Search results for 'enactivism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Mohan Matthen (forthcoming). Debunking Enactivism: A Critical Notice of Hutto and Myin, Radicalizing Enactivism. [REVIEW] Canadian Journal of Philosophy.score: 18.0
    In this review of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism (MIT 2013), I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Secondly, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Lastly, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an (...)
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  2. Mark Rowlands (2009). Enactivism and the Extended Mind. Topoi 28 (1):53-62.score: 18.0
    According to the view that has become known as the extended mind , some token mental processes extend into the cognizing organism’s environment in that they are composed (partly) of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. Enactivist models understand mental processes as (partly) constituted by sensorimotor knowledge and by the organism’s ability to act, in appropriate ways, on environmental structures. Given the obvious similarities between the two views, it is both tempting and common (...)
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  3. Leon De Bruin & Sanneke De Haan (2012). Enactivism and Social Cognition: In Search for the Whole Story. Journal of Cognitive Semiotics (1):225-250.score: 18.0
    Although the enactive approach has been very successful in explaining many basic social interactions in terms of embodied practices, there is still much work to be done when it comes to higher forms of social cognition. In this article, we discuss and evaluate two recent proposals by Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Hutto that try to bridge this ‘cognitive gap’ by appealing to the notion of narrative practice. Although we are enthusiastic about these proposals, we argue that (i) it is difficult (...)
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  4. Daniel D. Hutto (2005). Knowing What? Radical Versus Conservative Enactivism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):389-405.score: 18.0
    The binary divide between traditional cognitivist and enactivist paradigms is tied to their respective commitments to understanding cognition as based on knowing that as opposed to knowing how. Using O’Regan’s and No¨e’s landmark sensorimotor contingency theory of perceptual experience as a foil, I demonstrate how easy it is to fall into conservative thinking. Although their account is advertised as decidedly ‘skill-based’, on close inspection it shows itself to be riddled with suppositions threatening to reduce it to a rules-and-representations approach. To (...)
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  5. Richard Menary (2006). Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.score: 18.0
    This collection is a much-needed remedy to the confusion about which varieties of enactivism are robust yet viable rejections of traditional representionalism...
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  6. Mitchell Herschbach (2012). On the Role of Social Interaction in Social Cognition: A Mechanistic Alternative to Enactivism. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):467-486.score: 18.0
    Researchers in the enactivist tradition have recently argued that social interaction can constitute social cognition, rather than simply serve as the context for social cognition. They contend that a focus on social interaction corrects the overemphasis on mechanisms inside the individual in the explanation of social cognition. I critically assess enactivism’s claims about the explanatory role of social interaction in social cognition. After sketching the enactivist approach to cognition in general and social cognition in particular, I identify problems with (...)
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  7. Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo (2012). Enactivism is Not Interactionism. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.score: 18.0
  8. M. Elk, M. Slors & H. Bekkering (2009). Embodied Language Comprehension Requires an Enactivist Paradigm of Cognition. Frontiers in Psychology 1:234-234.score: 18.0
    Two recurrent concerns in discussions on an embodied view of cognition are the ‘necessity question’ (i.e. is activation in modality-specific brain areas necessary for language comprehension?) and the ‘simulation constraint’ (i.e. how do we understand language for which we lack the relevant experiences?). In the present paper we argue that the criticisms encountered by the embodied approach hinge on a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment. We argue that the data relating sensorimotor activation to language comprehension can best be interpreted as supporting (...)
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  9. Ezequiel Di Paolo Hanne De Jaegher (2012). Enactivism is Not Interactionism. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.score: 18.0
  10. Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Julian Kiverstein (2009). Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action. Topoi 28 (1):63-73.score: 15.0
    This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge (...)
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  11. Daniel D. Hutto (2010). Radical Enactivism and Narrative Practice: Implications for Psychopathology. In T. Fuchs, P. Henningsen & H. Sattel (eds.), Coherence and Disorders of the Embodied Self. Schattauer.score: 15.0
    Many psychopathological disorders – clinical depression, borderline personality disorder, schizophrenia and autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) – are commonly classified as disorders of the self. In an intuitive sense this sort of classification is unproblematic. There can be no doubt that such disorders make a difference to one’s ability to form and maintain a coherent sense of oneself in various ways. However, any theoretically rigourous attempt to show that they relate to underlying problems with say, such things as minimal selves or, (...)
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  12. Matthew MacKenzie (2010). Enacting the Self: Buddhist and Enactivist Approaches to the Emergence of the Self. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):75-99.score: 12.0
    In this paper, I take up the problem of the self through bringing together the insights, while correcting some of the shortcomings, of Indo–Tibetan Buddhist and enactivist accounts of the self. I begin with an examination of the Buddhist theory of non-self ( anātman ) and the rigorously reductionist interpretation of this doctrine developed by the Abhidharma school of Buddhism. After discussing some of the fundamental problems for Buddhist reductionism, I turn to the enactive approach to philosophy of mind and (...)
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  13. Daniel D. Hutto (2011). Philosophy of Mind’s New Lease on Life: Autopoietic Enactivism Meets Teleosemiotics. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (5-6):44-64.score: 12.0
    This commentary will seek to clarify certain core features of Thompson’s proposal about the enactive nature of basic mentality, as best it can, and to bring his ideas into direct conversation with accounts of basic cognition of the sort favoured by analytical philosophers of mind and more traditional cognitive scientists – i.e. those who tend to be either suspicious or critical of enactive/embodied approaches (to the extent that they confess to understanding them at all). My proposed way of opening up (...)
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  14. Daniel D. Hutto (2011). Elementary Mind Minding, Enactivist-Style. In A. Seemann (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments in Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience. MIT Press.score: 12.0
    The core claim of this paper is that mind minding of the sort required for the simplest and most pervasive forms of joint attentional activity is best understood and explained in non-representational, enactivist terms. In what follows I will attempt to convince the reader of its truth in three steps. The first step, section two, clarifies the target explanandum. The second step, section three, is wholly descriptive. It highlights the core features of a Radically Enactivist proposal about elementary mind minding, (...)
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  15. Andy Clark (2012). Dreaming the Whole Cat: Generative Models, Predictive Processing, and the Enactivist Conception of Perceptual Experience. Mind 121 (483):753-771.score: 12.0
    Does the material basis of conscious experience extend beyond the boundaries of the brain and central nervous system? In Clark 2009 I reviewed a number of ‘enactivist’ arguments for such a view and found none of them compelling. Ward (2012) rejects my analysis on the grounds that the enactivist deploys an essentially world-involving concept of experience that transforms the argumentative landscape in a way that makes the enactivist conclusion inescapable. I present an alternative (prediction-and-generative-model-based) account that neatly accommodates all the (...)
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  16. Marco Caracciolo (2012). Narrative, Meaning, Interpretation: An Enactivist Approach. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):367-384.score: 12.0
    After establishing its roots in basic forms of sensorimotor coupling between an organism and its environment, the new wave in cognitive science known as “enactivism” has turned to higher-level cognition, in an attempt to prove that even socioculturally mediated meaning-making processes can be accounted for in enactivist terms. My article tries to bolster this case by focusing on how the production and interpretation of stories can shape the value landscape of those who engage with them. First, it builds on (...)
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  17. Richard Menary (2006). Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative. John Benjamins.score: 12.0
    “ is collection is a much-needed remedy to the confusion about which varieties of enactivism are robust yet viable rejections of traditional representationalism approaches to cognitivism – and which are not. Hutto’s paper is the pivot around which the expert commentators, enactivists and non-enactivists alike, sketch out the implications of enactivism for a wide variety of issues: perception, emotion, the theory of content, cognition, development, social interaction, and more. e inclusion of thoughtful replies from Hutto gives the volume (...)
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  18. Mark Rowlands (2013). Enactivism, Intentionality, and Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):303-316.score: 12.0
    Enactivism has, perhaps, come to mean different things to different people. The version of enactivism that I am going to build on in this paper is that defended in my book The New Science of the Mind (henceforth NSM). That view is, I think, recognizably enactivist. Others might disagree, and I myself not only characterized it in other terms but was careful to distinguish it from other views that fall under the rubric "enactivist." However, the view I defended (...)
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  19. Marco Fenici (forthcoming). Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. :1-5.score: 12.0
    Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.804645.
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  20. D. Lubiszewski (2009). Are Enactivists Radical? Book Review Of: Richard Menary (Ed.) (2006) Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. [REVIEW] Constructivist Foundations 4 (3):170 - 171.score: 12.0
    Summary: What makes Hutto's account special is his commitment to the rejection of content, a point where he becomes a real radical. The book is not just another book about enactivism but it is an enactive book for everyone written by an enactivist.
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  21. Daniel D. Hutto (2013). Enactivism, From a Wittgensteinian Point of View. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):281-302.score: 10.0
    Enactivists seek to revolutionize the new sciences of the mind. In doing so, they promote adopting a thoroughly anti-intellectualist starting point, one that sees mentality as rooted in engaged, embodied activity as opposed to detached forms of thought. In advocating the so-called embodied turn, enactivists touch on recurrent themes of central importance in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. More than this, today's enactivists characterize the nature of minds and how they fundamentally relate to the world in ways that not only echo but (...)
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  22. Dave Ward & Mog Stapleton (2012). Es Are Good. Cognition as Enacted, Embodied, Embedded, Affective and Extended. In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness.score: 9.0
    We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer’s interactions with their environment is fundamental. If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from those of affect, that (...)
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  23. Joel Krueger (2010). Radical Enactivism and Inter-Corporeal Affectivity. In Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Heningnsen (eds.), The Embodied Self: Dimensions, Coherence, and Disorders. Schattauer.score: 9.0
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  24. Susan A. J. Stuart (2008). From Agency to Apperception: Through Kinaesthesia to Cognition and Creation. [REVIEW] Ethics and Information Technology 10 (4):255-264.score: 9.0
    My aim in this paper is to go some way towards showing that the maintenance of hard and fast dichotomies, like those between mind and body, and the real and the virtual, is untenable, and that technological advance cannot occur with being cognisant of its reciprocal ethical implications. In their place I will present a softer enactivist ontology through which I examine the nature of our engagement with technology in general and with virtual realities in particular. This softer ontology is (...)
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  25. Richard Menary (2009). Intentionality, Cognitive Integration and the Continuity Thesis. Topoi 28 (1):31-43.score: 9.0
    Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality, I suggest, (...)
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  26. Miriam Kyselo (2013). Locked-in Syndrome and BCI - Towards an Enactive Approach to the Self. Neuroethics 6 (3):579-591.score: 9.0
    It has been argued that Extended Cognition (EXT), a recently much discussed framework in the philosophy of cognition, would serve as the theoretical basis to account for the impact of Brain Computer Interfaces (BCI) on the self and life of patients with Locked-in Syndrome (LIS). In this paper I will argue that this claim is unsubstantiated, EXT is not the appropriate theoretical background for understanding the role of BCI in LIS. I will critically assess what a theory of the extended (...)
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  27. Leon de Bruin & Lena Kästner (2012). Dynamic Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.score: 9.0
    Abstract In this article, we investigate the merits of an enactive view of cognition for the contemporary debate about social cognition. If enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the “cognitive gap”, i.e. provide us with a convincing account of those higher forms of cognition that have traditionally been the focus of its cognitivist opponents. We show that, when it comes to social cognition, current articulations of enactivism are—despite their (...)
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  28. Erik Myin & Daniel D. Hutto (2009). Enacting is Enough. Psyche 15 (1):24-30.score: 9.0
    In the action-space account of color, an emphasis is laid on implicit knowledge when it comes to experience, and explanatory ambitions are expressed. If the knowledge claims are interpreted in a strong way, the action-space account becomes a form of conservative enactivism, which is a kind of cognitivism. Only if the knowledge claims are weakly interpreted, the action space-account can be seen as a distinctive form of enactivism, but then all reductive explanatory ambitions must be abandoned.
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  29. Somogy Varga (2013). Vulnerability to Psychosis, I-Thou Intersubjectivity and the Praecox-Feeling. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):131-143.score: 9.0
    Psychotic and prodromal states are characterized by distortions of intersubjectivity, and a number of psychopathologists see in the concrete I-You frame of the clinical encounter the manifestation of such impairment. Rümke has coined the term of ‘praecox-feeling’, designated to describe a feeling of unease emanating in the interviewer that reflects the detachment of the patient and the failure of an ‘affective exchange.’ While the reliability of the praecox-feeling as a diagnostic tool has since been established, the explanation and theoretical framing (...)
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  30. John Michael (2011). Interactionism and Mindreading. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):559-578.score: 9.0
    In recent years, a number of theorists have developed approaches to social cognition that highlight the centrality of social interaction as opposed to mindreading (e.g. Gallagher and Zahavi 2008 ; Gallagher 2001 , 2007 , 2008 ; Hobson 2002 ; Reddy 2008 ; Hutto 2004 ; De Jaegher 2009 ; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007 ; Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009 ; De Jaegher et al. 2010 ). There are important differences among these approaches, as I will discuss, but (...)
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  31. Steve Torrance (2005). In Search of the Enactive: Introduction to Special Issue on Enactive Experience. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):357-368.score: 9.0
    In the decade and a half since the appearance of Varela, Thompson and Rosch's workThe Embodied Mind,enactivism has helped to put experience and consciousness, conceived of in a distinctive way, at the forefront of cognitive science. There are at least two major strands within the enactive perspective: a broad view of what it is to be an agent with a mind; and a more focused account of the nature of perception and perceptual experience. The relation between these two strands (...)
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  32. Michele Merritt (2013). Thinking-is-Moving: Dance, Agency, and a Radically Enactive Mind. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.score: 9.0
    Recently, in cognitive science, the enactivist account of cognition has been gaining ground, due in part to studies of movement in conjunction with thought. The idea, as Noë (2009), has put it, that “cognition is not something happening inside us or to us, but it’s something we do, something we achieve,” is increasingly supported by research on joint attention, movement coordination, and gesture. Not surprisingly, therefore, enactivists have also begun to look at “movement specialists”—dancers—for both scientific and phenomenological accounts of (...)
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  33. Lawrence A. Shapiro (2014). Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content, by Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. Mind 123 (489):213-220.score: 9.0
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  34. J. R. Matyja (2013). Back to Basics. Review of “Radicalizing Enactivism” by Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):362-363.score: 9.0
    Upshot: Hutto & Myin’s latest “radical enactive cognition” manifesto is a truly exciting book and – despite its short length – quite thick with argumentation. The word “manifesto” here does not only describe the rousing writing style (filled with witty and resounding expressions), but also the general awed feeling one gets, while reading, of the importance of “RECtifying” the current state of research in enactive cognition. Interestingly for the constructivist community, the hallmark thesis of their book is that there can (...)
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  35. Glenda Satne (2014). Radicalizing Enactivism. Basic Minds Without Content. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):202-204.score: 9.0
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  36. Mike Beaton & Igor Aleksander (2012). World-Related Integrated Information: Enactivist and Phenomenal Perspectives. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (02):439-455.score: 9.0
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  37. Douglas Campbell (2013). Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds with Content By Daniel F. Hutto and Erik Myin. Analysis 74 (1):ant102.score: 9.0
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  38. Miriam Kyselo & Ezequiel Di Paolo (2013). Locked-in Syndrome: A Challenge for Embodied Cognitive Science. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-26.score: 9.0
    Embodied approaches in cognitive science hold that the body is crucial for cognition. What this claim amounts to, however, still remains unclear. This paper contributes to its clarification by confronting three ways of understanding embodiment—the sensorimotor approach, extended cognition and enactivism—with Locked-in syndrome (LIS). LIS is a case of severe global paralysis in which patients are unable to move and yet largely remain cognitively intact. We propose that LIS poses a challenge to embodied approaches to cognition requiring them to (...)
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  39. Jason Poettcker (2013). Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content Hutto Daniel and Myin Erik Cambridge Massachusetts. Mit Press, 2013; VII + 206 Pp. $35.00 (Hardback). [REVIEW] Dialogue:1-3.score: 9.0
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  40. Somogy Varga (2013). Radicalizing Enactivism. By D. Hutto and E. Myin. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013, 240pp, £24.95. ISBN: 9780262018548. [REVIEW] Philosophy:1-5.score: 9.0
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  41. Jon Cogburn & Mark Silcox (forthcoming). Against Brain-in-a-Vatism: On the Value of Virtual Reality. Philosophy and Technology:1-19.score: 9.0
    The term “virtual reality” was first coined by Antonin Artaud to describe a value-adding characteristic of certain types of theatrical performances. The expression has more recently come to refer to a broad range of incipient digital technologies that many current philosophers regard as a serious threat to human autonomy and well-being. Their concerns, which are formulated most succinctly in “brain in a vat”-type thought experiments and in Robert Nozick's famous “experience machine” argument, reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the way that (...)
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  42. Jerome A. Feldman (1992). Enactivist vision. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):35-36.score: 9.0
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  43. José Medina (2013). An Enactivist Approach to the Imagination: Embodied Enactments and "Fictional Emotions&Quot;. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):317.score: 9.0
    While in the movies or reading a novel, how can we feel terrified by monsters, ghosts, and fictional serial killers? And how can we feel sad or outraged by depictions of cruelty? After all, we know that the imagined threats that we fear do not exist and, therefore, pose no real threat to us; and we know that the instances of cruelty that bring tears to our eyes have not happened. And yet, the fear, the sadness, or the outrage experienced (...)
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  44. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2013). Wittgenstein's Razor: The Cutting Edge of Enactivism. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):263-280.score: 9.0
    If I had to say what the single most important contribution Wittgenstein made to philosophy was, it would be to have revived the animal in us: the animal that is there in every fiber of our human being, and therefore also in our thinking and reasoning. This means, his pushing us to realize that we are animals not only genealogically, but as evolved human beings—whether neonate, or language-possessing, civilized, law-abiding, fully fledged adults. Constitutionally, and in everything we do, still fundamentally (...)
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  45. Paul R. Kinnear (1992). Color Enactivism: A Return to Kant? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):41.score: 9.0
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  46. Janna van Grunsven (2013). Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin, Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 34 (2):483-487.score: 9.0
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  47. Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (2005). The Unity of Consciousness: An Enactivist Approach. Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (4):225-280.score: 9.0
     
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  48. Shaun Gallagher (2006). The Narrative Alternative to Theory of Mind. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.score: 9.0
  49. Peter Goldie (2006). Emotional Experience and Understanding. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.score: 9.0
  50. Daniel D. Hutto (2006). Embodied Expectations and Extended Possibilities: Reply to Goldie. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.score: 9.0
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