Search results for 'downward causation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Richard Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard (2011). Physicalism, Emergence and Downward Causation. Axiomathes 21 (1):33-56.
    The development of a defensible and fecund notion of emergence has been dogged by a number of threshold issues neatly highlighted in a recent paper by Jaegwon Kim. We argue that physicalist assumptions confuse and vitiate the whole project. In particular, his contention that emergence entails supervenience is contradicted by his own argument that the ‘microstructure’ of an object belongs to the whole object, not to its constituents. And his argument against the possibility of downward causation is question-begging (...)
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  2.  34
    Gil C. Santos (2015). Upward and Downward Causation From a Relational-Horizontal Ontological Perspective. Axiomathes 25 (1):23-40.
    Downward causation exercised by emergent properties of wholes upon their lower-level constituents’ properties has been accused of conceptual and metaphysical incoherence. Only upward causation is usually peacefully accepted. The aim of this paper is to criticize and refuse the traditional hierarchical-vertical way of conceiving both types of causation, although preserving their deepest ontological significance, as well as the widespread acceptance of the traditional atomistic-combinatorial view of the entities and the relations that constitute the so-called ‘emergence base’. (...)
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  3. Christophe Malaterre (2011). Making Sense of Downward Causation in Manipulationism (with Illustrations From Cancer Research). History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences (33):537-562.
    Many researchers consider cancer to have molecular causes, namely mutated genes that result in abnormal cell proliferation (e.g. Weinberg 1998). For others, the causes of cancer are to be found not at the molecular level but at the tissue level where carcinogenesis consists of disrupted tissue organization with downward causation effects on cells and cellular components (e.g. Sonnenschein and Soto 2008). In this contribution, I ponder how to make sense of such downward causation claims. Adopting a (...)
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  4. Mariusz Tabaczek (2013). The Metaphysics of Downward Causation: Rediscovering the Formal Cause. Zygon 48 (2):380-404.
    The methodological nonreductionism of contemporary biology opens an interesting discussion on the level of ontology and the philosophy of nature. The theory of emergence (EM), and downward causation (DC) in particular, bring a new set of arguments challenging not only methodological, but also ontological and causal reductionism. This argumentation provides a crucial philosophical foundation for the science/theology dialogue. However, a closer examination shows that proponents of EM do not present a unified and consistent definition of DC. Moreover, they (...)
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  5. Robert C. Bishop (2005). Downward Causation in Fluid Convection. Synthese 160 (2):229 - 248.
    Recent developments in nonlinear dynamics have found wide application in many areas of science from physics to neuroscience. Nonlinear phenomena such as feedback loops, inter-level relations, wholes constraining and modifying the behavior of their parts, and memory effects are interesting candidates for emergence and downward causation. Rayleigh–Bénard convection is an example of a nonlinear system that, I suggest, yields important insights for metaphysics and philosophy of science. In this paper I propose convection as a model for downward (...)
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  6. Menno Hulswit (2005). How Causal is Downward Causation? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):261 - 287.
    The purpose of this paper is to lay bare the major problems underlying the concept of downward causation as discussed within the perspective of the present interest for phenomena that are characterized by self-organization. In our Discussion of the literature, we have focussed on two questions: (1) What sorts of things are said to be, respectively, causing and caused within the context of downward causation? And (2) What is the meaning of 'causing' in downward (...)? We have concluded that the concept of 'downward causation' is muddled with regard to the meaning of causation and fuzzy with regard to the nature of the causes and the effects. Moreover, we have concluded that 'causation' in respect of 'downward causation' is usually understood in terms of explanation and determination rather than in terms of causation in the sense of 'bringing about'. Thus, the term 'downward causation' is badly chosen. (shrink)
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  7.  68
    Xiaoping Chen (2010). How Does Downward Causation Exist?—A Comment on Kim's Elimination of Downward Causation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (4):652-665.
    The importance of downward causation lies in showing that it shows that functional properties such as mental properties are real, although they cannot be reduced to physical properties. Kim rejects nonreductive physicalism, which includes leading functionalism, by eliminating downward causation, and thereby returns to reductionism. In this paper, I make a distinction between two aspects of function—functional meaning and functional structure and argue that functional meaning cannot be reduced to the physical level whereas functional structure can. (...)
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    Thomas Kroedel (2015). A Simple Argument for Downward Causation. Synthese 192 (3):841-858.
    Instances of many supervenient properties have physical effects. In particular, instances of mental properties have physical effects if non-reductive physicalism is true. This follows by a straightforward argument that assumes a counterfactual criterion for causation. The paper presents that argument and discusses several issues that arise from it. In particular, the paper addresses the worry that the argument shows too many supervenient property-instances to have physical effects. The argument is also compared to a similar argument that has been suggested (...)
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  9. Justin A. Capes (2010). Can 'Downward Causation' Save Free Will? Philosophia 38 (1):131-142.
    Recently, Trenton Merricks has defended a libertarian view of human freedom. He claims that human persons have downward causal control of their constituent parts, and that downward causal control of this sort is sufficient for free will. In this paper I examine Merricks’s defense of free will, and argue that it is unsuccessful. I show that having downward causal control is not sufficient for for free will. In an Appendix I also argue that Merricks’s defense of free (...)
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  10. Claus Emmeche, Simo Koppe & Frederick Stjernfelt (2000). Levels, Emergence, and Three Versions of Downward Causation. In P.B. Andersen, Claus Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann & P.V. Christiansen (eds.), Downward Causation. Aarhus, Denmark: University of Aarhus Press 322-348.
    The idea of a higher level phenomenon having a downward causal influence on a lower level process or entity has taken a variety of forms. In order to discuss the relation between emergence and downward causation, the specific variety of the thesis of downward causation (DC) must be identified. Based on some ontological theses about inter-level relations, types of causation and the possibility of reduction, three versions of DC are distinguished. Of these, the `Strong' (...)
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  11.  5
    Chen Xiaoping (2010). How Does Downward Causation Exist?—A Comment on Kim's Elimination of Downward Causation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (4):652-665.
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  12. Mark A. Bedau (2002). Downward Causation and the Autonomy of Weak Emergence. Principia 6 (1):5-50.
    Weak emergence has been offered as an explication of the ubiquitous notion of emergence used in complexity science (Bedau 1997). After outlining the problem of emergence and comparing weak emergence with the two other main objectivist approaches to emergence, this paper explains a version of weak emergence and illustrates it with cellular automata. Then it explains the sort of downward causation and explanatory autonomy involved in weak emergence.
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  13. John Gibbons (2006). Mental Causation Without Downward Causation. Philosophical Review 115 (1):79-103.
    to counterintuitive results. Suppose a mental event, m1, causes another mental event, m2. Unless the mental and the physical are completely independent, there will be a physical event in your brain or your body or the physical world as a whole that underlies this event. The mental event occurs at least partly in virtue of the physical event’s occurring. And the same goes for m2 [2] and p2. Let’s not worry about what exactly “underlying” or “in virtue of” means here. (...)
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  14.  52
    Dwayne Moore (2013). Counterfactuals, Autonomy and Downward Causation: Reply to Zhong. Philosophia 41 (3):831-839.
    In recent papers, Lei Zhong argues that the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem is unavailable to anyone that endorses the counterfactual model of causation. The linchpin of his argument is that the counterfactual theory entails the downward causation principle, which conflicts with the autonomy solution. In this note I argue that the counterfactual theory does not entail the downward causation principle, so it is possible to advocate for the autonomy solution to the causal (...)
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  15. Achim Stephan (2002). Emergentism, Irreducibility, and Downward Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):77-93.
    Several theories of emergence will be distinguished. In particular, these are synchronic, diachronic, and weak versions of emergence. While the weaker theories are compatible with property reductionism, synchronic emergentism and strong versions of diachronic emergentism are not. Synchronice mergentism is of particular interest for the discussion of downward causation. For such a theory, a system's property is taken to be emergent if it is irreducible, i.e., if it is not reductively explainable. Furthermore, we have to distinguish two different (...)
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  16. William S. Robinson (2005). Zooming in on Downward Causation. Biology and Philosophy 20 (1):117-136.
    . An attempt is made to identify a concept of ‘downward causation’ that will fit the claims of some recent writers and apply to interesting cases in biology and cognitive theory, but not to trivial cases. After noting some difficulties in achieving this task, it is proposed that in interesting cases commonly used to illustrate ‘downward causation’, (a) regularities hold between multiply realizable properties and (b) the explanation of the parallel regularity at the level of the (...)
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  17.  74
    Theo C. Meyering (2000). Physicalism and Downward Causation in Psychology and the Special Sciences. Inquiry 43 (2):181-202.
    Physicalism ? or roughly the view that the stuff that physics talks about is all the stuff there is ? has had a popular press in philosophical circles during the twentieth century. And yet, at the same time, it has become quite fashionable lately to believe that the mind matters in this world after all and that psychology is an autonomous science irreducible to physics. However, if (true, downward) mental causation implies non-reducibility and Physicalism implies the converse, it (...)
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  18.  5
    John Symons (2002). Emergence and Reflexive Downward Causation. Principia 6 (1):183-202.
    This paper responds to Jaegwon Kim's powerful objection to the very possibility of genuinely novel emergent properties. Kim argues that the incoherence of reflexive downward causation means that the causal power of an emergent phenomenon is ultimately reducible to the causal powers of its constituents. I offer a simple argument showing how to characterize emergent properties m terms of the effects of structural relations an the causal powers of that. constituents.
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  19.  16
    Wilson Mendonça (2002). Supervenience and the Problem of Downward Causation. Manuscrito 25 (3):251-270.
    It seems that higher-level, nonbasic properties can only manifest their causal powers by exerting causal influence on lower-level, physically basic phenomena in the first place. A very influential line of reasoning conceives of this form of downward causation as either reducible to causation by physical properties or as ultimately untenable, because incompatible with the causal closure of physical reality. The paper argues that this is not so. It examines, first, why it is that a recent attempt by (...)
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  20. P. B. Andersen, Claus Emmeche, N. O. Finnemann & P. V. Christiansen (eds.) (2000). Downward Causation. University of Aarhus Press.
     
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  21. Jonas Christensen & Jesper Kallestrup (2012). Counterfactuals and Downward Causation: A Reply to Zhong. Analysis 72 (3):513-517.
    Lei Zhong (2012. Counterfactuals, regularity and the autonomy approach. Analysis 72: 75–85) argues that non-reductive physicalists cannot establish the autonomy of mental causation by adopting a counterfactual theory of causation since such a theory supports a so-called downward causation argument which rules out mental-to-mental causation. We respond that non-reductive physicalists can consistently resist Zhong's downward causation argument as it equivocates between two familiar notions of a physical realizer.
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  22. Max Kistler (2010). Mechanisms and Downward Causation. Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):595-609.
    Experimental investigation of mechanisms seems to make use of causal relations that cut across levels of composition. In bottom-up experiments, one intervenes on parts of a mechanism to observe the whole; in top-down experiments, one intervenes on the whole mechanism to observe certain parts of it. It is controversial whether such experiments really make use of interlevel causation, and indeed whether the idea of causation across levels is even conceptually coherent. Craver and Bechtel have suggested that interlevel causal (...)
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  23. Markus I. Eronen (2013). No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1042-1052.
    I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is unsatisfactory since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the same level and is incompatible with Craver and Bechtel’s account of downward causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more well-defined notions such as composition and scale. One outcome of this (...)
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  24. Michel Bitbol (2012). Downward Causation Without Foundations. Synthese 185 (2):233-255.
    Emergence is interpreted in a non-dualist framework of thought. No metaphysical distinction between the higher and basic levels of organization is supposed, but only a duality of modes of access. Moreover, these modes of access are not construed as mere ways of revealing intrinsic patterns of organization: They are supposed to be constitutive of them, in Kant’s sense. The emergent levels of organization, and the inter-level causations as well, are therefore neither illusory nor ontologically real: They are objective in the (...)
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  25. Jaegwon Kim (2000). Making Sense of Downward Causation. In P. B. Andersen, Claus Emmeche, N. O. Finnemann & P. V. Christiansen (eds.), Downward Causation. University of Aarhus Press 305--321.
     
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  26.  23
    Jeff Engelhardt (2015). Mental Causation is Not Just Downward Causation. Ratio 29 (3):n/a-n/a.
    According to a popular model of mental causation, an irreducible mental cause M1 brings about an irreducible mental effect M2 by bringing about M2's supervenience base, P2. Call this ‘the Downward Causation View’. This paper raises doubts about the Downward Causation View on grounds that M1 does not cause M2 immediately and there is no causal chain from M1 to M2. Prima facie, then, M1 does not cause M2 on this view. But a theory of (...)
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  27.  61
    A. M. Soto, C. Sonnenschein & P. A. Miquel (2008). On Physicalism and Downward Causation in Developmental and Cancer Biology. Acta Biotheoretica 56 (4):257-274.
    The dominant position in Philosophy of Science contends that downward causation is an illusion. Instead, we argue that downward causation doesn’t introduce vicious circles either in physics or in biology. We also question the metaphysical claim that “physical facts fix all the facts.” Downward causation does not imply any contradiction if we reject the assumption of the completeness and the causal closure of the physical world that this assertion contains. We provide an argument for (...)
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  28. Alvaro Moreno & Jon Umerez (2000). Downward Causation at the Core of Living Organization. In P. B. Andersen, Claus Emmeche, N. O. Finnemann & P. V. Christiansen (eds.), Downward Causation. University of Aarhus Press 99--117.
     
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  29.  3
    Olga Pombo (2015). Upward and Downward Causation From a Relational-Horizontal Ontological Perspective. Axiomathes 25 (1):23-40.
    Downward causation exercised by emergent properties of wholes upon their lower-level constituents’ properties has been accused of conceptual and metaphysical incoherence. Only upward causation is usually peacefully accepted. The aim of this paper is to criticize and refuse the traditional hierarchical-vertical way of conceiving both types of causation, although preserving their deepest ontological significance, as well as the widespread acceptance of the traditional atomistic-combinatorial view of the entities and the relations that constitute the so-called ‘emergence base’. (...)
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  30.  16
    Charbel Niño Ei-Hani & Antonio Augusto Passos Videira (2001). Causação descendente, emergência de propriedades e modos causais aristotélicos (Downward Causation, Property Emergence, and Aristotelian Causal Modes). Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 16 (2):301-329.
    O problema da causação descendente é um ponto central na formulação do fisicalismo não-redutivo e na compreensão da emergência de propriedades. Duas interpretações possíveis da causação descendente, nas quais a contribuição do pensamento aristotélico é importante, são examinadas. Os requisitos do programa de matematização da natureza na mecanica clássica, que levaram ao abandono de três dos modos causais aristotélicos, nao parecem igualmente importantes nas ciencias especiais. Isto sugere que a contribuição de Aristóteles pode ser, de certa maneira, retomada. Uma definição (...)
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  31.  18
    Physical Causation (2008). To Psychological Causation. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press 71--184.
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    Charbel Niño Ei-Hani & Antonio Augusto Passos Videira (2001). Causação Descendente, Emergência de Propriedades E Modos Causais Aristotélicos (Downward Causation, Property Emergence, and Aristotelian Causal Modes). Theoria 16 (2):301-329.
    O problema da causação descendente é um ponto central na formulação do fisicalismo não-redutivo e na compreensão da emergência de propriedades. Duas interpretações possíveis da causação descendente, nas quais a contribuição do pensamento aristotélico é importante, são examinadas. Os requisitos do programa de matematização da natureza na mecanica clássica, que levaram ao abandono de três dos modos causais aristotélicos, nao parecem igualmente importantes nas ciencias especiais. Isto sugere que a contribuição de Aristóteles pode ser, de certa maneira, retomada. Uma definição (...)
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  33.  5
    Giovanni Felice Azzone (1998). The Cement of Medical Thought. Evolutionary Emergence and Downward Causation. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 20 (2):163 - 187.
    The aetio-pathogenetic sequences and the physio-pathological patterns of diabetes, emphysema, cholera, circulatory shock and thrombosis have been analysed with respect to an evolutionary interpretation. The diseases, although reflecting alterations of processes that can always be described in physico-chemical language, occur only at the level of biological systems which reflects the decodification of genomic project: the teleonomic projects that have been developed during evolution. The concepts of evolutionary emergence and of downward causation have been used to discuss the relationship (...)
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  34. Michele Paolini Paoletti & Francesco Orilia (eds.) (2017). Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation. Routledge.
    Downward causation plays a fundamental role in many theories of metaphysics and philosophy of mind. It is strictly connected with many topics in philosophy, including but not limited to: emergence, mental causation, the nature of causation, the nature of causal powers and dispositions, laws of nature, and the possibility of ontological and epistemic reductions. _Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation_ brings together experts from different fields—including William Bechtel, Stewart Clark and Tom Lancaster, Carl Gillett, (...)
     
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  35. Ole Togeby (2000). Anticipated Downward Causation and the Arch Structure of Texts. In P. B. Andersen, Claus Emmeche, N. O. Finnemann & P. V. Christiansen (eds.), Downward Causation. University of Aarhus Press 261--77.
     
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  36.  61
    Lei Zhong (2015). Why the Counterfactualist Should Still Worry About Downward Causation. Erkenntnis 80 (1):159-171.
    In Zhong (Philos Phenomenol Res 83:129–147, 2011; Analysis 72:75–85, 2012), I argued that, contrary to what many people might expect, the counterfactual theory of causation will generate (rather than solve) the exclusion problem. Recently some philosophers raise an incisive objection to this argument. They contend that my argument fails as it equivocates between different notions of a physical realizer (see Christensen and Kallestrup in Analysis 72:513–517, 2012). However, I find that their criticism doesn’t threaten the central idea of my (...)
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  37.  1
    Neil Campbell (2015). Does Same-Level Causation Entail Downward Causation? Abstracta 8 (2).
    I argue that Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument does not generalize to all special science properties by undermining his central intuition, employed in stage 1 of the argument, that there is a tension between horizontal causation and vertical determination. First, I challenge Kim’s treatment of the examples he employs to support this intuition, then I appeal to Kim’s own work on the metaphysics of explanation in order to dissipate the alleged tension.
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  38. Donald T. Campbell (1974). Downward Causation. In F. Ayala & T. Dobzhansky (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Biology. University of California Press 179--186.
     
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  39. Paul Cw Davies (2006). The Physics of Downward Causation. In P. Davies & P. Clayton (eds.), The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford University Press
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  40. Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (2010). Emergence and Downward Causation. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press
  41.  31
    Donald T. Campbell (1974). 11.'Downward Causation'in Hierarchically Organised Biological Systems. In Francisco Jose Ayala & Theodosius Grigorievich Dobzhansky (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related Problems. University of California Press 179.
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  42. Paul Sheldon Davies (2006). The Physics of Downward Causation. In Philip Clayton & Paul Sheldon Davies (eds.), The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford University Press
  43.  19
    Nancey Murphy, George Ellis, O. ’Connor F. R. & Timothy (eds.) (2009). Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will. Springer Verlag.
    The book includes contributions by Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, George F. R. Ellis , Christopher D. Frith, Mark Hallett, David Hodgson, Owen D. Jones, Alicia Juarrero, J. A. Scott Kelso, Christof Koch, Hans Küng, Hakwan C. Lau, Dean Mobbs, ...
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  44.  2
    Kirk Fitzhugh (2016). Sequence Data, Phylogenetic Inference, and Implications of Downward Causation. Acta Biotheoretica 64 (2):133-160.
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    Alicia Juarrero (2013). Downward Causation: Polanyi and Prigogine. Tradition and Discovery 40 (3):4-15.
    Michael Polanyi argues that in the case of both organisms and machines the functionality of the higher level imposes boundary conditions that harness the operations of lower level components in the service of the higher level, systemic whole. Given the science of his day, however, Polanyi understands this shaping of boundary conditions in terms of the operation of an external agency. The essay argues that the science of nonlinear, far from equilibrium thermodynamics in general, and the phenomenon of autocatalysis in (...)
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  46. Øistein Schmidt Galaaen, The Disturbing Matter of Downward Causation: A Study of the Exclusion Argument and its Causal-Explanatory Presuppositions.
     
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  47.  37
    Charbel Niño El-Hani (2010). Emergence and Downward Causation. Principia 6 (1):1-4.
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  48. Teed Rockwell, A Defense of Emergent Downward Causation.
    At least one of my professors told me that in order to write a good philosophy paper, one should always try to defend as little territory as possible. The danger of this advice is that although it may make one's points defensible, it may also make them not worth defending. In order to avoid both of these extremes, I am going to defend a relatively modest claim, which appears to be necessary but not sufficient for another more ambitious claim, which (...)
     
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  49. Jaegwon Kim (1992). "Downward Causation" in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism. In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter 119--138.
     
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  50. Kim Jaegwon (1992). Downward Causation in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism. In Ansgar Beckermann, H. Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. W. De Gruyter
     
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