Search results for 'doing and allowing' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Christian Barry, Matthew Lindauer & Gerhard Øverland (forthcoming). Doing, Allowing, and Enabling Harm: An Empirical Investigation. In Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.score: 162.0
    Traditionally, moral philosophers have distinguished between doing and allowing harm, and have normally proceeded as if this bipartite distinction can exhaustively characterize all cases of human conduct involving harm. By contrast, cognitive scientists and psychologists studying causal judgment have investigated the concept ‘enable’ as distinct from the concept ‘cause’ and other causal terms. Empirical work on ‘enable’ and its employment has generally not focused on cases where human agents enable harm. In this paper, we present new empirical evidence (...)
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  2. Thomas S. Huddle (2013). Moral Fiction or Moral Fact? The Distinction Between Doing and Allowing in Medical Ethics. Bioethics 27 (5):257-262.score: 150.0
    Opponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) maintain that physician withdrawal-of-life-sustaining-treatment cannot be morally equated to voluntary active euthanasia. PAS opponents generally distinguish these two kinds of act by positing a possible moral distinction between killing and allowing-to-die, ceteris paribus. While that distinction continues to be widely accepted in the public discourse, it has been more controversial among philosophers. Some ethicist PAS advocates are so certain that the distinction is invalid that they describe PAS opponents who hold to the distinction as (...)
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  3. Adam Omar Hosein (2014). Doing, Allowing, and the State. Law and Philosophy 33 (2):235-264.score: 120.0
    The doing/allowing distinction plays an important role in our thinking about a number of legal issues, such as the need for criminal process protections, prohibitions on torture, the permissibility of the death penalty and so on. These are areas where, at least initially, there seem to be distinctions between harms that the state inflicts and harms that it merely allows. In this paper I will argue for the importance of the doing/allowing distinction as applied to state (...)
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  4. Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments. Cognition 108 (2):353-380.score: 120.0
    An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation (...)
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  5. Timothy Hall (2008). Doing Harm, Allowing Harm, and Denying Resources. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (1):50-76.score: 120.0
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  6. Fiona Woollard (2010). Doing/Allowing and the Deliberative Requirement. Ratio 23 (2):199-216.score: 120.0
    Attempts to defend the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing harm directly have left many unconvinced. I give an indirect defence of the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing, focusing on the agent's duty to reason in a way that is responsive to possible harmful effects of their behaviour. Due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot be expected to take all harmful consequences of our behaviour into account. We are required (...)
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  7. Fiona Woollard (2012). The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing I: Analysis of the Doing/Allowing Distinction. Philosophy Compass 7 (7):448-458.score: 120.0
    According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the first of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the analysis of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I explore some of the most prominent (...)
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  8. Bashshar Haydar (2002). Consequentialism and the Doing-Allowing Distinction. Utilitas 14 (01):96-.score: 120.0
    This paper takes a closer look at the incompatibility thesis, namely the claim that consequentialism is incompatible with accepting the moral relevance of the doing-allowing distinction. I examine two attempts to reject the incompatibility thesis, the first by Samuel Scheffler and the second by Frances Kamm. I argue that both attempts fail to provide an adequate ground for rejecting the incompatibility thesis. I then put forward an account of what I take to be at stake in accepting or (...)
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  9. Marion Hourdequin (2007). Doing, Allowing, and Precaution. Environmental Ethics 29 (4):339-358.score: 120.0
    Many environmental policies seem to rest on an implicit distinction between doing and allowing. For example, it is generally thought worse to drive a speciesto extinction than to fail to save a species that is declining through no fault of our own, and worse to pollute the air with chemicals that trigger asthma attacks thanto fail to remove naturally occurring allergens such as pollen and mold. The distinction between doing and allowing seems to underlie certain versions (...)
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  10. Fiona Woollard (2012). The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing II: The Moral Relevance of the Doing/Allowing Distinction. Philosophy Compass 7 (7):459-469.score: 114.0
    According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the second of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the moral status of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I look at objections to the (...)
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  11. Fiona Woollard (2008). Doing and Allowing, Threats and Sequences. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):261–277.score: 102.0
    The distinction between doing and allowing appears to have moral significance, but the very nature of the distinction is as yet unclear. Philippa Foot's ‘pre-existing threats’ account of the doing/allowing distinction is highly influential. According to the best version of Foot's account an agent brings about an outcome if and only if his behaviour is part of the sequence leading to that outcome. When understood in this way, Foot's account escapes objections by Warren Quinn and Jonathan (...)
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  12. Xiaofei Liu (2012). A Robust Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Utilitas 24 (01):63-81.score: 96.0
    Philosophers debate over the truth of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the thesis that there is a morally significant difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm to happen. Deontologists tend to accept this doctrine, whereas consequentialists tend to reject it. A robust defence of this doctrine would require a conceptual distinction between doing and allowing that both matches our ordinary use of the concepts in a wide range of cases and enables a (...)
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  13. Bashshar Haydar (2010). The Consequences of Rejecting the Moral Relevance of the DoingAllowing Distinction. Utilitas 22 (2):222-227.score: 96.0
    The claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing enjoys a great intuitive appeal. If in addition to this claim, we reject the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction. In this short essay, I propose a different take on the argument in question. Instead of opting to reject its conclusion by defending the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction, we can no longer rely on the strong intuitive appeal of the claim that one is (...)
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  14. Allen Thompson (2006). Environmentalism, Moral Responsibility, and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Ethics, Place and Environment 9 (3):269 – 278.score: 96.0
    In 'Doing and Allowing', Samuel Scheffler argues that if a person sees herself as subject to norms of individual moral responsibility, then the content of her first-order substantive norms of individual moral responsibility must attribute greater responsibility to what one does than to what one could, but fails, to prevent. This paper is about how a morally responsible agent could deny the doctrine of doing and allowing, why an environmentalist should, and what this means for environmental (...)
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  15. Fiona Woollard (2013). If This Is My Body … : A Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):315-341.score: 96.0
    I defend the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: the claim that doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. A thing does not genuinely belong to a person unless he has special authority over it. The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing protects us against harmful imposition – against the actions or needs of another intruding on what is ours. This protection is necessary for something to genuinely belong to a person. The opponent (...)
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  16. Alec Walen (1995). Doing, Allowing, and Disabling: Some Principles Governing Deontological Restrictions. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 80 (2):183 - 215.score: 90.0
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  17. Warren S. Quinn (1989). Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Philosophical Review 98 (3):287-312.score: 72.0
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  18. Samuel Scheffler (2004). Doing and Allowing. Ethics 114 (2):215-239.score: 72.0
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  19. Ben Bradley & Michael Stocker (2005). Doing and Allowing” and Doing and Allowing. Ethics 115 (4):799-808.score: 72.0
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  20. Kai Draper (2005). Rights and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (3):253–280.score: 72.0
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  21. Samuel C. Rickless (1997). The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Philosophical Review 106 (4):555-575.score: 72.0
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  22. John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1992). Quinn on Doing and Allowing. Philosophical Review 101 (2):343-352.score: 72.0
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  23. Alan Strudler & David Wasserman (1995). The First Dogma of Deontology: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing and the Notion of a Say. Philosophical Studies 80 (1):51 - 67.score: 72.0
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  24. David Ryan (2004). Doing and Allowing: Dispensing with Rights and Agency. Philosophia 31 (3-4):557-573.score: 72.0
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  25. David K. Chan (2010). A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics, and Responsibility. MIT Press.score: 72.0
     
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  26. William J. FitzPatrick, Gerhard Øverland, Talbot Brewer, David Enoch & Philip Stratton‐Lake (2005). 2.“Doing and Allowing” and Doing and AllowingDoing and Allowing” and Doing and Allowing (Pp. 799-808). Ethics 115 (4).score: 72.0
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  27. Bashshar Haydar (2005). Extreme Poverty and Global Responsibility. Metaphilosophy 36 (1‐2):240-253.score: 60.0
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  28. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2012). Are Trade Subsidies and Tariffs Killing the Global Poor? Social Research (4):865-896.score: 54.0
    In recent years it has often been claimed that policies such as subsidies paid to domestic producers by affluent countries and tariffs on goods produced by foreign producers in poorer countries violate important moral requirements because they do severe harm to poor people, even kill them. Such claims involve an empirical aspect—such policies are on balance very bad for the global poor—and a philosophical aspect—that the causal influence of these policies can fairly be characterized as doing severe harm and (...)
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  29. Fiery Cushman & Liane Young (2011). Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations. Cognitive Science 35 (6):1052-1075.score: 50.0
    Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side-effect (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side-effect distinctions affect nonmoral representations (...)
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  30. Y.-Y. Chen & S. J. Youngner (2008). "Allow Natural Death" is Not Equivalent to "Do Not Resuscitate": A Response. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (12):887-888.score: 32.0
    Venneman and colleagues argue that “do not resuscitate” (DNR) is problematic and should be replaced by “allow natural death” (AND). Their argument is flawed. First, while end-of-life discussions should be as positive as possible, they cannot and should not sidestep painful but necessary confrontations with morality. Second, while DNR can indeed be nonspecific and confusing, AND merely replaces one problematic term with another. Finally, the study’s results are not generalisable to the populations of physicians and working nurses and certainly do (...)
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  31. Kenneth Einar Himma (2010). Plantinga's Version of the Free-Will Argument: The Good and Evil That Free Beings Do. Religious Studies 46 (1):21-39.score: 30.0
    According to Plantinga's version of the free-will argument (FWA), the existence of free beings in the world who, on the whole, do more good than evil is the greater moral good that cannot be secured by even an omnipotent God without allowing some evil and thereby shows the logical compatibility of God with evil. In this essay, I argue that there are good empirical and moral reasons, from the standpoint of one plausible conception of Christian ethics, to doubt that (...)
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  32. Maura C. Schlairet & Richard W. Cohen (2013). Allow-Natural-Death (AND) Orders: Legal, Ethical, and Practical Considerations. HEC Forum 25 (2):161-171.score: 30.0
    Conversations with patients and families about the allow-natural-death (AND) order, along with the standard do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order during end-of-life (EOL) decision-making, may create engagement and understanding while promoting care that can be defended using enduring notions of autonomy, beneficence, and professional duty. Ethical, legal, and pragmatic issues surrounding EOL care decision-making seem to suggest discussion of AND orders as one strategy clinicians could consider at the individual practice level and at institutional levels. A discussion of AND orders, along with traditional (...)
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  33. Melanie Sisson & Martin DeNicolo (forthcoming). Minimal Mutual Advantage: How the Social Contract Can Do Justice to the Disabled. European Journal of Political Theory:1474885114531238.score: 30.0
    In this work we address the proposition that because it emerges from the contract tradition and so relies upon the assumption of mutual advantage, John Rawls' theory of “Justice as Fairness” cannot accommodate persons with severe mental and/or physical impairments. We respond to this criticism by proposing a revision to Rawls' contracting situation, the Original Position (OP). Specifically, we propose to supplant the traditional understanding of mutual advantage—which we agree does constitute the necessary and sufficient condition for deliberation to come (...)
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  34. Elie Holzer (2007). Allowing the Biblical Text to Do its Pedagogical Work: Connecting Interpretative Activity and Moral Education. Journal of Moral Education 36 (4):497-514.score: 30.0
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  35. Adaptable Robots (2002). Robot is Going to Operate in is Completely Understood and the Actions It is Going to Take in the Environment to Achieve its Goals Are Also Completely Understood. The Problem is That This Kind of Design Does Not Allow for Encountering Unknown Obstacles and Doing Something Different to Get Around Them. In James Moor & Terrell Ward Bynum (eds.), Cyberphilosophy: The Intersection of Philosophy and Computing. Blackwell Pub.. 78.score: 30.0
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  36. Sydney Shoemaker, Content, Character, and Color Ii: A Better Kind of Representationalism.score: 24.0
    From now on I will assume that it is possible in principle for there to be cases of spectrum inversion in which the invertees are equally good perceivers of the colors. What I want to show next is that while allowing this possibility is incompatible with standard representationalism, it requires acceptance of a different version of representationalism. Consider the standard way of describing a case of spectrum inversion. Returning to Jack and Jill, we say that red things look to (...)
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  37. Matthew Kieran (2010). Teaching & Learning Guide For: Art, Morality and Ethics: On the (Im)Moral Character of Art Works and Inter-Relations to Artistic Value. Philosophy Compass 5 (5):426-431.score: 24.0
    Up until fairly recently it was philosophical orthodoxy – at least within analytic aesthetics broadly construed – to hold that the appreciation and evaluation of works as art and moral considerations pertaining to them are conceptually distinct. However, following on from the idea that artistic value is broader than aesthetic value, the last 15 years has seen an explosion of interest in exploring possible inter-relations between the appreciative and ethical character of works as art. Consideration of these issues has a (...)
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  38. Gregory M. Nixon (2010). Whitehead & the Elusive Present: Process Philosophy's Creative Core. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (5):625-639.score: 24.0
    Time’s arrow is necessary for progress from a past that has already happened to a future that is only potential until creatively determined in the present. But time’s arrow is unnecessary in Einstein’s so-called block universe, so there is no creative unfolding in an actual present. How can there be an actual present when there is no universal moment of simultaneity? Events in various places will have different presents according to the position, velocity, and nature of the perceiver. Standing against (...)
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  39. Samuel Scheffler (2010). Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Valuing -- Morality and reasonable partiality -- Doing and allowing -- The division of moral labour : egalitarian liberalism as moral pluralism -- Is the basic structure basic? -- Cosmopolitanism, justice, and institutions -- What is egalitarianism? -- Choice, circumstance, and the value of equality -- Is terrorism morally distinctive? -- Immigration and the significance of culture -- The normativity of tradition -- The good of toleration.
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  40. Samuel C. Rickless (2011). The Moral Status of Enabling Harm. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):66-86.score: 24.0
    According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, it is more difficult to justify doing harm than it is to justify allowing harm. Enabling harm consists in withdrawing an obstacle that would, if left in place, prevent a pre-existing causal sequence from leading to foreseen harm. There has been a lively debate concerning the moral status of enabling harm. According to some (e.g. McMahan, Vihvelin and Tomkow), many cases of enabling harm are morally indistinguishable from (...) harm. Others (e.g. Foot, Hanser) support the Equivalence Hypothesis, according to which enabling harm is morally equivalent to allowing harm. Here I argue that there is every reason to embrace, and no reason to reject, the Equivalence Hypothesis. (shrink)
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  41. Joel Michell (1994). Numbers as Quantitative Relations and the Traditional Theory of Measurement. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):389-406.score: 24.0
    The thesis that numbers are ratios of quantities has recently been advanced by a number of philosophers. While adequate as a definition of the natural numbers, it is not clear that this view suffices for our understanding of the reals. These require continuous quantity and relative to any such quantity an infinite number of additive relations exist. Hence, for any two magnitudes of a continuous quantity there exists no unique ratio. This problem is overcome by defining ratios, and hence real (...)
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  42. Roy A. Sorensen (2003). A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the Mind. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Can God create a stone too heavy for him to lift? Can time have a beginning? Which came first, the chicken or the egg? Riddles, paradoxes, conundrums--for millennia the human mind has found such knotty logical problems both perplexing and irresistible. Now Roy Sorensen offers the first narrative history of paradoxes, a fascinating and eye-opening account that extends from the ancient Greeks, through the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment, and into the twentieth century. When Augustine asked what God was doing (...)
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  43. Tamara Horowitz (1998). Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory. Ethics 108 (2):367-385.score: 24.0
    To what extent can philosophical thought experiments reveal norms? Some ethicists have argued that certain thought experiments reveal that people draw a morally significant distinction between "doing" and "allowing". I examine one such thought experiment in detail and argue that the intuitions it elicits can be explained by "prospect theory", a psychological theory about the way people reason. The extent to which such alternative explanations of the results of thought experiments in philosophy are generally available is an empirical (...)
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  44. Carolina Sartorio (2008). Moral Inertia. Philosophical Studies 140 (1):117 - 133.score: 24.0
    I argue that, according to ordinary morality, there is moral inertia, that is, moral pressure to fail to intervene in certain circumstances. Moral inertia is manifested in scenarios with a particular causal structure: deflection scenarios, where a threatening or benefiting process is diverted from a group of people to another. I explain why the deflection structure is essential for moral inertia to be manifested. I argue that there are two different manifestations of moral inertia: strict prohibitions on interventions, and constraints (...)
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  45. Andrew Benjamin (2007). Perception, Judgment and Individuation: Towards a Metaphysics of Particularity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (4):481 – 500.score: 24.0
    The aim of this paper is to develop a new theory of particularity. In so doing it redefines the concepts 'perception' and 'judgment'. The redefinition occurs once perception is understood as recognition. The move to recognition entails the centrality of repetition. Recognition, it is argued, is a form of repetition. Allowing for repetition necessitates changing the way the relationship between universals and particulars is understood. This is developed via an engagement with Hume and Plato. The article concludes with (...)
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  46. David B. Hershenov (1999). Restitution and Revenge. Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):79-94.score: 24.0
    The aim of this paper is to provide a broad sketch of the advantages of the debt/atonement approach to punishment. Such an approach is appealing for it can benefit both the victim and the remorseful victimizer. Compared to other theories, it gives a fuller and more unified account of our intuitions about paying debts, doing penance, alleviating guilt, granting forgiveness, and offsetting privileges, pleasures and burdens. The theory also allows us to avoid justifying punishment on the basis of using (...)
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  47. Mark van Roojen (1999). Reflective Moral Equilibrium and Psychological Theory. Ethics 109 (4):846-857.score: 24.0
    Tamara Horowitz criticizes the use of thought experiments by Warren Quinn and others to support a version of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. She argues that because a competing empirical explanatory hypothesis for our common agreement on the correct outcome in those thought experiments is true we should conclude that our intuitions concerning those examples do not provide support for the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Other authors have reached similar conclusions. I argue that the (...)
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  48. Stevan Harnad, There is No Concrete.score: 24.0
    We are accustomed to thinking that a primrose is "concrete" and a prime number is "abstract," that "roundness" is more abstract than "round," and that "property" is more abstract than "roundness." In reality, the relation between "abstract" and "concrete" is more like the (non)relation between "abstract" and "concave," "concrete" being a sensory term [about what something feels like] and "abstract" being a functional term (about what the sensorimotor system is doing with its input in order to produce its output): (...)
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  49. Gareth B. Matthews (2000). The Ring of Gyges. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (1):3-11.score: 24.0
    This paper illustrates some of the exciting and interesting philosophical discussions we can have with children when we let them develop the thread of the conversation in their own ways. The author discusses the virtue of patience when doing philosophy with children, and the importance of letting the rhythms of the discussion unfold without undue adult interference. Adults (and especially teachers) often attempt to control the ways in which children discuss issues with one another. The author reminds us of (...)
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  50. Brad Hooker, Publicity in Morality.score: 24.0
    Consider the idea that moral rules must be suitable for public acknowledgement and acceptance, i.e., that moral rules must be suitable for being ‘widely known and explicitly recognized’, suitable for teaching as part of moral education, suitable for guiding behaviour and reactions to behaviour, and thus suitable for justifying one’s behaviour to others. This idea is now most often associated with John Rawls, who traces it back through Kurt Baier to Kant.[1] My book developing ruleconsequentialism, Ideal Code, Real World, accepted (...)
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