Search results for 'emotion' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Uriah Kriegel (2016). Cognitivism About Emotion and the Alleged Hyperopacity of Emotional Content. Philosophical Studies 173 (2):315-320.
    According to cognitivism about emotion, emotions are reducible to some non-emotional states. In one version, they are reducible entirely to cognitive states, such as beliefs or judgments; in another, they are reducible to combinations of cognitive and conative states, such as desire or intention. Cognitivism is plausibly regarded as the orthodoxy in the philosophy of emotion since the 1980s. In a recent paper, however, Montague develops a powerful argument against cognitivism. Here I argue that the argument nonetheless fails.
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  2.  80
    Larry A. Herzberg (2012). To Blend or to Compose: A Debate About Emotion Structure. In Paul Wilson (ed.), Dynamicity in Emotion Concepts. Peter Lang
    An ongoing debate in the philosophy of emotion concerns the relationship between two prima facie aspects of emotional states. The first is affective: felt and/or motivational. The second, which I call object-identifying, represents whatever the emotion is about or directed towards. “Componentialists” – such as R. S. Lazarus, Jesse Prinz, and Antonio Damasio – assume that an emotion’s object-identifying aspect can have the same representational content as a non-emotional state’s, and that it is psychologically separable or dissociable (...)
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  3.  46
    Rafael De Clercq (2013). A Simple Solution to the Paradox of Negative Emotion. In Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Suffering Art Gladly: The Paradox of Negative Emotion in Art. Palgrave Macmillan 111-122.
    This chapter offers a new solution to the paradox of negative emotion in art. Crucial to the defense of this new solution is the normative sense of predicates such as 'is moving', 'is touching', 'is powerful', and 'is gripping'. Roughly, the solution itself is that, in their normative sense, these predicates designate aesthetic properties that we enjoy and value experiencing, even tough, in the cases which generate the paradox, the enjoyment comes at a price.
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  4. Christine Tappolet (2010). Emotion, Motivation and Action: The Case of Fear. In Goldie Peter (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. 325-45.
    Consider a typical fear episode. You are strolling down a lonely mountain lane when suddenly a huge wolf leaps towards you. A number of different interconnected elements are involved in the fear you experience. First, there is the visual and auditory perception of the wild animal and its movements. In addition, it is likely that given what you see, you may implicitly and inarticulately appraise the situation as acutely threatening. Then, there are a number of physiological changes, involving a variety (...)
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  5.  35
    Rainer Reisenzein (2009). Emotional Experience in the Computational Belief-Desire Theory of Emotion. Emotion Review 1 (3):214-222.
    Based on the belief that computational modeling (thinking in terms of representation and computations) can help to clarify controversial issues in emotion theory, this article examines emotional experience from the perspective of the Computational Belief–Desire Theory of Emotion (CBDTE), a computational explication of the belief–desire theory of emotion. It is argued that CBDTE provides plausible answers to central explanatory challenges posed by emotional experience, including: the phenomenal quality,intensity and object-directedness of emotional experience, the function of emotional experience (...)
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  6. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). By All the Blood That Ever Fury Breath'd: Brentano on Will and Emotion. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger.
    In contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, Franz Brentano is known mostly for his thesis that intentionality is ‘the mark of the mental.’ Among Brentano scholars, there are also lively debates on his theory of consciousness and his theory of judgment. Brentano’s theory of will and emotion is less widely discussed, even within the circles of Brentano scholarship. In this paper, I want to show that this is a missed opportunity, certainly for Brentano scholars but also for contemporary philosophy of (...)
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  7.  45
    Maria Magoula Adamos (2002). How Are the Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Aspects of Emotion Related? Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):183-195.
    Most scholars of emotions concede that although cognitive evaluations are essential for emotion, they are not sufficient for it, and that other elements, such as bodily feelings, physiological sensations and behavioral expressions are also required. However, only a few discuss how these diverse aspects of emotion are related in order to form the unity of emotion. In this essay I examine the co-presence and the causal views, and I argue that neither view can account for the unity (...)
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  8. Eva-Maria Engelen (2012). Meaning and Emotion. In Paul A. Wilson (ed.), Dynamicity in Emotion Concepts. Peter Lang
    Two aspects about meaning and emotion are discussed in this paper. The first, which is the main focus of this paper, addresses the semantic shaping of emotions (semanticization). It will be shown how language acquisition leads to the semantic shaping of emotions. For this purpose I will first introduce the theory of language acquisition that has been developed mainly by Michael Tomasello and also by Donald Davidson. Then I will take basic emotions into account in order to show that (...)
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  9.  30
    Leonhard Menges (forthcoming). The Emotion Account of Blame. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to (...)
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  10. Marc D. Lewis (2005). Bridging Emotion Theory and Neurobiology Through Dynamic Systems Modeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):169-194.
    Efforts to bridge emotion theory with neurobiology can be facilitated by dynamic systems (DS) modeling. DS principles stipulate higher-order wholes emerging from lower-order constituents through bidirectional causal processes cognition relations. I then present a psychological model based on this reconceptualization, identifying trigger, self-amplification, and self-stabilization phases of emotion-appraisal states, leading to consolidating traits. The article goes on to describe neural structures and functions involved in appraisal and emotion, as well as DS mechanisms of integration by which they (...)
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  11.  20
    Kristen A. Lindquist, Tor D. Wager, Hedy Kober, Eliza Bliss-Moreau & Lisa Feldman Barrett (2012). The Brain Basis of Emotion: A Meta-Analytic Review. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3):121-143.
    Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete (...)
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  12. Helen Casey, Robert D. Rogers, Tom Burns & Jenny Yiend (2013). Emotion Regulation in Psychopathy. Biological Psychology 92:541–548.
    Emotion processing is known to be impaired in psychopathy, but less is known about the cognitive mechanisms that drive this. Our study examined experiencing and suppression of emotion processing in psychopathy. Participants, violent offenders with varying levels of psychopathy, viewed positive and negative images under conditions of passive viewing, experiencing and suppressing. Higher scoring psychopathics were more cardiovascularly responsive when processing negative information than positive, possibly reflecting an anomalously rewarding aspect of processing normally unpleasant material. When required to (...)
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  13. Ronald B. de Sousa (1987). The Rationality of Emotion. MIT Press.
    In this urbane and witty book, Ronald de Sousa disputes the widespread notion that reason and emotion are natural antagonists.
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  14. Antti Kauppinen (2014). Empathy, Emotion Regulation, and Moral Judgment. In Heidi Maibom (ed.), Empathy and Morality. Oxford University Press
    In this paper, my aim is to bring together contemporary psychological literature on emotion regulation and the classical sentimentalism of David Hume and Adam Smith to arrive at a plausible account of empathy's role in explaining patterns of moral judgment. Along the way, I criticize related arguments by Michael Slote, Jesse Prinz, and others.
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  15.  59
    Alvin I. Goldman & Chandra S. Sripada (2005). Simulationist Models of Face-Based Emotion Recognition. Cognition 94 (3):193-213.
    Recent studies of emotion mindreading reveal that for three emotions, fear, disgust, and anger, deficits in face-based recognition are paired with deficits in the production of the same emotion. What type of mindreading process would explain this pattern of paired deficits? The simulation approach and the theorizing approach are examined to determine their compatibility with the existing evidence. We conclude that the simulation approach offers the best explanation of the data. What computational steps might be used, however, in (...)
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  16. Rick Anthony Furtak (2010). Emotion, the Bodily, and the Cognitive. Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):51 – 64.
    In both psychology and philosophy, cognitive theories of emotion have met with increasing opposition in recent years. However, this apparent controversy is not so much a gridlock between antithetical stances as a critical debate in which each side is being forced to qualify its position in order to accommodate the other side of the story. Here, I attempt to sort out some of the disagreements between cognitivism and its rivals, adjudicating some disputes while showing that others are merely superficial. (...)
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  17.  69
    William E. Lyons (1980). Emotion. Cambridge University Press.
    In this study William Lyons presents a sustained and coherent theory of the emotions, and one which draws extensively on the work of psychologists and physiologists in the area. Dr Lyons starts by giving a thorough and critical survey of other principal theories, before setting out his own 'causal-evaluative' account. In addition to giving an analysis of the nature of emotion - in which, Dr Lyon argues, evaluative attitudes play a crucial part - his theory throws light on the (...)
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  18. J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & S. Orestis Palermos (2015). Extended Emotion. Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):198-217.
    Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas and, in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.
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  19. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion. European Journal of Philosophy (3):420-442.
    According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer from two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any (...)
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  20.  74
    Thomas Douglas (2013). Moral Enhancement Via Direct Emotion Modulation: A Reply to John Harris. Bioethics 27 (3):160-168.
    Some argue that humans should enhance their moral capacities by adopting institutions that facilitate morally good motives and behaviour. I have defended a parallel claim: that we could permissibly use biomedical technologies to enhance our moral capacities, for example by attenuating certain counter-moral emotions. John Harris has recently responded to my argument by raising three concerns about the direct modulation of emotions as a means to moral enhancement. He argues that such means will be relatively ineffective in bringing about moral (...)
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  21.  88
    Paul Carron, A Case for Virtue: Aristotle’s Psychology and Contemporary Accounts of Emotion Regulation. Images of Europe. Past, Present, Future: ISSEI 2014 - Conference Proceedings.
    This essay argues that recent evidence in neurobiology and psychology supports Aristotle’s foundational psychology and account of self-control and demonstrates that his account of virtue is still relevant for understanding human agency. There is deep correlation between the psychological foundation of virtue that Aristotle describes in The Nicomachean Ethics (NE)—namely his distinction between the rational and nonrational parts of the soul, the way that they interact, and their respective roles in self-controlled action—and dual-process models of moral judgment. Furthermore, Aristotle’s conception (...)
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  22. Christine Tappolet & Bruce Maxwell (2012). Rethinking Cognitive Mediation: Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and the Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 19 (1):1-12.
    Empirical assessments of Cognitive Behavioral Theory and theoretical considerations raise questions about the fundamental theoretical tenet that psychological disturbances are mediated by consciously accessible cognitive structures. This paper considers this situation in light of emotion theory in philosophy. We argue that the “perceptual theory” of emotions, which underlines the parallels between emotions and sensory perceptions, suggests a conception of cognitive mediation that can accommodate the observed empirical anomalies and one that is consistent with the dual-processing models dominant in cognitive (...)
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  23.  95
    A. J. P. Kenny (1963). Action, Emotion And Will. Ny: Humanities Press.
    ACTION, EMOTION AND WILL "This a clear and persuasive book which contains as many sharp points as a thorn bush and an array of arguments that as neat and ...
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  24. Jason Megill (2014). Emotion, Cognition and Artificial Intelligence. Minds and Machines 24 (2):189-199.
    Some have claimed that since machines lack emotional “qualia”, or conscious experiences of emotion, machine intelligence will fall short of human intelligence. I examine this objection, ultimately finding it unpersuasive. I first discuss recent work on emotion that suggests that emotion plays various roles in cognition. I then raise the following question: are phenomenal experiences of emotion an essential or necessary component of the performance of these cognitive abilities? I then sharpen the question by distinguishing between (...)
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  25. Luca Barlassina & Albert Newen (2014). The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):637-678.
    In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural (...)
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  26. Tim Crane (2006). Intentionality and Emotion: Comment on Hutto. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. John Benjamins Publishing Company 107-119.
    I am very sympathetic to Dan Hutto’s view that in our experience of the emotions of others “we do not neutrally observe the outward behaviour of another and infer coldly, but on less than certain grounds, that they are in such and such an inner state, as justified by analogy with our own case. Rather we react and feel as we do because it is natural for us to see and be moved by specific expressions of emotion in others” (...)
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  27. Joel Smith (forthcoming). The Perceptibility of Emotion. In Hichem Naar & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), The Ontology of Emotion. Cambridge University Press
    I offer an account of the ontology of emotions and their expressions, drawing some morals for the view that we can perceive others' emotions in virtue of seeing their expressions.
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  28. Sabine A. Döring (2003). Explaining Action by Emotion. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.
    I discuss two ways in which emotions explain actions: in the first, the explanation is expressive; in the second, the action is not only explained but also rationalized by the emotion's intentional content. The belief-desire model cannot satisfactorily account for either of these cases. My main purpose is to show that the emotions constitute an irreducible category in the explanation of action, to be understood by analogy with perception. Emotions are affective perceptions. Their affect gives them motivational force, and (...)
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  29. Michael S. Brady (2010). Virtue, Emotion, and Attention. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):115-131.
    The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that (...)
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  30. Alexandra Zinck & Albert Newen (2008). Classifying Emotion: A Developmental Account. Synthese 161 (1):1 - 25.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a systematic classification of emotions which can also characterize their nature. The first challenge we address is the submission of clear criteria for a theory of emotions that determine which mental phenomena are emotions and which are not. We suggest that emotions as a subclass of mental states are determined by their functional roles. The second and main challenge is the presentation of a classification and theory of emotions that can account for (...)
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  31.  62
    Paul E. Griffiths (1990). Modularity, and the Psychoevolutionary Theory of Emotion. Biology and Philosophy 5 (2):175-196.
    It is unreasonable to assume that our pre-scientific emotion vocabulary embodies all and only those distinctions required for a scientific psychology of emotion. The psychoevolutionary approach to emotion yields an alternative classification of certain emotion phenomena. The new categories are based on a set of evolved adaptive responses, or affect-programs, which are found in all cultures. The triggering of these responses involves a modular system of stimulus appraisal, whose evoluations may conflict with those of higher-level cognitive (...)
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  32.  24
    Jacob Miguel Vigil (2009). A Socio-Relational Framework of Sex Differences in the Expression of Emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (5):375.
    Despite a staggering body of research demonstrating sex differences in expressed emotion, very few theoretical models (evolutionary or non-evolutionary) offer a critical examination of the adaptive nature of such differences. From the perspective of a socio-relational framework, emotive behaviors evolved to promote the attraction and aversion of different types of relationships by advertising the two most parsimonious properties of reciprocity potential, or perceived attractiveness as a prospective social partner. These are the individual's (a) perceived capacity or ability to provide (...)
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  33. Joel Smith (forthcoming). Perceptual Recognition, Emotion, and Value. In Julian Dodd (ed.), Art, Mind, and Narrative, Themes from the Work of Peter Goldie. Oxford University Press
    I outline an account of perceptual knowledge and assess the extent to which it can be employed in a defence of perceptual accounts of emotion and value recognition. I argue that considerations ruling out lucky knowledge give us some reason to doubt its prospects in the case of value recognition. I also discuss recent empirical work on cultural and contextual influences on emotional expression, arguing that a perceptual account of value recognition is consistent with current evidence.
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  34.  10
    Muk Yan Wong (forthcoming). The Mood-Emotion Loop. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    This paper aims to clarify and reformulate the conceptual relationship between emotions and moods in light of recent researches in philosophy and cognitive psychology. I argue that the mechanism of mood may produces cognitive biases that affect the appraisals involved in emotions, whereas the mechanism of emotion may produce physiological and behavioral responses that affect the energy level being monitored by mood. These two distinct mechanisms can affect each other repeatedly and continuously, which form the mood-emotion loop. I (...)
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  35. Jeremy Fischer (2012). Being Proud and Feeling Proud: Character, Emotion, and the Moral Psychology of Personal Ideals. Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (2):209-222.
    Much of the philosophical attention directed to pride focuses on the normative puzzle of determining how pride can be both a central vice and a central virtue. But there is another puzzle, a descriptive puzzle, of determining how the emotion of pride and the character trait of pride relate to each other. A solution is offered to the descriptive puzzle that builds upon the accounts of Hume and Gabriele Taylor, but avoids the pitfalls of those accounts. In particular, the (...)
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  36. Julien A. Deonna (2006). Emotion, Perception and Perspective. Dialectica 60 (1):29–46.
    Abstract The content of an emotion, unlike the content of a perception, is directly dependent on the motivational set of the subject experiencing the emotion. Given the instability of this motivational set, it might be thought that there is no sense in which emotions can be said to pick up information about the environment in the same way that perception does. Whereas it is admitted that perception tracks for us what is the case in the environment, no such (...)
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  37.  24
    Jeff Kochan (2015). Reason, Emotion, and the Context Distinction. Philosophia Scientiae 19 (1):35-43.
    Recent empirical and philosophical research challenges the view that reason and emotion necessarily conflict with one another. Philosophers of science have, however, been slow in responding to this research. I argue that they continue to exclude emotion from their models of scientific reasoning because they typically see emotion as belonging to the context of discovery rather than of justification. I suggest, however, that recent work in epistemology challenges the authority usually granted the context distinction, taking a socially (...)
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  38. Giovanna Colombetti (2011). Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience. Inquiry 54 (3):293 - 313.
    How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the (...)
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  39.  82
    Ulf Hlobil, Chaturbhuj Rathore, Aley Alexander, Sankara Sarma & Kurupath Radhakrishnan (2008). Impaired Facial Emotion Recognition in Patients with Mesial Temporal Lobe Epilepsy Associated with Hippocampal Sclerosis (MTLE-HS): Side and Age at Onset Matters. Epilepsy Research 80 (2-3):150–157.
    To define the determinants of impaired facial emotion recognition (FER) in patients with mesial temporal lobe epilepsy associated with hippocampal sclerosis (MTLE-HS), we examined 76 patients with unilateral MTLE-HS, 36 prior to antero-mesial temporal lobectomy (AMTL) and 40 after AMTL, and 28 healthy control subjects with a FER test consisting of 60 items (20 each for anger, fear, and happiness). Mean percentages of the accurate responses were calculated for different subgroups: right vs. left MTLE-HS, early (age at onset <6 (...)
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  40. Louis C. Charland (1997). Reconciling Cognitive and Perceptual Theories of Emotion: A Representational Proposal. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):555-579.
    The distinction between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion is entrenched in the literature on emotion and is openly used by individual emotion theorists when classifying their own theories and those of others. In this paper, I argue that the distinction between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion is more pernicious than it is helpful, while at the same time insisting that there are nonetheless important perceptual and cognitive factors in emotion that need to be (...)
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  41.  27
    Maria Magoula Adamos (2007). The Unity of Emotion: An Unlikely Aristotelian Solution. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):101-114.
    Most researchers of emotions agree that although cognitive evaluations such as beliefs, thoughts, etc. are essential for emotion, bodily feelings and their behavioral expressions are also required. Yet, only a few explain how all these diverse aspects of emotion are related to form the unity or oneness of emotion. The most prevalent account of unity is the causal view, which, however, has been shown to be inadequate because it sees the relations between the different parts of (...) as external and contingent. I argue that an adequate account of unity would require internal or conceptual relations between the aspects of emotion, and I suggest that such an account can be found in Aristotle's metaphysics and theory of emotion, and specifically, in his form and matter distinction. After I show that emotions are intentional pleasures and pains or distresses, I argue that the characteristic intentional pleasure and pain of an emotion, along with its other intentional elements , are the form of the emotion, whereas the bodily feelings are its matter. Form and matter constitute a conceptual unity, which cannot be accounted for in conglomeration accounts that see emotions as mixtures of different parts related only through efficient causation. (shrink)
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  42. Marc A. Cohen (2008). The Two-Stage Model of Emotion and the Interpretive Structure of the Mind. Journal of Mind and Behavior 29 (4):291-320.
    Empirical evidence shows that non-conscious appraisal processes generate bodily responses to the environment. This finding is consistent with William James’s account of emotion, and it suggests that a general theory of emotion should follow James: a general theory should begin with the observation that physiological and behavioral responses precede our emotional experience. But I advance three arguments (empirical and conceptual arguments) showing that James’s further account of emotion as the experience of bodily responses is inadequate. I offer (...)
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  43.  56
    Jeff Kochan (2013). Subjectivity and Emotion in Scientific Research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (3):354-362.
    A persistent puzzle for philosophers of science is the well-documented appeal made by scientists to their aesthetic emotions in the course of scientific research. Emotions are usually viewed as irremediably subjective, and thus of no epistemological interest. Yet, by denying an epistemic role for scientists’ emotional dispositions, philosophers find themselves in the awkward position of ignoring phenomena which scientists themselves often insist are of importance. This paper suggests a possible solution to this puzzle by challenging the wholesale identification of (...) with subjectivity. The proposed method is a naturalistic and externalist one, calling for empirical investigation into the intersubjective processes by which scientists’ emotional dispositions become refined and attuned to specific objects of attention. The proposal is developed through a critical discussion of Michael Polanyi’s theory of scientific passions, as well as plant geneticist Barbara McClintock’s celebrated “feeling for the organism.”. (shrink)
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  44. Matthew Ratcliffe (2005). William James on Emotion and Intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (2):179-202.
    William James's theory of emotion is often criticized for placing too much emphasis on bodily feelings and neglecting the cognitive aspects of emotion. This paper suggests that such criticisms are misplaced. Interpreting James's account of emotion in the light of his later philosophical writings, I argue that James does not emphasize bodily feelings at the expense of cognition. Rather, his view is that bodily feelings are part of the structure of intentionality. In reconceptualizing the relationship between cognition (...)
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  45. Peter Goldie (2000). Explaining Expressions of Emotion. Mind 109 (433):25-38.
    The question is how to explain expressions of emotion. It is argued that not all expressions of emotion are open to the same sort of explanation. Those expressions which are actions can be explained, like other sorts of action, by reference to a belief and a desire; however, no genuine expression of emotion is done as a means to some further end. Certain expressions of emotion which are actions can also be given a deeper explanation as (...)
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  46. Peter Zachar (2006). The Classification of Emotion and Scientific Realism. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 26 (1-2):120-138.
    The scientific study of emotion has been characterized by classification schemes that propose to 'carve nature at the joints.' This article examines several of these classifications, drawn from both the categorical and dimensional perspectives. Each classification is given credit for what it contributes to our understanding, but the dream of a single, all purpose taxonomy of emotional phenomena is called into question. Such hopes are often associated with the carving at the joints metaphor, which is here argued to be (...)
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  47.  82
    Louis C. Charland (2002). The Natural Kind Status of Emotion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):511-37.
    It has been argued recently that some basic emotions should be considered natural kinds. This is different from the question whether as a class emotions form a natural kind; that is, whether emotion is a natural kind. The consensus on that issue appears to be negative. I argue that this pessimism is unwarranted and that there are in fact good reasons for entertaining the hypothesis that emotion is a natural kind. I interpret this to mean that there exists (...)
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  48. Demian Whiting (2006). Standing Up for an Affective Account of Emotion. Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.
    This paper constitutes a defence of an affective account of emotion. I begin by outlining the case for thinking that emotions are just feelings. I also suggest that emotional feelings are not reducible to other kinds of feelings, but rather form a distinct class of feeling state. I then consider a number of common objections that have been raised against affective accounts of emotion, including: (1) the objection that emotion cannot always consist only of feeling because some (...)
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    Somogy Varga & Joel Krueger (2013). Background Emotions, Proximity and Distributed Emotion Regulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):271-292.
    In this paper, we draw on developmental findings to provide a nuanced understanding of background emotions, particularly those in depression. We demonstrate how they reflect our basic proximity (feeling of interpersonal connectedness) to others and defend both a phenomenological and a functional claim. First, we substantiate a conjecture by Fonagy & Target (International Journal of Psychoanalysis 88(4):917–937, 2007) that an important phenomenological aspect of depression is the experiential recreation of the infantile loss of proximity to significant others. Second, we argue (...)
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  50.  15
    Victoria A. Braithwaite, Felicity Huntingford & Ruud den Bos (2013). Variation in Emotion and Cognition Among Fishes. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 26 (1):7-23.
    Increasing public concern for the welfare of fish species that human beings use and exploit has highlighted the need for better understanding of the cognitive status of fish and of their ability to experience negative emotions such as pain and fear. Moreover, studying emotion and cognition in fish species broadens our scientific understanding of how emotion and cognition are represented in the central nervous system and what kind of role they play in the organization of behavior. For instance, (...)
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