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- Christian Barry, Matthew Lindauer & Gerhard Øverland (2014). Doing, Allowing, and Enabling Harm: An Empirical Investigation. In Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press
- Thomas S. Huddle (2013). Moral Fiction or Moral Fact? The Distinction Between Doing and Allowing in Medical Ethics. Bioethics 27 (5):257-262.
- Xiaofei Liu (2012). A Robust Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Utilitas 24 (01):63-81.
- Timothy Hall (2008). Doing Harm, Allowing Harm, and Denying Resources. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (1):50-76.
- Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments. Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
- Adam Omar Hosein (2014). Doing, Allowing, and the State. Law and Philosophy 33 (2):235-264.
- Fiona Woollard (2012). The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing I: Analysis of the Doing/Allowing Distinction. Philosophy Compass 7 (7):448-458.
- Marion Hourdequin (2007). Doing, Allowing, and Precaution. Environmental Ethics 29 (4):339-358.
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- Bashshar Haydar (2002). Consequentialism and the Doing-Allowing Distinction. Utilitas 14 (01):96-.
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- Jason Hanna (2014). Doing, Allowing, and the Moral Relevance of the Past. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (4).
- Bashshar Haydar (2010). The Consequences of Rejecting the Moral Relevance of the Doing–Allowing Distinction. Utilitas 22 (2):222-227.
- Fiona Woollard (2008). Doing and Allowing, Threats and Sequences. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):261–277.
- Brian Berkey (2014). State Action, State Policy, and the Doing/Allowing Distinction. Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (2):147-149.
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- Patrick Taylor Smith (2014). Redirecting Threats, the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, and the Special Wrongness of Solar Radiation Management. Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (2):143-146.
- Ralph Wedgwood (forthcoming). Two Grades of Non-Consequentialism. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-20.
- David R. Morrow (2014). Starting a Flood to Stop a Fire? Some Moral Constraints on Solar Radiation Management. Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (2):123-138.
- Randolph Clarke (2014). Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
- Jason Hanna (2015). Enabling Harm, Doing Harm, and Undoing One’s Own Behavior. Ethics 126 (1):68-90.
- Bashshar Haydar (2005). Extreme Poverty and Global Responsibility. Metaphilosophy 36 (1‐2):240-253.
- Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2012). Are Trade Subsidies and Tariffs Killing the Global Poor? Social Research (4):865-896.
- Stefan Hirschauer (2005). On Doing Being a Stranger: The Practical Constitution of Civil Inattention. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35 (1):41–67.
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- Elie Holzer (2007). Allowing the Biblical Text to Do its Pedagogical Work: Connecting Interpretative Activity and Moral Education. Journal of Moral Education 36 (4):497-514.
- Adaptable Robots (2002). Robot is Going to Operate in is Completely Understood and the Actions It is Going to Take in the Environment to Achieve its Goals Are Also Completely Understood. The Problem is That This Kind of Design Does Not Allow for Encountering Unknown Obstacles and Doing Something Different to Get Around Them. In James Moor & Terrell Ward Bynum (eds.), Cyberphilosophy: The Intersection of Philosophy and Computing. Blackwell Pub. 78.
- S. S. Venneman, P. Narnor-Harris, M. Perish & M. Hamilton (2008). "Allow Natural Death" Versus "Do Not Resuscitate": Three Words That Can Change a Life. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (1):2-6.
- Y.-Y. Chen & S. J. Youngner (2008). "Allow Natural Death" is Not Equivalent to "Do Not Resuscitate": A Response. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (12):887-888.
- S. S. Venneman, P. Narnor-Harris, M. Perish & M. Hamilton (2008). “Allow Natural Death” Versus “Do Not Resuscitate”: Three Words That Can Change a Life. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (1):2-6.
- G. Alexias, M. Lavdas & M. Tzanakis (forthcoming). “I Do Not Allow Myself to Be Harmed, It is a Luxury; I Have Two Children Who Need Me”: Basic Guidelines for Planning an Experiential Research Methodology in Women Who Have Undergone Mastectomy Due to Breast Cancer. Facta Universitatis.
- Bashshae Haydah (2002). In Connection with a Much Discussed Hypothetical Situation, in Which a Person Can Prevent the Death (or Killing) of Several Innocent People Only If She Herself Kills an Innocent Person, Some Have Maintained That It is Morally Better for Her Not to Kill That Innocent Person, on the Ground That It is Morally Worse to Do Harm Than to Allow It. The Distinc. Utilitas 14 (1).
- Paul A. Dudchenko, Emma R. Wood & Roderick M. Grieves (2013). Think Local, Act Global: How Do Fragmented Representations of Space Allow Seamless Navigation? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (5):548 - 549.
- Helga Kuhse (1998). Problems of Personhood and Personal Identity: Do Advance Directives Allow One Person to Kill Another?.[Reprinted From Personsein Aus Bioethischer Sicht (1997)]. Monash Bioethics Review 17 (2):14.
- Y. Y. Chen & S. J. Youngner (2008). “Allow Natural Death” is Not Equivalent to “Do Not Resuscitate”: A Response. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (12):887-888.
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