Search results for 'doing and allowing' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  24
    Daniel Lim (forthcoming). Doing, Allowing, and the Problem of Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-17.
    Many assume that the best, and perhaps only, way to address the so-called Problem of Evil is to claim that God does not do evil, but that God merely allows evil. This assumption depends on two claims: the doing-allowing distinction exists and the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. In this paper I try to undermine both of these claims. Against I argue that some of the most influential analyses of the doing-allowing distinction face grave (...)
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  2.  18
    Duncan Purves (2011). Still in Hot Water: Doing, Allowing, and Rachels’ Bathtub Cases. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):129-137.
    The aim of this paper is to explain and defend a type of argument common in the doing/allowing literature called a “contrast argument.” I am concerned with defending a particular type of contrast argument that is intended to demonstrate the moral irrelevance of the doing/allowing distinction. This type of argument, referred to in this paper as an “irrelevance argument,” is exemplified by an argument offered by James Rachels (1975) that employs the Smith and Jones bathtub cases. (...)
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  3. Christian Barry, Matthew Lindauer & Gerhard Øverland (2014). Doing, Allowing, and Enabling Harm: An Empirical Investigation. In Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press
    Traditionally, moral philosophers have distinguished between doing and allowing harm, and have normally proceeded as if this bipartite distinction can exhaustively characterize all cases of human conduct involving harm. By contrast, cognitive scientists and psychologists studying causal judgment have investigated the concept ‘enable’ as distinct from the concept ‘cause’ and other causal terms. Empirical work on ‘enable’ and its employment has generally not focused on cases where human agents enable harm. In this paper, we present new empirical evidence (...)
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  4. Xiaofei Liu (2012). A Robust Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Utilitas 24 (01):63-81.
    Philosophers debate over the truth of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the thesis that there is a morally significant difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm to happen. Deontologists tend to accept this doctrine, whereas consequentialists tend to reject it. A robust defence of this doctrine would require a conceptual distinction between doing and allowing that both matches our ordinary use of the concepts in a wide range of cases and enables a (...)
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  5.  31
    Thomas S. Huddle (2013). Moral Fiction or Moral Fact? The Distinction Between Doing and Allowing in Medical Ethics. Bioethics 27 (5):257-262.
    Opponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) maintain that physician withdrawal-of-life-sustaining-treatment cannot be morally equated to voluntary active euthanasia. PAS opponents generally distinguish these two kinds of act by positing a possible moral distinction between killing and allowing-to-die, ceteris paribus. While that distinction continues to be widely accepted in the public discourse, it has been more controversial among philosophers. Some ethicist PAS advocates are so certain that the distinction is invalid that they describe PAS opponents who hold to the distinction as (...)
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  6.  15
    Jason Hanna (2014). Doing, Allowing, and the Moral Relevance of the Past. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (4):677-698.
    Most deontologists claim that it is more objectionable to do harm than it is to allow harm of comparable magnitude. I argue that this view faces a largely neglected puzzle regarding the moral relevance of an agent's past behavior. Consider an agent who chooses to save five people rather than one, where the one person's life is in jeopardy because of something the agent did earlier. How are the agent's obligations affected by the fact that his now letting the one (...)
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  7. Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments. Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation (...)
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  8.  59
    Timothy Hall (2008). Doing Harm, Allowing Harm, and Denying Resources. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (1):50-76.
    Of great importance to many non-consequentialists is a claimed moral difference between doing and allowing harm. I argue that non-consequentialism is best understood, however, as consisting in three morally distinct categories where commentators typically identify two: standard doings of harm, standard allowings of harm, and denials of resources. Furthermore, the moral distinctness of denials of resources is independent of whether denials are doings or allowings of harm, I argue. I argue by way of matched examples, as well as (...)
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  9.  1
    David K. Chan (2010). A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics, and Responsibility. MIT Press 25-45.
    Warren Quinn and Philippa Foot have given versions of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing justifying a moral distinction between doing something to bring about harm, and doing nothing to prevent harm. They argue that it is justified to allow one person to die so that one can save a larger number of people, but not to kill one person to achieve the same purpose. In this chapter, I show that the examples typically used to support (...)
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  10. Adam Omar Hosein (2014). Doing, Allowing, and the State. Law and Philosophy 33 (2):235-264.
    The doing/allowing distinction plays an important role in our thinking about a number of legal issues, such as the need for criminal process protections, prohibitions on torture, the permissibility of the death penalty and so on. These are areas where, at least initially, there seem to be distinctions between harms that the state inflicts and harms that it merely allows. In this paper I will argue for the importance of the doing/allowing distinction as applied to state (...)
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  11.  51
    Fiona Woollard (2012). The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing I: Analysis of the Doing/Allowing Distinction. Philosophy Compass 7 (7):448-458.
    According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the first of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the analysis of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I explore some of the most prominent (...)
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  12.  12
    Marion Hourdequin (2007). Doing, Allowing, and Precaution. Environmental Ethics 29 (4):339-358.
    Many environmental policies seem to rest on an implicit distinction between doing and allowing. For example, it is generally thought worse to drive a speciesto extinction than to fail to save a species that is declining through no fault of our own, and worse to pollute the air with chemicals that trigger asthma attacks thanto fail to remove naturally occurring allergens such as pollen and mold. The distinction between doing and allowing seems to underlie certain versions (...)
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  13.  31
    Fiona Woollard (2010). Doing/Allowing and the Deliberative Requirement. Ratio 23 (2):199-216.
    Attempts to defend the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing harm directly have left many unconvinced. I give an indirect defence of the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing, focusing on the agent's duty to reason in a way that is responsive to possible harmful effects of their behaviour. Due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot be expected to take all harmful consequences of our behaviour into account. We are required (...)
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  14.  49
    Bashshar Haydar (2002). Consequentialism and the Doing-Allowing Distinction. Utilitas 14 (1):96.
    This paper takes a closer look at the incompatibility thesis, namely the claim that consequentialism is incompatible with accepting the moral relevance of the doing-allowing distinction. I examine two attempts to reject the incompatibility thesis, the first by Samuel Scheffler and the second by Frances Kamm. I argue that both attempts fail to provide an adequate ground for rejecting the incompatibility thesis. I then put forward an account of what I take to be at stake in accepting or (...)
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  15.  48
    Fiona Woollard (2012). The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing II: The Moral Relevance of the Doing/Allowing Distinction. Philosophy Compass 7 (7):459-469.
    According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the second of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the moral status of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I look at objections to the (...)
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  16.  41
    Fiona Woollard (2013). If This Is My Body … : A Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):315-341.
    I defend the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: the claim that doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. A thing does not genuinely belong to a person unless he has special authority over it. The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing protects us against harmful imposition – against the actions or needs of another intruding on what is ours. This protection is necessary for something to genuinely belong to a person. The opponent (...)
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  17.  82
    Bashshar Haydar (2010). The Consequences of Rejecting the Moral Relevance of the DoingAllowing Distinction. Utilitas 22 (2):222-227.
    The claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing enjoys a great intuitive appeal. If in addition to this claim, we reject the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction. In this short essay, I propose a different take on the argument in question. Instead of opting to reject its conclusion by defending the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction, we can no longer rely on the strong intuitive appeal of the claim that one is (...)
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  18. Fiona Woollard (2008). Doing and Allowing, Threats and Sequences. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):261–277.
    The distinction between doing and allowing appears to have moral significance, but the very nature of the distinction is as yet unclear. Philippa Foot's ‘pre-existing threats’ account of the doing/allowing distinction is highly influential. According to the best version of Foot's account an agent brings about an outcome if and only if his behaviour is part of the sequence leading to that outcome. When understood in this way, Foot's account escapes objections by Warren Quinn and Jonathan (...)
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  19.  20
    Brian Berkey (2014). State Action, State Policy, and the Doing/Allowing Distinction. Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (2):147-149.
  20.  18
    Alec Walen (1995). Doing, Allowing, and Disabling: Some Principles Governing Deontological Restrictions. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 80 (2):183 - 215.
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  21.  34
    Allen Thompson (2006). Environmentalism, Moral Responsibility, and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Ethics, Place and Environment 9 (3):269 – 278.
    In 'Doing and Allowing', Samuel Scheffler argues that if a person sees herself as subject to norms of individual moral responsibility, then the content of her first-order substantive norms of individual moral responsibility must attribute greater responsibility to what one does than to what one could, but fails, to prevent. This paper is about how a morally responsible agent could deny the doctrine of doing and allowing, why an environmentalist should, and what this means for environmental (...)
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  22.  13
    Fiona Woollard (2015). Doing and Allowing Harm. OUP Oxford.
    Fiona Woollard presents an original defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, according to which doing harm seems much harder to justify than merely allowing harm. She argues that the Doctrine is best understood as a principle that protects us from harmful imposition, and offers a moderate account of our obligations to offer aid to others.
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  23. Warren S. Quinn (1989). Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Philosophical Review 98 (3):287-312.
  24. Samuel Scheffler (2004). Doing and Allowing. Ethics 114 (2):215-239.
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  25.  71
    Jacob Blair (2016). Fiona Woollard, Doing and Allowing Harm. Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (3):673-681.
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  26. Ben Bradley & Michael Stocker (2005). Doing and Allowing” and Doing and Allowing. Ethics 115 (4):799-808.
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  27.  79
    Kai Draper (2005). Rights and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (3):253–280.
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  28.  12
    Fei Song (2016). Doing and Allowing Harm. Fiona Woollard, 2015 Oxford, Oxford University Press 239 Pp., £40.00. [REVIEW] Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (4).
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  29.  77
    Samuel C. Rickless (1997). The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Philosophical Review 106 (4):555-575.
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  30.  44
    Alan Strudler & David Wasserman (1995). The First Dogma of Deontology: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing and the Notion of a Say. Philosophical Studies 80 (1):51 - 67.
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  31. William J. FitzPatrick, Gerhard Øverland, Talbot Brewer, David Enoch & Philip Stratton‐Lake (2005). 2.“Doing and Allowing” and Doing and AllowingDoing and Allowing” and Doing and Allowing (Pp. 799-808). Ethics 115 (4).
     
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  32.  41
    John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1992). Quinn on Doing and Allowing. Philosophical Review 101 (2):343-352.
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  33.  31
    David Ryan (2004). Doing and Allowing: Dispensing with Rights and Agency. Philosophia 31 (3-4):557-573.
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  34.  4
    Kai Draper (2005). Rights and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (3):253-280.
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  35.  4
    Patrick Taylor Smith (2014). Redirecting Threats, the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, and the Special Wrongness of Solar Radiation Management. Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (2):143-146.
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  36.  24
    Ralph Wedgwood (2016). Two Grades of Non-Consequentialism. Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):795-814.
    In this paper, I explore how to accommodate non-consequentialist constraints with a broadly value-based conception of reasons for action. It turns out that there are two grades of non-consequentialist constraints. The first grade involves attaching ethical importance to such distinctions as the doing/allowing distinction, and the distinction between intended and unintended consequences that is central to the Doctrine of Double Effect. However, at least within the value-based framework, this first grade is insufficient to explain rights, which ground weighty (...)
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  37.  25
    David R. Morrow (2014). Starting a Flood to Stop a Fire? Some Moral Constraints on Solar Radiation Management. Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (2):123-138.
    Solar radiation management (SRM), a form of climate engineering, would offset the effects of increased greenhouse gas concentrations by reducing the amount of sunlight absorbed by the Earth. To encourage support for SRM research, advocates argue that SRM may someday be needed to reduce the risks from climate change. This paper examines the implications of two moral constraints?the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, and the Doctrine of Double Effect?on this argument for SRM and SRM research. The Doctrine of (...)
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  38. Randolph Clarke (2014). Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophical theories of agency have focused primarily on actions and activities. But, besides acting, we often omit to do or refrain from doing certain things. How is this aspect of our agency to be conceived? This book offers a comprehensive account of omitting and refraining, addressing issues ranging from the nature of agency and moral responsibility to the metaphysics of absences and causation. Topics addressed include the role of intention in intentional omission, the connection between negligence and omission, the (...)
     
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  39.  7
    Stijn Bruers (forthcoming). Can Deontological Principles Be Unified? Reflections on the Mere Means Principle. Philosophia:1-16.
    The mere means principle says it is impermissible to treat someone as merely a means to someone else’s ends. I specify this principle with two conditions: a victim is used as merely a means if the victim does not want the treatment by the agent and the agent wants the presence of the victim’s body. This principle is a specification of the doctrine of double effect which is compatible with moral intuitions and with a restricted kind of libertarianism. An extension (...)
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  40.  18
    Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2016). Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency. Cambridge University Press.
    This book explores the nature of moral responsibilities of affluent individuals in the developed world, addressing global poverty and arguments that philosophers have offered for having these responsibilities. The first type of argument grounds responsibilities in ability to avert serious suffering by taking on some cost. The second argument seeks to ground responsibilities in the fact that the affluent are contributing to such poverty. The authors criticise many of the claims advanced by those who seek to ground stringent responsibilities to (...)
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  41.  47
    Bashshar Haydar (2005). Extreme Poverty and Global Responsibility. Metaphilosophy 36 (1‐2):240-253.
  42.  25
    Jason Hanna (2015). Enabling Harm, Doing Harm, and Undoing One’s Own Behavior. Ethics 126 (1):68-90.
    Philosophers disagree about the moral status of harm-enabling, or behavior by which an agent removes an obstacle to the completion of a threatening sequence. I argue that enabling harm is equivalent to doing harm, at least when an agent withdraws a resource to which neither she nor the victim has any prior moral claim. This conclusion reinforces the common objection that deontological appeals to the doing/allowing distinction cannot easily handle cases involving the withdrawal of aid. I argue (...)
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  43. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2012). Are Trade Subsidies and Tariffs Killing the Global Poor? Social Research (4):865-896.
    In recent years it has often been claimed that policies such as subsidies paid to domestic producers by affluent countries and tariffs on goods produced by foreign producers in poorer countries violate important moral requirements because they do severe harm to poor people, even kill them. Such claims involve an empirical aspect—such policies are on balance very bad for the global poor—and a philosophical aspect—that the causal influence of these policies can fairly be characterized as doing severe harm and (...)
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  44.  93
    Stefan Hirschauer (2005). On Doing Being a Stranger: The Practical Constitution of Civil Inattention. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35 (1):41–67.
    The article takes on a less developed aspect of the sociology of the stranger: the normalized non-relations people in urban settings establish in their effort to stay strangers for one another. How is their “civil inattention”accomplished in practice? What is the social orderliness of “asocial” relations? In order to answer these questions the article uses the elevator as a sociological research instrument allowing for a highly detailed investigation in structural problems of public encounters: bodily navigation, contact avoidance, feigned preoccupation, (...)
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  45.  22
    Mark Van Roojen (1997). Affirmative Action, Non-Consequentialism, and Responsibility for the Effects of Past Discrimination. Public Affairs Quarterly 11 (3):281-301.
    One popular criticism of affirmative action is that it discriminates against those who would otherwise have been offered jobs without it. This objection must rely on the non- consequentialist distinction between what we do and what we merely allow to claim that doing nothing merely allows people to be harmed by the discrimination of others, while preferential programs actively harm those left out. It fails since the present effects of past discrimination result from social arrangements which result from actions (...)
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  46. Ryan Preston-Roedder (forthcoming). Civic Trust. Philosophers' Imprint.
    It is a commonplace that there are limits to the ways we can permissibly treat people, even in the service of good ends. For example, we may not steal someone’s wallet, even if we plan to donate the contents to famine relief, or break a promise to help a colleague move, even if we encounter someone else on the way whose need is somewhat more urgent. In other words, we should observe certain constraints against mistreating people, where a constraint is (...)
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  47. Howard Nye (2014). Chaos and Constraints. In David Boersema (ed.), Dimensions of Moral Agency. Cambridge Scholars Publishing 14-29.
    Agent-centered constraints on harming hold that some harmful upshots of our conduct cannot be justified by its generating equal or somewhat greater benefits. In this paper I argue that all plausible theories of agent-centered constraints on harming are undermined by the likelihood that our actions will have butterfly effects, or cause cascades of changes that make the world dramatically different than it would have been. Theories that impose constraints against only intended harming or proximally caused harm have unacceptable implications for (...)
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  48. Fiery Cushman & Liane Young (2011). Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations. Cognitive Science 35 (6):1052-1075.
    Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side-effect (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side-effect distinctions affect nonmoral representations (...)
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  49. Govind C. Persad (2009). Risk, Everyday Intuitions, and the Institutional Value of Tort Law. Stan. L. Rev 62:1445.
    This Note offers a normative critique of cost-benefit analysis, one informed by deontological moral theory, in the context of the debate over whether tort litigation or a non-tort approach is the appropriate response to mass harm. The first Part argues that the difference between lay and expert intuitions about risk and harm often reflects a difference in normative judgments about the existing facts, rather than a difference in belief about what facts exist, which makes the lay intuitions more defensible. The (...)
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  50.  5
    Robert F. Card (2006). "Lessons (Not) Learned: Ethical Medical Treatment at the End of Life." . Philosophy Now 55:14-17.
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