Search results for 'disquotational theory of truth' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1993). The Disquotational Theory of Truth is False. Philosophia 22 (3-4):331-339.score: 1632.0
    It is argued that if there are truth-value gaps then the disquotational theory of truth is false. Secondly, it is argued that the same conclusion can be reached even without the assumption that there are truth-value gaps.
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  2. Thomas Schindler (forthcoming). A Disquotational Theory of Truth as Strong as Z 2 −. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-16.score: 1328.0
    T-biconditionals have often been regarded as insufficient as axioms for truth. This verdict is based on Tarski’s (1935) observation that the typed T-sentences suffer from deductive weakness. As indicated by McGee (1992), the situation might change radically if we consider type-free disquotational theories of truth. However, finding a well-motivated set of untyped T-biconditionals that is consistent and recursively enumerable has proven to be very difficult. Moreover, some authors (e.g. Glanzberg (2005)) have argued that any solution to the (...)
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  3. Hilary Putnam (1991). Does the Disquotational Theory of Truth Solve All Philosophical Problems? In ¸ Iteputnam:Wl. 264--78.score: 1020.0
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  4. Michael Glanzberg (2004). Discussion – Truth, Disquotation, and Expression: On McGinn's Theory of Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 118 (3):413-423.score: 725.0
    In Logical Properties, Colin McGinn offers a new theory of truth, which he describes as “thick disquotationalism.” In keeping with wider theme of the book, truth emerges as conceptually primitive. Echoing Moore, it is simple and unanalyzable. Though truth cannot be analyzed, in the sense of giving a conceptual decomposition, McGinn argues that truth can be defined. A non-circular statement of its application conditions can be given. This makes truth a singularly remarkable property. Indeed, (...)
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  5. Brian Ribeiro (2011). A Really Short Refutation of the Pragmatic Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:31-34.score: 711.0
    The pragmatic theory of truth (PTT) seeks to illuminate the concept of truth by focusing on concepts like usefulness or adaptivity. However, contrary to common opinion, PTT does not merely face a narrow band of (perhaps) rather artificial counterexamples (as in a case of empirically unfounded but life-extending optimism in a cancer patient); instead, PTT is faced with a fast psychological research literature which suggests that inaccurate beliefs are both (1) pervasive in human beings and, nonetheless, (2) (...)
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  6. Leon Horsten (2006). Axiomatizing Kripke's Theory of Truth. Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (2):677 - 712.score: 708.0
    We investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense: only the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to (...)
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  7. Colin Johnston (2013). Judgment and the Identity Theory of Truth. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):381-397.score: 702.0
    The identity theory of truth takes on different forms depending on whether it is combined with a dual relation or a multiple relation theory of judgment. This paper argues that there are two significant problems for the dual relation identity theorist regarding thought’s answerability to reality, neither of which takes a grip on the multiple relation identity theory.
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  8. Benedikt Löwe & Philip D. Welch (2001). Set-Theoretic Absoluteness and the Revision Theory of Truth. Studia Logica 68 (1):21-41.score: 695.3
    We describe the solution of the Limit Rule Problem of Revision Theory and discuss the philosophical consequences of the fact that the truth set of Revision Theory is a complete 1/2 set.
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  9. Marian David (1994). Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth. Oxford University Press.score: 670.0
    Marian David defends the correspondence theory of truth against the disquotational theory of truth, its current major rival. The correspondence theory asserts that truth is a philosophically rich and profound notion in need of serious explanation. Disquotationalists offer a radically deflationary account inspired by Tarski and propagated by Quine and others. They reject the correspondence theory, insist truth is anemic, and advance an "anti-theory" of truth that is essentially a (...)
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  10. P. Schlenker (2007). The Elimination of Self-Reference: Generalized Yablo-Series and the Theory of Truth. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (3):251 - 307.score: 659.3
    Although it was traditionally thought that self-reference is a crucial ingredient of semantic paradoxes, Yablo (1993, 2004) showed that this was not so by displaying an infinite series of sentences none of which is self-referential but which, taken together, are paradoxical. Yablo's paradox consists of a countable series of linearly ordered sentences s(0), s(1), s(2),... , where each s(i) says: For each k > i, s(k) is false (or equivalently: For no k > i is s(k) true). We generalize Yablo's (...)
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  11. Ernesto Perini-Santos (2011). John Buridans Theory of Truth and the Paradox of the Liar. Vivarium 49 (1-3):184-213.score: 639.0
    The solution John Buridan offers for the Paradox of the Liar has not been correctly placed within the framework of his philosophy of language. More precisely, there are two important points of the Buridanian philosophy of language that are crucial to the correct understanding of his solution to the Liar paradox that are either misrepresented or ignored in some important accounts of his theory. The first point is that the Aristotelian formula, ` propositio est vera quia qualitercumque significat in (...)
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  12. Ricardo Roque Pascual (1940). Logical Analysis of Fictionalism with Respect to the Theory of Truth. [Manila, P.I..score: 609.8
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  13. James O. Young (2002). The Slingshot Argument and the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Acta Analytica 17 (2):121-132.score: 598.5
    The correspondence theory of truth holds that each true sentence corresponds to a discrete fact. Donald Davidson and others have argued (using an argument that has come to be known as the slingshot) that this theory is mistaken, since all true sentences correspond to the same “Great Fact.” The argument is designed to show that by substituting logically equivalent sentences and coreferring terms for each other in the context of sentences of the form ‘P corresponds to the (...)
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  14. Andrew Newman (2002). The Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication. Cambridge University Press.score: 598.5
    This work presents a version of the correspondence theory of truth based on Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Russell's theory of truth and discusses related metaphysical issues such as predication, facts, and propositions. Like Russell and one prominent interpretation of the Tractatus it assumes a realist view of universals. Part of the aim is to avoid Platonic propositions, and although sympathy with facts is maintained in the early chapters, the book argues that facts as real entities (...)
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  15. Julian Dodd (2000). An Identity Theory of Truth. St. Martin's Press.score: 597.0
    This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation that holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true they are merely true thoughts. According to Julian Dodd, the resulting modest identity theory , while not defining truth, correctly diagnoses the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby prepares the ground for a defensible deflation of the concept of (...). (shrink)
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  16. Lorenz B. Puntel (1999). On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth: The Fundamental Problem and a New Perspective. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 30 (1):101-130.score: 569.3
    The present article purports to show that the protocol sentence debate, pursued by some leading members of the Vienna Circle in the mid-1930s, was essentially a controversy over the explanation and the real significance of the concept of truth. It is further shown that the fundamental issue underlying the discussions about the concept of truth was the relationship between form and content, as well as between logic/language and the world. R. Carnap was the philosopher who most explicitly and (...)
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  17. James R. Beebe, Prosentential Theory of Truth. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 553.5
    Prosentential theorists claim that sentences such as “That’s true” are prosentences that function analogously to their better known cousins–pronouns. For example, just as we might use the pronoun ‘he’ in place of ‘James’ to transform “James went to the supermarket” into “He went to the supermarket,” so we might use the prosentenceforming operator ‘is true’ to transform “Snow is white” into “‘Snow is white’ is true.” According to the prosentential theory of truth, whenever a referring expression (for example, (...)
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  18. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1977). Theories of Truth and Semantical Primitives. Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):349 - 354.score: 551.3
    Robert cummins has recently attacked this line of argument: if p is a semantically primitive predicate of a first order language l, then p requires its own clause in the definition of satisfaction integral to a definition of truth of l. thus if l has infinitely many such p, the satisfaction clause cannot be completed and truth for l will remain undefined. against this cummins argues that a single clause in a general base theory for l can (...)
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  19. Glen Hoffmann (2010). The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.score: 544.5
    Minimalism is currently the received deflationary theory of truth. On minimalism, truth is a transparent concept and a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I situate minimalism within current deflationary debate about truth by contrasting it with its main alternative―the redundancy theory of truth (according to which truth is a transparent concept but not a property). I also outline three of the primary challenges facing minimalism, its formulation, explanatory adequacy and (...)
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  20. Glen Hoffmann (2007). The Semantic Theory of Truth: Field's Incompleteness Objection. Philosophia 35 (2):161-170.score: 544.5
    According to Field’s influential incompleteness objection, Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is unsatisfactory since the definition that forms its basis is incomplete in two distinct senses: (1) it is physicalistically inadequate, and for this reason, (2) it is conceptually deficient. In this paper, I defend the semantic theory of truth against the incompleteness objection by conceding (1) but rejecting (2). After arguing that Davidson and McDowell’s reply to the incompleteness objection fails to pass muster, I argue (...)
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  21. Jamin Asay (2013). The Primitivist Theory of Truth. Cambridge University Press.score: 544.5
    Jamin Asay's book offers a fresh and daring perspective on the age-old question 'What is truth?', with a comprehensive articulation and defence of primitivism, the view that truth is a fundamental and indefinable concept. Often associated with Frege and the early Russell and Moore, primitivism has been largely absent from the larger conversation surrounding the nature of truth. Asay defends primitivism by drawing on a range of arguments from metaphysics, philosophy of language and philosophy of logic, and (...)
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  22. Bradley Armour-Garb (2013). A Minimalist Theory of Truth. Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):53-57.score: 544.5
    This article, after briefly discussing Alfred Tarski's influential theory of truth, turns to a more recent theory of truth, a deflationary, or minimalist, theory. One of the chief elements of a deflationary, or minimalist, theory of truth is that it replaces the question of what truth is with the question of what “true” does. After setting out the central features of the minimalist theory of truth, the article explains the motivation (...)
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  23. Charles Sayward (1987). Prior’s Theory of Truth. Analysis 47 (2):83-87.score: 544.5
    This paper is a critical exposition of Prior’s theory of truth as expressed by the following truth locutions: (1) ‘it is true that’ prefixed to sentences; (2) ‘true proposition’; (3) true belief’, ‘true assertion’, ‘true statement’, etc.; (4) ‘true sentence’.
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  24. Aladdin Mahmūd Yaqūb (1993). The Liar Speaks the Truth: A Defense of the Revision Theory of Truth. Oxford University Press.score: 544.5
    In this book, Yaqub describes a simple conception of truth and shows that it yields a semantical theory that accommodates the whole range of our seemingly conflicting intuitions about truth. This conception takes the Tarskian biconditionals (such as "The sentence 'Johannes loved Clara' is true if and only if Johannes loved Clara") as correctly and completely defining the notion of truth. The semantical theory, which is called the revision theory, that emerges from this conception (...)
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  25. Klaus Ambos-Spies, Peter A. Fejer, Steffen Lempp & Manuel Lerman (1996). Decidability of the Two-Quantifier Theory of the Recursively Enumerable Weak Truth-Table Degrees and Other Distributive Upper Semi-Lattices. Journal of Symbolic Logic 61 (3):880-905.score: 540.0
    We give a decision procedure for the ∀∃-theory of the weak truth-table (wtt) degrees of the recursively enumerable sets. The key to this decision procedure is a characterization of the finite lattices which can be embedded into the r.e. wtt-degrees by a map which preserves the least and greatest elements: a finite lattice has such an embedding if and only if it is distributive and the ideal generated by its cappable elements and the filter generated by its cuppable (...)
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  26. Saul A. Kripke (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.score: 535.5
    A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truth-value gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences.
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  27. Marian David, The Correspondence Theory of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 535.5
    Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact -- a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20 th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (...)
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  28. Marian David (2004). Don't Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):42 – 47.score: 535.5
    Contra Lewis, it is argued that the correspondence theory is a genuine rival theory of truth: it goes beyond the redundancy theory; it competes with other theories of truth; it is aptly summarized by the slogan 'truth is correspondence to fact'; and it really is a theory of truth.
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  29. Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten (2006). Axiomatizing Kripke's Theory of Truth. Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (2):677 - 712.score: 535.5
    We investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense: only the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to (...)
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  30. J. O. Young (2001). A Defence of the Coherence Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (1):89--101.score: 535.5
    Recent critics of the coherence theory of truth (notably Ralph Walker) have alleged that the theory is incoherent, since its defence presupposes the correctness of the contrary correspondence theory of truth. Coherentists must specify the system of propositions with which true propositons cohere (the specified system). Generally, coherentists claim that the specified system is a system composed of propositions believed by a community. Critics of coherentism maintain that the coherentist’s assertions about which system is the (...)
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  31. Pascal Engel (2001). The False Modesty of the Identity Theory of Truth. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):441 – 458.score: 535.5
    The identity theory of truth, according to which true thoughts are identical with facts, is very hard to formulate. It oscillates between substantive versions, which are implausible, and a merely truistic version, which is difficult to distinguish from deflationism about truth. This tension is present in the form of identity theory that one can attribute to McDowell from his views on perception, and in the conception defended by Hornsby under that name.
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  32. Daniel Stoljar, The Deflationary Theory of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 535.5
    According to the deflationary theory of truth, to assert that a statement is true is just to assert the statement itself. For example, to say that ‘snow is white’ is true, or that it is true that snow is white, is equivalent to saying simply that snow is white, and this, according to the deflationary theory, is all that can be said significantly about the truth of ‘snow is white’.
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  33. James Hardy (1997). Three Problems for the Singularity Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (5):501-520.score: 535.5
    In this paper I present three problems for Simmons' singularity theory of truth as he presents it in Universality and the Liar. I begin with a brief overview of the theory and then present the three problems I see for it. The first problem shows that the singularity theory is in conflict with our ordinary notion of truth. I present a set of sentences that the singularity theory evaluates differently than does our pretheoretic concept (...)
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  34. M. Hay (2002). An Identity Theory of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):242 – 243.score: 535.5
    Book Information An Identity Theory of Truth. By Dodd Julian. Macmillan. Basingstoke. 2000. Pp. ix + 199. Hardback, £42.50.
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  35. Kathleen Wider (1995). Truth and Existence: The Idealism in Sartre's Theory of Truth. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (1):91 – 109.score: 535.5
    Although Sartre rejects a certain kind of idealism in "Truth and Existence", I argue that a commitment to a kind of transcendental idealism remains. I explore the expression of this idealism in "Truth and Existence" and how it enhances an idealist tradition which begins with Kant. More importantly, I examine Sartre's divergence from Kantian idealism and his blending of pragmatism with idealism, in a way most similar to Wittgenstein's. Unlike Wittgenstein's idealism, however, Sartre's idealism, I argue, brings him (...)
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  36. Melvin Fitting (1989). Bilattices and the Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (3):225 - 256.score: 535.5
    While Kripke's original paper on the theory of truth used a three-valued logic, we believe a four-valued version is more natural. Its use allows for possible inconsistencies in information about the world, yet contains Kripke's development within it. Moreover, using a four-valued logic makes it possible to work with complete lattices rather than complete semi-lattices, and thus the mathematics is somewhat simplified. But more strikingly, the four-valued version has a wide, natural generalization to the family of interlaced bilattices. (...)
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  37. María Ponte Azcárate (2007). A Proposal for a Non-Realist Theory of Truth. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:105-109.score: 535.5
    My aim in this article is to analyze and to discuss what I think are the two most important approaches to a theory of truth from a non-realist standpoint: the proposal of Crispin Wright and the proposal enounced by Putnam in Reason, Truth and History. Wright argues for a minimalist theory of truth according to which truth has to be a metaphysically neutral notion and admits several possible models. One of these possible models is (...)
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  38. Greg Restall (2008). Modal Models for Bradwardine's Theory of Truth. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):225-240.score: 535.5
    Stephen Read (2002, 2006) has recently discussed Bradwardine's theory of truth and defended it as an appropriate way to treat paradoxes such as the liar. In this paper, I discuss Read's formalisation of Bradwardine's theory of truth and provide a class of models for this theory. The models facilitate comparison of Bradwardine's theory with contemporary theories of truth.
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  39. Michael D. Bybee (1984). James's Theory of Truth as a Theory of Knowledge. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 20 (3):253 - 267.score: 535.5
    The object of james's theory of truth is knowledge, not truth "qua" correctness. to designate the object of his theory, james avoids using traditional english terminology for correctness but often uses diction typically reserved for knowledge. furthermore, the object of james's theory (as he describes it) cannot be distinguished from knowledge on philosophical grounds.
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  40. Gurpreet S. Rattan (2004). The Theory of Truth in the Theory of Meaning. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):214–243.score: 534.0
    The connection between theories of truth and meaning is explored. Theories of truth and meaning are connected in a way such that differences in the conception of what it is for a sentence to be true are engendered by differences in the conception of how meanings depend on each other, and on a base of underlying facts. It is argued that this view is common ground between Davidson and Dummett, and that their dispute over realism is really a (...)
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  41. Stewart Candlish, The Identity Theory of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 533.3
    is true, there is a truth-maker (e.g., a fact) with which it is identical and the truth of the former consists in its identity with the latter. The theory is best understood as a reaction to the correspondence theory, according to which the relation of truth-bearer to truth-maker is correspondence. A correspondence theory is vulnerable to the nagging suspicion that if the best we can do is make statements that merely correspond to the (...)
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  42. Stewart Candlish (1999). Identifying the Identity Theory of Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):233–240.score: 533.3
    This is a response to Jennifer Hornsby's Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society in 1996 (published 1997) and to Julian Dodd's defences of an identity theory. Both authors explain their versions of the theory through its rejection of a correspondence theory and its insistence on the indefinability of truth. I ask what more there is to the identity theory to justify its title and argue that the investigation of this matter reveals difficulties which neither author (...)
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  43. Bella K. Milmed (1956). Lewis and the Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 53 (19):569-583.score: 533.3
    C i lewis, regarding himself as a pragmatist, repeatedly attempts to identify truth with verification. it is here argued, however, that a correspondence or semantic theory is required by (1) lewis's interpretation of objective judgments in terms of "possible experience" and of possible experience in terms of counterfactual conditions; (2) his distinction between the justification of knowledge and the truth of knowledge; and (3) his logical analysis of truth in terms of the extension (known or unknown) (...)
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  44. William G. Lycan (2010). Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning. Topoi 29 (2):99-108.score: 531.0
    The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed.
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  45. Scott Soames (1984). What is a Theory of Truth? Journal of Philosophy 81 (8):411-429.score: 528.8
    412 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY There are theories that try, in my opinion unsuccessfully, to do just this. Tarski's theory, which restricts itself to cases in which truth is predicated of sentences of certain formal languages, is not one of them. Thus, Tarski cannot be seen.
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  46. Theo A. F. Kuipers (2005). Toward a Geometrical Theory of Truth Approximation: Reply to Thomas Mormann. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):455-457.score: 528.8
    This paper primarily deals with the conceptual prospects for generalizing the aim of abduction from the standard one of explaining surprising or anomalous observations to that of empirical progress or even truth approximation. It turns out that the main abduction task then becomes the instrumentalist task of theory revision aiming at an empirically more successful theory, relative to the available data, but not necessarily compatible with them. The rest, that is, genuine empirical progress as well as observational, (...)
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  47. Matt Leonard (2012). Burge's Contextual Theory of Truth and the Super-Liar Paradox. In Michal Pelis Vit Puncochar (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2011. College Publications.score: 526.5
    One recently proposed solution to the Liar paradox is the contextual theory of truth. Tyler Burge (1979) argues that truth is an indexical notion and that the extension of the truth predicate shifts during Liar reasoning. A Liar sentence might be true in one context and false in another. To many, contextualism seems to capture our pre-theoretic intuitions about the semantic paradoxes; this is especially due to its reliance on the so-called Revenge phenomenon. I, however, show (...)
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  48. David Lewis (2001). Forget About the ‘Correspondence Theory of Truth’. Analysis 61 (272):275–280.score: 526.5
    There is no distinct correspondence theory of truth, truth is correspondence to fact. If facts are taken to be true propositions, we wind up with just another version of the correspondence theory's ostensible competitor, the redundancy theory of truth. If instead facts are taken to be Armstrong's states of affairs, or Tractarian facts, or Mellor's _facta, we get a _truthmaker principle, that for every truth there is a truthmaker; something whose existence implies the (...)
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