Josefa Toribio (1999). Meaning, Dispositions, and Normativity. Minds and Machines 9 (3):399-413.score: 14.0
    In a recent paper, Paul Coates defends a sophisticated dispositional account which allegedly resolves the sceptical paradox developed by Kripke in his monograph on Wittgenstein's treatment of following a rule (Kripke, 1982). Coates' account appeals to a notion of 'homeostasis', unpacked as a subject's second-order disposition to maintain a consistent pattern of extended first-order dispositions regarding her linguistic behavior. This kind of account, Coates contends, provides a naturalistic model for the normativity of intentional properties and thus resolves Kripke's sceptical (...)
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  46. Jan Hauska (2009). Dispositions Unmasked. Theoria 75 (4):304-335.score: 14.0
    The problem of masking is widely regarded as a grave threat to the conditional analysis of dispositions. Unlike the difficulty arising in connection with finkish situations, the problem does not involve the (dis)appearance of a disposition upon the arrival of its activating conditions. Consequently, some promising responses to the finkish cases, in particular David Lewis's reformed analysis, are ill-equipped to deal with masks. I contend that the difficulty posed by masks can be surmounted by supplementing the counterfactual at the (...)
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  47. D. M. Armstrong (1996). Dispositions: A Debate. Routledge.score: 14.0
    Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. IDispositions: A Debate is an extended dialogue between three distinguished philosophers - D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place - on the many problems associated with dispositions, which reveals their own distinctive accounts of the nature of dispositions. These are then linked to other issues such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws (...)
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  48. Robert D. Rupert (2000). Dispositions Indisposed: Semantic Atomism and Fodor's Theory of Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):325-349.score: 14.0
    According to Jerry Fodor’s atomistic theory of content, subjects’ dispositions to token mentalese terms in counterfactual circumstances fix the contents of those terms. I argue that the pattern of counterfactual tokenings alone does not satisfactorily fix content; if Fodor’s appeal to patterns of counterfactual tokenings has any chance of assigning correct extensions, Fodor must take into account the contents of subjects’ various mental states at the times of those tokenings. However, to do so, Fodor must abandon his semantic atomism. (...)
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  49. Jean Porter (2013). Dispositions of the Will. Philosophia 41 (2):289-300.score: 14.0
    According to Aquinas (1888–1906), the virtue of justice is a habit, that is to say, a stable disposition of the will. Many commentators have found this claim to be puzzling, since it is difficult to see what this might entail, beyond a simple tendency to choose and act in accordance with precepts of justice. However, this objection does not take account of the fact that for Aquinas, the will is the principle of human freedom, and as such, it is expressed (...)
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  50. Stephen Mumford (1994). Dispositions. Cogito 8 (2):141-146.score: 14.0
    Mumford puts forward a new theory of dispositions, showing how central their role in metaphysics and philosophy of science is. Much of our understanding of the physical and psychological world is expressed in terms of dispositional properties--from the spin of a sub-atomic particle to the solubility of sugar. Mumford discusses what it means to say that something has a property of this kind and how dispositions can possibly be real things in the world.
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