Search results for 'dualism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Martina Fürst (2014). A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts. In Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism. A Defense. 112-135. Routledge. 112-135.score: 21.0
    The phenomenal concept strategy is considered a powerful response to anti-physicalist arguments. This physicalist strategy aims to provide a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions. In this paper I first argue that physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts fail to explain their cognitive role. Second, I develop an encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts that best explains their particularities. Finally, I argue that the encapsulation account, which features self-representing experiences, implies non-physical referents. Therefore, the account of (...)
     
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  2. E. J. Lowe (2006). Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.score: 18.0
    Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of (...)
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  3. William G. Lycan (2013). Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.score: 18.0
    It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.
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  4. Marcus Arvan, A Simple Proof of Mind-Body Dualism.score: 18.0
    This paper provides a simple proof of mind-body dualism. I show, first, that all properties known to humankind, aside from qualitative properties of consciousness, are fundamentally relational properties. I then show that relational properties are always fully describable in language. Finally, I point out that qualitative properties of consciousness are clearly not fully describable in language. Thus, qualitative properties of consciousness are fundamentally different than all other properties known to humankind.
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  5. Anthony L. Brueckner (2001). Chalmers' Conceivability Argument for Dualism. Analysis 61 (3):187-193.score: 18.0
    In The Conscious Mind, D. Chalmers appeals to his semantic framework in order to show that conceivability, as employed in his "zombie" argument for dualism, is sufficient for genuine possibility. I criticize this attempt.
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  6. Nicholas Everitt (2000). Substance Dualism and Disembodied Existence. Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):333-347.score: 18.0
    Substance dualism, that most unpopular of current theories of mind, continues to find interesting and able defenders.1 I shall focus on one set of arguments supplied by one of the current defenders, and I shall argue that these arguments fail. That in itself is a matter of some interest, since it is always reassuring to be able to demonstrate that unpopular doctrines are rightly unpopular. But I hope that a further interest will attach to the refutation, in that it (...)
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  7. Will Bynoe & Nicholas K. Jones (2013). Solitude Without Souls: Why Peter Unger Hasn't Established Substance Dualism. [REVIEW] Philosophia 41 (1):109-125.score: 18.0
    Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is available to Unger’s (...)
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  8. Tim Crane (2000). Dualism, Monism, Physicalism. Mind and Society 1 (2):73-85.score: 18.0
    Dualism can be contrasted with monism, and also with physicalism. It is argued here that what is essential to physicalism is not just its denial of dualism, but the epistemological and ontological authority it gives to physical science. A physicalist view of the mind must be reductive in one or both of the following senses: it must identify mental phenomena with physical phenomena (ontological reduction) or it must give an explanation of mental phenomena in physical terms (...)
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  9. Robert Francescotti (2001). Property Dualism Without Substance Dualism? Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.score: 18.0
    Substance dualism is widely rejected by philosophers of mind, but many continue to accept some form of property dualism. The assumption here is that one can consistently believe that (1) mental properties are not physical properties, while denying that (2) mental particulars are not physical particulars. But is this assumption true? This paper considers several analyses of what makes something a physical particular (as opposed to a non-physical particular), and it is argued that on any plausible analysis, accepting (...)
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  10. Corbin Collins (1997). Searle on Consciousness and Dualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):15-33.score: 18.0
    In this article, I examine and criticize John Searle's account of the relation between mind and body. Searle rejects dualism and argues that the traditional mind-body problem has a 'simple solution': mental phenomena are both caused by biological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain. More precisely, mental states and events are macro-properties of neurons in much the same way that solidity and liquidity are macro-properties of molecules. However, Searle also maintains that the mental (...)
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  11. Henry P. Stapp (2005). Quantum Interactive Dualism - an Alternative to Materialism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (11):43-58.score: 18.0
    _René Descartes proposed an interactive dualism that posits an interaction between the_ _mind of a human being and some of the matter located in his or her brain. Isaac Newton_ _subsequently formulated a physical theory based exclusively on the material/physical_ _part of Descartes’ ontology. Newton’s theory enforced the principle of the causal closure_ _of the physical, and the classical physics that grew out of it enforces this same principle._ _This classical theory purports to give, in principle, a complete deterministic (...)
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  12. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Undefeated Dualism. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.score: 18.0
    In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By (...)
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  13. D. Jehle (2006). Kim Against Dualism. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):565-78.score: 18.0
    This paper presents and evaluates Jaegwon Kim’s recent argument against substance dualism. The argument runs as follows. Causal interaction between two entities requires pairing relations. Pairing relations are spatial relations, such as distance and orientation. Souls are supposedly nonspatial, immaterial substances. So it is hard to see how souls could enter into paired causal relations with material substances. I show that Kim’s argument against dualism fails. I conclude by sketching a way the substance dualist could meet (...)
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  14. Henry P. Stapp (2006). Quantum Interactive Dualism: An Alternative to Materialism. Zygon 41 (3):599-615.score: 18.0
    René Descartes proposed an interactive dualism that posits an interaction between the mind of a human being and some of the matter located in his or her brain. Isaac Newton subsequently formulated a physical theory based exclusively on the material/physical part of Descartes’ ontology. Newton’s theory enforced the principle of the causal closure of the physical, and the classical physics that grew out of it enforces this same principle. This classical theory purports to give, in principle, a complete deterministic (...)
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  15. Henry P. Stapp (2006). Quantum Interactive Dualism, II: The Libet and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Causal Anomalies. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 65 (1):117-142.score: 18.0
    b>: Replacing faulty nineteenth century physics by its orthodox quantum successor converts the earlier materialist conception of nature to a structure that does not enforce the principle of the causal closure of the physical. The quantum laws possess causal gaps, and these gaps are filled in actual scientific practice by inputs from our streams of consciousness. The form of the quantum laws permits and suggests the existence of an underlying reality that is built not on substances, but on psychophysical events, (...)
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  16. Gordon P. Baker (2002). Decartes' Dualism. Routledge.score: 18.0
    Arguing against the prevailing view that Cartesian dualism is fundamental to understanding Descartes' philosophy, Gordon Baker and Katherine Morris present a controversial examination of Descartes' philosophy. As the first full-length study of Descartes' conception of the person, Baker and Morris depart radically from traditional representations of Descartes'argument about the persona, the cogito, and the alleged "mind/body" dualism. Contesting the nearly institutionalized view that Cartesian duality is central to understanding Descartes, Baker and Morris illuminate how this "reading" has been (...)
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  17. Cecilia Wee & Michael Pelczar (2008). Descartes' Dualism and Contemporary Dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):145-160.score: 18.0
    After drawing a distinction between two kinds of dualism -- numerical dualism (defined in terms of identity) and modal dualism (defined in terms of supervenience) -- we argue that Descartes is a numerical dualist, but not a modal dualist. Since most contemporary dualists advocate modal dualism, the relation of Descartes' views to the contemporary philosophy of mind are more complex than is commonly assumed.
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  18. Fiona Macpherson (2006). Property Dualism and the Merits of Solutions to the Mind-Body Problem: A Reply to Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 10-11):72-89.score: 18.0
    This paper is divided into two main sections. The first articulates what I believe Strawson's position to be. I contrast Strawson's usage of 'physicalism' with the mainstream use. I then explain why I think that Strawson's position is one of property dualism and substance monism. In doing this, I outline his view and Locke's view on the nature of substance. I argue that they are similar in many respects and thus it is no surprise that Strawson actually holds a (...)
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  19. Terence Rajivan Edward (2012). The Dualism of Conceptual Scheme and Undifferentiated Reality. E-Logos.score: 18.0
    This paper evaluates a form of dualism, which is referred to here as the dualism of conceptual scheme and undifferentiated reality. According to this dualism, although reality appears to be divided into distinct things from the perspective of our system of concepts, it is actually not. I justify the view that this dualism is incoherent.
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  20. John A. Foster (1993). Dennett's Rejection of Dualism. Inquiry 36 (1-2):17-31.score: 18.0
    In Consciousness Explained, Dennett elaborates and defends a materialist?functionalist account of the human mind, and of consciousness in particular. This defence depends crucially on his prior rejection of dualism. Dennett rejects this dualist alternative on three grounds: first, that its version of mind?to?body causation is in conflict with what we know, or have good reason to believe, from the findings of physical science; second, that the very notion of dualistic psychophysical causation is incoherent; and third, that dualism puts (...)
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  21. David S. Oderberg (2005). Hylemorphic Dualism. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):70-99.score: 18.0
    To the extent that dualism is even taken to be a serious option in contemporary discussions of personal identity and the philosophy of mind, it is almost exclusively either Cartesian dualism or property dualism that is considered. The more traditional dualism defended by Aristotelians and Thomists, what I call hylemorphic dualism, has only received scattered attention. In this essay I set out the main lines of the hylemorphic dualist position, with (...)
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  22. Tim van Gelder (1998). Monism, Dualism, Pluralism. Mind and Language 13 (1):76-97.score: 18.0
    1. Consider the basic outlines of the mind-body debate as it is found in contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophy. The central question is “whether mental phenomena are physical phenomena, and if not, how they relate to physical phenomena.”1 Over the centuries, a wide range of possible solutions to this problem have emerged. These are the various “isms” familiar to any student of the debate: Cartesian dualism, idealism, epiphenomenalism, central state materialism, non- reductive physicalism, anomalous monism, and so forth. Each (...)
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  23. Marleen Rozemond (1995). Descartes's Case for Dualism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (1):29-63.score: 18.0
    Descartes's dualism, and his argument for it, are often understood in terms of the modal notion of separability. I argue that the central notions, substance and real distinction, should not be understood this way. Descartes's well-known argument for dualism relies implicitly on views he spells out in the Principles of Philosophy, where he explains that a substance has a nature that consists in a single attribute, and all its qualities are modes of that nature. The argument relies ultimately (...)
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  24. Robert K. Garcia (forthcoming). Descartes's Independence Conception of Substance and His Separability Argument for Substance Dualism. Journal of Philosophical Research.score: 18.0
    I critically examine the view that Descartes’s independence conception (IC) of substance plays a crucial role in his “separability argument” for substance dualism. I argue that IC is a poisoned chalice. I do so by considering how an IC-based separability argument fares on two different ways of thinking about principal attributes. On the one hand, if we take principal attributes to be universals, then a separability argument that deploys IC establishes a version of dualism that is unacceptably strong. (...)
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  25. Wolfram Hinzen (2006). Dualism and the Atoms of Thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (9):25-55.score: 18.0
    Contemporary arguments for forms of psycho-physical dualism standardly depart from phenomenal aspects of consciousness ('what it is like' to have some particular conscious experience). Conceptual aspects of conscious experience, as opposed to phenomenal or visual/perceptual ones, are often taken to be within the scope of functionalist, reductionist, or physicalist theories. I argue that the particular conceptual structure of human consciousness makes this asymmetry unmotivated. The argument for a form of dualism defended here proceeds from the empirical (...)
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  26. Jay F. Rosenberg (1988). On Not Knowing What or Who One Is: Reflections on the Intelligibility of Dualism. Topoi 7 (March):57-63.score: 18.0
    Beginning with Descartes' caution not “imprudently” to “take some other object in place of myself”, I consider first the problems of self-identification confronted by various amnesiacs , both ordinary and Cartesian. Noting that cogitationes as such do not individuate, I proceed to examine conclusions drawn from certain sorts of “body-switching” thought experiments. This, in turn, gives rise to a general critique of “psychological connectedness” or “unity of consciousness” as a candidate criterion of personal identity. I conclude that our ability to (...)
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  27. Emmett L. Holman (2006). Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism: Putting a New Spin on the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229-56.score: 18.0
    Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately.
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  28. Warren Shrader (2006). The Unity of Consciousness: Trouble for the Materialist or the Emergent Dualist? Faith and Philosophy 23 (1):33-44.score: 18.0
    As part of his case for emergent dualism, William Hasker proffers a _unity-of-_ _consciousness_ (UOC) argument against materialism. I formalize the argument and show how the warrant for two of its premises accrues from the warrant one assigns to two distinct theses about unified conscious experience. I then argue that though both unity theses are plausible, the materialist has little to fear from Hasker.
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  29. Kirk Ludwig (2013). The Argument for Subject‐Body Dualism From Transtemporal Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):684-701.score: 18.0
    Martine Nida-Rümelin has argued recently for subject-body dualism on the basis of reflections on the possibility of survival in fission cases from the literature on personal identity. The argument focuses on the claim that there is a factual difference between the claims that one or the other of two equally good continuers of a person in a fission case is identical with her. I consider three interpretations of the notion of a factual difference that the argument employs, and I (...)
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  30. John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Jeffrey K. McDonough (1998). Numbers, Minds, and Bodies: A Fresh Look at Mind-Body Dualism. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):349-371.score: 18.0
    In this essay, we explore a fresh avenue into mind-body dualism by considering a seemingly distant question posed by Frege: "Why is it absurd to suppose that Julius Caesar is a number?". The essay falls into three main parts. In the first, through an exploration of Frege’s Julius Caesar problem, we attempt to expose two maxims applicable to the mind-body problem. In the second part, we draw on those maxims in arguing that “full blown dualism” is preferable to (...)
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  31. William R. Uttal (2004). Dualism: The Original Sin of Cognitivism. L. Erlbaum Associates.score: 18.0
    Directed to scholars and senior-level graduate students, this book is an iconoclastic survey of the history of dualism and its impact on contemporary cognitive psychology. It argues that much of modern cognitive or mentalist psychology is built upon a cryptodualism--the idea that the mind and brain can be thought of as independent entities. This dualism pervades so much of society that it covertly influences many aspects of modern science, particularly psychology. To support the argument, the history of (...) is extended over 100,000 years--from the Paleolithic times until modern philosophical and psychological thinking. The questions regarding this topic that are answered in the book are: 1) Does dualism influence the scientific theories of psychology? 2) If so, should dualism be put aside in the search for a more objective analysis of human mentation? (shrink)
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  32. Xinli Wang (2012). Alternative Conceptual Schemes and A Non-Kantian Scheme-Content Dualism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:267-275.score: 18.0
    D. Davidson argues that the existence of alternative conceptual schemes presupposes the Kantian scheme-content dualism, which requires a scheme-neutral empirical content and a fixed, sharp schemecontent distinction. The dismantlement of such a Kantian scheme-content dualism, which Davidson calls “the third dogma of empiricism”, would render the notion of alternative conceptual schemes groundless. To counter Davidson’s attack on the notion of alternative conceptual schemes, I argue that alternative conceptual schemes neither entail nor presuppose the Kantian scheme-content dualism. On (...)
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  33. Eric Russert Kraemer & Charles Sayward (1980). Dualism and the Argument From Continuity. Philosophical Studies 37 (January):55-59.score: 18.0
    One of the things C. D Broad argued many years ago is that certain 'scientific' arguments against dualist interactionism come back in the end to a metaphysical bias in favor of materialism. Here the authors pursue this basic strategy against another 'scientific' argument against dualism itself. The argument is called 'the argument from continuity'. According to this argument the fact that organisms and species develop by insensible gradations renders dualism implausible. The authors try to demonstrate that this argument (...)
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  34. Brendan O.’Sullivan (2008). Through Thick and Thin with Ned Block: How Not to Rebut the Property Dualism Argument. Philosophia 36 (4):531-544.score: 18.0
    In Max Black’s Objection to Mind–Body Identity, Ned Block seeks to offer a definitive treatment of property dualism arguments that exploit modes of presentation. I will argue that Block’s central response to property dualism is confused. The property dualist can happily grant that mental modes of presentation have a hidden physical nature. What matters for the property dualist is not the hidden physical side of the property, but the apparent mental side. Once that ‘thin’ side is granted, the (...)
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  35. Rick Dolphijn & Iris Tuin (2011). Pushing Dualism to an Extreme: On the Philosophical Impetus of a New Materialism. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 44 (4):383-400.score: 18.0
    This article discusses the way in which a group of contemporary cultural theorists in whose work we see a “new materialism” (a term coined by Braidotti and DeLanda) at work constitutes a philosophy of difference by traversing the dualisms that form the backbone of modernist thought. Continuing the ideas of Lyotard and Deleuze they have set themselves to a rewriting of all possible forms of emancipation that are to be found. This rewriting exercise involves a movement in thought that, in (...)
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  36. Yrjö Haila (2000). Beyond the Nature-Culture Dualism. Biology and Philosophy 15 (2):155-175.score: 18.0
    It is commonly accepted that thewestern view of humanity's place in nature isdominated by a dualistic opposition between nature andculture. Historically this has arisen fromexternalization of nature in both productive andcognitive practices; instances of such externalizationhave become generalized. I think the dualism can bedecomposed by identifying dominant elements in eachparticular instantiation and showing that their strictseparation evaporates under close scrutiny. The philosophical challenge this perspective presents isto substitute concrete socioecological analysis forfoundational metaphysics. A review of majorinterpretations of the history (...)
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  37. Andrew Botterell (2003). The Property Dualism Argument Against Physicalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:223-242.score: 18.0
    Many contemporary philosophers of mind are concerned to defend a thesis called a posteriori physicalism. This thesis has two parts, one metaphysical, and the other epistemological. The metaphysical part of the thesis—the physicalist part—is the claim that the psychological nature of the actual world is wholly physical. The epistemological part of the thesis—the a posteriori part—is the claim that no a priori connection holds between psychological nature and physical nature. Despite its attractiveness, however, a familiar argument alleges that a posteriori (...)
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  38. Thomas W. Bestor (1976). Dualism and Bodily Movements. Inquiry 19 (1-4):1-26.score: 18.0
    Philosophers.all too often think that statements about human bodily movements are basic and unproblematic. It is argued here that just the opposite is the case: with human beings action descriptions are the basic ones and bodily movement descriptions are the problematic ones. They are problematic because they are the offspring of the Cartesian dualist's notion of a human body as something ?conceptually separable? from anything mental, a notion which in fact is wholly empty. This claim is supported by examining three (...)
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  39. Christian Onof (2008). Property Dualism, Epistemic Normativity, and the Limits of Naturalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):60-85.score: 18.0
    This paper examines some consequences of the (quasi-)epiphenomenalism implied by a property dualistic view of phenomenal consciousness. The focus is upon the variation of phenomenal content over time. A thought-experiment is constructed to support two claims. The weaker claim exhibits an incompatibility which arises in certain logically possible situations between a conscious subject’s epistemic norms and the requirement that one be aware of one’s conscious experience. This could be interpreted as providing some epistemic grounds for the postulation of bridging laws (...)
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  40. Igor Gasparov (2013). Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 18 (1).score: 18.0
    n this paper I would like to defend the three interconnected claims. The first one is based on that fact that the definition of substance dualism proposed recently by Dean Zimmerman needs some essential adjustments in order to capture the genuine spirit of this doctrine. In this paper I will formulate the conditions for the genuine substance dualism in contrast to quasi-dualisms and provide the definition for the genuine substance dualism which I consider to be more appropriate (...)
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  41. Paul Noordhof (2002). Personal Dualism and the Argument From Differential Vagueness. Philosophical Papers 31 (1):63-86.score: 18.0
    Abstract In Causing Actions, Pietroski defends a distinctive view of the relationship between mind and body which he calls Personal Dualism. Central to his defence is the Argument from Differential Vagueness. It moves from the claim that mental events have different vagueness of spatiotemporal boundaries from neural events to the claim that mental events are not identical to neural events. In response, I argue that this presupposes an ontological account of vagueness that there is no reason to believe in (...)
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  42. Arthur O. Lovejoy (1960). The Revolt Against Dualism: An Inquiry Concerning the Existence of Ideas. La Salle, Ill.,Open Court Pub. Co..score: 18.0
    DUALISM AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD 257 IX. THE NATURE OF KNOWING AS A NATURAL EVENT . . 303 INDEX 323 PREFACE The principal purpose of this volume is not to present ...
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  43. Shigeto Nuki (1998). The Theory of Association After Husserl: “Form/Content”Dualism and the Phenomenological Way Out. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 31 (3):273-291.score: 18.0
    This paper will address one of the “unsolved” problems that has traditionally been called the “form/content” dualism. Husserl writes in Ideas I: “This remarkable duality and unity of sensory hyle and intentional morphe plays a dominant role in the whole phenomenological sphere (in the whole sphere, namely within the stage of constituting temporality, which can be constantly verified)” (Hua III, 192). To be sure, Husserl has defined the sensory hyle “descriptively” as the really immanent [reell] part of consciousness with (...)
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  44. Irene Switankowsky (2000). Dualism and its Importance for Medicine. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21 (6):567-580.score: 18.0
    Cartesian dualism has been viewed by medical theorists to be oneof the chief causes of a reductionist/mechanistic treatment ofthe patient. Although I aver that Cartesian dualism is one culprit for the misapprehension of the genuine treatment of patients in termsof both mind and body, I argue that interactive dualism whichstresses the interaction of mind and body is essential to treatpatients with dignity and compassion. Thus, adequate medical carethat is humanistic in nature is difficult (if not impossible)to achieve (...)
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  45. Hao Tang (forthcoming). Wittgenstein and the Dualism of the Inner and the Outer. Synthese:1-22.score: 18.0
    A dualism characteristic of modern philosophy is the conception of the inner and the outer as two independently intelligible domains. Wittgenstein’s attack on this dualism contains deep insights. The main insight (excavated from §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations) is this: our sensory consciousness is deeply shaped by language and this shaping plays a fundamental role in the etiology of the dualism. I locate this role in the learning of a sensation-language (as described in §244), by (...)
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  46. Edward Slingerland & Maciej Chudek (2011). The Prevalence of Mind–Body Dualism in Early China. Cognitive Science 35 (5):997-1007.score: 18.0
    We present the first large-scale, quantitative examination of mind and body concepts in a set of historical sources by measuring the predictions of folk mind–body dualism against the surviving textual corpus of pre-Qin (pre-221 BCE) China. Our textual analysis found clear patterns in the historically evolving reference of the word xin (heart/heart–mind): It alone of the organs was regularly contrasted with the physical body, and during the Warring States period it became less associated with emotions and increasingly portrayed as (...)
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  47. Hans Burkhardt & Guido Imaguire (2002). Mind-Body Dualism and the Compatibility of Medical Methods. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 23 (2):135-150.score: 18.0
    In this paper we analyse some misleading theses concerning the oldcontroversy over the relation between mind and body presented incontemporary medical literature. We undertake an epistemologicalclarification of the axiomatic structure of medical methods. Thisclarification, in turn, requires a precise philosophical explanation ofthe presupposed concepts. This analysis will establish two results: (1)that the mind-body dualism cannot be understood as a kind of biologicalvariation of the subject-object dichotomy in physics, and (2) that thethesis of the incompatibility between somatic and psychosomatic medicineheld (...)
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  48. Paul L. Allen (2013). An Augustinian Philosopher Between Dualism and Materialism: Ernan McMullin on Human Emergence. Zygon 48 (2):294-304.score: 18.0
    In claiming the independence of theology from science, Ernan McMullin nevertheless saw the danger of separating these disciplines on questions of mutual significance, as his accompanying article “Biology and the Theology of the Human” in this edition of Zygon shows. This paper analyzes McMullin's adoption of emergence as a qualified endorsement of a view that avoids the excesses of both dualism and materialism. I argue that McMullin's distinctive contribution is the conceptual clarification of emergence in the light of a (...)
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  49. Arnold B. Levison (1986). Metalinguistic Dualism and the Mark of the Mental. Synthese 66 (March):339-359.score: 18.0
    In this paper I argue against the view, defended by some philosophers, that it is part of the meaning of mental that being mental is incompatible with being physical. I call this outlook metalinguistic dualism (MLD for short), and I distinguish it from metaphysical theories of the mind-body relation such as Cartesian dualism. I argue that MLD is mistaken, but I don't try to defend the contrary view that mentalistic terms can be definitionally reduced to nonmental (...)
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  50. Adam Drozdek (1993). Computers and the Mind-Body Problem: On Ontological and Epistemological Dualism. Idealistic Studies 23 (1):39-48.score: 18.0
    There seems to exist an indirect link between computer science and theology via psychology, which is founded on dualism. First, these theories from psychology, computer science and theology are considered that acknowledge the existence of (at least) two different kinds of reality, or, possibly, two different realms of the same reality. In order to express a root of incompatibility of science and theology, a distinction is drawn between ontological and epistemological dualism. It seems that computer science combines ontological (...)
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