Search results for 'epistemic externalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  95
    Michael Bergmann (2006). Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford University Press.
    Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...)
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  2.  11
    Pierre le Morvan (2005). A Metaphilosophical Dilemma for Epistemic Externalism. Metaphilosophy 36 (5):688-707.
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  3. J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos (2015). Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism. Erkenntnis 80 (4):753-772.
    Internalist approaches to epistemic justification are, though controversial, considered a live option in contemporary epistemology. Accordingly, if ‘active’ externalist approaches in the philosophy of mind—e.g. the extended cognition and extended mind theses—are _in principle_ incompatible with internalist approaches to justification in epistemology, then this will be an epistemological strike against, at least the _prima facie_ appeal of, active externalism. It is shown here however that, contrary to pretheoretical intuitions, neither the extended cognition _nor_ the extended mind theses are (...)
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  4. J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos (forthcoming). Epistemic Internalism, Content Externalism and the Subjective/Objective Justification Distinction. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Two arguments against the compatibility of epistemic internalism and content externalism are considered. Both arguments are shown to fail, because they equivocate on the concept of justification involved in their premises. To spell out the involved equivocation, a distinction between subjective and objective justification is introduced, which can also be independently motivated on the basis of a wide range of thought experiments to be found in the mainstream literature on epistemology. The subjective/objective justification distinction is also ideally (...)
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  5. B. J. C. Madison (2009). On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism. Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.
    In this paper I consider a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s that epistemic internalism and content externalism are indeed incompatible, and since he takes content externalism to be above reproach, so much the worse for epistemic internalism. However, I argue that epistemic internalism, properly understood, remains substantially unaffected no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key to the New Evil Genius thought experiment is that, given everything of which the (...)
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  6.  10
    Zivan Lazovic (2011). Externalism, Skepticism and Epistemic Luck. Filozofija I Društvo 22 (1):89-102.
    This paper deals with the concept of epistemic luck and its place within wider philosophical debates on knowledge and skepticism. Philosophers involved in these debates share an intuition that knowledge excludes luck. Starting from Prichard’s modal definition of luck and his distinction between two varieties of epistemic luck, namely veridic and reflective, the paper explores the internalist and externalist prospects for avoiding epistemic luck and skepticism. Externalism seems to be capable of both coping with the Gettier-type (...)
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  7.  94
    Joe Cruz & John Pollock (2004). The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter 125--42.
    Internalism in epistemology is the view that all the factors relevant to the justification of a belief are importantly internal to the believer, while externalism is the view that at least some of those factors are external. This extremely modest first approximation cries out for refinement (which we undertake below), but is enough to orient us in the right direction, namely that the debate between internalism and externalism is bound up with the controversy over the correct account of (...)
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  8. Daniel Star (2008). Moral Knowledge, Epistemic Externalism, and Intuitionism. Ratio 21 (3):329-343.
    This paper explores the generally overlooked relevance of an important contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology to philosophers working within ethics on questions concerning moral knowledge. It is argued that this debate, between internalists and externalists about the accessibility of epistemic justification, has the potential to be both significantly influenced by, and have a significant impact upon, the study of moral knowledge. The moral sphere provides a particular type of strong evidence in favour of externalism, and mainstream epistemologists might (...)
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  9.  18
    Renata Ziemińska (2006). Two Notions of the Internal and Goldman's Epistemic Externalism. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):395-400.
    Two concepts of the internal should be distinguished in the current epistemic internalism/externalism debate: (1) the internal in an introspective sense as what is accessible by introspection and (2) the internal in a biological sense as what is inside the organism's nervous system. When "internal" is meant in the introspective sense, Goldman's process reliabilism is externalist, but when "internal" is taken in the biological sense, Goldman's process reliabilism is internalist. Goldman as a naturalist prefers "internal" in the biological (...)
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  10. Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup (2004). An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism. Philosophia 31 (3-4):345-354.
    Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that (...)
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  11. Michael Bergmann (2009). Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other 'good-making' features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...)
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  12.  7
    Thomas Grundmann (2004). Counterexamples to Epistemic Externalism Revisited. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter 2--65.
  13. Laurence BonJour & Ernest Sosa (2003). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Blackwell Pub..
    The regress problem and foundationalism -- Externalist accounts of justification -- In search of coherentism -- Back to foundationalism -- The conceptualization of sensory experience and the problem of the external world -- Knowledge and justification -- Does knowledge have foundation -- Skepticism and the internal/external divide -- A virtue epistemology -- Reply to Sosa -- Reply to Bonjour.
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  14.  46
    Richard Fumerton (2007). Review of Michael Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3).
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  15.  45
    S. Hetherington (2007). Review: Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (464):1088-1092.
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  16. D. Matheson (2006). Bounded Rationality, Epistemic Externalism and the Enlightenment Picture of Cognitive Virtue. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing 134--144.
  17. Richard Fumerton (2010). Epistemic externalism. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge
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  18. Peter Murphy (2009). Michael Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Philosophy in Review 29 (5):314.
     
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  19. Iris Vidmar (2009). Michael Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 27:331-339.
     
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  20. Laurence BonJour & Ernest Sosa (2003). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one's belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification. The issues debated by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa concern mostly the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge. Presents central issues pertaining to internalism vs. externalism and foundationalism vs. virtue epistemology in the form of a philosophical debate. Introduces students to fundamental questions within (...)
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  21. Laurence BonJour & Ernest Sosa (2003). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one's belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification. The issues debated by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa concern mostly the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge. Presents central issues pertaining to internalism vs. externalism and foundationalism vs. virtue epistemology in the form of a philosophical debate. Introduces students to fundamental questions within (...)
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  22.  51
    Stephen Jacobson (1997). Externalism and Action-Guiding Epistemic Norms. Synthese 110 (3):343-355.
    In his book, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, John Pollock argues that all externalist theories of justification should be rejected on the grounds that they do not do justice to the action-guiding character of epistemic norms. I reply that Pollocks argument is ineffective — because not all externalisms are intended to involve action-guiding norms, and because Pollock does not give a good reason for thinking that action-guiding norms must be internalist norms. Second, I consider rehabilitating Pollocks argument by restricting his (...)
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  23.  47
    Martin Davies (2000). Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press 321-363.
    This paper addresses a problem about epistemic warrant. The problem is posed by philosophical arguments for externalism about the contents of thoughts, and similarly by philosophical arguments for architecturalism about thinking, when these arguments are put together with a thesis of first person authority. In each case, first personal knowledge about our thoughts plus the kind of knowledge that is provided by a philosophical argument seem, together, to open an unacceptably ‘non-empirical’ route to knowledge of empirical facts. Furthermore, (...)
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  24. Laurence BonJour & Ernest Sosa (2008). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one's belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification. The issues debated by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa concern mostly the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge. Presents central issues pertaining to internalism vs. externalism and foundationalism vs. virtue epistemology in the form of a philosophical debate. Introduces students to fundamental questions within (...)
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  25.  97
    Henry Jackman (2004). Temporal Externalism and Epistemic Theories of Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):79-94.
    'Epistemic' theories of vagueness notoriously claim that (despite the appearances to the contrary) all of our vague terms have sharp boundaries, it's just that we can't know what they are. Epistemic theories are typically criticized for failing to explain (1) the source of the ignorance postulated, and (2) how our terms could come to have such precise boundaries. Both of these objections will, however, be shown to rest on certain 'presentist' assumptions about the relation between use and meaning, (...)
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  26. Kim Sterelny (2004). Externalism, Epistemic Artefacts and the Extended Mind. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter 239--254.
    A common picture of evolution by natural selection sees it as a process through which organisms change so that they become better adapted to their environment. However, agents do not merely respond to the challenges their environments pose. They modify their environments, filtering and transforming the action of the environment on their bodies A beaver, in making a dam, engineers a stream, increasing both the size of its safe refuge and reducing its seasonal variability. Beavers, like many other animals, are (...)
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  27. Joëlle Proust (2008). Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):241-268.
    Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind–world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments as reliable indicators of epistemic norms. A 'brain in the lab' thought (...)
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  28.  72
    Brie Gertler (2007). Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):37–56.
    Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, <span class='Hi'>epistemic</span>: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this <span class='Hi'>epistemic</span> conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self.
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  29.  25
    Brie Gertler (2007). Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):37-56.
    Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self.
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  30. Sanford C. Goldberg (2007). Semantic Externalism and Epistemic Illusions. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press 235--252.
     
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  31. Michael G. Titelbaum (2010). Tell Me You Love Me: Bootstrapping, Externalism, and No-Lose Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):119–134.
    Recent discussion of Vogel-style “bootstrapping” scenarios suggests that they provide counterexamples to a wide variety of epistemological theories. Yet it remains unclear why it’s bad for a theory to permit bootstrapping, or even exactly what counts as a bootstrapping case. Going back to Vogel's original bootstrapping example, I note that an agent who could gain justification through the method Vogel describes would have available a “no-lose investigation”: an investigation that can justify a proposition but has no possibility of undermining it. (...)
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  32.  74
    Timothy Williamson (2001). Comments on Michael Williams' Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):25 - 33.
    The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but the original publication is available at springerlink.com.
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  33. Michael Williams (2001). Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):1 - 23.
    I want to discuss an approach to knowledge that I shall call simple conversational contextualism or SCC for short. Proponents of SCC think that it offers an illuminating account of both why scepti- cism is wrong and why arguments for scepticism are so intuitively appealing. I have my doubts.
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  34.  52
    George Pappas, Internalist Vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  35.  25
    Trent Dougherty (2006). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Review of Metaphysics 60 (1):142-143.
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  36. Mikkel Gerken (2013). Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):532-557.
    Is the nature of testimonial warrant epistemically internalist or externalist? I will argue that the question should be answered ‘yes!’ The disjunction is not exclusive. Rather, a testimonial belief may possess epistemically internalist warrant—justification—as well as epistemically externalist warrant—entitlement. I use the label ‘pluralism’ to denote the view that there are both internalist and externalist species of genuinely epistemic warrant and argue for pluralism in the epistemology of testimony.
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  37. Richard Fumerton (2006). The Epistemic Role of Testimony: Internalist and Externalist Perspectives. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Clarendon Press
     
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  38.  48
    Duncan Pritchard (2004). Review: Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (450):319-322.
  39.  19
    M. Bergmann (2004). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Philosophical Review 113 (3):435-437.
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  40. Piotr Szalek (2008). Do the Externalism and the Internalism in the Debate Over Epistemic Justification Have Indeed the Same Subject? Acta Philosophica: Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia 17 (1):145-164.
     
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  41.  2
    Christopher Lepock (2005). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Dialogue 44 (4):811-813.
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  42.  12
    Christopher Lepock (2005). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa Great Debates in Philosophy Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003, 240 Pp., $26.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 44 (04):811-.
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  43. Tomoji Shogenji, An Externalist Guide to Epistemic Practice.
     
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  44. Marina Bakalova (2006). Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17:363-368.
     
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  45. Stephen Jacobson (2004). Externalism and Action-Guiding Epistemic Norms. Synthese 110 (3):381-397.
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  46.  35
    B. J. C. Madison (forthcoming). Internalism V.S. Externalism in the Epistemology of Memory. In Sven Bernecker Kourken Michaelin (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge
    This chapter first surveys general issues in the epistemic internalism / externalism debate: what is the distinction, what motivates it, and what arguments can be given on both sides. -/- The second part of the chapter will examine the internalism / externalism debate as regards to the specific case of the epistemology of memory belief.
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  47. B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
    The internalism /externalism debate is of interest in epistemology since it addresses one of the most fundamental questions in the discipline: what is the basic nature of knowledge and epistemic justification? It is generally held that if a positive epistemic status obtains, this is not a brute fact. Rather if a belief is, for example, justified, it is justified in virtue of some further condition obtaining. What has been called epistemic internalism holds, as the label suggests, (...)
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  48.  10
    Spyridon Palermos (2015). Active Externalism, Virtue Reliabilism and Scientific Knowledge. Synthese 192 (9):2955-2986.
    Combining active externalism in the form of the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses with virtue reliabilism can provide the long sought after link between mainstream epistemology and philosophy of science. Specifically, by reading virtue reliabilism along the lines suggested by the hypothesis of extended cognition, we can account for scientific knowledge produced on the basis of both hardware and software scientific artifacts. Additionally, by bringing the distributed cognition hypothesis within the picture, we can introduce the notion of epistemic (...)
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  49.  62
    Mikael Janvid (2009). The Value of Lesser Goods: The Epistemic Value of Entitlement. Acta Analytica 24 (4):263-274.
    The notion of entitlement plays an important role in some influential epistemologies. Often the epistemological motive for introducing the concept is to accommodate certain externalist intuitions within an internalist framework or, conversely, to incorporate internalist traits into an otherwise externalist position. In this paper two prominent philosophers will be used as examples: Tyler Burge as a representative of the first option and Fred Dretske as one of the second. However, even on the assumption that the concept of entitlement is sufficiently (...)
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  50.  61
    Gerhard Schurz (2008). Third-Person Internalism: A Critical Examination of Externalism and a Foundation-Oriented Alternative. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 23 (1):9-28.
    This paper starts with an examination of the major problems of foundation-oriented epistemology in Sect. 2. Then, in Sects. 3–4, it is argued that the externalistic re-definition of knowledge deprives this concept from useful applications to human’s epistemic practice. From the viewpoint of cultural evolution, the condition of justification is the most important ingredient of knowledge. An alternative foundation-oriented conception of knowledge called third-person internalism is developed in Sect. 2 and Sect. 5. It combines insights of externalism with (...)
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