Search results for 'disquotational theory of truth' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  34
    Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1993). The Disquotational Theory of Truth is False. Philosophia 22 (3-4):331-339.
    It is argued that if there are truth-value gaps then the disquotational theory of truth is false. Secondly, it is argued that the same conclusion can be reached even without the assumption that there are truth-value gaps.
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  2.  11
    Thomas Schindler (2015). A Disquotational Theory of Truth as Strong as Z 2 −. Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (4):395-410.
    T-biconditionals have often been regarded as insufficient as axioms for truth. This verdict is based on Tarski’s observation that the typed T-sentences suffer from deductive weakness. As indicated by McGee, the situation might change radically if we consider type-free disquotational theories of truth. However, finding a well-motivated set of untyped T-biconditionals that is consistent and recursively enumerable has proven to be very difficult. Moreover, some authors ) have argued that any solution to the semantic paradoxes necessarily involves (...)
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  3.  45
    Hilary Putnam (1991). Does the Disquotational Theory of Truth Solve All Philosophical Problems? In Metaphilosophy. 264--78.
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  4. Jay Newhard (2002). A Correspondence Theory of Truth. Dissertation, Brown University
    The aim of this dissertation is to offer and defend a correspondence theory of truth. I begin by critically examining the coherence, pragmatic, simple, redundancy, disquotational, minimal, and prosentential theories of truth. Special attention is paid to several versions of disquotationalism, whose plausibility has led to its fairly constant support since the pioneering work of Alfred Tarski, through that by W. V. Quine, and recently in the work of Paul Horwich. I argue that none of these (...)
     
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  5.  8
    Lorenzo Rossi (forthcoming). Adding a Conditional to Kripke’s Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-45.
    Kripke’s theory of truth, 690–716; 1975) has been very successful but shows well-known expressive difficulties; recently, Field has proposed to overcome them by adding a new conditional connective to it. In Field’s theories, desirable conditional and truth-theoretic principles are validated that Kripke’s theory does not yield. Some authors, however, are dissatisfied with certain aspects of Field’s theories, in particular the high complexity. I analyze Field’s models and pin down some reasons for discontent with them, focusing on (...)
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  6.  24
    Rinat M. Nugayev (2014). Coherent Theory of Truth and Its Forerunners. In Vladimir G. Kuznetzov & Alexandre A. Pechenkin (eds.), Science,Philosophy and Humanities. Moscow State University 44-66.
    Arguments pro and contra convergent realism - underdetermination of theory by observational evidence and pessimistic meta-induction from past falsity- are considered. It is argued that, to meet the counter-arguments challenge, convergent realism should be considerably changed with a help of modification of the propositions from this meta-programme’s “hard core” and “protecting belt”. Maybe one of the ways out is to turn to the coherent theory of truth. Some of the works of Hegel (as interpreted by Merab Mamardashvili (...)
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  7.  78
    Brian Ribeiro (2011). A Really Short Refutation of the Pragmatic Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:31-34.
    The pragmatic theory of truth (PTT) seeks to illuminate the concept of truth by focusing on concepts like usefulness or adaptivity. However, contrary to common opinion, PTT does not merely face a narrow band of (perhaps) rather artificial counterexamples (as in a case of empirically unfounded but life-extending optimism in a cancer patient); instead, PTT is faced with a fast psychological research literature which suggests that inaccurate beliefs are both (1) pervasive in human beings and, nonetheless, (2) (...)
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  8.  67
    Leon Horsten (2006). Axiomatizing Kripke's Theory of Truth. Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (2):677 - 712.
    We investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense: only the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to (...)
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  9.  39
    Colin Johnston (2013). Judgment and the Identity Theory of Truth. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):381-397.
    The identity theory of truth takes on different forms depending on whether it is combined with a dual relation or a multiple relation theory of judgment. This paper argues that there are two significant problems for the dual relation identity theorist regarding thought’s answerability to reality, neither of which takes a grip on the multiple relation identity theory.
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  10.  30
    Benedikt Löwe & Philip D. Welch (2001). Set-Theoretic Absoluteness and the Revision Theory of Truth. Studia Logica 68 (1):21-41.
    We describe the solution of the Limit Rule Problem of Revision Theory and discuss the philosophical consequences of the fact that the truth set of Revision Theory is a complete 1/2 set.
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  11.  33
    P. Schlenker (2007). The Elimination of Self-Reference: Generalized Yablo-Series and the Theory of Truth. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (3):251 - 307.
    Although it was traditionally thought that self-reference is a crucial ingredient of semantic paradoxes, Yablo (1993, 2004) showed that this was not so by displaying an infinite series of sentences none of which is self-referential but which, taken together, are paradoxical. Yablo's paradox consists of a countable series of linearly ordered sentences s(0), s(1), s(2),... , where each s(i) says: For each k > i, s(k) is false (or equivalently: For no k > i is s(k) true). We generalize Yablo's (...)
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  12.  28
    A. Gupta & N. Belnap (1993). The Revision Theory of Truth. MIT Press.
    In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological..
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  13. Saul A. Kripke (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
    A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truth-value gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences.
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  14.  53
    Julian Dodd (2000). An Identity Theory of Truth. St. Martin's Press.
    This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation that holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true they are merely true thoughts. According to Julian Dodd, the resulting modest identity theory, while not defining truth, correctly diagnoses the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby prepares the ground for a defensible deflation of the concept of truth.
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  15.  48
    Nuel D. Belnap (1982). Gupta's Rule of Revision Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.
    Gupta’s Rule of Revision theory of truth builds on insights to be found in Martin and Woodruff and Kripke in order to permanently deepen our understanding of truth, of paradox, and of how we work our language while our language is working us. His concept of a predicate deriving its meaning by way of a Rule of Revision ought to impact significantly on the philosophy of language. Still, fortunately, he has left me something to.
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  16.  74
    Andrew Newman (2002). The Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication. Cambridge University Press.
    This work presents a version of the correspondence theory of truth based on Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Russell's theory of truth and discusses related metaphysical issues such as predication, facts, and propositions. Like Russell and one prominent interpretation of the Tractatus it assumes a realist view of universals. Part of the aim is to avoid Platonic propositions, and although sympathy with facts is maintained in the early chapters, the book argues that facts as real entities are not (...)
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  17. Ricardo Roque Pascual (1940). Logical Analysis of Fictionalism with Respect to the Theory of Truth. [Manila, P.I..
     
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  18.  37
    Ernesto Perini-Santos (2011). John Buridan's Theory of Truth and the Paradox of the Liar. Vivarium 49 (1-3):184-213.
    The solution John Buridan offers for the Paradox of the Liar has not been correctly placed within the framework of his philosophy of language. More precisely, there are two important points of the Buridanian philosophy of language that are crucial to the correct understanding of his solution to the Liar paradox that are either misrepresented or ignored in some important accounts of his theory. The first point is that the Aristotelian formula, ` propositio est vera quia qualitercumque significat in (...)
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  19.  86
    Marian David (1994). Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth. Oxford University Press.
    Marian David defends the correspondence theory of truth against the disquotational theory of truth, its current major rival. The correspondence theory asserts that truth is a philosophically rich and profound notion in need of serious explanation. Disquotationalists offer a radically deflationary account inspired by Tarski and propagated by Quine and others. They reject the correspondence theory, insist truth is anemic, and advance an "anti-theory" of truth that is essentially a (...)
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  20. James O. Young (2002). The Slingshot Argument and the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Acta Analytica 17 (2):121-132.
    The correspondence theory of truth holds that each true sentence corresponds to a discrete fact. Donald Davidson and others have argued (using an argument that has come to be known as the slingshot) that this theory is mistaken, since all true sentences correspond to the same “Great Fact.” The argument is designed to show that by substituting logically equivalent sentences and coreferring terms for each other in the context of sentences of the form ‘P corresponds to the (...)
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  21. Tristan Haze (2015). Two New Counterexamples to the Truth-Tracking Theory of Knowledge. Logos and Episteme (3):309-311.
    I present two counterexamples to the recently back-in-favour truth-tracking account of knowledge: one involving a true belief resting on a counterfactually robust delusion, one involving a true belief acquired alongside a bunch of false beliefs. These counterexamples carry over to a recent modification of the theory due to Briggs and Nolan (2012), and seem invulnerable to a recent defence of the theory against known counterexamples, by Adams and Clarke (2005).
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  22.  14
    Richard G. Heck (2015). Consistency and the Theory of Truth. Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):424-466.
    This paper attempts to address the question what logical strength theories of truth have by considering such questions as: If you take a theory T and add a theory of truth to it, how strong is the resulting theory, as compared to T? Once the question has been properly formulated, the answer turns out to be about as elegant as one could want: Adding a theory of truth to a finitely axiomatized theory (...)
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  23.  32
    Lorenz B. Puntel (1999). On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth: The Fundamental Problem and a New Perspective. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (1):101-130.
    The present article purports to show that the protocol sentence debate, pursued by some leading members of the Vienna Circle in the mid-1930s, was essentially a controversy over the explanation and the real significance of the concept of truth. It is further shown that the fundamental issue underlying the discussions about the concept of truth was the relationship between form and content, as well as between logic/language and the world. R. Carnap was the philosopher who most explicitly and (...)
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  24.  51
    Jamin Asay (2013). The Primitivist Theory of Truth. Cambridge University Press.
    Jamin Asay's book offers a fresh and daring perspective on the age-old question 'What is truth?', with a comprehensive articulation and defence of primitivism, the view that truth is a fundamental and indefinable concept. Often associated with Frege and the early Russell and Moore, primitivism has been largely absent from the larger conversation surrounding the nature of truth. Asay defends primitivism by drawing on a range of arguments from metaphysics, philosophy of language and philosophy of logic, and (...)
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  25.  76
    Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten (2006). Axiomatizing Kripke's Theory of Truth. Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (2):677 - 712.
    We investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense: only the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to (...)
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  26.  41
    James R. Beebe, Prosentential Theory of Truth. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Prosentential theorists claim that sentences such as “That’s true” are prosentences that function analogously to their better known cousins–pronouns. For example, just as we might use the pronoun ‘he’ in place of ‘James’ to transform “James went to the supermarket” into “He went to the supermarket,” so we might use the prosentenceforming operator ‘is true’ to transform “Snow is white” into “‘Snow is white’ is true.” According to the prosentential theory of truth, whenever a referring expression (for example, (...)
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  27. Glen Hoffmann (2010). The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.
    Minimalism is currently the received deflationary theory of truth. On minimalism, truth is a transparent concept and a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I situate minimalism within current deflationary debate about truth by contrasting it with its main alternative―the redundancy theory of truth. I also outline three of the primary challenges facing minimalism, its formulation, explanatory adequacy and stability, and draw some lessons for the soundness of its conception of (...). (shrink)
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  28. Dale Dorsey (2006). A Coherence Theory of Truth in Ethics. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):493 - 523.
    Quine argues, in “On the Nature of Moral Values” that a coherence theory of truth is the “lot of ethics”. In this paper, I do a bit of work from within Quinean theory. Specifically, I explore precisely what a coherence theory of truth in ethics might look like and what it might imply for the study of normative value theory generally. The first section of the paper is dedicated (...)
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  29. Otavio Bueno & Steven French (2005). A Coherence Theory of Truth. Manuscrito 28 (2):263-290.
    In this paper, we provide a new formulation of a coherence theory of truth using the resources of the partial structures approach -— in particular the notions of partial structure and quasi-truth. After developing this new formulation, we apply the resulting theory to the philosophy of mathematics, and argue that it can be used to develop a new account of nominalism in mathematics. This application illustrates the strength and usefulness of the proposed formulation of a coherence (...)
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  30. D. Patterson (2003). What is a Correspondence Theory of Truth? Synthese 137 (3):421 - 444.
    It is often thought that instances of the T-schema such as snow is white is true if and only if snow is white state correspondences between sentences andthe world, and that therefore such sentences play a crucial role in correspondence theories oftruth. I argue that this assumption trivializes the correspondence theory: even a disquotationaltheory of truth would be a correspondence theory on this conception. This discussionallows one to get clearer about what a correspondence theory does claim, (...)
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  31. Bella K. Milmed (1956). Lewis and the Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 53 (19):569-583.
    C i lewis, regarding himself as a pragmatist, repeatedly attempts to identify truth with verification. it is here argued, however, that a correspondence or semantic theory is required by (1) lewis's interpretation of objective judgments in terms of "possible experience" and of possible experience in terms of counterfactual conditions; (2) his distinction between the justification of knowledge and the truth of knowledge; and (3) his logical analysis of truth in terms of the extension (known or unknown) (...)
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  32. Joshua Rasmussen (2014). Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Cambridge University Press.
    The correspondence theory of truth is a precise and innovative account of how the truth of a proposition depends upon that proposition's connection to a piece of reality. Joshua Rasmussen refines and defends the correspondence theory of truth, proposing new accounts of facts, propositions, and the correspondence between them. With these theories in hand, he then offers original solutions to the toughest objections facing correspondence theorists. Addressing the Problem of Funny Facts, Liar Paradoxes, and traditional (...)
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  33. Richard Creath (1998). Quine and the Limit Assumption in Peirce's Theory of Truth. Philosophical Studies 90 (2):109-112.
    Quine rejects Peirce's theory of truth because, among other things, its notion of a limit of a sequence of theories is defective in that the notion of a limit depends on that of nearer than which is defined for numbers but not for theories. This paper shows that the missing definition of nearer than applied to theories can be supplied from within Quine's own epistemology. The upshot is that either Quine's epistemology must be rejected or Peirce's pragmatic (...) of truth is partially vindicated. (shrink)
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  34. Glen Hoffmann (2007). The Semantic Theory of Truth: Field's Incompleteness Objection. Philosophia 35 (2):161-170.
    According to Field’s influential incompleteness objection, Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is unsatisfactory since the definition that forms its basis is incomplete in two distinct senses: (1) it is physicalistically inadequate, and for this reason, (2) it is conceptually deficient. In this paper, I defend the semantic theory of truth against the incompleteness objection by conceding (1) but rejecting (2). After arguing that Davidson and McDowell’s reply to the incompleteness objection fails to pass muster, I argue (...)
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  35.  97
    Charles Sayward (1987). Prior’s Theory of Truth. Analysis 47 (2):83-87.
    This paper is a critical exposition of Prior’s theory of truth as expressed by the following truth locutions: (1) ‘it is true that’ prefixed to sentences; (2) ‘true proposition’; (3) true belief’, ‘true assertion’, ‘true statement’, etc.; (4) ‘true sentence’.
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  36.  46
    Bradley Armour-Garb (2013). A Minimalist Theory of Truth. Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):53-57.
    This article, after briefly discussing Alfred Tarski's influential theory of truth, turns to a more recent theory of truth, a deflationary, or minimalist, theory. One of the chief elements of a deflationary, or minimalist, theory of truth is that it replaces the question of what truth is with the question of what “true” does. After setting out the central features of the minimalist theory of truth, the article explains the motivation (...)
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  37.  86
    Michael Glanzberg (2004). Discussion – Truth, Disquotation, and Expression: On McGinn's Theory of Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 118 (3):413-423.
    In Logical Properties, Colin McGinn offers a new theory of truth, which he describes as “thick disquotationalism.” In keeping with wider theme of the book, truth emerges as conceptually primitive. Echoing Moore, it is simple and unanalyzable. Though truth cannot be analyzed, in the sense of giving a conceptual decomposition, McGinn argues that truth can be defined. A non-circular statement of its application conditions can be given. This makes truth a singularly remarkable property. Indeed, (...)
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  38.  25
    Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen (2007). Kuhn, the Correspondence Theory of Truth and Coherentist Epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (3):555-566.
    Kuhn argued against both the correspondence theory of truth and convergent realism. Although he likely misunderstood the nature of the correspondence theory, which it seems he wrongly believed to be an epistemic theory, Kuhn had an important epistemic point to make. He maintained that any assessment of correspondence between beliefs and reality is not possible, and therefore, the acceptance of beliefs and the presumption of their truthfulness has to be decided on the basis of other criteria. (...)
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  39.  25
    Nicholas Rescher (1973). The Coherence Theory of Truth. Oxford,Clarendon Press.
  40.  20
    Aladdin Mahmūd Yaqūb (1993). The Liar Speaks the Truth: A Defense of the Revision Theory of Truth. Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Yaqub describes a simple conception of truth and shows that it yields a semantical theory that accommodates the whole range of our seemingly conflicting intuitions about truth. This conception takes the Tarskian biconditionals (such as "The sentence 'Johannes loved Clara' is true if and only if Johannes loved Clara") as correctly and completely defining the notion of truth. The semantical theory, which is called the revision (...), that emerges from this conception paints a metaphysical picture of truth as a property whose applicability is given by a revision process rather than by a fixed extension. The main advantage of this revision process is its ability to explain why truth seems in many cases almost redundant, in others substantial, and yet in others paradoxical (as in the famous Liar). Yaub offers a comprehensive defense of the revision theory of truth by developing consistent and adequate formal semantics for languages in which all sorts of problematic sentences (Liar and company) can be constructed. Yaqub concludes by introducing a logic of truth that further demonstrates the adequacy of the revision theory. (shrink)
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  41.  70
    Stewart Candlish, The Identity Theory of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    is true, there is a truth-maker (e.g., a fact) with which it is identical and the truth of the former consists in its identity with the latter. The theory is best understood as a reaction to the correspondence theory, according to which the relation of truth-bearer to truth-maker is correspondence. A correspondence theory is vulnerable to the nagging suspicion that if the best we can do is make statements that merely correspond to the (...)
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  42. David Lewis (2001). Forget About the ‘Correspondence Theory of Truth’. Analysis 61 (272):275–280.
    There is no distinct correspondence theory of truth, truth is correspondence to fact. If facts are taken to be true propositions, we wind up with just another version of the correspondence theory's ostensible competitor, the redundancy theory of truth. If instead facts are taken to be Armstrong's states of affairs, or Tractarian facts, or Mellor's _facta, we get a _truthmaker principle, that for every truth there is a truthmaker; something whose existence implies the (...)
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  43.  67
    Luciano Floridi (2011). Semantic Information and the Correctness Theory of Truth. Erkenntnis 74 (2):147-175.
    Semantic information is usually supposed to satisfy the veridicality thesis: p qualifies as semantic information only if p is true. However, what it means for semantic information to be true is often left implicit, with correspondentist interpretations representing the most popular, default option. The article develops an alternative approach, namely a correctness theory of truth (CTT) for semantic information. This is meant as a contribution not only to the philosophy of information but also to the philosophical debate on (...)
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  44. Marian David, The Correspondence Theory of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact -- a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20 th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (...)
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  45.  13
    Klaus Ambos-Spies, Peter A. Fejer, Steffen Lempp & Manuel Lerman (1996). Decidability of the Two-Quantifier Theory of the Recursively Enumerable Weak Truth-Table Degrees and Other Distributive Upper Semi-Lattices. Journal of Symbolic Logic 61 (3):880-905.
    We give a decision procedure for the ∀∃-theory of the weak truth-table (wtt) degrees of the recursively enumerable sets. The key to this decision procedure is a characterization of the finite lattices which can be embedded into the r.e. wtt-degrees by a map which preserves the least and greatest elements: a finite lattice has such an embedding if and only if it is distributive and the ideal generated by its cappable elements and the filter generated by its cuppable (...)
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  46. Marian David (2004). Don't Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):42 – 47.
    Contra Lewis, it is argued that the correspondence theory is a genuine rival theory of truth: it goes beyond the redundancy theory; it competes with other theories of truth; it is aptly summarized by the slogan 'truth is correspondence to fact'; and it really is a theory of truth.
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  47. William G. Lycan (2010). Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning. Topoi 29 (2):99-108.
    The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed.
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  48.  45
    Pascal Engel (2001). The False Modesty of the Identity Theory of Truth. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):441 – 458.
    The identity theory of truth, according to which true thoughts are identical with facts, is very hard to formulate. It oscillates between substantive versions, which are implausible, and a merely truistic version, which is difficult to distinguish from deflationism about truth. This tension is present in the form of identity theory that one can attribute to McDowell from his views on perception, and in the conception defended by Hornsby under that name.
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  49.  17
    Melvin Fitting (1989). Bilattices and the Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (3):225 - 256.
    While Kripke's original paper on the theory of truth used a three-valued logic, we believe a four-valued version is more natural. Its use allows for possible inconsistencies in information about the world, yet contains Kripke's development within it. Moreover, using a four-valued logic makes it possible to work with complete lattices rather than complete semi-lattices, and thus the mathematics is somewhat simplified. But more strikingly, the four-valued version has a wide, natural generalization to the family of interlaced bilattices. (...)
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  50. Douglas Patterson (2005). Deflationism and the Truth Conditional Theory of Meaning. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):271-294.
    Controversy has arisen of late over the claim that deflationism about truth requires that we explain meaning in terms of something other than truth-conditions. This controversy, it is argued, is due to unclarity as to whether the basic deflationary claim that a sentence and a sentence that attributes truth to it are equivalent in meaning is intended to involve the truth- predicate of the object language for which we develop an account of meaning, or is intended (...)
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