Inspired by two-dimensional modal logic, some have sought to provide analyses of the notion of the contingent a priori which identify the a priori with truths which have a necessary diagonal. I argue that these analyses fail insofar as they miss the crucial epistemic aspect of the a priori. Augmenting these analyses with specifically epistemic accounts might be possible, but the interest would then reside in these epistemic accounts of the a priori and not in the formal models.

It is argued that propositions cannot be the compositional semantic values of sentences (in context) simply due to issues stemming from the compositional semantics of modal operators (or modal quantifiers). In particular, the fact that the arguments for double indexing generalize to multiple indexing exposes a fundamental tension in the default philosophical conception of semantic theory. This provides further motivation for making a distinction between two sentential semantic contents—what (Dummett 1973) called “ingredient sense” and “assertoric content”.

This essay argues that relativist semantics provide fruitful frameworks for the study of the relationships between meaning and truth-conditions, and consequently for the analysis of the logical properties of expressions. After a discussion of the role of intensionality and indexicality within classic double-indexed semantics, I explain that the non-relativistic identification of the parameters needed for the definition of truth and for the interpretation of indexicals is grounded on considerations that are irrelevant for the assessment of the relationships between meaning (...) and truth. (shrink)

The verb 'knows' is often taken to be context-sensitive in an interesting way. What 'knows' means seems to be sensitive to the epistemic features of the context, e.g. the epistemic standard in play, the set of relevant alternatives, etc. There are standard model-theoretic semantic frameworks which deal with both intensional operators and context-sensitive expressions. In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of the various moving parts of these frameworks, the roles of context and index, the need for double (...) indexing, and the relationship between semantic value and content. With the best version of the standard framework explicated we then return at the end to the treatment of ‘know’ as a context-sensitive intensional operator (contrasting it with an invariantist treatment). (shrink)

“Double-halfers” think that throughout the Sleeping Beauty Scenario, Beauty ought to maintain a credence of 1/2 in the proposition that the fair coin toss governing the experimental protocol comes up heads. Titelbaum (2012) introduces a novel variation on the standard scenario, one involving an additional coin toss, and claims that the double-halfer is committed to the absurd and embarrassing result that Beauty’s credence in an indexical proposition concerning the outcome of a future fair coin toss is not 1/2. (...) I argue that there is no reason to regard the credence required by the double-halfer as any less acceptable than the one deemed required by Titelbaum. (shrink)

The ability to understand both the self and others as purposeful agents — with thoughts, beliefs, and desires — seems to be central to the emergence of cultural processes both phylo- and ontogenetically. This ability has been termed second-order intentionality or “theory of mind” and has been conceptualized as a species-specific “trait” which is genetically predetermined, naturally selected and the resident of a dedicated module within the mind. Alternatively, we see it emerging out of a more general process — symbolization. (...) The paper discusses the emergence of the symbolic function from previously existing forms of communication by analyzing the structures and functions of different kinds of signs used in human and non-human vocal communication. We reinterpret evidence from the study of non-human primate vocalizations and suggest that these vocalizations embody a semiotic type that, like all signs, is more highly developed than a signal, but is not catalogued within the basic Peircean triad of sign types . This form, the double indexical, is intermediary between indexes and symbols. We speculate on what structural and functional reorganization is required to establish a developmental continuity from signals through the various types of signs to the well-known structure of the symbol — and possibly beyond. (shrink)

Expressions typically thought to be rigid designators can refer to distinct individuals in the consequents of counterfactuals. This occurs in counteridenticals, such as “If I were you, I would arrest me”, as well as more ordinary counterfactuals with clearly possible antecedents, like “If I were a police officer, I would arrest me”. I argue that in response we should drop rigidity and deal with de re modal predication using something more flexible, such as counterpart theory.

This article examines the relationship between everyday talk, the reproduction of political ideology and the interactional accomplishment of situated identities through analyzing how institutional members index neoliberal ideology in their everyday interactions. Analysis of audio- and video-recorded data from racially diverse business members of two Texas chambers of commerce illustrates how chamber members indirectly index neoliberal ideology through taking stances toward government policies. White, upper class participants display neoliberal stances through using complaints – constituted by questions, humor, idioms and inference-rich (...) terms – about the Affordable Care Act because it is a form of government interference that increases taxes and the federal deficit. Minority business members use discursive strategies such as double-voiced discourse and self-repairs to balance tensions between criticizing neoliberal ideology because it does not benefit minorities yet still orient to its taken-for-granted value in their business community. Overall, while participants’ interactions generally seem to operate within the structural constraints of neoliberal ideology, our analysis illustrates how participants take up neoliberal ideology in situated ways that, at times, provide avenues for negotiating the relevance of neoliberal ideology to everyday life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant-Index: Band 5: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zur "Wiener Logik,"Riccardo PozzoNorbert Hinske. Kant-Index: Band 5: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zur "Wiener Logik," Erstellt in Zusammenarbeit mit Heinrich P. Delfosse und Michael Oberhausen unter Mitwirkung von Hans-Werner Bartz, Christian Popp, Tina Strauch und Michael Trauth. Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1999. Pp. Cxiii + 865.The Wiener Logik has long led a shadowy existence. This has nothing to do with the quality of the (...) text, but rather with accidental conditions. When the manuscript of the Wiener Logik was discovered in 1913, the planning of the Akademie-Ausgabe of Kant's complete works had already been largely completed and eight volumes of the works, three of the correspondence and two of the Nachlaß were published. Erich Adickes' edition of Kant's Reflexionen über die Logik appeared in 1914. Hinske suggests that, had Adickes considered it, the Wiener Logik would have played a valuable role in integrating Kant's reflections (xi). This double-volume makes up for all this by highlighting the relevance of this lecture transcript with special reference to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, which is close to it not only in time but also systematically. It contains a lemmatized main index that makes a recognition of the language of the logic course possible and a concordance that allows one to check the corresponding passages. The introduction and more than twenty pages of editorial notes elaborate on the relationship of the Wiener Logik to other Kantian texts while correcting and integrating the references to sources indicated in its 1966 edition by Gerhard Lehmann within the Akademie-Ausgabe (lxxii-xcvi). At the same time, the index correcs more than one hundred fifty errors of the 1966 edition (lviii-lxvii).The Wiener Logik was translated into English by J. Michael Young in the volume of The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant dedicated to the Lectures on Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 251-377). Young made clear that the Wiener Logik is constituted by two different parts (ibid., xxv f.). In fact the manuscript shows a first part written by the hand of a professional copyist, which covers Kant's course until almost the end of the theory of judgement (Akademie-Ausgabe, vol. 24, 790-937), and a second part constituted by a single page written by another hand (probably a student while sitting in Kant's classroom), which deals with the very end of the theory of judgement and the beginning of the theory of syllogism (ibid., 937-40). One needs to recall, though, that the text of the Wiener Logik is incomplete, given that a large part of the theory of syllogism as well as the theory of method, of discourse and of character are missing. The first part of the Wiener Logik shows several parallels with the edited fragments of the Logik Hoffmann (ibid., 944-52), while the second part shows parallels with the Logik Hechsel, which was discovered in 1983 and has recently been made accessible by Tilman Pinder (cf. Logik-Vorlesungen: Unveröffentliche Nachschriften, Hamburg: Meiner, 1998, 271-499). In fact, J. Michael Young found it convenient to complete his translation of the missing parts of the Wiener Logik by the attaching to it the corresponding parts of the Logik Hechsel (cf. Lectures on Logic, 381-423).Hinske provides new arguments as regards the dating of the Wiener Logik by objecting to both the late dating to the nineties suggested by Wilhelm Jerusalem and the early dating before 1781 by Reinhard Brandt and Tilman Pinder. Hinske remarks that while for the terminus ad quem one should consider the years indicated on the frontispice (1794 [End Page 284] and 1796), the terminus a quo should be set after the final redaction of the Critique of Pure Reason (xxiii f.). Following Hinske's lead and on the basis of an accurate examination on the cross-references between the texts, Bruno Bianco has proposed that the terminus a quo be set not before the publication of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (cf. the Italian translation edited by Bianco, Milan: Angeli, forthcoming).What makes the Wiener Logik and this index particularly interesting for Kant... (shrink)

One can have no prior credence whatsoever (not even zero) in a temporally indexical claim. This fact saves the principle of conditionalization from potential counterexample and undermines the Elga and Arntzenius/Dorr arguments for the thirder position and Lewis' argument for the halfer position on the Sleeping Beauty Problem, thereby supporting the double-halfer position. -/- .

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant-Index: Band 5: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zur "Wiener Logik,"Riccardo PozzoNorbert Hinske. Kant-Index: Band 5: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zur "Wiener Logik," Erstellt in Zusammenarbeit mit Heinrich P. Delfosse und Michael Oberhausen unter Mitwirkung von Hans-Werner Bartz, Christian Popp, Tina Strauch und Michael Trauth. Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1999. Pp. Cxiii + 865.The Wiener Logik has long led a shadowy existence. This has nothing to do with the quality of the (...) text, but rather with accidental conditions. When the manuscript of the Wiener Logik was discovered in 1913, the planning of the Akademie-Ausgabe of Kant's complete works had already been largely completed and eight volumes of the works, three of the correspondence and two of the Nachlaß were published. Erich Adickes' edition of Kant's Reflexionen über die Logik appeared in 1914. Hinske suggests that, had Adickes considered it, the Wiener Logik would have played a valuable role in integrating Kant's reflections (xi). This double-volume makes up for all this by highlighting the relevance of this lecture transcript with special reference to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, which is close to it not only in time but also systematically. It contains a lemmatized main index that makes a recognition of the language of the logic course possible and a concordance that allows one to check the corresponding passages. The introduction and more than twenty pages of editorial notes elaborate on the relationship of the Wiener Logik to other Kantian texts while correcting and integrating the references to sources indicated in its 1966 edition by Gerhard Lehmann within the Akademie-Ausgabe (lxxii-xcvi). At the same time, the index correcs more than one hundred fifty errors of the 1966 edition (lviii-lxvii).The Wiener Logik was translated into English by J. Michael Young in the volume of The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant dedicated to the Lectures on Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 251-377). Young made clear that the Wiener Logik is constituted by two different parts (ibid., xxv f.). In fact the manuscript shows a first part written by the hand of a professional copyist, which covers Kant's course until almost the end of the theory of judgement (Akademie-Ausgabe, vol. 24, 790-937), and a second part constituted by a single page written by another hand (probably a student while sitting in Kant's classroom), which deals with the very end of the theory of judgement and the beginning of the theory of syllogism (ibid., 937-40). One needs to recall, though, that the text of the Wiener Logik is incomplete, given that a large part of the theory of syllogism as well as the theory of method, of discourse and of character are missing. The first part of the Wiener Logik shows several parallels with the edited fragments of the Logik Hoffmann (ibid., 944-52), while the second part shows parallels with the Logik Hechsel, which was discovered in 1983 and has recently been made accessible by Tilman Pinder (cf. Logik-Vorlesungen: Unveröffentliche Nachschriften, Hamburg: Meiner, 1998, 271-499). In fact, J. Michael Young found it convenient to complete his translation of the missing parts of the Wiener Logik by the attaching to it the corresponding parts of the Logik Hechsel (cf. Lectures on Logic, 381-423).Hinske provides new arguments as regards the dating of the Wiener Logik by objecting to both the late dating to the nineties suggested by Wilhelm Jerusalem and the early dating before 1781 by Reinhard Brandt and Tilman Pinder. Hinske remarks that while for the terminus ad quem one should consider the years indicated on the frontispice (1794 [End Page 284] and 1796), the terminus a quo should be set after the final redaction of the Critique of Pure Reason (xxiii f.). Following Hinske's lead and on the basis of an accurate examination on the cross-references between the texts, Bruno Bianco has proposed that the terminus a quo be set not before the publication of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (cf. the Italian translation edited by Bianco, Milan: Angeli, forthcoming).What makes the Wiener Logik and this index particularly interesting for Kant... (shrink)

Résumé Le présent article décortique, avec une approche sémiotique, l’index que l’on retrouve à la fin d’un livre. L’objectif est double : faire ressortir les processus de signification en jeu dans l’index et reconnaître la création sémiotique réalisée par l’analyste documentaire. L’index est un assemblage de signes, soit les vedettes, les localisateurs ainsi que diverses caractéristiques de la représentation spatiale ; leur signifiant renvoie à leur signifié respectif. L’index dans sa totalité représente un texte sémiotique, d’un genre spécifique, et (...) dont l’interprétation repose non seulement sur les expressions linguistiques elles-mêmes, mais aussi sur la structure des entrées et sur les liens tissés avec les passages de l’ouvrage indexé. L’index peut paraître une structure objective, proposant une version épurée et stable du contenu d’un document. Or, l’analyse sémiotique proposée ici révélera d’une part la structure malléable de l’index et d’autre part l’interprétation flexible et la subjectivité injectées dans sa construction. Après une description plus approfondie du contexte et de la problématique, nous décrivons d’abord l’aspect formel de l’index, soit les signes impliqués et la manière dont ils sont agencés. Nous abordons ensuite l’aspect interprétatif de l’index, notamment les facteurs qui influencent son interprétation. Ceci nous amène à décrire en détail la structure logique de l’index. Cet exercice un peu scolaire d’un outil qui peut sembler familier permettra de mettre en lumière des jeux de signification normalement passés sous silence. (shrink)

My interest is in two of the four conditions which must be satisfied if the doctrine of double effect is to be successfully employed. One of these involves the distinction between direct and oblique intention, And I deny that this distinction is the index of character or goodness adherents to the doctrine take it to be. Rather, I emphasize the notion of "control responsibility", In considering several cases around which discussion of the doctrine has focused. I develop this notion, (...) In the course of rejecting several attempts to render it superfluous, And then sustain it, In the face of a possible rival. Finally, I consider a second condition of the doctrine, One which turns upon the view that the order of causation between an evil and a good effect of an act is morally significant, And I suggest that this view is mistaken. (shrink)

If the autopoiesis concept has been of enormous benefit for the description of the society and in particular for the radical revolution of the theory of social systems in the work of Luhmann, with the phenomenon of the indexicality developed by Garfinkel it seems to have happened exactly the opposi..

The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within (...) our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Double seeks to prove that when we ascribe responsibility, blame, or freedom, we merely express attitudes, rather than state anything capable of truth or falsity. Free will, he concludes, is essentially an incoherent notion. (shrink)

L’agence d’expertise indépendante INDEX, constituée d’architectes, d’artistes et de chercheurs, enquête sur les violences d’État en France et depuis la France. Dans cet entretien, iels expliquent comment iels réinvestissent politiquement la notion d’expertise dans les enquêtes policières, racontent leurs liens avec le collectif Forensic Architecture, explicitent ce qu’iels entendent par « vérité » dans les enquêtes en sources ouvertes et ce qu’iels mettent en place pour permettre une plus grande dissémination des outils de l’OSINT.

Why is debate over the free will problem so intractable? In this broad and stimulating look at the philosophical enterprise, Richard Double uses the free will controversy to build on the subjectivist conclusion he developed in The Non-Reality of Free Will (OUP 1991). Double argues that various views about free will--e.g., compatibilism, incompatibilism, and even subjectivism--are compelling if, and only if, we adopt supporting metaphilosophical views. Because metaphilosophical considerations are not provable, we cannot show any free will theory (...) to be most reasonable. Metaphilosophy and Free Will deconstructs the free will problem and, by example, challenges philosophers in other areas to show how their philosophical argumentation can succeed. (shrink)

Confidence ratings have often been integrated into reasoning and intelligence tasks as a means for assessing meta-reasoning processes. Although it is often assumed that eliciting these judgements throughout reasoning tasks has no effect on the underlying performance outcomes, this is yet to be established empirically. The current study examines whether eliciting CR from participants during a fluid-reasoning task influences their performance and how this effect is moderated by their initial self-confidence in their own reasoning abilities. In a first experiment, we (...) found that participants performing CR during Raven's Progressive Matrices significantly outperformed a control group who did not provide ratings. Additionally, a second experiment demonstrated that CR only facilitated performance in participants who have a high level of initial self-confidence in their reasoning ability, whereas they were detrimental to participants low in self-confidence. (shrink)

In this article I consider when the question of whether entities exist subjectively (only in the minds of subjects) or objectively (in themselves, independently of the minds of subjects) is important, both theoretically and practically. I argue that when it comes to the metaphysics underlying three types of moral questions, broadly conceived, the subjectivity question does not matter practically, although it is widely thought to matter. Subjectivism does not matter in these moral questions in the same way(s) it matters in (...) some nonmoral metaphysical issues. The moral questions I consider are the meaning of life, normative ethics, and the free‐will problem. The nonmoral issues I address are the existence of God, the traditional mind/body problem, and personal identity. I explain the difference by noting that certain metaphysical issues on the fact side of the fact/value distinction impinge on persons' lives more prominently than do the metaphysics behind the three moral questions. (shrink)

The following is a criticism designed to apply to most libertarian free will theorists. I argue that most libertarians hold three beliefs that jointly show them to be unsympathetic or hard-hearted to persons whom they hold morally responsible: that persons are morally responsible only because they make libertarian choices, that we should hold persons responsible, and that we lack epistemic justification for thinking persons make such choices. Softhearted persons who held these three beliefs would espouse hard determinism, which exonerates all (...) persons of moral responsibility, or, at least, would not espouse libertarianism. I do not address the view held by some libertarians that we do have epistemic justification for thinking that persons make libertarian choices, a minority position that I believe cannot be sustained. (shrink)

Philosophers’ intuitions about what constitutes autonomy are largely driven by the exemplars or paradigms that we recognize. There are indefinitely many exemplars, inasmuch as there are relatively private personae that serve as autonomy exemplars such as our parents, third grade teacher, or, for the megalomaniac, oneself. But among Western philosophers there are doubtless some exemplars that are widely shared and broadly influential. Philosophical exemplars include Socrates, Aristotle’s magnanimous man, Kant’s noumenal self that is perfectly attuned to the moral law, Mill’s (...) anti-authoritarian non-conformist, Marx’s manin-society, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, and Sartre’s authentic youth who must decide whether to join the French resistance or stay at home for the sake of his mother. Exemplars from outside of philosophy include Antigone, Christ, Faust, Ibsen’s Enemy of the People, Winston Churchill, and even figures from popular culture such as the baseball player Ted Williams, the free spirited flower children of the 1960s, and practically any character that John Wayne ever played. (shrink)

The objection to R-S accounts that was raised by the possibility of external agents requires the acceptance of two premises, viz., that all R-S accounts allow for puppeteers and that puppeteers necessarily make us unfree. The Metaphilosophical reply shows that to the extent that puppeteers are more problematic than determinism per se, pup-peteers may be explicitly excluded since they violate our paradigm of free will. The Metaphilosophical reply also suggests that we should not expect our mature R-S account to supply (...) logically necessary and sufficient conditions for free will, but rather give us answers that agree with our intuitions regarding paradigms of free and unfree decisions. The Irrelevancy reply completed our reply to incompatibilists who continue to object that determinism per se destroys the R-S program. It may be debated whether my autonomy variable account is a satisfactory way to spell out the Irrelevancy reply, but I think that this type of approach suggests the way to vindicating the R-S view from an important type of objection. (shrink)

In “The Moral Hardness of Libertarianism”, I accuse libertarians of being morally unsympathetic if they hold three widely shared beliefs: that persons are morally responsible only if they make libertarian choices; that we should hold persons morally responsible; and that we lack epistemic justification for thinking persons make libertarian choices. In “Hard-Heartedness and Libertarianism”, John Lemos, relying on the Kantian principle of ends, suggests a way for libertarians to accept these three beliefs while avoiding the charge of hard-heartedness. In this (...) paper, I criticize Lemos’s rebuttal. (shrink)

Psychiatry is increasingly dominated by the reductionist claim that mental illness is caused by neurobiological abnormalities such as chemical imbalances in the brain. Critical psychiatry does not believe that this is the whole story and proposes a more ethical foundation for practice. This book describes an original framework for renewing mental health services in alliance with people with mental health problems. It is an advance over the polarization created by the "anti-psychiatry" of the past.