Search results for 'double effect' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  75
    Ezio Di Nucci (forthcoming). Strategic Bombing, Causal Beliefs, and Double Effect. Journal of Value Inquiry:1-10.
    I argue against the Doctrine of Double Effect’s explanation of the moral difference between terror bombing and strategic bombing. I show that the standard thought-experiment of terror bombing and strategic bombing which dominates this debate is underdetermined with regards to the agents’ psychologies: (a) if Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber have the same causal beliefs, then why does Terror Bomber set out to kill the children? It may then be this unwarranted and immoral choice and not the (...)
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  2. Ezio Di Nucci (forthcoming). Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics. In Christoph Luetge, Hannes Rusch & Matthias Uhl (eds.), Experimental Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan
    I analyse the relationship between the Doctrine of Double Effect and the Trolley Problem: the former offers a solution for the latter only on the premise that killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is permissible. Here I offer both empirical and theoretical arguments against the permissibility of killing the one: firstly, I present data from my own empirical studies according to which the intuition that killing the one is permissible is neither widespread nor stable; secondly, I (...)
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  3. T. A. Cavanaugh (2006). Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil. Oxford University Press.
    T. A. Cavanaugh defends double-effect reasoning (DER), also known as the principle of double effect. DER plays a role in anti-consequentialist ethics (such as deontology), in hard cases in which one cannot realize a good without also causing a foreseen, but not intended, bad effect (for example, killing non-combatants when bombing a military target). This study is the first book-length account of the history and issues surrounding this controversial approach to hard cases. It will be (...)
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  4. Philippa Foot (1967). The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Oxford Review 5:5-15.
    One of the reasons why most of us feel puzzled about the problem of abortion is that we want, and do not want, to allow to the unborn child the rights that belong to adults and children. When we think of a baby about to be born it seems absurd to think that the next few minutes or even hours could make so radical a difference to its status; yet as we go back in the life of the fetus we (...)
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  5. Ezio Di Nucci (2014). Aristotle and Double Effect. Journal of Ancient Philosophy 8 (1):20.
    There are some interesting similarities between Aristotle’s ‘mixed actions’ in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics and the actions often thought to be justifiable with the Doctrine of Double Effect. Here I analyse these similarities by comparing Aristotle’s examples of mixed actions with standard cases from the literature on double effect such as, amongst others, strategic bombing, the trolley problem, and craniotomy. I find that, despite some common features such as the dilemmatic structure and the inevitability (...)
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  6. Ezio Di Nucci (2013). Double Effect and Terror Bombing. In T. Spitzley, M. Hoeltje & W. Spohn (eds.), GAP.8 Proceedings. GAP
    I argue against the Doctrine of Double Effect’s explanation of the moral difference between terror bombing and strategic bombing. I show that the standard thought-experiment of Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber which dominates this debate is underdetermined in three crucial respects: (1) the non-psychological worlds of Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber; (2) the psychologies of Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber; and (3) the structure of the thought-experiment, especially in relation to its similarity with the Trolley Problem. (1) If (...)
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  7.  64
    Alexander R. Pruss (2013). The Accomplishment of Plans: A New Version of the Principle of Double Effect. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 165 (1):49-69.
    The classical principle of double effect offers permissibility conditions for actions foreseen to lead to evil outcomes. I shall argue that certain kinds of closeness cases, as well as general heuristic considerations about the order of explanation, lead us to replace the intensional concept of intention with the extensional concept of accomplishment in double effect.
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  8. Peter Allmark, Mark Cobb, B. Jane Liddle & Angela Mary Tod (2010). Is the Doctrine of Double Effect Irrelevant in End-of-Life Decision Making? Nursing Philosophy 11 (3):170-177.
    In this paper, we consider three arguments for the irrelevance of the doctrine of double effect in end-of-life decision making. The third argument is our own and, to that extent, we seek to defend it. The first argument is that end-of-life decisions do not in fact shorten lives and that therefore there is no need for the doctrine in justification of these decisions. We reject this argument; some end-of-life decisions clearly shorten lives. The second is that the doctrine (...)
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  9. Ezio Di Nucci (2013). Embryo Loss and Double Effect. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (8):537-540.
    I defend the argument that if embryo loss in stem cell research is morally problematic, then embryo loss in in vivo conception is similarly morally problematic. According to a recent challenge to this argument, we can distinguish between in vivo embryo loss and the in vitro embryo loss of stem cell research by appealing to the doctrine of double effect. I argue that this challenge fails to show that in vivo embryo loss is a mere unintended side (...) while in vitro embryo loss is an intended means and that, even if we refine the challenge by appealing to Michael Bratman's three roles of intention, the distinction is still unwarranted. (shrink)
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  10.  61
    Ezio Di Nucci (forthcoming). Eight Arguments Against Double Effect. In Proceedings of the XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie.
    I offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end.
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  11. Ralph Wedgwood (2011). Scanlon on Double Effect. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):464-472.
    In this new book Moral Dimensions, T. M. Scanlon (2008) explores the ethical significance of the intentions and motives with which people act. According to Scanlon, these intentions and motives do not have any direct bearing on the permissibility of the act. Thus, Scanlon claims that the traditional Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) is mistaken. However, the way in which someone is motivated to act has a direct bearing on what Scanlon calls the act's "meaning". One particularly important (...)
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  12.  29
    Neil Delaney (2015). The Doctrine of Double Effect. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):397-406.
    Abstract: This essay consists of some clarifying remarks on the doctrine of double effect (DDE). After providing a contemporary formulation of the doctrine we put special emphasis on the distinction between those aspects of an action plan that are intended and those that are merely foreseen (the I/F distinction). Making use of this distinction is often made difficult in practice because salient aspects of the action plan exhibit a felt “closeness” to one another that is difficult if not (...)
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  13. Neil Francis Delaney (2008). Two Cheers for “Closeness”: Terror, Targeting and Double Effect. Philosophical Studies 137 (3):335 - 367.
    Philosophers from Hart to Lewis, Johnston and Bennett have expressed various degrees of reservation concerning the doctrine of double effect. A common concern is that, with regard to many activities that double effect is traditionally thought to prohibit, what might at first look to be a directly intended bad effect is really, on closer examination, a directly intended neutral effect that is closely connected to a foreseen bad effect. This essay examines the extent (...)
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  14. Alison McIntyre (2004). The Double Life of Double Effect. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 25 (1):61-74.
    The U.S. Supreme Court's majority opinion in Vacco v. Quill assumes that the principle of double effect explains the permissibility of hastening death in the context of ordinary palliative care and in extraordinary cases in which painkilling drugs have failed to relieve especially intractable suffering and terminal sedation has been adopted as a last resort. The traditional doctrine of double effect, understood as providing a prohibition on instrumental harming as opposed to incidental harming or harming asa (...)
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  15.  19
    Howard Nye (2013). Objective Double Effect and the Avoidance of Narcissism. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 3. Oxford University Press 260-286.
    The Doctrine of Double Effect [DDE] states roughly that it is harder to justify causing or allowing harm as a means to an end than it is to justify conduct that results in harm as a side effect. This chapter argues that a theory of deontological constraints on harming needs something like the DDE in order to avoid the charge that it reflects a narcissistic obsession with the cleanliness of our own hands. Unfortunately, the DDE is often (...)
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  16. Neil Roughley (2007). The Double Failure of 'Double Effect'. In Christoph Lumer & Sandro Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy. Ashgate
    The ‘doctrine of double effect’ claims that it is in some sense morally less problematic to bring about a negatively evaluated state of affairs as a ‘side effect’ of one’s pursuit of another, morally unobjectionable aim than it is to bring it about in order to achieve that aim. In a first step, this chapter discusses the descriptive difference on which the claim is built. That difference is shown to derive from the attitudinal distinction between intention and (...)
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  17.  36
    Patrick A. Tully (2005). The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Question of Constraints on Business Decisions. Journal of Business Ethics 58 (1-3):51 - 63.
    . How does the doctrine of double effect apply to business decisions to sell products which may be harmful to consumers? Lawrence Masek believes that some authors have misapplied the doctrine to this type of decision and, as a consequence, have committed themselves to placing unwarranted constraints on businesses. Seeking to correct this mistake, Masek presents his account of how the doctrine applies here, an account which is rather permissive but which, he claims, nevertheless preserves the virtues of (...)
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  18. Richard Hull (2000). Deconstructing the Doctrine of Double Effect. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (2):195-207.
    This paper examines the doctrine of double effect as it is typically applied. The difficulty of distinguishing between what we intend and what we foresee is highlighted. In particular, Warren Quinn's articulation of that distinction is examined and criticised. It is then proposed that the only credible way that we can be said to foresee that a harm will result and mean something other than that we intend it to result, is if we are not certain (...)
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  19.  25
    S. Matthew Liao (forthcoming). The Closeness Problem and the Doctrine of Double Effect: A Way Forward. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-15.
    A major challenge to the Doctrine of Double Effect is the concern that an agent’s intention can be identified in such a fine-grained way as to eliminate an intention to harm from a putative example of an intended harm, and yet, the resulting case appears to be a case of impermissibility. This is the so-called “closeness problem.” Many people believe that one can address the closeness problem by adopting Warren Quinn’s version of the DDE, call it DDE*, which (...)
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  20.  19
    Bernard G. Prusak (2011). Double Effect, All Over Again: The Case of Sister Margaret McBride. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 32 (4):271-283.
    As media reports have made widely known, in November 2009, the ethics committee of St. Joseph’s Hospital in Phoenix, Arizona, permitted the abortion of an eleven-week-old fetus in order to save the life of its mother. This woman was suffering from acute pulmonary hypertension, which her doctors judged would prove fatal for both her and her previable child. The ethics committee believed abortion to be permitted in this case under the so-called principle of double effect, but Thomas J. (...)
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  21.  82
    Jakob Elster (2012). Scanlon on Permissibility and Double Effect. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (1):75-102.
    In his book Moral Dimensions. Permissibility, Meaning, Blame , T.M. Scanlon proposes a new account of permissibility, and argues, against the doctrine of double effect (DDE), that intentions do not matter for permissibility. I argue that Scanlon's account of permissibility as based on what the agent should have known at the time of action does not sufficiently take into account Scanlon's own emphasis on permissibility as a question for the deliberating agent. A proper account of permissibility, based on (...)
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  22.  99
    David K. Chan (2000). Intention and Responsibility in Double Effect Cases. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4):405-434.
    I argue that the moral distinction in double effect cases rests on a difference not in intention as traditionally stated in the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), but in desire. The traditional DDE has difficulty ensuring that an agent intends the bad effect just in those cases where what he does is morally objectionable. I show firstly that the mental state of a rational agent who is certain that a side-effect will occur satisfies Bratman's (...)
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  23.  8
    Georg Spielthenner (2008). The Principle of Double Effect as a Guide for Medical Decision-Making. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 11 (4):465-473.
    Many medical interventions have both negative and positive effects. When health care professionals cannot achieve a particular desired good result without bringing about some bad effects also they often rely on double-effect reasoning to justify their decisions. The principle of double effect is therefore an important guide for ethical decision-making in medicine. At the same time, however, it is a very controversial tool for resolving complex ethical problems that has been criticized by many authors. For these (...)
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  24.  37
    Laura Capitaine, Katrien Devolder & Guido Pennings (2013). Lifespan Extension and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34 (3):207-226.
    Recent developments in biogerontology—the study of the biology of ageing—suggest that it may eventually be possible to intervene in the human ageing process. This, in turn, offers the prospect of significantly postponing the onset of age-related diseases. The biogerontological project, however, has met with strong resistance, especially by deontologists. They consider the act of intervening in the ageing process impermissible on the grounds that it would (most probably) bring about an extended maximum lifespan—a state of affairs that they deem intrinsically (...)
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  25.  13
    Fiery Cushman (forthcoming). The Psychological Origins of the Doctrine of Double Effect. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-14.
    The doctrine of double effect (DDE) is a moral principle that distinguishes between harm we cause as a means to an end and harm that we cause as a side-effect. As a purely descriptive matter, the DDE is well established that it describes a consistent feature of human moral judgment. There are, however, several rival theories of its psychological cause. I review these theories and consider their advantages and disadvantages. Critically, most extant psychological theories of the DDE (...)
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  26.  27
    Danny Marrero (2013). Is the Appeal of the Doctrine of Double Effect Illusory? Philosophia 41 (2):349-359.
    Scanlon (2008) has argued that his theory of permissibility (STP) has more explanatory power than the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). I believe this claim is wrong. Borrowing Michael Walzer’s method of inquiry, I will evaluate the explanatory virtue of these accounts by their understanding of actual moral intuitions originated in historical cases. Practically, I will evaluate these accounts as they explain cases of hostage crises. The main question in this context is: is it permissible that nation-states act (...)
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  27.  5
    Lawrence Masek (2015). In Defense of a Minimalist, Agent-Based Principle of Double Effect. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):521-538.
    Many philosophers assume that the principle of double effect (PDE) is meant to cover trolley cases. In fact, trolley cases come from PDE’s critics, not its defenders. When philosophers stretch PDE to explain intuitions about trolley cases, they define intended effects too broadly. More importantly, trolley cases make poor illustrations of PDE because they focus attention away from the agent and onto the victim. When philosophers lose sight of the agent, some intuitions that fit PDE survive, but (...)
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  28.  31
    Joshua Stuchlik (2012). A Critique of Scanlon on Double Effect. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):178-199.
    According to the Principle of Double Effect (PDE), there are conditions under which it would be morally justifiable to cause some harm as a foreseen side-effect of one's action even though it would not be justifiable to form and execute the intention of causing the same harm. If we take the kind of justification in question to be that of moral permissibility, this principle correctly maps common intuitions about when it would be permissible to act in certain (...)
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  29.  3
    Alexander Sarch (forthcoming). Double Effect and the Criminal Law. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-27.
    American criminal law is committed to some version of the doctrine of double effect. In this paper, I defend a new variant of the agent-centered rationale for a version of DDE that is of particular relevance to the criminal law. In particular, I argue for a non-absolute version of DDE that concerns the relative culpability of intending a bad or wrongful state of affairs as opposed to bringing it about merely knowingly. My aim is to identify a particular (...)
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  30.  33
    Martin Klein (2004). Voluntary Active Euthanasia and the Doctrine of Double Effect: A View From Germany. Health Care Analysis 12 (3):225-240.
    This paper discusses physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia, supplies a short history and argues in favour of permitting both once rigid criteria have been set and the cases retro-reviewed. I suggest that among these criteria should be that VAE should only be permitted with one more necessary criterion: that VAE should only be allowed when physician assisted suicide is not a possible option. If the patient is able to ingest and absorb the medication there is no reason why VAE (...)
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  31.  38
    Lawrence Masek (2006). Deadly Drugs and the Doctrine of Double Effect: A Reply to Tully. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 68 (2):143-151.
    In a recent contribution to this journal, Patrick Tully criticizes my view that the doctrine of double effect does not prohibit a pharmaceutical company from selling a drug that has potentially fatal side-effects and that does not treat a life-threatening condition. Tully alleges my account is too permissive and makes the doctrine irrelevant to decisions about selling harmful products. In the following paper, I respond to Tully’s objections and show that he misinterprets my position and misstates some (...)
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  32.  16
    Anna Lindblad, Niels Lynöe & Niklas Juth (2014). End‐of‐Life Decisions and the Reinvented Rule of Double Effect: A Critical Analysis. Bioethics 28 (7):368-377.
    The Rule of Double Effect (RDE) holds that it may be permissible to harm an individual while acting for the sake of a proportionate good, given that the harm is not an intended means to the good but merely a foreseen side-effect. Although frequently used in medical ethical reasoning, the rule has been repeatedly questioned in the past few decades. However, Daniel Sulmasy, a proponent who has done a lot of work lately defending the RDE, has recently (...)
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  33.  2
    Steven A. Trankle (2014). Decisions That Hasten Death: Double Effect and the Experiences of Physicians in Australia. BMC Medical Ethics 15 (1):26.
    In Australian end-of-life care, practicing euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide is illegal. Despite this, death hastening practices are common across medical settings. Practices can be clandestine or overt but in many instances physicians are forced to seek protection behind ambiguous medico-legal imperatives such as the Principle of Double Effect. Moreover, the way they conceptualise and experience such practices is inconsistent. To complement the available statistical data, the purpose of this study was to understand the reasoning behind how and why (...)
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  34. Ezio Di Nucci (2014). Contraception and Double Effect. American Journal of Bioethics 14 (7):42-43.
  35.  80
    Jörg Schroth, Bibliography on the Principle of Double Effect. Ethik Seite.
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  36.  58
    Lawrence Masek (2011). The Contralife Argument and the Principle of Double Effect. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11 (1):83-97.
  37. Neil Sinhababu (2013). Unequal Vividness and Double Effect. Utilitas 25 (3):291-315.
    I argue that the Doctrine of Double Effect is accepted because of unreliable processes of belief-formation, making it unacceptably likely to be mistaken. We accept the doctrine because we more vividly imagine intended consequences of our actions than merely foreseen ones, making our aversions to the intended harms more violent, and making us judge that producing the intended harms is morally worse. This explanation fits psychological evidence from Schnall and others, and recent neuroscientific research from Greene, Klein, Kahane, (...)
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  38. Ralph Wedgwood (2011). Defending Double Effect. Ratio 24 (4):384-401.
    This essay defends a version of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) – the doctrine that there is normally a stronger reason against an act that has a bad state of affairs as one of its intended effects than against an otherwise similar act that has that bad state of affairs as an unintended effect. First, a precise account of this version of the DDE is given. Secondly, some suggestions are made about why we should believe the (...)
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  39. Joseph Boyle (2004). Medical Ethics and Double Effect: The Case of Terminal Sedation. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 25 (1):51-60.
    The use of terminal sedation to control theintense discomfort of dying patients appearsboth to be an established practice inpalliative care and to run counter to the moraland legal norm that forbids health careprofessionals from intentionally killingpatients. This raises the worry that therequirements of established palliative care areincompatible with moral and legal opposition toeuthanasia. This paper explains how thedoctrine of double effect can be relied on todistinguish terminal sedation from euthanasia. The doctrine of double effect is rooted (...)
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  40. Timothy Chappell (2002). Two Distinctions That Do Make a Difference: The Action/Omission Distinction and the Principle of Double Effect. Philosophy 77 (2):211-233.
    The paper outlines and explores a possible strategy for defending both the action/omission distinction (AOD) and the principle of double effect (PDE). The strategy is to argue that there are degrees of actionhood, and that we are in general less responsible for what has a lower degree of actionhood, because of that lower degree. Moreover, what we omit generally has a lower degree of actionhood than what we actively do, and what we do under known-but-not-intended descriptions generally has (...)
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  41.  13
    Timothy F. Murphy (2013). Double-Effect Reasoning and the Conception of Human Embryos. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (8):529-532.
    Some commentators argue that conception signals the onset of human personhood and that moral responsibilities toward zygotic or embryonic persons begin at this point, not the least of which is to protect them from exposure to death. Critics of the conception threshold of personhood ask how it can be morally consistent to object to the embryo loss that occurs in fertility medicine and research but not object to the significant embryo loss that occurs through conception in vivo. Using that apparent (...)
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  42. Alison Hills (2007). Intentions, Foreseen Consequences and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):257 - 283.
    The difficulty of distinguishing between the intended and the merely foreseen consequences of actions seems to many to be the most serious problem for the doctrine of double effect. It has led some to reject the doctrine altogether, and has left some of its defenders recasting it in entirely different terms. I argue that these responses are unnecessary. Using Bratman’s conception of intention, I distinguish the intended consequences of an action from the merely foreseen in a way that (...)
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  43. Lawrence Masek (2010). Intentions, Motives and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):567-585.
    I defend the doctrine of double effect and a so-called ‘strict’ definition of intention: A intends an effect if and only if A has it as an end or believes that it is a state of affairs in the causal sequence that will result in A's end. Following Kamm's proposed ‘doctrine of triple effect’, I distinguish an intended effect from an effect that motivates an action, and show that this distinction is morally significant. I (...)
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  44.  34
    Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (2015). So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short. Noûs 49 (2):376-409.
    According to the classical Doctrine of Double Effect, there is a morally significant difference between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm. Versions of DDE have been defended in a variety of creative ways, but there is one difficulty, the so-called “closeness problem”, that continues to bedevil all of them. The problem is that an agent's intention can always be identified in such a fine-grained way as to eliminate an intention to harm from almost any situation, including those (...)
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  45.  86
    Joseph Boyle (1991). Who is Entitled to Double Effect? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (5):475-494.
    The doctrine of double effect continues to be an important tool in bioethical casuistry. Its role within the Catholic moral tradition continues, and there is considerable interest in it by contemporary moral philosophers. But problems of justification and correct application remain. I argue that if the traditional Catholic conviction that there are exceptionless norms prohibiting inflicting some kinds of harms on people is correct, then double effect is justified and necessary. The objection that double (...) is superfluous is a rejection of that normative conviction, not a refutation of double effect itself. This justification suggests the correct way of applying double effect to controversial cases. But versions of double effect which dispense with the absolutism of the Catholic tradition lack justification and fall to the objection that double effect is an unnecessary complication. Keywords: double effect, intention, side effect CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
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  46.  49
    Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (2014). Three Cheers for Double Effect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):125-158.
    The doctrine of double effect, together with other moral principles that appeal to the intentions of moral agents, has come under attack from many directions in recent years, as have a variety of rationales that have been given in favor of it. In this paper, our aim is to develop, defend, and provide a new theoretical rationale for a secular version of the doctrine. Following Quinn (1989), we distinguish between Harmful Direct Agency and Harmful Indirect Agency. We propose (...)
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  47.  49
    P. I. Odozor (1997). Proportionalists and the Principle of Double Effect: A Review Discussion. Christian Bioethics 3 (2):115-130.
    The proportionalist position on the revision of the principle of double effect is now an important feature of moral discourse in contemporary Roman Catholic theological discussion. While its claim to being rooted in the work of Saint Thomas Aquinas is defensible, its view on the universal applicability of proportionate reasoning for determining the moral rightness or wrongness of actions is not without problems in some key areas, such as the distinction between direct and indirect consequences of an action. (...)
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  48.  65
    William J. FitzPatrick (2012). The Doctrine of Double Effect: Intention and Permissibility. Philosophy Compass 7 (3):183-196.
    The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) is an influential non-consequentialist principle positing a role for intention in affecting the moral permissibility of some actions. In particular, the DDE focuses on the intend/foresee distinction, the core claim being that it is sometimes permissible to bring about as a foreseen but unintended side-effect of one’s action some harm it would have been impermissible to aim at as a means or as an end, all else being equal. This article explores (...)
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  49. Jeff McMahan (1994). Revising the Doctrine of Double Effect. Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (2):201-212.
    The Doctrine of Double Effect has been challenged by the claim that what an agent intends as a means may be limited to those effects that are precisely characterized by the descriptions under which the agent believes that they are minimally causally necessary for the production of other effects that the agent seeks to bring about. If based on so narrow a conception of an intended means, the traditional Doctrine of Double Effect becomes limitlessly permissive. In (...)
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    Charles D. Douglas, Ian H. Kerridge & Rachel A. Ankeny (2014). Double Meanings Will Not Save the Principle of Double Effect. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (3):304-316.
    In an article somewhat ironically entitled “Disambiguating Clinical Intentions,” Lynn Jansen promotes an idea that should be bewildering to anyone familiar with the literature on the intention/foresight distinction. According to Jansen, “intention” has two commonsense meanings, one of which is equivalent to “foresight.” Consequently, questions about intention are “infected” with ambiguity—people cannot tell what they mean and do not know how to answer them. This hypothesis is unsupported by evidence, but Jansen states it as if it were accepted fact. In (...)
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