Search results for 'doing and allowing' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Christian Barry, Matthew Lindauer & Gerhard Øverland (forthcoming). Doing, Allowing, and Enabling Harm: An Empirical Investigation. In Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.score: 81.0
    Traditionally, moral philosophers have distinguished between doing and allowing harm, and have normally proceeded as if this bipartite distinction can exhaustively characterize all cases of human conduct involving harm. By contrast, cognitive scientists and psychologists studying causal judgment have investigated the concept ‘enable’ as distinct from the concept ‘cause’ and other causal terms. Empirical work on ‘enable’ and its employment has generally not focused on cases where human agents enable harm. In this paper, we present new empirical evidence (...)
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  2. Thomas S. Huddle (2013). Moral Fiction or Moral Fact? The Distinction Between Doing and Allowing in Medical Ethics. Bioethics 27 (5):257-262.score: 75.0
    Opponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) maintain that physician withdrawal-of-life-sustaining-treatment cannot be morally equated to voluntary active euthanasia. PAS opponents generally distinguish these two kinds of act by positing a possible moral distinction between killing and allowing-to-die, ceteris paribus. While that distinction continues to be widely accepted in the public discourse, it has been more controversial among philosophers. Some ethicist PAS advocates are so certain that the distinction is invalid that they describe PAS opponents who hold to the distinction as (...)
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  3. Adam Omar Hosein (2014). Doing, Allowing, and the State. Law and Philosophy 33 (2):235-264.score: 60.0
    The doing/allowing distinction plays an important role in our thinking about a number of legal issues, such as the need for criminal process protections, prohibitions on torture, the permissibility of the death penalty and so on. These are areas where, at least initially, there seem to be distinctions between harms that the state inflicts and harms that it merely allows. In this paper I will argue for the importance of the doing/allowing distinction as applied to state (...)
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  4. Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments. Cognition 108 (2):353-380.score: 60.0
    An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation (...)
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  5. Timothy Hall (2008). Doing Harm, Allowing Harm, and Denying Resources. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (1):50-76.score: 60.0
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  6. Fiona Woollard (2010). Doing/Allowing and the Deliberative Requirement. Ratio 23 (2):199-216.score: 60.0
    Attempts to defend the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing harm directly have left many unconvinced. I give an indirect defence of the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing, focusing on the agent's duty to reason in a way that is responsive to possible harmful effects of their behaviour. Due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot be expected to take all harmful consequences of our behaviour into account. We are required (...)
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  7. Fiona Woollard (2012). The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing I: Analysis of the Doing/Allowing Distinction. Philosophy Compass 7 (7):448-458.score: 60.0
    According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the first of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the analysis of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I explore some of the most prominent (...)
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  8. Bashshar Haydar (2002). Consequentialism and the Doing-Allowing Distinction. Utilitas 14 (01):96-.score: 60.0
    This paper takes a closer look at the incompatibility thesis, namely the claim that consequentialism is incompatible with accepting the moral relevance of the doing-allowing distinction. I examine two attempts to reject the incompatibility thesis, the first by Samuel Scheffler and the second by Frances Kamm. I argue that both attempts fail to provide an adequate ground for rejecting the incompatibility thesis. I then put forward an account of what I take to be at stake in accepting or (...)
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  9. Marion Hourdequin (2007). Doing, Allowing, and Precaution. Environmental Ethics 29 (4):339-358.score: 60.0
    Many environmental policies seem to rest on an implicit distinction between doing and allowing. For example, it is generally thought worse to drive a speciesto extinction than to fail to save a species that is declining through no fault of our own, and worse to pollute the air with chemicals that trigger asthma attacks thanto fail to remove naturally occurring allergens such as pollen and mold. The distinction between doing and allowing seems to underlie certain versions (...)
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  10. Fiona Woollard (2012). The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing II: The Moral Relevance of the Doing/Allowing Distinction. Philosophy Compass 7 (7):459-469.score: 57.0
    According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the second of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the moral status of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I look at objections to the (...)
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  11. Fiona Woollard (2008). Doing and Allowing, Threats and Sequences. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):261–277.score: 51.0
    The distinction between doing and allowing appears to have moral significance, but the very nature of the distinction is as yet unclear. Philippa Foot's ‘pre-existing threats’ account of the doing/allowing distinction is highly influential. According to the best version of Foot's account an agent brings about an outcome if and only if his behaviour is part of the sequence leading to that outcome. When understood in this way, Foot's account escapes objections by Warren Quinn and Jonathan (...)
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  12. Xiaofei Liu (2012). A Robust Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Utilitas 24 (01):63-81.score: 48.0
    Philosophers debate over the truth of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the thesis that there is a morally significant difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm to happen. Deontologists tend to accept this doctrine, whereas consequentialists tend to reject it. A robust defence of this doctrine would require a conceptual distinction between doing and allowing that both matches our ordinary use of the concepts in a wide range of cases and enables a (...)
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  13. Bashshar Haydar (2010). The Consequences of Rejecting the Moral Relevance of the DoingAllowing Distinction. Utilitas 22 (2):222-227.score: 48.0
    The claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing enjoys a great intuitive appeal. If in addition to this claim, we reject the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction. In this short essay, I propose a different take on the argument in question. Instead of opting to reject its conclusion by defending the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction, we can no longer rely on the strong intuitive appeal of the claim that one is (...)
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  14. Allen Thompson (2006). Environmentalism, Moral Responsibility, and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Ethics, Place and Environment 9 (3):269 – 278.score: 48.0
    In 'Doing and Allowing', Samuel Scheffler argues that if a person sees herself as subject to norms of individual moral responsibility, then the content of her first-order substantive norms of individual moral responsibility must attribute greater responsibility to what one does than to what one could, but fails, to prevent. This paper is about how a morally responsible agent could deny the doctrine of doing and allowing, why an environmentalist should, and what this means for environmental (...)
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  15. Fiona Woollard (2013). If This Is My Body … : A Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):315-341.score: 48.0
    I defend the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: the claim that doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. A thing does not genuinely belong to a person unless he has special authority over it. The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing protects us against harmful imposition – against the actions or needs of another intruding on what is ours. This protection is necessary for something to genuinely belong to a person. The opponent (...)
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  16. Alec Walen (1995). Doing, Allowing, and Disabling: Some Principles Governing Deontological Restrictions. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 80 (2):183 - 215.score: 45.0
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  17. Warren S. Quinn (1989). Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Philosophical Review 98 (3):287-312.score: 36.0
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  18. Samuel Scheffler (2004). Doing and Allowing. Ethics 114 (2):215-239.score: 36.0
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  19. Ben Bradley & Michael Stocker (2005). Doing and Allowing” and Doing and Allowing. Ethics 115 (4):799-808.score: 36.0
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  20. Kai Draper (2005). Rights and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (3):253–280.score: 36.0
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  21. Samuel C. Rickless (1997). The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Philosophical Review 106 (4):555-575.score: 36.0
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  22. John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1992). Quinn on Doing and Allowing. Philosophical Review 101 (2):343-352.score: 36.0
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  23. Alan Strudler & David Wasserman (1995). The First Dogma of Deontology: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing and the Notion of a Say. Philosophical Studies 80 (1):51 - 67.score: 36.0
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  24. David Ryan (2004). Doing and Allowing: Dispensing with Rights and Agency. Philosophia 31 (3-4):557-573.score: 36.0
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  25. David K. Chan (2010). A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics, and Responsibility. MIT Press.score: 36.0
     
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  26. William J. FitzPatrick, Gerhard Øverland, Talbot Brewer, David Enoch & Philip Stratton‐Lake (2005). 2.“Doing and Allowing” and Doing and AllowingDoing and Allowing” and Doing and Allowing (Pp. 799-808). Ethics 115 (4).score: 36.0
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  27. Bashshar Haydar (2005). Extreme Poverty and Global Responsibility. Metaphilosophy 36 (1‐2):240-253.score: 30.0
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  28. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2012). Are Trade Subsidies and Tariffs Killing the Global Poor? Social Research (4):865-896.score: 27.0
    In recent years it has often been claimed that policies such as subsidies paid to domestic producers by affluent countries and tariffs on goods produced by foreign producers in poorer countries violate important moral requirements because they do severe harm to poor people, even kill them. Such claims involve an empirical aspect—such policies are on balance very bad for the global poor—and a philosophical aspect—that the causal influence of these policies can fairly be characterized as doing severe harm and (...)
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  29. Fiery Cushman & Liane Young (2011). Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations. Cognitive Science 35 (6):1052-1075.score: 25.0
    Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side-effect (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side-effect distinctions affect nonmoral representations (...)
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  30. David McCarthy (2000). Harming and Allowing Harm. Ethics 110 (4):749-779.score: 18.0
    The article takes as its starting point the assumption that (a) competing accounts of moral rules should be judged by the distribution of benefits and burdens which would arise from everyone accepting these rules, and that (b) these benefits and burdens are understood in a way which has a substantial resource or freedom-based component. This starting point is compatible with contractualism and various forms of rule consequentialism, and will yield a morality in which people have significant freedoms. The main claim (...)
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  31. Elie Holzer (2007). Allowing the Biblical Text to Do its Pedagogical Work: Connecting Interpretative Activity and Moral Education. Journal of Moral Education 36 (4):497-514.score: 18.0
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  32. Natascha Kienstra, Machiel Karskens & Jeroen Imants (2014). Three Approaches to Doing Philosophy: A Proposal for Grouping Philosophical Exercises in Classroom Teaching. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):288-318.score: 18.0
    Classroom teaching has two aims: learning philosophy, that is, the great philosophers, and doing philosophy. This article provides an overview of thirty exercises that can be used for doing philosophy, grouped into three approaches. The first approach, doing philosophy as connective truth finding or communicative action, is related to such philosophers as Dewey and Arendt, and is illustrated by the Socratic method. The second, doing philosophy as test-based truth finding, is related to such philosophers as Popper, (...)
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  33. Shenbai Liao (2006). Doing Business: An Obscure Notion of the Ethics of Public Associations in Ordinary Chinese. [REVIEW] Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (3):325-340.score: 18.0
    Along with the notion of being a person (zuo ren 做人), the notion of doing business (zuo shi 做事) in ordinary Chinese is basically an over-all notion of the norms in the practical and associative activities, carrying typically obscure meanings on practice and association affairs in some external world. Ordinary Chinese not only distinguishes these two notions but also defines a dictionary order of them, with the affairs of the internal world prior to those of the external. The fact (...)
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  34. Rahul Mitra (2010). Doing Ethnography, Being an Ethnographer: The Autoethnographic Research Process and I. Journal of Research Practice 6 (1):Article M4.score: 18.0
    I examine here Theory and Scholarship (taken to be formalized social scientific frameworks that seek to map out the real world and social actions in an objective fashion) via an autoethnographic lens. Chiefly, I ask how autoethnography as a research method reconfigures them: how may we extend knowledge using autoethnography? While much critique has centered on the "doing" (dispassionately?) versus "being" (going native?) of autoethnography, I argue that such a dichotomy is inherently false. Instead, doing is located within (...)
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  35. Adaptable Robots (2002). Robot is Going to Operate in is Completely Understood and the Actions It is Going to Take in the Environment to Achieve its Goals Are Also Completely Understood. The Problem is That This Kind of Design Does Not Allow for Encountering Unknown Obstacles and Doing Something Different to Get Around Them. In James Moor & Terrell Ward Bynum (eds.), Cyberphilosophy: The Intersection of Philosophy and Computing. Blackwell Pub.. 78.score: 18.0
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  36. Jonathan Webber (2002). Doing Without Representation: Coping with Dreyfus. Philosophical Explorations 5 (1):82-88.score: 16.0
    Hubert Dreyfus argues that the traditional and currently dominant conception of an action, as an event initiated or governed by a mental representation of a possible state of affairs that the agent is trying to realise, is inadequate. If Dreyfus is right, then we need a new conception of action. I argue, however, that the considerations that Dreyfus adduces show only that an action need not be initiated or governed by a conceptual representation, but since a representation need not be (...)
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  37. Y.-Y. Chen & S. J. Youngner (2008). "Allow Natural Death" is Not Equivalent to "Do Not Resuscitate": A Response. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (12):887-888.score: 16.0
    Venneman and colleagues argue that “do not resuscitate” (DNR) is problematic and should be replaced by “allow natural death” (AND). Their argument is flawed. First, while end-of-life discussions should be as positive as possible, they cannot and should not sidestep painful but necessary confrontations with morality. Second, while DNR can indeed be nonspecific and confusing, AND merely replaces one problematic term with another. Finally, the study’s results are not generalisable to the populations of physicians and working nurses and certainly do (...)
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  38. Kenneth Einar Himma (2010). Plantinga's Version of the Free-Will Argument: The Good and Evil That Free Beings Do. Religious Studies 46 (1):21-39.score: 15.0
    According to Plantinga's version of the free-will argument (FWA), the existence of free beings in the world who, on the whole, do more good than evil is the greater moral good that cannot be secured by even an omnipotent God without allowing some evil and thereby shows the logical compatibility of God with evil. In this essay, I argue that there are good empirical and moral reasons, from the standpoint of one plausible conception of Christian ethics, to doubt that (...)
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  39. Stacy Lee Burns (2009). Doing Justice and Demonstrating Fairness in Small Claims Arbitration. Human Studies 32 (2):109 - 131.score: 15.0
    This paper examines the intersection of technical law and common sense reasoning in small claims arbitration, a distinctive and increasingly prevalent kind of legal work. Following (Garfinkel, Ethnomethodology’s program: Working out Durkheim’s aphorism , 2002 ), the study explores the “reform of technical reason” and what a “just outcome” means by focusing on the arbitration of actual small claims cases and how technical-legal and non-technical/informal resources are brought into alignment to produce dispute resolution. The arbitrator elicits discussions that establish consensual (...)
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  40. Maura C. Schlairet & Richard W. Cohen (2013). Allow-Natural-Death (AND) Orders: Legal, Ethical, and Practical Considerations. HEC Forum 25 (2):161-171.score: 15.0
    Conversations with patients and families about the allow-natural-death (AND) order, along with the standard do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order during end-of-life (EOL) decision-making, may create engagement and understanding while promoting care that can be defended using enduring notions of autonomy, beneficence, and professional duty. Ethical, legal, and pragmatic issues surrounding EOL care decision-making seem to suggest discussion of AND orders as one strategy clinicians could consider at the individual practice level and at institutional levels. A discussion of AND orders, along with traditional (...)
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  41. Melanie Sisson & Martin DeNicolo (forthcoming). Minimal Mutual Advantage: How the Social Contract Can Do Justice to the Disabled. European Journal of Political Theory:1474885114531238.score: 15.0
    In this work we address the proposition that because it emerges from the contract tradition and so relies upon the assumption of mutual advantage, John Rawls' theory of “Justice as Fairness” cannot accommodate persons with severe mental and/or physical impairments. We respond to this criticism by proposing a revision to Rawls' contracting situation, the Original Position (OP). Specifically, we propose to supplant the traditional understanding of mutual advantage—which we agree does constitute the necessary and sufficient condition for deliberation to come (...)
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  42. William Desmond (2005). Doing Justice and the Practice of Philosophy. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:41-59.score: 15.0
    There is a sense of doing justice prior to the juxtaposition of theory and practice, accounting for an ontological vulnerability prior to both social power andsocial vulnerability. Justice in the sense of “being true” involves fidelity to truth that we neither possess nor construct, preceding all efforts to enact justice. The charge to be just precedes any just act. There is a “patience of being,” or a receiving of being before acting, which we must then actively take up. All (...)
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  43. Liao Shenbai (2006). Doing Business: An Obscure Notion of the Ethics of Public Associations in Ordinary Chinese. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (3):325-340.score: 15.0
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  44. Christian List (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.score: 14.0
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an (...)
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  45. Paul McNamara (1998). Doing Well Enough in an Andersonian-Kangerian Framework. In Paul McNamara & Henry Prakken (eds.), Norms, Logics and Information Systems: New Studies on Deontic Logic and Computer Science. IOS Press. 181-198.score: 14.0
    I recast the DWE ("Doing Well Enough") deontic framework as an Andersonian-Kangerian modal framework and explore its metatheory systematically.
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  46. N. Agar (2013). Why is It Possible to Enhance Moral Status and Why Doing so is Wrong? Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (2):67-74.score: 13.0
    This paper presents arguments for two claims. First, post-persons, beings with a moral status superior to that of mere persons, are possible. Second, it would be bad to create such beings. Actions that risk bringing them into existence should be avoided. According to Allen Buchanan, it is possible to enhance moral status up to the level of personhood. But attempts to improve status beyond that fail for want of a target - there is no category of moral status superior to (...)
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  47. Sydney Shoemaker, Content, Character, and Color Ii: A Better Kind of Representationalism.score: 12.0
    From now on I will assume that it is possible in principle for there to be cases of spectrum inversion in which the invertees are equally good perceivers of the colors. What I want to show next is that while allowing this possibility is incompatible with standard representationalism, it requires acceptance of a different version of representationalism. Consider the standard way of describing a case of spectrum inversion. Returning to Jack and Jill, we say that red things look to (...)
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  48. Matthew Kieran (2010). Teaching & Learning Guide For: Art, Morality and Ethics: On the (Im)Moral Character of Art Works and Inter-Relations to Artistic Value. Philosophy Compass 5 (5):426-431.score: 12.0
    Up until fairly recently it was philosophical orthodoxy – at least within analytic aesthetics broadly construed – to hold that the appreciation and evaluation of works as art and moral considerations pertaining to them are conceptually distinct. However, following on from the idea that artistic value is broader than aesthetic value, the last 15 years has seen an explosion of interest in exploring possible inter-relations between the appreciative and ethical character of works as art. Consideration of these issues has a (...)
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  49. Wayne Wu (2008). Visual Attention, Conceptual Content, and Doing It Right. Mind 117 (468):1003-1033.score: 12.0
    Reflection on the fine-grained information required for visual guidance of action has suggested that visual content is non-conceptual. I argue that in a common type of visually guided action, namely the use of manipulable artefacts, vision has conceptual content. Specifically, I show that these actions require visual attention and that concepts are involved in directing attention. In acting with artefacts, there is a way of doing it right as determined by the artefact’s conventional use. Attention must reflect our understanding (...)
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  50. Mohan Matthen (2008). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Précis. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):392–399.score: 12.0
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