Search results for 'eliminativism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Baptiste Le Bihan (2016). Super-Relationism: Combining Eliminativism About Objects and Relationism About Spacetime. Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2151-2172.
    I will introduce and motivate eliminativist super-relationism. This is the conjunction of relationism about spacetime and eliminativism about material objects. According to the view, the universe is a big collection of spatio-temporal relations and natural properties, and no substance (material or spatio-temporal) exists in it. The view is original since eliminativism about material objects, when understood as including not only ordinary objects like tables or chairs but also physical particles, is generally taken to imply substantivalism about spacetime: if (...)
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  2. Jiri Benovsky (2016). Eliminativism and Gunk. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (1):59-66.
    Eliminativism about macroscopic material objects claims that we do not need to include tables in our ontology, and that any job – practical or theoretical – they have to do can be done by 'atoms arranged tablewise'. This way of introducing eliminativism faces the worry that if there are no 'atoms', that is, if there are no simples and the world is 'gunky', there are no suitable entities to be 'arranged tablewise'. In this article, I discuss various strategies (...)
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  3. Gabriele Contessa (2014). One's a Crowd: Mereological Nihilism Without Ordinary‐Object Eliminativism. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):199-221.
    Mereological nihilism is the thesis that there are no composite objects—i.e. objects with proper material parts. One of the main advantages of mereological nihilism is that it allows its supporters to avoid a number of notorious philosophical puzzles. However, it seems to offer this advantage only at the expense of certain widespread and deeply entrenched beliefs. In particular, it is usually assumed that mereological nihilism entails eliminativism about ordinary objects—i.e. the counterintuitive thesis that there are no such things as (...)
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  4.  27
    Jiri Benovsky (2015). 'Nothing Over and Above' or 'Nothing'? On Eliminativism, Reductionism, and Composition. Polish Journal of Philosophy 9 (2).
    In this article, I am interested in an issue concerning eliminativism about ordinary objects that can be put as the claim that the eliminativist is guilty of postulating the existence of something (atoms arranged tablewise) but not of something that is identical to it (the table). But, as we will see, this turns out to be a problem for everybody except the eliminativist. Indeed, this issue highlights a more general problem about the relationship between an entity and the parts (...)
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  5.  99
    Gregg D. Caruso (2015). Free Will Eliminativism: Reference, Error, and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2823-2833.
    Shaun Nichols has recently argued that while the folk notion of free will is associated with error, a question still remains whether the concept of free will should be eliminated or preserved. He maintains that like other eliminativist arguments in philosophy, arguments that free will is an illusion seem to depend on substantive assumptions about reference. According to free will eliminativists, people have deeply mistaken beliefs about free will and this entails that free will does not exist. However, an alternative (...)
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  6.  98
    John N. Williams (2015). Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox. Theoria 81 (1):27-47.
    John Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “G. E. Moore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that of Ellie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd. Nor does she seem irrational if the sincerity of her assertion requires her to believe its content. A commissive counterpart of (...)
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  7. Cory D. Wright (2000). Eliminativist Undercurrents in the New Wave Model of Psychoneural Reduction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 21 (4):413-436.
    "New wave" reductionism aims at advancing a kind of reduction that is stronger than unilateral dependency of the mental on the physical. It revolves around the idea that reduction between theoretical levels is a matter of degree, and can be laid out on a continuum between a "smooth" pole (theoretical identity) and a "bumpy" pole (extremely revisionary). It also entails that both higher and lower levels of the reductive relationship sustain some degree of explanatory autonomy. The new wave predicts that (...)
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  8.  30
    Jennifer Corns (forthcoming). Pain Eliminativism: Scientific and Traditional. Synthese:1-23.
    Traditional eliminativism is the view that a term should be eliminated from everyday speech due to failures of reference. Following Edouard Machery, we may distinguish this traditional eliminativism about a kind and its term from a scientific eliminativism according to which a term should be eliminated from scientific discourse due to a lack of referential utility. The distinction matters if any terms are rightly retained for daily life despite being rightly eliminated from scientific inquiry. In this article, (...)
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  9.  99
    Robert Lockie (2003). Transcendental Arguments Against Eliminativism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):569-589.
    Eliminativism was targeted by transcendental arguments from the first. Three responses to these arguments have emerged from the eliminativist literature, the heart of which is that such arguments are question-begging. These responses are shown to be incompatible with the position, eliminativism, they are meant to defend. Out of these failed responses is developed a general transcendental argument against eliminativism (the "Paradox of Abandonment"). Eliminativists have anticipated this argument, but their six different attempts to counter it are shown (...)
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  10.  64
    John M. Collins (2000). Theory of Mind, Logical Form and Eliminativism. Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):465-490.
    I argue for a cognitive architecture in which folk psychology is supported by an interface of a ToM module and the language faculty, the latter providing the former with interpreted LF structures which form the content representations of ToM states. I show that LF structures satisfy a range of key features asked of contents. I confront this account of ToM with eliminativism and diagnose and combat the thought that "success" and innateness are inconsistent with the falsity of folk psychology. (...)
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  11.  9
    Henry Taylor & Peter Vickers (forthcoming). Conceptual Fragmentation and the Rise of Eliminativism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-24.
    Pluralist and eliminativist positions have proliferated within both science and philosophy of science in recent decades. This paper asks the question why this shift of thinking has occurred, and where it is leading us. We provide an explanation which, if correct, entails that we should expect pluralism and eliminativism to transform other debates currently unaffected, and for good reasons. We then consider the question under what circumstances eliminativism will be appropriate, arguing that it depends not only on the (...)
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  12.  71
    Steven Horst (1995). Eliminativism and the Ambiguity of `Belief'. Synthese 104 (1):123-45.
    It has recently been claimed (1) that mental states such as beliefs are theoretical entities and (2) that they are therefore, in principle, subject to theoretical elimination if intentional psychology were to be supplanted by a psychology not employing mentalistic notions. Debate over these two issues is seriously hampered by the fact that the key terms 'theoretical' and 'belief' are ambiguous. This article argues that there is only one sense of 'theoretical' that is of use to the eliminativist, and in (...)
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  13.  88
    Glenn Braddock (2002). Eliminativism and Indeterminate Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):37-54.
    One of Daniel Dennett's most sophisticated arguments for his eliminativism about phenomenological properties centers around the color phi phenomenon. He attempts to show that there is no phenomenological fact of the matter concerning the phenomenon of apparent motion because it is impossible to decide between two competing explanations. I argue that the two explanations considered by Dennett are both based on the assumption that a realist account of the phenomenon must include a neat mapping between phenomenological time and objective (...)
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  14.  53
    Harold Kincaid (1990). Eliminativism and Methodological Individualism. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):141-148.
    Tuomela (this issue, pp. 96-103) raises several objections to the analysis and critique of methodological individualism in my (1986). In what follows I reply to those criticisms, arguing, among other things, that: (1) the alleged reductions provided by Tuomela and others fail, because they either presuppose rather than eliminate social predicates or do not avoid the problem of multiple realizations; (2) supervenience does not guarantee that the social sciences are reducible, because merely describing supervenieence bases leaves numerous questions unanswered, and (...)
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  15.  70
    Joel Pust (1999). External Accounts of Folk Psychology, Eliminativism, and the Simulation Theory. Mind and Language 14 (1):113-130.
    Stich and Ravenscroft (1994) distinguish between internal and external accounts of folk psychology and argue that this distinction makes a significant difference to the debate over eliminative materialism. I argue that their views about the implications of the internal/external distinction for the debate over eliminativism are mistaken. First, I demonstrate that the first of their two external versions of folk psychology is either not a possible target of eliminativist critique, or not a target distinct from their second version of (...)
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  16.  56
    Andrew Melnyk (1996). Testament of a Recovering Eliminativist. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):S185-S193.
    If physicalism is true (e.g., if every event is a fundamental-physical event), then it looks as if there is a fundamental-physical explanation of everything. If so, then what is to become of special scientific explanations? They seem to be excluded by the fundamental-physical ones, and indeed to be excellent candidates for elimination. I argue that, if physicalism is true, there probably is a fundamental-physical explanation of everything, but that nevertheless there can perfectly well be special scientific explanations as well, notwithstanding (...)
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  17.  8
    Anthony Wrigley (2015). An Eliminativist Approach to Vulnerability. Bioethics 29 (7):478-487.
    The concept of vulnerability has been subject to numerous different interpretations but accounts are still beset with significant problems as to their adequacy, such as their contentious application or the lack of genuine explanatory role for the concept. The constant failure to provide a compelling conceptual analysis and satisfactory definition leaves the concept open to an eliminativist move whereby we can question whether we need the concept at all. I highlight problems with various kinds of approach and explain why a (...)
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  18.  20
    Nathan Stemmer (2007). Quine's Eliminativism and the Crystal Spheres. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (2):315 - 327.
    Quine’s eliminativist theory has largely been ignored by the philosophical community. This is highly regrettable because Quine’s theory is probably close to correct. Now, the probable correctness of Quine’s theory has an important consequence since, according to the theory, there are no mental entities (events, states, phenomena, properties, etc.) nor do such entities play any role in a scientific account of the relevant phenomena. But the hundreds or probably thousands of publications that deal with issues such as mental causation, the (...)
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  19. Valtteri Arstila (2010). Color Eliminativism and Intuitions About Colors. Rivista di Estetica 50 (43):29-45.
    The philosophical debate over the nature of color has been governed by what we have learnt from color vision science and what color phenomenology suggests to us. It is usually thought that color eliminativism, which maintains that physical objects do not have any properties that can be identified with colors, can account for the former but not the latter. After all, what could be more obvious than the external world to be colored? Here I outline one color eliminativistic response (...)
     
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  20. Eric Yang (2013). Eliminativism, Interventionism and the Overdetermination Argument. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):321-340.
    In trying to establish the view that there are no non-living macrophysical objects, Trenton Merricks has produced an influential argument—the Overdetermination Argument—against the causal efficacy of composite objects. A serious problem for the Overdetermination Argument is the ambiguity in the notion of overdetermination that is being employed, which is due to the fact that Merricks does not provide any theory of causation to support his claims. Once we adopt a plausible theory of causation, viz. interventionism, problems with the Overdetermination will (...)
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  21.  12
    Edmund Dain (2012). Ethical Eliminativism and the Sense of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 35:49-50.
    This paper argues that Wittgenstein holds that ethical propositions are nonsense, in that they lack any meaning whatsoever, that they are redundant, in that the work they are intended to do is already being done by other features of our language, and that they are harmful, insofar as they prevent us from appreciating what is of genuine ethical significance in our lives. Its aim is to outline a sense in which Wittgenstein can be seen to be trying, through the elimination (...)
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  22.  91
    Elizabeth Fricker (1993). The Threat of Eliminativism. Mind and Language 8 (2):253-281.
  23.  63
    Emmett L. Holman (2002). Color Eliminativism and Color Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quareterly 83 (1):38-56.
  24.  81
    Edward W. Averill (1990). Functionalism, the Absent Qualia Objection, and Eliminativism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):449-67.
  25.  95
    Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Eliminativism and an Argument From Science. Mind and Language 8 (2):180-188.
  26.  56
    Victor Reppert (1991). Ramsey on Eliminativism and Self-Refutation. Inquiry 34 (4):499-508.
  27.  75
    Natalie Stoljar (1988). Churchland's Eliminativism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (December):489-497.
  28.  64
    John O'Leary-Hawthorne (1994). On the Threat of Eliminativism. Philosophical Studies 74 (3):325-46.
  29.  29
    Keith Campbell (1993). What Motivates Eliminativism? Mind and Language 8 (2):206-210.
  30.  45
    Rod Bertolet (1994). Saving Eliminativism. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):87-100.
    This paper contests Lynne Rudder Baker's claim to have shown that eliminative materialism is bound to fail on purely conceptual grounds. It is argued that Baker's position depends on knowing that certain developments in science cannot occur, and that we cannot know that this is so. Consequently, the sort of argument Baker provides is question-begging. For similar reasons, the confidence that the proponents of eliminative materialism have in it is misplaced.
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  31.  53
    Andy Clark (1993). The Varieties of Eliminativism: Sentential, Intentional and Catastrophic. Mind and Language 8 (2):223-233.
  32.  52
    Andy Clark (1989). Beyond Eliminativism. Mind and Language 4 (4):251-79.
  33.  29
    Charles M. Hermes (2006). The Overdetermination Argument Against Eliminativism. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):113-119.
  34. Berm (2006). Arguing for Eliminativism. In Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
     
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  35.  28
    Barbara Hannan (1990). `Non-Scientific Realism' About Propositional Attitudes as a Response to Eliminativist Arguments. Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):21-31.
    Two arguments are discussed which have been advanced in support of eliminative materialism: the argument from reductionism and the argument from functionalism. It is contended that neither of these arguments is effective if "non-scientific realism" is adopted with regard to commonsense propositional attitude psychology and its embedded notions. "Non-scientific realism," the position that commonsense propositional attitude psychology is an independently legitimate descriptive/explanatory framework, neither in competition with science nor vulnerable to being shown false by science, is defended.
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  36. Cynthia Macdonald (1995). Connectionism and Eliminativism. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell
     
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  37. Daniel Z. Korman (2009). Eliminativism and the Challenge From Folk Belief. Noûs 43 (2):242-264.
    Virtually everyone agrees that, even after having presented the arguments for their positions, proponents of revisionary philosophical theories are required to provide some sort of account of the conflict between their theories and what the folk believe. I examine various strategies for answering the challenge from folk belief. The examination proceeds as a case study, whose focus is eliminativism about ordinary material objects. I critically assess eliminativist attempts to explain folk belief by appeal to paraphrase, experience, and intuition.
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  38.  24
    Peter Vickers (2014). Scientific Theory Eliminativism. Erkenntnis 79 (1):111-126.
    The philosopher of science faces overwhelming disagreement in the literature on the definition, nature, structure, ontology, and content of scientific theories. These disagreements are at least partly responsible for disagreements in many of the debates in the discipline which put weight on the concept scientific theory. I argue that available theories of theories and conceptual analyses of theory are ineffectual options for addressing this difficulty: they do not move debates forward in a significant way. Directing my attention to debates about (...)
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  39.  19
    Alexander Miller (2015). Rule Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):323-336.
    In this paper, I argue for three main claims. First, that there are two broad sorts of error theory about a particular region of thought and talk, eliminativist error theories and non-eliminativist error theories. Second, that an error theory about rule following can only be an eliminativist view of rule following, and therefore an eliminativist view of meaning and content on a par with Paul Churchland’s prima facie implausible eliminativism about the propositional attitudes. Third, that despite some superficial appearances (...)
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  40. Ingo Brigandt (2003). Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1305–1316.
    Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. It is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts.
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  41.  73
    Jesse Prinz (2010). Can Concept Empiricism Forestall Eliminativism? Mind and Language 25 (5):612-621.
    In this commentary, I focus on Machery's criticism of Neo-Empiricism. I argue that Neo-Empiricism can survive Machery's critique, and I show that there is an empiricist strategy for forestalling eliminativism.
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  42.  16
    Andrea Scarantino (2010). Evidence of Coordination as a Cure for Concept Eliminativism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):223-224.
    I argue that Machery stacks the deck against hybrid theories of concepts by relying on an unduly restrictive understanding of coordination between concept parts. Once a less restrictive notion of coordination is introduced, the empirical case for hybrid theories of concepts becomes stronger, and the appeal of concept eliminativism weaker.
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  43.  84
    John W. Carroll & William R. Carter (2005). An Unstable Eliminativism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):1–17.
    In his book Objects and Persons, Trenton Merricks has reoriented and fine-tuned an argument from the philosophy of mind to support a selective eliminativism about macroscopic objects.1 The argument turns on a rejection of systematic causal overdetermination and the conviction that microscopic things do the causal work that is attributed to a great many (though not all) macroscopic things. We will argue that Merricks’ argument fails to establish his selective eliminativism.
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  44.  61
    John Collins (2007). Meta-Scientific Eliminativism: A Reconsideration of Chomsky's Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):625 - 658.
    The paper considers our ordinary mentalistic discourse in relation to what we should expect from any genuine science of the mind. A meta-scientific eliminativism is commended and distinguished from the more familiar eliminativism of Skinner and the Churchlands. Meta-scientific eliminativism views folk psychology qua folksy as unsuited to offer insight into the structure of cognition, although it might otherwise be indispensable for our social commerce and self-understanding. This position flows from a general thesis that scientific advance is (...)
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  45.  73
    Francisco Calvo Garzón (2001). Can We Turn a Blind Eye to Eliminativism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):485-498.
    In this paper I shall reply to two arguments that Stephen Stich (1990; 1991; 1996) has recently put forward against the thesis of eliminative materialism. In a nutshell, Stich argues that (i) the thesis of eliminative materialism, according to which propositional attitudes don't exist, is neither true nor false, and that (ii) even if it were true, that would be philosophically uninteresting. To support (i) and (ii) Stich relies on two premises: (a) that the job of a theory of reference (...)
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  46.  25
    J. H. Taylor & Peter Vickers, Conceptual Fragmentation and the Rise of Eliminativism.
    Pluralist and eliminativist positions in philosophy – and other disciplines – have proliferated in recent decades. This paper emphasises the sheer scale of this movement: we start by summarising twenty debates which have been affected, thus illustrating how often debates have been transformed by the introduction of pluralist and/or eliminativist thinking. We then provide an explanation of why this shift of philosophical terrain has occurred, an explanation which in turn predicts that its reach will extend to other debates currently unaffected, (...)
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  47.  99
    John Bickle (1993). Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Semantic View of Theories. Erkenntnis 39 (3):359-382.
    Recently some philosophers have urged that connectionist artificial intelligence is (potentially) eliminative for the propositional attitudes of folk psychology. At the same time, however, these philosophers have also insisted that since philosophy of science has failed to provide criteria distinguishing ontologically retentive from eliminative theory changes, the resulting eliminativism is not principled. Application of some resources developed within the semantic view of scientific theories, particularly recent formal work on the theory reduction relation, reveals these philosophers to be wrong in (...)
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  48.  11
    José Luis Bermúdez (2005). Arguing for Eliminativism. In Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge University Press
    This paper considers how best an eliminativist might argue for the radical falsity of commonsense psychology. I will be arguing that Paul Churchland’s “official” arguments for eliminative materialism (in, e.g., Churchland 1981) are unsatisfactory, although much of the paper will be developing themes that are clearly present in Churchland’s writings. The eliminativist needs to argue that the representations that feed into action are fundamentally different from those invoked by propositional attitude psychology. The “springs of action” are representations of features that (...)
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  49.  8
    Peter Vickers, Theory Eliminativism as a Methodological Tool.
    Disagreements about the definition, nature, structure, ontology, and content of scientific theories are at least partly responsible for disagreements in other debates in the philosophy of science. I argue that available theories of theories and conceptual analyses of *theory* are ineffectual options for overcoming this difficulty. Directing my attention to debates about the properties of particular, named theories, I introduce ‘theory eliminativism’ as a certain type of debate-reformulation. As a methodological tool it has the potential to be a highly (...)
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  50.  49
    Jacoby Adeshei Carter (2014). Does “Race” Have a Future or Should the Future Have “Races”? Reconstruction or Eliminativism in a Pragmatist Philosophy of Race. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50 (1):29-47,.
    In Preludes to Pragmatism: Toward A Reconstruction of Philosophy, Phillip Kitcher argues in Chapter 6, “Does ‘Race’ Have a Future” that developments in evolutionary biology may support a separation of our species into subcategories that could be regarded as races. The human species, he argues, could possibly be divided, using a similar methodology to that employed by evolutionary biologists, into relatively stable and isolated breeding populations that bear distinctive and salient clusters of significant genotypic and phenotypic traits. Hence, the eliminativist (...)
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