Search results for 'epistemic externalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. B. J. C. Madison (2009). On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism. Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.score: 72.0
    In this paper I consider a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s that epistemic internalism and content externalism are indeed incompatible, and since he takes content externalism to be above reproach, so much the worse for epistemic internalism. However, I argue that epistemic internalism, properly understood, remains substantially unaffected no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key to the New Evil Genius thought experiment is that, given everything of which the (...)
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  2. Joe Cruz & John Pollock (2004). The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 125--42.score: 60.0
    Internalism in epistemology is the view that all the factors relevant to the justification of a belief are importantly internal to the believer, while externalism is the view that at least some of those factors are external. This extremely modest first approximation cries out for refinement (which we undertake below), but is enough to orient us in the right direction, namely that the debate between internalism and externalism is bound up with the controversy over the correct account of (...)
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  3. Zivan Lazovic (2011). Externalism, Skepticism and Epistemic Luck. Filozofija I Drustvo 22 (1):89-102.score: 60.0
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  4. Daniel Star (2008). Moral Knowledge, Epistemic Externalism, and Intuitionism. Ratio 21 (3):329-343.score: 57.0
    This paper explores the generally overlooked relevance of an important contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology to philosophers working within ethics on questions concerning moral knowledge. It is argued that this debate, between internalists and externalists about the accessibility of epistemic justification, has the potential to be both significantly influenced by, and have a significant impact upon, the study of moral knowledge. The moral sphere provides a particular type of strong evidence in favour of externalism, and mainstream epistemologists might (...)
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  5. Michael Bergmann (2006). Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford University Press.score: 57.0
    Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...)
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  6. Renata Ziemińska (2006). Two Notions of the Internal and Goldman's Epistemic Externalism. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):395-400.score: 57.0
    Two concepts of the internal should be distinguished in the current epistemic internalism/externalism debate: (1) the internal in an introspective sense as what is accessible by introspection and (2) the internal in a biological sense as what is inside the organism's nervous system. When "internal" is meant in the introspective sense, Goldman's process reliabilism is externalist, but when "internal" is taken in the biological sense, Goldman's process reliabilism is internalist. Goldman as a naturalist prefers "internal" in the biological (...)
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  7. Michael G. Titelbaum (2010). Tell Me You Love Me: Bootstrapping, Externalism, and No-Lose Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):119–134.score: 54.0
    Recent discussion of Vogel-style “bootstrapping” scenarios suggests that they provide counterexamples to a wide variety of epistemological theories. Yet it remains unclear why it’s bad for a theory to permit bootstrapping, or even exactly what counts as a bootstrapping case. Going back to Vogel's original bootstrapping example, I note that an agent who could gain justification through the method Vogel describes would have available a “no-lose investigation”: an investigation that can justify a proposition but has no possibility of undermining it. (...)
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  8. Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup (2004). An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism. Philosophia 31 (3-4):345-354.score: 54.0
    Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that (...)
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  9. B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.score: 48.0
    The internalism/externalism debate is of interest in epistemology since it addresses one of the most fundamental questions in the discipline: what is the basic nature of knowledge and epistemic justification? It is generally held that if a positive epistemic status obtains, this is not a brute fact. Rather if a belief is, for example, justified, it is justified in virtue of some further condition(s) obtaining. What has been called epistemic internalism holds, as the label suggests, is (...)
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  10. Stephen Jacobson (1997). Externalism and Action-Guiding Epistemic Norms. Synthese 110 (3):343-355.score: 48.0
    In his book, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, John Pollock argues that all externalist theories of justification should be rejected on the grounds that they do not do justice to the action-guiding character of epistemic norms. I reply that Pollocks argument is ineffective — because not all externalisms are intended to involve action-guiding norms, and because Pollock does not give a good reason for thinking that action-guiding norms must be internalist norms. Second, I consider rehabilitating Pollocks argument by restricting his (...)
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  11. Martin Davies (2000). Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 321-363.score: 48.0
    This paper addresses a problem about epistemic warrant. The problem is posed by philosophical arguments for externalism about the contents of thoughts, and similarly by philosophical arguments for architecturalism about thinking, when these arguments are put together with a thesis of first person authority. In each case, first personal knowledge about our thoughts plus the kind of knowledge that is provided by a philosophical argument seem, together, to open an unacceptably ‘non-empirical’ route to knowledge of empirical facts. Furthermore, (...)
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  12. Thomas Grundmann (2004). Counterexamples to Epistemic Externalism Revisited. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 2--65.score: 48.0
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  13. Mikael Janvid (2009). The Value of Lesser Goods: The Epistemic Value of Entitlement. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 24 (4):263-274.score: 45.0
    The notion of entitlement plays an important role in some influential epistemologies. Often the epistemological motive for introducing the concept is to accommodate certain externalist intuitions within an internalist framework or, conversely, to incorporate internalist traits into an otherwise externalist position. In this paper two prominent philosophers will be used as examples: Tyler Burge as a representative of the first option and Fred Dretske as one of the second. However, even on the assumption that the concept of entitlement is sufficiently (...)
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  14. Richard Fumerton (2007). Review of Michael Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3).score: 45.0
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  15. Henry Jackman (2004). Temporal Externalism and Epistemic Theories of Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):79-94.score: 45.0
    'Epistemic' theories of vagueness notoriously claim that (despite the appearances to the contrary) all of our vague terms have sharp boundaries, it's just that we can't know what they are. Epistemic theories are typically criticized for failing to explain (1) the source of the ignorance postulated, and (2) how our terms could come to have such precise boundaries. Both of these objections will, however, be shown to rest on certain 'presentist' assumptions about the relation between use and meaning, (...)
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  16. Gerhard Schurz (2008). Third-Person Internalism: A Critical Examination of Externalism and a Foundation-Oriented Alternative. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 23 (1):9-28.score: 45.0
    This paper starts with an examination of the major problems of foundation-oriented epistemology in Sect. 2. Then, in Sects. 3–4, it is argued that the externalistic re-definition of knowledge deprives this concept from useful applications to human’s epistemic practice. From the viewpoint of cultural evolution, the condition of justification is the most important ingredient of knowledge. An alternative foundation-oriented conception of knowledge called third-person internalism is developed in Sect. 2 and Sect. 5. It combines insights of externalism with (...)
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  17. S. Hetherington (2007). Review: Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (464):1088-1092.score: 45.0
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  18. Patrick Bondy (2013). Intensionality and Epistemic Justification. Philosophia 41 (2):463-475.score: 45.0
    The purpose of this paper is to raise a new objection to externalist process reliabilism about epistemic justification. The objection is that epistemic justification is intensional—it does not permit the substitution of co-referring expressions—and reliabilism cannot accommodate that.
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  19. Pierre le Morvan (2005). A Metaphilosophical Dilemma for Epistemic Externalism. Metaphilosophy 36 (5):688-707.score: 45.0
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  20. Richard Fumerton (2010). Epistemic externalism. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.score: 45.0
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  21. D. Matheson (2006). Bounded Rationality, Epistemic Externalism and the Enlightenment Picture of Cognitive Virtue. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing. 134--144.score: 45.0
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  22. Peter Murphy (2009). Michael Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Philosophy in Review 29 (5):314.score: 45.0
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  23. Iris Vidmar (2009). Michael Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 27:331-339.score: 45.0
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  24. Robert Lockie (2008). Problems for Virtue Theories in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):169 - 191.score: 42.0
    This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with (...)
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  25. Laurence BonJour & Ernest Sosa (2003). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Blackwell Pub..score: 39.0
    The regress problem and foundationalism -- Externalist accounts of justification -- In search of coherentism -- Back to foundationalism -- The conceptualization of sensory experience and the problem of the external world -- Knowledge and justification -- Does knowledge have foundation -- Skepticism and the internal/external divide -- A virtue epistemology -- Reply to Sosa -- Reply to Bonjour.
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  26. Kim Sterelny (2004). Externalism, Epistemic Artefacts and the Extended Mind. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 239--254.score: 39.0
    A common picture of evolution by natural selection sees it as a process through which organisms change so that they become better adapted to their environment. However, agents do not merely respond to the challenges their environments pose. They modify their environments, filtering and transforming the action of the environment on their bodies A beaver, in making a dam, engineers a stream, increasing both the size of its safe refuge and reducing its seasonal variability. Beavers, like many other animals, are (...)
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  27. Joëlle Proust (2008). Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):241-268.score: 39.0
    Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind–world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments as reliable indicators of epistemic norms. A 'brain in the lab' thought (...)
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  28. Brie Gertler (2007). Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):37–56.score: 39.0
    Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self.
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  29. Jennifer Duke-Yonge (2013). Ownership, Authorship and External Justification. Acta Analytica 28 (2):237-252.score: 39.0
    Some of the most well-known arguments against epistemic externalism come in the form of thought experiments involving subjects who acquire beliefs through anomolous means such as clairvoyance. These thought experiments purport to provide counterexamples to the reliabilist conception of justification: their subjects are intuitively epistemically unjustified, yet meet reliabilist externalist criteria for justification. In this article, I address a recent defence of externalism due to Daniel Breyer, who argues that externalists need not consider such subjects justified, since (...)
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  30. Sanford C. Goldberg (2007). Semantic Externalism and Epistemic Illusions. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 235--252.score: 39.0
     
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  31. Kelly Becker (2008). Epistemic Luck and the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.score: 36.0
    Epistemic luck has been the focus of much discussion recently. Perhaps the most general knowledge-precluding type is veritic luck, where a belief is true but might easily have been false. Veritic luck has two sources, and so eliminating it requires two distinct conditions for a theory of knowledge. I argue that, when one sets out those conditions properly, a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism emerges.
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  32. Declan Smithies (2014). The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification. In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave MacMillan. 98-124.score: 36.0
    In this chapter, I argue for the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is the basis of epistemic justification. More precisely, I argue for the thesis of phenomenal mentalism, according to which epistemic facts about which doxastic attitudes one has justification to hold are determined by non-epistemic facts about one’s phenomenally individuated mental states. I begin by providing intuitive motivations for phenomenal mentalism and then proceed to sketch a more theoretical line of argument according to which phenomenal mentalism provides (...)
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  33. Michael Williams (2001). Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):1 - 23.score: 36.0
    I want to discuss an approach to knowledge that I shall call simple conversational contextualism or SCC for short. Proponents of SCC think that it offers an illuminating account of both why scepti- cism is wrong and why arguments for scepticism are so intuitively appealing. I have my doubts.
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  34. Timothy Williamson (2001). Comments on Michael Williams' Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):25 - 33.score: 36.0
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  35. George Pappas, Internalist Vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 36.0
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  36. Brian Ribeiro (2002). Cartesian Skepticism and the Epistemic Priority Thesis. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):573-586.score: 36.0
    In ' Unnatural Doubts' Michael Williams argues that Cartesian skepticism is not truly an "intuitive problem" (that is, one which we can state with little or no appeal to contentious theories) at all. According to Williams, the skeptic has rich theoretical commitments all his own, prominent among which is the epistemic priority thesis. I argue, however, that Williams's diagnostic critique of the epistemic priority thesis fails on his own conception of what is required for success. Furthermore, in a (...)
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  37. Duncan Pritchard (2004). Review: Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (450):319-322.score: 36.0
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  38. Heather Battaly (2012). Sosa's Reflective Knowledge: How Damaging is Epistemic Circularity? Synthese 188 (2):289-308.score: 36.0
    The problem of epistemic circularity maintains that we cannot know that our central belief-forming practices (faculties) are reliable without vicious circularity. Ernest Sosa's Reflective Knowledge (2009) offers a solution to this problem. Sosa argues that epistemic circularity is virtuous rather than vicious: it is not damaging. Contra Sosa, I contend that epistemic circularity is damaging. Section 1 provides an overview of Sosa's solution. Section 2 focuses on Sosa's reply to the Crystal ballgazer Objection. Section 2 also contends (...)
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  39. Christopher Lepock (2005). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa Great Debates in Philosophy Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003, 240 Pp., $26.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 44 (04):811-.score: 36.0
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  40. Tomoji Shogenji, An Externalist Guide to Epistemic Practice.score: 36.0
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  41. M. Bergmann (2004). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Philosophical Review 113 (3):435-437.score: 36.0
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  42. Marina Bakalova (2006). Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17:363-368.score: 36.0
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  43. Trent Dougherty (2006). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Review of Metaphysics 60 (1):142-143.score: 36.0
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  44. Richard Fumerton (2006). The Epistemic Role of Testimony: Internalist and Externalist Perspectives. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Clarendon Press.score: 36.0
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  45. Christopher Lepock (2005). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Dialogue 44 (4):811-813.score: 36.0
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  46. Piotr Szalek (2008). Do the Externalism and the Internalism in the Debate Over Epistemic Justification Have Indeed the Same Subject? Acta Philosophica: Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia 17 (1):145-164.score: 36.0
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  47. Duncan Pritchard (2009). Wright Contra McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge and Scepticism. Synthese 171 (3):467 - 479.score: 33.0
    One of the key debates in contemporary epistemology is that between Crispin Wright and John McDowell on the topic of radical scepticism. Whereas both of them endorse a form of epistemic internalism, the very different internalist conceptions of perceptual knowledge that they offer lead them to draw radically different conclusions when it comes to the sceptical problem. The aim of this paper is to maintain that McDowell's view, at least when suitably supplemented with further argumentation (argumentation that he may (...)
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  48. Piotr Szalek (2009). Do Externalism and Internalism in the Debate Over EpistemicJustification Have Indeed the Same Subject? Rivista di Filosofia 2 (2):263-386.score: 33.0
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  49. J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (forthcoming). Varieties of Externalism. Philosophical Issues.score: 30.0
    Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the internalism/externalism distinction within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In light of the above dividing lines, we (...)
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